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| Mikhail Frinovsky NKVD. Frinovsky Mikhail Petrovich (01/14/1898–02/08/1940). Special message from L. Beria to I.V. Stalin with the application of a statement from M.P. Frinovsky |
| The consignment: | CPSU(b) since 1918. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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| Education: | Improvement courses for senior command staff of the Red Army | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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| Affiliation: | USSR USSR | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Type of army: | NKVD | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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An excerpt characterizing Frinovsky, Mikhail Petrovich
- Yes, everything is different now, everything is new. Well done little guy! Well done! Well, let's come to me.He took Prince Vasily by the arm and led him into the office.
Prince Vasily, left alone with the prince, immediately announced to him his desire and hopes.
“What do you think,” said the old prince angrily, “that I’m holding her and can’t part with her?” Imagine! – he said angrily. - At least tomorrow for me! I’ll just tell you that I want to know my son-in-law better. You know my rules: everything is open! I’ll ask you tomorrow: she wants it, then let him live. Let him live, I'll see. - The prince snorted.
“Let him come out, I don’t care,” he shouted in that shrill voice with which he shouted when saying goodbye to his son.
“I’ll tell you straight,” said Prince Vasily in the tone of a cunning man, convinced of the needlessness of being cunning in front of the insight of his interlocutor. – You see right through people. Anatole is not a genius, but an honest, kind fellow, a wonderful son and dear one.
- Well, well, okay, we'll see.
As always happens for single women who have lived for a long time without male society, when Anatole appeared, all three women in the house of Prince Nikolai Andreevich equally felt that their life had not been life before that time. The power to think, feel, and observe instantly increased tenfold in all of them, and as if it had hitherto been happening in darkness, their lives were suddenly illuminated with a new light, full of meaning.
Princess Marya did not think or remember at all about her face and hairstyle. The handsome, open face of the man who might be her husband absorbed all her attention. He seemed to her kind, brave, decisive, courageous and generous. She was convinced of it. Thousands of dreams about a future family life constantly arose in her imagination. She drove them away and tried to hide them.
“But am I too cold with him? - thought Princess Marya. “I try to restrain myself, because deep down I feel too close to him; but he doesn’t know everything that I think about him, and he can imagine that he is unpleasant to me.”
And Princess Marya tried and failed to be polite to the new guest. “La pauvre fille! Elle est diablement laide,” [Poor girl, she’s devilishly ugly,] Anatole thought about her.
M lle Bourienne, also raised to a high degree of excitement by Anatole's arrival, thought in a different way. Of course, a beautiful young girl without a certain position in the world, without relatives and friends and even a homeland, did not think of devoting her life to the services of Prince Nikolai Andreevich, reading books to him and friendship with Princess Marya. M lle Bourienne has long been waiting for that Russian prince who will immediately be able to appreciate her superiority over the Russian, bad, poorly dressed, awkward princesses, fall in love with her and take her away; and this Russian prince finally arrived. M lle Bourienne had a story that she heard from her aunt, completed by herself, which she loved to repeat in her imagination. It was a story about how a seduced girl introduced herself to her poor mother, sa pauvre mere, and reproached her for giving herself to a man without marriage. M lle Bourienne was often moved to tears, telling him, the seducer, this story in her imagination. Now this he, a real Russian prince, has appeared. He will take her away, then ma pauvre mere will appear, and he will marry her. This is how her entire future story took shape in M lle Bourienne’s head, while she was talking to him about Paris. It was not calculations that guided m lle Bourienne (she didn’t even think for a minute about what she should do), but all this had been ready in her for a long time and was now only grouped around the appearance of Anatole, whom she wanted and tried to please as much as possible.
The little princess, like an old regimental horse, hearing the sound of a trumpet, unconsciously and forgetting her position, prepared for the usual gallop of coquetry, without any ulterior thought or struggle, but with naive, frivolous fun.
Despite the fact that in women's society Anatole usually put himself in the position of a man who was tired of women running after him, he felt vain pleasure in seeing his influence on these three women. In addition, he began to experience for the pretty and provocative Bourienne that passionate, brutal feeling that came over him with extreme speed and prompted him to the most rude and daring actions.
After tea, the company moved to the sofa room, and the princess was asked to play the clavichord. Anatole leaned his elbows in front of her next to M lle Bourienne, and his eyes, laughing and rejoicing, looked at Princess Marya. Princess Marya felt his gaze on her with painful and joyful excitement. Her favorite sonata transported her to the most sincerely poetic world, and the gaze she felt on herself made this world even more poetic. Anatole’s gaze, although fixed on her, did not refer to her, but to the movements of m lle Bourienne’s leg, which at that time he was touching with his foot under the piano. M lle Bourienne also looked at the princess, and in her beautiful eyes there was also an expression of frightened joy and hope, new to Princess Marya.
“How she loves me! - thought Princess Marya. – How happy I am now and how happy I can be with such a friend and such a husband! Is it really a husband? she thought, not daring to look at his face, feeling the same gaze directed at herself.
In the evening, when they began to leave after dinner, Anatole kissed the princess’s hand. She herself did not know how she got the courage, but she looked directly at the beautiful face approaching her myopic eyes. After the princess, he approached M lle Bourienne’s hand (it was indecent, but he did everything so confidently and simply), and M lle Bourienne flushed and looked at the princess in fear.
“Quelle delicatesse” [What delicacy,] thought the princess. – Does Ame (that was the name of m lle Bourienne) really think that I can be jealous of her and not appreciate her pure tenderness and devotion to me? “She went up to m lle Bourienne and kissed her deeply. Anatole approached the little princess's hand.
- Non, non, non! Quand votre pere m"ecrira, que vous vous conduisez bien, je vous donnerai ma main a baiser. Pas avant. [No, no, no! When your father writes to me that you are behaving well, then I will let you kiss your hand. Not before.] – And, raising her finger and smiling, she left the room.
Everyone left, and, except for Anatole, who fell asleep as soon as he lay down on the bed, no one slept for a long time that night.
“Is he really my husband, this strange, handsome, kind man; the main thing is to be kind,” thought Princess Marya, and fear, which almost never came to her, came over her. She was afraid to look back; it seemed to her that someone was standing here behind the screens, in a dark corner. And this someone was he - the devil, and he - this man with a white forehead, black eyebrows and a ruddy mouth.
She called the maid and asked her to lie down in her room.
M lle Bourienne walked around the winter garden for a long time that evening, waiting in vain for someone and then smiling at someone, then being moved to tears by the imaginary words of pauvre mere, reproaching her for her fall.
The little princess grumbled at the maid because the bed was not good. She was not allowed to lie on her side or on her chest. Everything was difficult and awkward. Her stomach was bothering her. He bothered her more than ever, just now, because Anatole’s presence transported her more vividly to another time, when this was not the case and everything was easy and fun for her. She was sitting in a blouse and cap on an armchair. Katya, sleepy and with a tangled braid, interrupted and turned over the heavy feather bed for the third time, saying something.
“I told you that everything is lumps and pits,” the little princess repeated, “I would be glad to fall asleep myself, so it’s not my fault,” and her voice trembled, like that of a child about to cry.
The old prince also did not sleep. Through his sleep, Tikhon heard him walking angrily and snorting through his nose. It seemed to the old prince that he was insulted on behalf of his daughter. The insult is the most painful, because it did not apply to him, but to someone else, to his daughter, whom he loves more than himself. He told himself that he would change his mind about this whole matter and find what was fair and should be done, but instead he only irritated himself more.
“The first person he meets appears - and father and everything are forgotten, and runs upstairs, combs his hair and wags his tail, and doesn’t look like himself! Glad to leave my father! And she knew that I would notice. Fr... fr... fr... And don’t I see that this fool only looks at Burienka (we need to drive her away)! And how there is no pride enough to understand this! At least not for myself, if there is no pride, then for me, at least. We need to show her that this idiot doesn’t even think about her, but only looks at Bourienne. She has no pride, but I will show her this”...
Having told his daughter that she was mistaken, that Anatole intended to court Bourienne, the old prince knew that he would irritate Princess Marya’s pride, and his case (the desire not to be separated from his daughter) would be won, and therefore he calmed down on this. He called Tikhon and began to undress.
“And the devil brought them! - he thought while Tikhon covered his dry, senile body, overgrown with gray hair on his chest, with his nightgown. – I didn’t call them. They came to upset my life. And there’s a little of it left.”
- To hell! - he said while his head was still covered with his shirt.
Tikhon knew the prince’s habit of sometimes expressing his thoughts out loud, and therefore, with an unchanged face, he met the questioningly angry look of the face that appeared from under his shirt.
- Have you gone to bed? - asked the prince.
Tikhon, like all good lackeys, knew by instinct the direction of the master’s thoughts. He guessed that they were asking about Prince Vasily and his son.
“We deigned to lie down and put out the fire, your Excellency.”
“No reason, no reason...” the prince said quickly and, putting his feet into his shoes and his hands into his robe, went to the sofa on which he was sleeping.
Despite the fact that nothing was said between Anatole and m lle Bourienne, they completely understood each other regarding the first part of the novel, before the appearance of pauvre mere, they realized that they had a lot to say to each other secretly, and therefore in the morning they looked for an opportunity see you alone. While the princess went to her father at the usual hour, m lle Bourienne met with Anatole in the winter garden.
Princess Marya approached the office door that day with special trepidation. It seemed to her that not only did everyone know that her fate would be decided today, but that they also knew what she thought about it. She read this expression in Tikhon’s face and in the face of Prince Vasily’s valet, who met the hot water in the corridor and bowed deeply to her.
The old prince that morning was extremely affectionate and diligent in his treatment of his daughter. Princess Marya knew this expression of diligence well. This was the expression that happened on his face in those moments when his dry hands clenched into a fist out of frustration because Princess Marya did not understand the arithmetic problem, and he, getting up, walked away from her and repeated the same words several times in a quiet voice. the same words.
He immediately got down to business and started the conversation by saying “you.”
“They made me a proposition about you,” he said, smiling unnaturally. “I think you guessed,” he continued, “that Prince Vasily came here and brought with him his pupil (for some reason Prince Nikolai Andreich called Anatoly his pupil) not for my beautiful eyes.” Yesterday they made a proposition about you. And since you know my rules, I treated you.
– How should I understand you, mon pere? - said the princess, turning pale and blushing.
- How to understand! – the father shouted angrily. “Prince Vasily finds you to his liking for his daughter-in-law and makes a proposal to you for his pupil. Here's how to understand it. How to understand?!... And I’m asking you.
“I don’t know how you are, mon pere,” the princess said in a whisper.
- I? I? what am I doing? Leave me aside. I'm not the one getting married. What do you? This is what it would be good to know.
FRINOVSKY Mikhail Petrovich
(January 26 (February 7), 1898, Narovchat, Penza province, Russian Empire - February 4, 1940, Moscow) - figure in the Soviet state security agencies, army commander of the 1st rank (1938). Member of the USSR Central Executive Committee of the 7th convocation, deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of the 1st convocation. One of the direct organizers of the “Great Terror”.
Mikhail Frinovsky was born at the beginning of 1898 in the city (now village) of Narovchat, Penza province.
Before the First World War he studied at the theological school in Krasnoslobodsk.
In January 1916 he entered the cavalry as a volunteer and served with the rank of non-commissioned officer. In January-August 1916 he deserted. He was associated with anarchists, participated in the murder of Major General M.A. Bem.
Since March 1917, Frinovsky has been a bookkeeper at a military hospital. Participant in the July uprising of 1917. In September of the same year, he joined the Red Guard in Khamovniki (Moscow), commanded a group of Red Guards, participated in the storming of the Kremlin, and was seriously wounded. Until February 1918, he was undergoing treatment at the Lefortovo Hospital.
In March-July 1918 he worked as an assistant superintendent of the Khodynka hospital. He joined the RCP(b), worked in the party cell and the local committee of the Khodynka hospital. In July 1918, he enlisted in the Red Army, served as a squadron commander, and head of the Special Department of the 1st Cavalry Army.
In 1919, after being seriously wounded, he was transferred to trade union work, and then to the Cheka. In the second half of 1919, he served as assistant to the head of the active part of the Special Department of the Moscow Cheka. Participated in the most important operations of the Cheka - the defeat of the anarchists, the liquidation of anarchist and rebel groups in Ukraine, etc.
From December 1919 to April 1920 he served in the Special Department of the Southern Front. In 1920, he was the head of the active part of the Special Department of the Southwestern Front, deputy head of the Special Department of the 1st Cavalry Army. In 1921-1922 - deputy head of the Special Department, deputy head of the operational detachment of the All-Ukrainian Cheka.
In 1922-1923, Frinovsky was the head of the general administrative part and secretary of the Kyiv department of the GPU (from June 23, 1923 - head of the OGPU plenipotentiary mission in the South-East).
In November 1923, he was transferred to the North Caucasus to the post of head of the Special Department of the North Caucasus Military District. Since March 1924, Frinovsky has been the first deputy plenipotentiary representative of the OGPU for the North Caucasus. In 1925 - head of the border guard of the Black Sea coast of the North Caucasus region, from January 1926 - first deputy plenipotentiary and head of the GPU troops.
On July 8, 1927, he was transferred to Moscow to the position of assistant to the head of the Special Department of the Moscow Military District. In 1927, he completed courses for senior command personnel at the Frunze Military Academy of the Red Army. From November 28, 1928 to September 1, 1930, he was the commander-military commissar of a separate special-purpose division named after F. E. Dzerzhinsky at the board of the OGPU of the USSR.
On September 1, 1930, Frinovsky was appointed to the post of chairman of the GPU of the Azerbaijan SSR. He was one of the organizers of dispossession in Azerbaijan. On April 8, 1933, he was appointed head of the Main Directorate of Border Guards and Troops of the OGPU of the USSR, and led the OGPU operation to suppress the uprising in Xinjiang
With the formation of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR on July 10, 1934, the Main Directorate of Border Guards and OGPU Troops was renamed the Main Directorate of Border and Internal Security (from mid-1937 - the Main Directorate of Border and Internal Troops) of the NKVD of the USSR. On July 11, M.P. Frinovsky was appointed its chief.
See also: Great Terror
With the fall of G. G. Yagoda and the appointment of N. I. Ezhov as People's Commissar of Internal Affairs on September 26, 1936, Frinovsky was appointed Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR on October 16, 1936. The 1st Deputy People's Commissar was then Ya. S. Agranov, another deputy was M. D. Berman from September 29, 1936, and on November 3, 1936 L. N. Belsky was appointed another deputy. From April 15, 1937, Frinovsky was the first deputy people's commissar of internal affairs of the USSR and headed the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR. With the abolition of the GUGB on March 28, 1938, he headed the State Security Directorate (1st Directorate) of the NKVD of the USSR. Lavrentiy Beria was appointed another first deputy people's commissar on August 22, 1938, who, with Frinovsky's departure from the NKVD on September 8, 1938, also replaced him as head of the 1st Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR - from September 29, 1938 at the head of the newly formed GUGB .
On December 12, 1937, he was elected as a deputy of the Union Council of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of the 1st convocation from the Krasnodar Territory. One of Yezhov's closest collaborators and the main organizers of the Great Terror. One of the main organizers of repressions in the Red Army, he took a direct part in organizing the Moscow trials. He was one of the organizers of mass political repressions in Mongolia.
On September 8, 1938, he was appointed People's Commissar of the USSR Navy. On September 14, 1938, he was awarded the rank of army commander of the 1st rank (bypassing the rank of army commander of the 2nd rank).
On April 6, 1939, he was removed from all posts and arrested on charges of “organizing a Trotskyist-fascist conspiracy in the NKVD” (which he admitted to). He was kept in the Sukhanovskaya special prison. On February 4, 1940, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR sentenced him to death. The body was cremated in the Donskoy Monastery.
Not rehabilitated.
Family
Wife - Frinovskaya Nina Stepanovna (1903, Ryazan - February 3, 1940) - Russian, non-party, higher education, graduate student at the Institute of History of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Arrested on April 12, 1939. On February 2, 1940, on trumped-up charges of “concealing the criminal counter-revolutionary activities of enemies of the people” (that is, her own husband and son), the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR sentenced her to death. Shot on February 3, 1940. Rehabilitated on January 12, 1956.
Son - Oleg Mikhailovich Frinovsky (1922, Kharkov - January 21, 1940, Moscow) - member of the Komsomol, incomplete secondary education, 10th grade student of the 2nd Moscow Special Artillery School. Arrested on April 12, 1939. On January 21, 1940, on trumped-up charges of participation in a “counter-revolutionary youth group”, he was sentenced to death by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR. Shot on the same day. Rehabilitated on January 12, 1956.
In Moscow, Frinovsky occupied a 9-room apartment (Kropotkinskaya street, building 31, apt. 77), into which, after his arrest, the family of a high-ranking NKVD officer, Veniamin Gulst, moved in.
Ranks
- Komkor (11/29/1935)
- Commander 1st rank (09/14/1938)
Awards
- Order of Lenin (02/14/1936)
- 3 Orders of the Red Banner (1924, 12/20/1932; 02/03/1935)
- Order of the Red Star (07/22/1937)
- Order of the Red Banner of Labor of the Azerbaijan SSR (03/04/1931)
- Order of the Red Banner of Labor of the TSFSR (03/07/1932)
- Medal “XX Years of the Red Army” (02/22/1938)
- Badge “Honorary Worker of the Cheka-OGPU (V)” (1925)
- Badge “Honorary Worker of the Cheka-OGPU (XV)” (05/26/1933)
- Order of the Red Banner (MPR) (10/25/1937)
By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of January 24, 1941, he was deprived of state awards and military rank.
FRINOVSKY Mikhail Petrovich- Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs. 
Report card for party card of 1936 model No. 1872034, owned by M. P. Frinovsky ADDITIONAL MATERIALS:
Special message from L.P. Beria to I.V. Stalin with attached statement from M.P. Frinovsky
We don’t know how it was written, but it is there. Author's note.
SPECIAL MESSAGE L.P. BERII I.V. STALIN WITH APPLICATION OF M.P. FRINOVSKY
Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to comrade I.V. STALIN
At the same time, we are sending a statement from the arrested Frinovsky dated March 11, 1939. We continue the interrogation of Frinovsky.
Appendix: according to the text.
People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR BERIA
TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE UNION
SOVIET SOCIAL REPUBLIC TO COMMISSIONER
STATE SECURITY 1st RANK:
BERIA L.P.
From the arrested FRINOVSKY M.P.
Statement
The investigation charged me with anti-Soviet conspiratorial work. For a long time I struggled with the idea of the need to confess to my criminal activities during the period when I was free, but the pitiful state of a coward prevailed. Having the opportunity to honestly tell you and the leaders of the party about everything, of which I have been an unworthy member in recent years, deceiving the party, I did not do this. Only after the arrest, after the presentation of charges and a conversation with you personally, did I take the path of repentance and promise to tell the investigation the whole truth to the end, both about my criminal enemy work and about the persons who are accomplices and leaders of this criminal enemy work.
I became a criminal because of blind trust in the authorities of my leaders YAGODA, EVDOKIMOV and YEZHOV, and having become a criminal, I, together with them, committed a vile counter-revolutionary deed against the party.
In 1928, shortly after my appointment as commander and military commissar of the Special Purpose Division at the OGPU Collegium, at the regional party conference I was elected to the plenum, and by the plenum to the bureau of the party organization of the Sokolniki district.
Even at the conference, I established contact with a former OGPU employee (in 1937 he committed suicide in connection with the arrest of Yagoda) - Pogrebinsky, who informed me about the existence of group struggle among members of the district committee. Subsequently, I joined the majority in the bureau, which turned out to be right, and worked together with this group of bureau members until it was exposed in the district party organization.
At the next party conference in 1929, this majority of the bureau, including me and other OGPU workers: MIRONOV, LIZERSON, POGREBINSKY, were completely exposed. MIRONOV and I gave repentant speeches at the conference, but did not completely break with the right-wing group in the region.
After the conference, a meeting of the leadership was held at the OGPU in connection with the instructions of the Central Committee, which condemned the involvement of the OGPU party organization in group struggle in the Sokolnichesky district committee.
In the same 1929, EVDOKIMOV came to Moscow in connection with his planned transfer as head of the Special Educational Institution of the Optical Technical School. I was in his room at the Select Hotel. At first, EVDOKIMOV asked me how things were going in Moscow, then he said that he was being transferred to Moscow and that the Central Committee was inviting him to organize the operational work of the OGPU. In the same conversation, I shared with EVDOKIMOV and said that I ended up on the right in practice.
At this time, there were already complications in the village due to the collectivization of agriculture. I asked EVDOKIMOV - how are things going in the North Caucasus? He says: “Things are complicated, collective farms in the Cossack and national areas are taking root slowly, there is a lot of resistance,” and he put it this way: “The devil knows, will anything come of this matter?”
While EVDOKIMOV was in Moscow, and then after he moved to Moscow, I had several meetings with him. During these meetings, EVDOKIMOV said that the Central Committee was allowing a lot of outrages in the countryside and “the devil knows where all this will lead.”
In 1930, after a decisive offensive by the party and government against the kulaks, as a result of excesses committed locally, uprisings began, and these uprisings took particularly complex forms in the national regions of the North Caucasus, in particular in Dagestan. I was summoned to the OGPU Collegium and sent to Dagestan. I was not able to talk to EVDOKIMOV before leaving.
My next meeting with EVDOKIMOV took place during my visit to Transcaucasia in 1930, when he toured areas in which counter-insurgency operations were carried out.
After official conversations, I had an intimate conversation with EVDOKIMOV, during which he told me that, as the Central Committee thinks, you cannot create collective farms by armed means. Here, he says, in Dagestan the population says that the collective farms are kaput, and this is not only in the national regions, but that the situation is very difficult in central Russia. It may happen, said EVDOKIMOV, that we will ruin the kulaks and physically destroy them, but there may be many complications in our country and the party will not create an economy in the countryside.
That was the end of the conversation with him. After staying for several days, EVDOKIMOV left. I had a subsequent meeting with EVDOKIMOV in 1930 before leaving for work in Azerbaijan. We met in EVDOKIMOV's office. I asked him for instructions. Along with operational and official instructions, he told me that he, EVDOKIMOV, did not believe in the success of the ongoing operation to eliminate the kulaks as a class, although he was entrusted with carrying out this operation across the USSR. He also does not believe in the expediency of the operation carried out by decision of the Central Committee, believing that this could lead to the impoverishment of the village and the degradation of agriculture. During this time, I did not conduct any anti-Soviet work in Azerbaijan.
In 1933, shortly after I was appointed head of the GUPVO OGPU and arrived in Moscow, I met with EVDOKIMOV at his apartment. He came from Rostov.
EVDOKIMOV started a conversation with me that the situation in the country, despite the seemingly slight improvement in the situation in the countryside with manufactured goods and food in the cities, is still extremely difficult. And then EVDOKIMOV began a frank conversation with me. He asked: “How are you, have the right-wing sentiments that you had gotten over or not?” I say: “The devil knows whether they’ve outlived it or not, I don’t know, so what?” “You see, sooner or later the right will be able to prove to the Central Committee that the line of the Central Committee is wrong and the line of the right is correct.” I tried to object, saying that the position of the collective farms was becoming strong. He replied: “Wait, collective farms have begun to exist, but this is just the beginning, and what will happen next is unknown. The right-wing cadres are large; the right-wingers are doing a lot of underground work both to recruit personnel and to create discontent against the government and the Central Committee.”
Then EVDOKIMOV asked: “Did you accept the GUPVO or not?” After my affirmative answer, he said: “You should take a proper interest in the issues of the troops. The troops will play a big role in the event of any complications within the country, and you must take the troops into your own hands.”
Knowing that my deputies at the Main Directorate for Military Defense are KRUCHINKIN, LEPIN and ROSHAL, EVDOKIMOV, touching them, said: “KRUCHINKIN, apparently, is YAGODINSKY’s man, but that’s nothing. YAGODA himself is engaged in the troops, but that’s not scary either.” Immediately EVDOKIMOV informed me that YAGODA himself is also right, recommended: “Still, in relations with YAGODA, do not go too far and do not trust him and, in particular, those around him completely, since these people are capable of crimes, these crimes will fail and they can give you away, and take KRUCHINKIN into your hands.” And then EVDOKIMOV said that KRUCHINKIN, while on a business trip in Central Asia, while EVDOKIMOV was there, during operations, because of his cowardice, he failed the operation. I raised the question with YAGODA, Evdokimov said, about putting KRUCHINKIN on trial, but they were silent about something. You need to carefully pull him towards you, but also begin to recruit your own cadres in the OGPU troops.
I asked what specifically needs to be done regarding the troops? First, said EVDOKIMOV, get your absolutely reliable people and get them under your control so that in case of complications they will carry out your will.
In the same 1933, YAGODA, after my clash with him over an official issue, began to bring me closer to him again with the help of BULANOV. BULANOV often invited me to his dacha under the guise of fishing and playing billiards. On one of these trips to BULANOV, on a day off at the dacha, YAGODA came, who, after dinner and drinks, had a conversation with me in a separate room. YAGODA began the conversation by saying that I was wrong to set myself up against him, and that, apparently, Evdokimov’s hand was at work here, and then he told me: “Keep in mind: that you remain right, I know that you you are carrying out the work, I also know, and wouldn’t it be better for you to come to terms with the situation that exists in our central apparatus, lower your ambition and listen to me.” And immediately, continuing the conversation, YAGODA asked me: “How are things going at the GUPVO, you have a lot of deputies there, wouldn’t it be better to get rid of some of them. Who do you think is better to leave: KRUCHINKIN or LEPIN?”
Without waiting for my answer, YAGODA said that KRUCHINKIN was a reliable person. I realized that KRUCHINKIN is connected with him in criminal activities. Regarding LEPIN, YAGODA said that he hesitated and was guided by AKULOV and BALITSKY when they worked in the OGPU. “Maybe we should offer him to BALITSKY,” he said, “let him go to him. ROSHALY needs to be broken off, and for the combat training department you should take KRAFTA or RYMSHAN.” After this, YAGODA began to invite me to go to his dacha, but because it was late, I refused. Saying goodbye, YAGODA said: “Well, global and full contact.”
In pursuance of the assignments that I received from EVDOKIMOV, and after a conversation with YAGODA, I began to bring KRUCHINKIN closer to me in every possible way and soon had an open conversation with him. I asked KRUCHINKIN what work he was doing on YAGODA’s assignments in the troops. At first KRUCHINKIN looked puzzled, and then began to say that he does not receive any special assignments, mainly that he works on selecting people and training them in the spirit of endless devotion to Yagoda personally. KRUCHINKIN finally told me about the work he did and a number of people who were recruited by him and carried out work within the OGPU troops upon his return from Xinjiang in 1934.
Expanding the full picture of his anti-Soviet work, KRUCHINKIN named me the following people: KRAFTA, RYMSHAN, who at that time was already seconded from the GUPVO to the Red Army, ROTHERMEL, LEPSIS, ZARIN, BARKOV, KONDRATIEV, the commander of a special purpose division at that time, and stipulated, that YAGODA and BULANOV have a direct connection with KONDRATIEV and that KONDRATIEV *has his own people in the division*.
LEPIN at that time was already working in Ukraine as the head of the UPVO, and, despite the fact that BALITSKY agreed to take him on, his relationship with BALITSKY was not entirely normal, and YAGODA could not forgive him for his orientation at one time towards AKULOV and BALITSKY.
On his next visit to Moscow in 1934, LEPIN complained to me. I called KRUCHINKIN, and together with him we told LEPIN that I became aware of LEPIN’s participation in enemy work under the leadership of KRUCHINKIN. LEPIN was surprised at first, and then, having learned that I was also taking part in this work and had already begun to lead it in the border guard, we opened up to each other. After this, LEPIN asked to resolve the issue of his relationship with YAGODA and BALITSKY. We managed to do this by having a direct conversation with YAGODA that LEPIN is our man and we cannot put him in such a position, especially in Ukraine, where in our interests he should contact the Ukrainian people and find out what is happening in Ukraine. I myself spoke with BALITSKY so that he would not offend LEPIN.
From LEPIN I learned that he has the impression that right-wing work is also underway in Ukraine within the organs and troops of the OGPU. KRUCHINKIN and I gave the task to LEPIN so that he would contact the Ukrainians, without giving them his connections in Moscow and without saying anything about YAGODA, me and KRUCHINKIN, to get into BALITSKY’s circle and, if they recruit him, to go for it.
Around the first months of 1935, LEPIN, on his next visit to Moscow, told me that he had contacted BALITSKY and that BALITSKY connected him with a number of people from the border guard, in particular with the head of the political department of the UPVO - SAROTSKY, the head of the border detachment in Odessa - KULESHOM** and deputy. Head of the Ukrainian Air Defense Department - SEMENOV**.
During the same time - 1934 - I had several meetings with EVDOKIMOV when he arrived in Moscow. At these meetings, he gradually revealed to me his practical work and talked about the work of the center of the right and the Union. In particular, he said that he had a number of people inside the GPU apparatus, and named RUDY, DAGIN, RAEV, KURSKY, DEMENTYEV, GORBACH and others. He said that he had connections in national regions: in Dagestan - through MAMEDBEKOV, in Chechnya - GORSHEEV or GORSHENI-NA, and then said that he had difficulty only with KALMYKOV, who has his own line, and EVDOKIMOV could not to break it off, but characterized KALMYKOV as a completely “ours” person - right-wing, but apparently having an independent line.
I asked him, what is going on in the Union in general? EVDOKIMOV said that a lot of work was being done; a number of people who held important positions in a number of other regions of the USSR had gone over to the right. And here he said: “You see how we now have to fight the Central Committee: once we fought against the insurrection, but now we ourselves have to look for threads, connections with the insurrection, and in order to organize it, we have to go to the bottom. This is a very difficult and dangerous job, but without the lower ranks - secretaries of district committees, chairmen of regional executive committees or people who are connected with the village - we will not be able to lead the insurrection, and this is one of the main tasks that faces us.”
EVDOKIMOV asked what I was doing about the troops. I told him completely about everything, in particular about the meeting with YAGODA, about the conversation with him. EVDOKIMOV again gave me the following instructions: not to break this connection with YAGODA, but not to go all the way and, most importantly, not to say anything to YAGODA about my connection with him - EVDOKIMOV. At one of the meetings, EVDOKIMOV suggested that I contact the former. deputy People's Commissar indoctrinated PROKOFIEV and probe his mood. When I asked what the goal was, he replied, “I’ll tell you later.”
In pursuance of EVDOKIMOV’s instructions, I became close friends with PROKOFIEV. Afterwards I found out that EVDOKIMOV was looking for connections with PROKOFIEV in order to contact him personally, which he essentially accomplished through me. Their first meeting was at my dacha, and after that, during his visits to Moscow, he began to visit PROKOFIEV. After some time, EVDOKIMOV told me that by getting closer to PROKOFIEV, he pursued the goal of checking whether KALMYKOV was connected with the OGPU.
In 1934, while expanding our work at the GUPVO, KRUCHINKIN and I tried to get in closer contact with the former. commander of the special purpose division of the OGPU - KONDRATIEV, since KOndratiev directly received assignments from YAGODA and BULANOV. We wanted to know exactly what tasks he receives in the division. However, KRUCHINKIN’s conversation with KONDRATIEV did not produce any results, and only after an inspection of the division, which was carried out during YAGODA’s vacation and the discovery of a number of facts about the disgraceful state of the division’s units, we managed to force KONDRATIEV to talk about the conspiratorial work he was carrying out in the division.
KONDRATIEV said that most of the regiment commanders of the division, as well as many of the political apparatus workers, were recruited by him. KOndratiev also said that GOLKHOV, the head of the division’s political department (who arrived with KOndratiev from the Far East) was involved in the conspiracy.
Further, KONDRATYEV said that YAGODA gave him the task (and he is working on this) so that the command staff, recruited and brought to work, worked out a plan for the division’s possible actions in the conditions of Moscow. This plan basically consisted of cordoning off and isolating the Kremlin from the rest of the city. In addition, he said that in case of complications there is a **troop group from the division**, which should immediately be at the disposal of YAGODA. And finally, he said that the commanders appointed to the squad for duty inside the OGPU, on armored cars, are allocated mainly from among the participants in the conspiracy. Having told this, KONDRATIEV, immediately becoming timid, began to say that he would like YAGODA not to know about his conversations with us until he settles this issue with him. At the same time, KONDRATIEV said that he knew from BULANOV that KRUCHINKIN and I were working. In 1935, EVDOKIMOV began to ask me: was YAGODA’s hand in the murder of KIROV and did I have information about this? Moreover, he pointed out that if YAGODA is a participant in this case, it is a bad act, not from the point of view of regret about the loss of KIROV, but from the point of view of complicating the situation and the repressions that began shortly after the murder of KIROV.
During this conversation, Yakov LIFSHITZ, formerly, came to his apartment. deputy People's Commissar, who, after greeting me, said: “We live in the same city and don’t meet.” EVDOKIMOV immediately said - it would be necessary to meet, it would be useful for both. It was a day off, and LIFSHITS invited us to his dacha for the day off.
After LIFSHITS left EVDOKIMOV, I asked him whether LIFSHITS honestly repented? EVDOKIMOV replied: “Honestly, people like Yashka do not repent” - and added that LIFSHITS was carrying out the corresponding work.
On the second day, EVDOKIMOV and I were at LIFSHITS’s dacha. We did not have conspiratorial conversations, but EVDOKIMOV constantly emphasized the need for close communication with LIFSHITS, with whom we agreed on further meetings.
At the end of these meetings, during a horseback ride, LIFSHITS told me: “I heard about you from EVDOKIMOV, frankly speaking, I didn’t expect that you were also with us, well done.” I started talking to LIFSHITS, how are you? He replied: “EVDOKIMOV told you that I was working.” I also asked him, “Do you do a lot of work?” He said that he is doing a lot of work, has connections with the center through PYATAKOV, has a large number of people and does not break ties with the Ukrainians.
At the next meeting, in connection with the arrests of a number of Trotskyists that had begun, LIFSHITS gave me the task, although I worked in the GUPVO and had no direct relation to operational work, to listen to what testimony the arrested Trotskyists were giving and inform him.
In 1935, in the fall, there was a march of the wives of Ukrainian border guards to Moscow. YAGODA allowed me to organize their reception at my dacha, and in the morning of the same day I rode horseback with LIFSHITS and told him about this reception. LIFSHITS asked, who will you have? I say that I invite the heads of departments. Then he said - invite MOLCHANOV too, and can I be at this reception? I said that nothing special would happen, come as if by chance. LIFSHITZ actually came to my dacha in the evening. MOLCHANOV also arrived. After dinner, LIFSHITS and MOLCHANOV sat next to each other, drank, and after that they went for a walk in the garden. LIFSHITS left when the rest of those present had not yet left, and only ten days later I asked LIFSHITS what you talked about with MOLCHANOV, did you tell him anything about me? He replied that he had spoken to him about the Trotskyists. “You see, MOLCHANOV is also not a completely pure person, but he was playing tricks on me. I didn’t have a direct conversation with him, but I probed him about what kind of testimony the Trotskyists were giving.”
At one of the meetings in 1935, EVDOKIMOV at his apartment told me about a number of people whom he had recruited to work in Pyatigorsk. He named PIVOVAROV, a large group of security officers: ***BOYAR, DYATKIN and SHATSKY***. Here he told me about his connections with KHATAEVICH, and praised him in every possible way as an expert on the village; with EIKHE, about part of the Leningrad group - CHUDOV, ZHUKOV, and he immediately warned me - not to particularly meet with them, because the Leningraders drink and in general in the Central Committee are reputed as people who are worn out, decomposed due to drunkenness. On the same visit, EVDOKIMOV said: is it possible to somehow, through YAGODA, get DAGIN into the operational department. “Although PAUKER is a Yagoda man, he is a fool, and if you entrust him with something serious, he will definitely fail,” said EVDOKIMOV. At the same time, he warned that if you try to get DAGIN to the first department, then you need to do it very carefully, taking into account the situation. EVDOKIMOV spoke about the fact that in a number of regions of the North Caucasus he managed to lead rebel groups with his own people, and that the purge of the party carried out before this helped in terms of recruiting people.
During the trial of ZINOVIEV, KAMENEV and others, when it was published in the press about BUKHARIN, before the end of the trial, EVDOKIMOV was in Moscow. He was very worried and, in a conversation with me, said: “Devil knows how we will be able to get out of this whole thing. I just don’t understand YAGODA, what he’s doing there, why he’s expanding the circle of people for repression, or whether these guys have weak veins and are giving it away. But it would be possible to arrange the course of the investigation in such a way as to protect oneself in every possible way.”
Immediately he questioned me regarding LIFSHITS: is LIFSHITS found anywhere in the KGB materials? LIFSHITS was not in Moscow at that moment; he was on vacation. I told EVDOKIMOV that I was present at one of the operational meetings where MOLCHANOV reported evidence against LIFSHITS, and that this evidence came from Ukraine. EVDOKIMOV said: “LIFSHITS will soon return from vacation, don’t openly meet with him.” At that time, I was already getting ready to go on a business trip to the Far East, and once on one of the trips on horseback, with Lifshitz, before his vacation, we talked about a possible joint trip to the Far East.
I tell EVDOKIMOV that we were going to go to the Far East together with LIFSHITS. He said that if you can, it’s better to go alone in this environment. EVDOKIMOV was interested in which of the security officers was conducting the investigation and intelligence work on the Trotskyists and the right. He himself was very depressed.
Before I left for the Far East, LIFSHITS returned from vacation, but I stopped meeting with him, given the evidence against him and my possible compromise.
I had this conversation with DERIBAS, and DERIBAS was interested mainly in the names of people who had already been repressed and the people who were included in the materials. I told him about LIFSHITS and PYATAKOV, who are on the verge of being exposed. On the way from the Far East to Moscow, after I was appointed deputy people's commissar, on one of the railways. stations, an agent came into my carriage and said that at the next station the deputy wanted to talk to me. People's Commissar of Ways LIFSHITS. And indeed, I met LIFSHITS at the next station. I deliberately left the carriage so as not to talk to him in the carriage, since a number of employees were traveling with me. LIFSHITS came up to me together with RUTENBURG, the head of the road. LIFSHITS asked permission to travel through the same station with me. He said that he had been removed from the post of Deputy People's Commissar, and that in Moscow he had confrontations with those arrested. He scolded in every possible way the people who betrayed him, he was nervous and asked me, as already the deputy people's commissar, to somehow do something so that he could get out of this case. I, in turn, asked him: “If you get caught, since things have gone so far, then hold on as you should.”
At the next station he left. Having met with LIFSHITS, I got a little scared, as if there were no troubles on this basis, and adopted a plan that upon arrival in Moscow I would tell Yezhov about this, and I would tell in such a context that LIFSHITS swore and swore that he not guilty, he is terribly nervous and through practical work he is trying to prove his devotion to the Central Committee. Upon returning to Moscow, I did just that.
Soon after assuming the post of Deputy People's Commissar, EZHOV began to bring me closer to him, to single me out from the other deputies, to have more frank conversations with me in assessing other deputies, and to express some dissatisfaction with AGRANOV. Before the distribution of responsibilities between the deputies, in addition to the fact that I continued to be the head of the GUPVO, Yezhov invited me to be interested in operational issues, and around 1937, after the arrest of Yagoda, he began to talk with me regarding my possible appointment as first deputy people's commissar. During one of these conversations, Yezhov told me: “I have predetermined this issue, but I want to talk to you, just let’s be honest, you have some sins.”
At first I was completely taken aback, thinking that the matter was lost. Seeing my confusion, Yezhov began to say: “Don’t be afraid, tell me honestly.” Then I told him about the story of the falconer’s business, about my connection with YAGODA, connection with EVDOKIMOV and through him with LIFSHITS. Then Yezhov said: “You have so many sins, even if you go to prison now, well, it’s okay, you’ll work, you’ll be one hundred percent my man.” I looked at him in confusion and tried to refuse the appointment to the position of first deputy. People's Commissar, but he said: “Sit down, work, we will work together and we will answer together.”
Before the arrest of BUKHARIN and RYKOV, speaking frankly with me, EZHOV began to talk about plans for security work in connection with the current situation and the upcoming arrests of BUKHARIN and RYKOV. Yezhov said that this would be a big loss for the right-wingers, after this, beyond our desire, on the instructions of the Central Committee, large measures could unfold against the right-wing cadres, and that in connection with this, his and my main task is to conduct the investigation in such a way that, as far as possible, save right frames. He immediately unfolded the plan for this matter. Basically, this plan was as follows: “We need to place our people, mainly in the SPO apparatus, select investigators who would either be completely connected with us, or who would have had any sins and they would know that these there are sins behind them, and on the basis of these sins you can completely control them. Get involved in the investigation yourself and lead it.” “And this is,” said Yezhov, “not to write down everything that the arrested person says, but for the investigators to bring all the sketches, drafts to the head of the department, and in relation to those arrested who in the past occupied a high position and occupy a leading position in the right-wing organization , protocols should be drawn up with his approval.” If the arrested person named the members of the organization, then they had to be written down in a separate list and reported to him each time. It would be nice, Yezhov said, to take into the apparatus people who were already associated with the organization. “For example, EVDOKIMOV told you about people, and I know someone. It will be necessary to first pull them into the central apparatus. In general, we need to take a closer look at capable people, from a business point of view, from among those already working in the central apparatus, somehow bring them closer to us and then recruit them, because without these people we cannot build our work, we need to somehow show the work to the Central Committee.” .
In order to implement this proposal from Yezhov, we took a firm course towards retaining Yagodin cadres in leadership positions in the NKVD. It should be noted that we succeeded with difficulty, since various local authorities received materials from various local authorities about their involvement in the conspiracy and anti-Soviet work in general.
To preserve these cadres and their formal rehabilitation, those arrested who gave such testimony were summoned to Moscow, where, through interrogation, they were led to renounce their testimony (the ZIRNIS case, the GLEBOV case and others).
Along with this, in return for the arrested Yagoda residents (who could not be retained), at Yezhov’s direction, North Caucasian security officer cadres were intensively recruited and appointed to leadership positions in the central apparatus and local bodies of the NKVD.
A significant number of these security officers, who made up EVDOKIMOV’s cadre, were also hired to work in the NKVD security department. As I indicated above, these cadres were used by DAGIN to prepare for them, at the direction of YEZHOV, to carry out terrorist acts against the leaders of the party and government at the necessary moment.
After the arrest of PAUKER, Yezhov raised the question of selecting the head of the first department and himself proposed KURSKY, who was appointed to the position of head of the 1st department. Soon after the appointment of KURSKY, EVDOKIMOV was in Moscow. EVDOKIMOV asked me what was happening.
I told him about establishing contact with Yezhov. EVDOKIMOV then immediately moved on to the first department, saying that KURSKY was unsuccessfully appointed to the first department, although this man is ours, he said, but he is neurasthenic and a coward; I told you that DAGIN should have been appointed.
I told him about KURSKY’s moods already in the process of work, that he wanted in every possible way to be freed from the post of head of the 1st department. EVDOKIMOV proposed to take advantage of these sentiments and, at any cost, appoint KURSKY DAGIN to his place. KURSKY was released, and DAGIN was appointed.
At the same meeting with EVDOKIMOV, he said: “With you, the Yagodin line will also continue; we will destroy ourselves. How long will this continue? I told him about the conversation I had with Yezhov and pointed out that we are now taking measures to preserve personnel as much as possible.
EVDOKIMOV advised me to quickly conduct cases against the arrested and scheduled for arrest security officers. “You see,” he said, “you can’t hide the Yagoda cadres, they are known to everyone, not today, tomorrow, each of them will be pushed out, it’s just that collectives from the bottom will rise up against them, so these things need to be done here as soon as possible.” He went on to say that you need to be especially careful with BERRY. YAGODA is the kind of person who will start chattering absurd things during the investigation, and he advised that the investigation into the Yagoda case should be led by KURSKY.
I told Yezhov about this conversation with EVDOKIMOV. EZHOV said - it’s good that you’re telling me, but in vain you’re telling EVDOKIMOV what we talked about, let’s better agree this way - you’ll only tell EVDOKIMOV what I tell you.
After the October plenum of the Central Committee in 1937, EVDOKIMOV and I met together for the first time at Yezhov’s dacha. Moreover, the conversation was started by Evdokimov, who, turning to Yezhov, asked: “What’s wrong with you, he promised to straighten out Yagoda’s situation, but the matter is getting deeper and deeper and is now coming close to us. It’s obvious that you’re not managing things well.” Yezhov was silent at first, and then stated that “the situation is really difficult, now we are taking measures to reduce the scope of operations, but, apparently, we will have to deal with the head of the right.” EVDOKIMOV swore, spat and said: “Can’t I go to the NKVD, I will provide more help than others.” Yezhov says: “It would be good, but the Central Committee is unlikely to agree to transfer you to the NKVD. I think that the matter is not completely hopeless, but you need to talk with DAGINSH, you have influence on him, we need him to start working in the Operations Department, and we need to be ready to commit terrorist acts.” I don’t remember - EZHOV or EVDOKIMOV said that it was necessary to look at how the frames of PAUKER and YAGODA were arranged, and remove them. Since people are left, without management they can do stupid things and take independent actions. Here EVDOKIMOV said that it would be nice to have people from the nationalities of the North Caucasus in the external security, directly at the dachas, these people will serve honestly, after all, the Ingush guarded the Tsar. After this, EZHOV again began to say that under no circumstances should the work be stopped and curtailed, but that it was necessary to go further underground and in no case should he (EVDOKIMOV) establish additional connections around the region. “You have people, let them slowly check and get people in.”
Returning from Mongolia, I learned that there was a question about my transfer from the NKVD to the People's Commissariat of Defense - deputy. People's Commissar
On the day of the opening of the plenum, I asked Yezhov about this. He says the issue has not yet been resolved. To my question whether the conversations in the apparatus about the transfer of ZAKOVSKY to Moscow to the position of first deputy people's commissar correspond to reality, EZHOV answered: We want to take ZAKOVSKY into the apparatus as the head of a department with the right of deputy. This man, he said, is completely ours, but he is a man who needs to be looked after, and then he needs to be transferred from the Leningrad situation, because there is a lot of talk about his connections with CHUDOV and KODATSKY. The Central Committee is also talking about the decomposition of ZAKOVSKY.
After one of the meetings of the plenum, in the evening, at Yezhov’s dacha there were EVDOKIMOV, me and Yezhov. When we arrived there, EIHE was there, but EIHE did not have any conversations with us. What happened before our arrival at EZHOV and EIKHE - Yezhov did not tell me. After dinner, EIHE left, and we stayed and talked almost until the morning. EVDOKIMOV mainly insisted that they were targeting us, in particular, he began to talk about himself and expressed dissatisfaction with why EZHOV sent DEITCH to him in the region, who was selecting materials for him.
During the same plenum, I had another meeting with EVDOKIMOV. He kept pressing on the fact that Nikolai YEZHOV must be kept in his hands all the time, that “you cannot cope with this matter, you take your own cadres and shoot them,” and immediately EVDOKIMOV suggested: “I would advise not to send the Leningrad arrestees ( CHUDOV, KODATSKY, STRUPPE) to Leningrad because although ZAKOVSKY is completely our man, and whoever works with him, the devil knows, no matter how they start to screw them up.” EVDOKIMOV continued: “I think that you started awarding orders early. After all, people are being awarded not only ours, but also others, the impulse of struggle is growing, and this should have been restrained, but orders are an incentive for people who are not organically and organizationally connected with us and therefore can expand operations.” And here EVDOKIMOV and EZHOV already talked together about a possible reduction in operations, but since this was considered impossible, they agreed to deflect the blow from their cadres and try to direct it towards honest cadres loyal to the Central Committee. This was Yezhov’s attitude. I forgot to mention one circumstance that is of significant importance for the case. In the fall of 1935, at LIFSHITZ’s dacha, a meeting took place between EVDOKIMOV, me, DAGIN and LIFSHITS, at which EVDOKIMOV, in an extremely irritated state, began to say that he did not entirely believe in the success of the terrorist acts against STALIN being prepared by the Trotskyists and right-wingers. At the same time, EVDOKIMOV directly stated that only the forces of the NKVD security department could actually carry out a terrorist attack against STALIN.
EVDOKIMOV strongly regretted that he was unable to appoint DAGIN as the head of the security department, even when he was working as the head of the OGPU SOU, and suggested that if the opportunity was successful, I should carefully recommend DAGIN instead of PAUKER. Soon Evdokimov was transferred to work in Moscow. Our meetings began to occur more often, both between EZHOV directly and EVDOKIMOV, and between the three of us.
Here I consider it necessary to note the following:
After the arrests of members of the right-wing center, EZHOV and EVDOKIMOV essentially became the center themselves, organizing:
1) preserving, as far as possible, anti-Soviet right-wing cadres from defeat;
2) striking a blow at honest party cadres devoted to the Central Committee of the CPSU (b);
3) preservation of rebel personnel both in the North Caucasus and in other territories and regions of the USSR with the expectation of their use at the time of international complications;
4) intensified preparation of terrorist attacks against the leaders of the party and government;
5) the rise to power of the right, led by N. Yezhov.
Upon returning from the Far East, at Yezhov’s request, I went to the People’s Commissariat without stopping home. I have never seen Yezhov in such a dejected state. He said: “This is rubbish” - and immediately moved on to the question that BERIA was appointed to the NKVD against his wishes. It will be a lousy business, he said. I'm afraid that everything will be revealed and our plans will collapse.
On August 27-28, 1938, EVDOKIMOV called me and asked me to come to his apartment. EVDOKIMOV boiled down our entire conversation to the fact that if there are any shortcomings that could lead to our involvement in criminal matters, we should finish it before BERIA arrives, and then EVDOKIMOV told me: “You check whether ZAKOVSKY was shot and whether all people are YAGODA, because upon BERIA’s arrival, the investigation into these cases can be restored and these cases will turn against us.” I checked and found that ZAKOVSKY, MIRONOV and a group of other security officers were shot on August 26-27.
I turn to the practical enemy work carried out by Yezhov, myself and other conspirators in the NKVD.
Investigative work
The investigative apparatus in all departments of the NKVD is divided into “kolschikov” investigators, “kolshchikov” and “ordinary” investigators.
What were these groups and who were they?
The “puncher investigators” were selected mainly from conspirators or compromised individuals, used uncontrolled beatings of those arrested, obtained “testimonies” in the shortest possible time and were able to competently and colorfully draw up protocols.
Since the number of people confessing to those arrested during such interrogation methods increased from day to day and the need for investigators who knew how to draw up protocols was great, the so-called “puncher investigators” began, each with himself, to create groups of simply “punchers.”
The group of “choppers” consisted of technical workers. These people did not know the materials on the person under investigation, but were sent to Lefortovo, called the arrested person and proceeded to beat him. The beating continued until the moment when the defendant agreed to testify.
The rest of the investigative staff was engaged in interrogating less serious arrestees, they were left to their own devices, and were not led by anyone.
The further process of the investigation was as follows: the investigator conducted the interrogation and, instead of a protocol, wrote down notes. After several such interrogations, the investigator drew up a draft protocol, which was sent for “correction” to the head of the relevant department, and from him, not yet signed, for “review”. People's Commissar Yezhov and, in rare cases, to me. Yezhov reviewed the protocol, made changes and additions. In most cases, those arrested did not agree with the wording of the protocol and stated that they did not say this during the investigation and refused to sign.
Then the investigators reminded the arrested person about the “bells”, and the defendant signed the protocol. In most cases, Yezhov carried out “corrections” and “editing” of protocols without seeing the arrested persons in person, and if he did, it was during fleeting visits to cells or investigative offices.
With such investigative methods, names were suggested.
In my opinion, I will be telling the truth if, to generalize, I will say that very often the testimony was given by the investigators, and not by the defendants.
Did the leadership of the People's Commissariat know about this, i.e. me and Yezhov? - They knew.
How did you react? Honestly, no way, and Yezhov even encouraged it. No one understood who was being subjected to physical pressure. And since most of the people using this method were enemies - conspirators, slander was clearly carried out, false testimony was taken, and innocent people slandered by enemies from among those arrested and enemies - investigators were arrested and shot. The real investigation was blurred.
MARYASIN was arrested - former. prev State Bank, with which Yezhov had a close relationship before his arrest. Yezhov showed exceptional interest in the investigation of his case. He personally led the investigation into his case, repeatedly attending his interrogations. MARYASIN was kept in Lefortovo prison all the time. He was beaten brutally and constantly. If other arrested people were beaten only until they confessed, then MARYASIN was beaten even after the investigation was over and no testimony was taken from him.
Once, while going through the interrogation rooms together with YEZHOV (and YEZHOV was drunk), we went to interrogate MARYASIN, and YezhOV told MARYASIN for a long time that he had not said everything yet, and, in particular, made a hint to MARYASIN about terrorism in general and the terrorist attack against him - EZHOV, and immediately declared that “we will beat, beat and beat.”
Or again: from the arrested YAKOVLEV, during the first or second interrogation after his arrest, YEZHOV, in a drunken state, sought testimony about YAKOVLEV’s preparation of a terrorist act against YEZHOV. YAKOVLEV said that this was not true, but he was beaten by YEZHOV and those present, and after that YEZHOV left without obtaining a confession. A few days later, testimony appeared about a terrorist attack being prepared against YEZHOV - YAKOVLEV.
EZHOV's consciously open line of falsifying investigative materials about the preparation of terrorist acts against him reached the point that obsequious investigators from among the "injurers" constantly sought a "confession" from those arrested about the imaginary preparation of terrorist acts against Yezhov.
The arrested KRUGLIKOV (former head of the State Bank) also testified in his testimony to the terrorist group preparing the murder of Yezhov. I was present at the pre-interrogation of Kruglikov by Yezhov. KRUGLIKOV stated that he lied on the issue of the terrorist attack against Yezhov. After this remark, Yezhov stood up, did not talk to Kruglikov, and left. Following him, the investigator who interrogated KRUGLIKOV came out and approached Yezhov. The latter said something to him, and Ezhov and I left for the People's Commissariat. I don’t know what he told the investigator, but I know that the next morning there was a statement from KRUGLIKOV, in which he explained his refusal by saying that when he saw Yezhov, he was “confused” and did not want to confirm his testimony to his face.
KRUGLIKOV was forced to confirm this testimony, and after that EZHOV never asked where the truth was.
During the investigation into the case of YAGODA and the arrested KGB conspirators, as well as other arrestees, especially right-wingers, the procedure established by YEZHOV for “adjusting” the protocols pursued the goal of preserving the cadre of conspirators and preventing any possibility of failure of our involvement in the anti-Soviet conspiracy.
One can cite dozens and hundreds of examples when arrested persons under investigation did not extradite persons associated with them in anti-Soviet work.
The most obvious examples are the conspirators YAGODA, BULANOV, ZAKOVSKY, KRUCHINKIN and others, who, knowing about my participation in the conspiracy, did not testify about it.
How were those arrested prepared for confrontations, and especially for confrontations that were carried out in the presence of members of the government?
Those arrested were specially prepared, first by the investigator, then by the head of the department. The preparation consisted of reading out the testimony that the arrested person gave to the person with whom the confrontation was to be confronted, explaining how the confrontation would be carried out, what unexpected questions could be put to the arrested person and how he should answer. Essentially, there was a conspiracy and a rehearsal for the upcoming confrontation. After this, Yezhov called the arrested person to him or, pretending that he accidentally walked into the investigator’s room, where the arrested person was sitting and talked to him about the upcoming rate, asked if he felt confident, would he confirm it, and, among other things, inserted that Government members will be present at the confrontation. Usually Yezhov was nervous before such confrontations, even after talking to the arrested person. There were cases when an arrested person, during a conversation with Yezhov, made a statement that his testimony was not true, that he had been slandered. In such cases, Yezhov left, and the investigator or the head of the department was given instructions to “reinstate” the arrested person, since a confrontation was scheduled. As an example, we can cite the preparation of a confrontation between URITSKY (head of the Intelligence Department) and BELOV (commander of the Belarusian Military District). URITSKY refused to testify against BELOV during his interrogation by Yezhov. Without having anything to talk to them about, YEZHOV left, and a few minutes later URITSKY, through NIKOLAEV, apologized to YEZHOV and said that he was “coward-hearted.”
Preparation of the trial of RYKOV, BUKHARIN, KRESTINSKY, YAGODA and others
While actively participating in the investigation in general, Yezhov withdrew from the preparation of this process. Before the trial, there were confrontations of those arrested, interrogations, clarifications, in which Yezhov did not participate. He talked with Yagoda for a long time, and this conversation concerned mainly Yagoda’s conviction that he would not be shot. Yezhov talked several times with BUKHARIN and RYKOV and, also in order to calm them down, assured them that they would not be shot under any circumstances. Once Yezhov had a conversation with BULANOV, and he began the conversation in the presence of the investigator and me, and ended the conversation one on one, asking us to leave.
Moreover, BULANOV began a conversation at that moment about the poisoning of Yezhov. Yezhov did not tell me what the conversation was about. When he asked to come in again, he said: “Be good during the trial - I will ask you not to be shot.” After the trial, Yezhov always expressed regret about BULANOV. During the execution, Yezhov suggested that BULANOV be shot first and did not enter the room where they were shooting. Of course, here Yezhov was driven by the need to cover up his connections with the arrested right-wing leaders who were going to a public trial.
Essentially the poisoning of EZHOV. Yezhov himself suggested the idea of his poisoning - day after day, telling all deputies and heads of departments that he was not feeling well, that as soon as he was in the office, he felt some kind of metallic taste and smell in his mouth. After that, he began to complain that blood began to appear from his gums and his teeth began to loosen. Yezhov began to insist that he was poisoned in his office, and thereby inspired the investigation to obtain appropriate testimony, which was done using the Lefortovo prison and beating.
Bulk Operations
At the very beginning, Yezhov’s directive was issued regarding mass operations in full accordance with the government’s decision, and the first months they proceeded normally. It was soon established that in a number of territories and regions, and especially in the Ordzhonikidze region, there were cases of murder of those arrested during interrogations, and subsequently cases against them were registered through the troika as sentenced to death. By the same period, data on outrages began to arrive from other regions, in particular from the Urals, Belarus, Orenburg, Leningrad and Ukraine.
The outrages increased especially strongly when, in addition to the ongoing mass operations in the territories and regions, a directive was issued on the repression of foreign nationalities suspected of espionage, connections with the consulates of foreign states, and defectors. In the Leningrad, Sverdlovsk regions, Belarusian SSR, and Ukraine, native residents of the USSR began to be arrested, accusing them of having connections with foreigners. There were often cases when there was no evidence of such a connection. Cases related to this operation were considered in Moscow by a specially created troika. The chairman of the troika was first TSESARSKY and then SHAPIRO.
The decision made by EZHOV, me and EVDOKIMOV about the impossibility of stopping and deflecting the blow from their own anti-Soviet rebel cadres and the need to transfer the blow to honest cadres devoted to the homeland and party practically found expression in the criminal implementation of a punitive policy that was supposed to be directed against traitors to the motherland and foreign intelligence agencies. Honest workers of the NKVD on the ground, not suspecting betrayal on the part of the leadership of the NKVD of the USSR and many leaders of the NKVD involved in the anti-Soviet conspiracy, mistook our enemy’s guidelines for the guidelines of the party and government and objectively turned out to be participants in the extermination of innocent, honest citizens.
Mass signals coming to us about so-called “excesses”, essentially exposing our enemy work, were left without any response, on Yezhov’s instructions. In those cases when, due to the intervention of the Central Committee, it was not possible to cover up or drown out this or that revealing signal, they resorted to outright forgery and falsification.
So, for example, in 1938, on behalf of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, SHKIRYATOV traveled to the Ordzhonikidze region to investigate received materials about criminal perversions during mass operations carried out by the NKVD in the region. Yezhov, in order to show the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks that he had responded to signals in a timely manner, handed Shkiryatov an “order” allegedly issued by him from the NKVD. In fact, he did not issue such an order.
In other cases, in order to cover up the enemy work of the conspirators, ordinary NKVD employees were brought to justice.
Deception of the party and government
Yezhov, having come to the NKVD, at all meetings, in conversations with operational workers, deservedly criticizing the departmentalism existing among the security officers, isolation from the party, emphasized that he would instill party spirit in the workers, that he did not and would never hide anything from the party and from STALIN. In fact, he deceived the party both in serious, big issues and in small things. Yezhov conducted these conversations for nothing other than to lull the vigilance of honest NKVD workers.
Yezhov created for himself, and then his closest assistants, starting with me, an aura of glory for the best of the best, the vigilant of the vigilant. Yezhov often said that if it weren’t for him, there would have been a coup in the country; as a result of his work and the cases that were revealed, the war was delayed, etc. He criticized hostilely and discredited individual members of the Politburo. He spoke about a number of them openly as unreliable and shaky. Often, in the presence of a number of subordinate workers, he uttered catchphrases about the close ties of individual members of the Politburo with exposed and repressed conspirators. He spoke of some as blind, not seeing what was happening around them, having missed the enemies in their surroundings. All these were phrases covering his deception of the party and the Central Committee and his criminal activities. Perhaps the facts that I stated earlier would be enough, but I want to give a few more examples. Former beginning The intelligence department of the Red Army URITSKY began to testify against the commander of the BVO - BELOV, who was summoned to Moscow, where a confrontation between BELOV and URITSKY was expected. The confrontation was scheduled for the evening. EZHOV was summoned to the Kremlin to STALIN's apartment and after some time he called me on the phone in my office and said: “We urgently need to find BELOV and ask him to come to the NKVD.” To my question, where could he be, Yezhov answered in a raised tone: “I gave you the order to install an outdoor surveillance system behind BELOV?” When I tried to tell Yezhov that he had not given me any instructions about this, Yezhov, without listening to me, hung up. The audit established that no surveillance of BELOV had been established and that EZHOV had deceived the Central Committee.
The second fact that I became aware of after leaving the NKVD. EZHOV hid from the Central Committee and STALIN the testimony sent from the Georgian NKVD against LYUSHKOV and other conspirators when LYUSHKOV was appointed head of the NKVD department of the DCK. On Yezhov’s instructions, I carried out a “verification” of this testimony against LYUSHKOV by interrogating YAGODA. The interrogation was deliberately carried out in such a way that YAGODA did not confirm these testimonies against LYUSHKOV, while LYUSHKOV was one of his closest people. LYUSH-KOV, as is known, fled abroad.
Third fact. About a group of conspirators and terrorists in the Kremlin (BRYUKHANOV, TABOLIN, KALMYKOV, VINOGRADOVA).
I don’t know whether there is any point in writing this, Citizen People’s Commissar, since you know this, but I still consider it necessary to report that the protocol of testimony against BRYUKHANOV and others was immediately handed over to Yezhov upon their receipt, and was kept by him, ostensibly for the report STALIN and MOLOTOV. And there was a need for this, since BRYUKHANOV was VINOGRADOVA’s husband, and the latter worked to serve STALIN and his secretariat. However, Yezhov, as I learned upon returning from the Far East, hid these materials from the party and government for seven months.
This statement does not exhaust the entire sum of the facts of my criminal work.
In my subsequent testimony, I will exhaustively tell the investigation everything that I know, and I will not hide a single enemy of the Communist Party and Soviet power known to me, and I will name all the persons involved in anti-Soviet conspiratorial work, regardless of whether they have been arrested today or not .
M. FRINOVSKY
AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 373. L. 3-44. Script. Typescript.
In the margins there are handwritten notes from Stalin:
- F once “Roshal must be broken off” is circled, and in the margin it is written: “What does this mean?”;
- The phrase is circled and written in the margin: “Who are they?”;
- F The names are circled and written in the margin: “Where are they?”;
- F it is underlined once, and in the margin it is written: “Who is there?”;
- P The sentence is underlined and written in the margin: “Who are they?”;
- The names are circled and "Where are they?" written in the margin;
- WITH the words “shot on August 26-27” are circled and an “xx” sign is placed in the margin;
- WITH The word is circled and written in the margin: “Which others?”;
- The sentence is circled and written in the margin: “Agreed? You're lying!
- The last name is circled, and at the end of the page it says: “You’re lying!”
Frinovsky Michael Petrovich(Jan. 1898, Narovchat, Penza province - 4.2.1940, Moscow), one of the heads of state security agencies, military leader, 1st rank army commander (14.9.1938). Teacher's son. He received his education at a theological school (1914), at courses for senior command personnel at the Frunze Military Academy of the Red Army (1927). In Jan. 1916 entered the cavalry as a volunteer, non-commissioned officer. In Aug. 1916 deserted. He was associated with anarchists, participated in the murder of Major General M.A. Bema. From March 1917 he worked as an accountant. Vsent. 1917 joined the Red Guard in Khamovniki (Moscow). In Oct.-Nov. 1917 commanded a group of Red Guards, took part in the storming of the Kremlin, and was seriously wounded. In March-July 1918, assistant superintendent of the Khodynka hospital. In 1918 he joined the RCP(b), in July 1918 he joined the Red Army, squadron commander, beginning. Special department of the 1st Cavalry Army. In 1919 he was transferred to the Cheka. In Aug. - Nov. 1919 assistant chief active part of the Special Department of the Moscow Cheka. Participated in the most important operations of the Cheka - the defeat of anarchists, the liquidation of anarchist and rebel groups in Ukraine, etc. From Dec. 1919 to Apr. 1920 served in the Special Department of the Southern Front. In the early 1920s active part of the Special Department of the Southwestern Front, deputy. beginning Special department of the 1st Cavalry Army. In 1921-22 deputy. beginning Special department, deputy beginning operational detachment of the Bee-Ukrainian Cheka. In 1922-23 beginning. general administrative part and secretary of the Kyiv department of the GPU (from June 23, 1923 - plenipotentiary representative of the OGPU in the South-East). On Nov. 1923 transferred to the North Caucasus, beginning. Special Department of the North Caucasus Military District. From March 1924 1st deputy. Plenipotentiary Representative of the OGPU for the North Caucasus, from January. 1926 - 1st deputy plenipotentiary and chief GPU troops. 07/08/1927 transferred to Moscow as assistant chief. Special department of the military district. 11/28/1928 - 9/1/1930 commander and commissar of the special purpose division named after F.E. Dzerzhinsky at the Collegium of the OGPU of the USSR. 1.9.1930 Frinovsky received another promotion, becoming a manager. GPU of Azerbaijan. From that moment on, his career began to develop with incredible speed. On April 8, 1933, he took over as chief. Main Directorate of Border Guard of the OGPU of the USSR, 10.7.1934 - Main Directorate of Border and Internal Guard of the NKVD of the USSR. He was promoted after the removal of G.G. Yagoda and the arrival of N.I. to the NKVD. Yezhov, who replaced almost all of Yagodin’s henchmen. From 10/16/1936 deputy, from 4/15/1937 1st deputy. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR. At the same time, from April 15, 1937 to June 9, 1938, he headed the Main Directorate of State Security, and from March 28, 1938, the State Security Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR. Since 1937, member of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. One of Yezhov’s closest collaborators and the main organizers of mass repressions, participated in all “events”, incl. on falsification of cases of “military-fascist conspiracy in the Red Army”, etc. Most of the arrest warrants were signed by him personally (without the sanction of the prosecutor), and he personally supervised the arrests in the Far East. According to the memoirs of N.S. Khrushchev, “a big strong man with a scar on his face, physically powerful.” After joining the NKVD L.P. Beria and the beginning of the NKVD purges of Yezhov’s promoters Frinovsky within 17 days - September 8, 1938 - he was appointed People's Commissar of the USSR Navy. On April 6, 1939 he was arrested, and 22 days later he was officially released from his duties as People's Commissar. Accused of participating in a “conspiracy in the NKVD” and sentenced to death on February 4, 1938. Shot.
“Sometimes there are no names left from the heroes of bygone times...” - sang in one popular Soviet song. People of the older generation understood that the author meant representatives of the “Leninist Guard”, party and government officials, leaders of the Red Army, repressed during the years of the “Great Terror” (1937-1938).
In the 50s-60s of the last century, most of them were rehabilitated and reinstated in the party. The streets of our cities are named after them today (in Penza: M. Tukhachevsky, V. Kuraev, R. Austrian streets). Books have been written and films made about their heroic life.
Among those who organized and carried out the terrible repressions of 1937-1938. and whose relatives were denied the right to rehabilitation - all the leaders of the OGPU-NKVD of the 30s-50s of the XX century: G. Yagoda, N. Yezhov, L. Beria, as well as many of their deputies and NKVD investigators.
Among them, as sad as it may be for Penza history, is our fellow countryman, a native of Narovchat, one of the heads of state security agencies, Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs N. Yezhov, Army Commander of the 1st rank M. P. Frinovsky (1900-1940).
Having received the task from the editor of Moskovskaya Street to prepare an article for the 115th anniversary of M. Frinovsky, I had no idea what difficulties I would have to face. It turned out that many pages of his biography do not find archival confirmation or are simply made up. Why, for what purpose and by whom was this done? Let's try to figure it out.
Moreover, there is a reason: 75 years of the “great terror” in the USSR, as a result of which (according to modern historians) at least 1.710 million people were arrested, of which at least 1.440 million people were convicted, sentenced to death - not less than 725 thousand people
At least 436 thousand people were shot in the so-called “kulak operation”, and at least 247 thousand people were shot in the “national operations”.
Narovchatsky roots
As confirmed by documents located in the State Archive of the Penza Region (GAPO), Mikhail Frinovsky was indeed born in the town of Narovchat, Penza province, in the family of a teacher. But the materials found refute some pages of his biography, which he probably had to correct when joining the ranks of the RCP (b), becoming an employee of the Cheka. So the entire vast literature about him contains incorrect data about the early period of his life.
It turned out that he was born not in 1898, but 2 years later, on January 25, 1900. This fact is recorded in the metric book of the Trinity Church in Narovchat for 1900. In it, in particular, it is reported that Mikhail Frinovsky was born in to the family of the teacher (January 25 - born, January 28 - baptized) of the Narovchatsky district school, collegiate assessor Pyotr Eliseevich Frinovsky and “his legal wife Olga Semenova. Both are Orthodox.
It was possible to find in the archive the “Formular List of Service and. d. teacher of the Krasnoslobodsky city 4-grade school Pyotr Frinovsky" for 1907-1913.
From these important documents we learn that M. Frinovsky’s father came from the clergy and was the son of a local deacon. By 1907 he was 48 years old, i.e. he was born in 1859.
The personal file says that Pyotr Eliseevich completed a full course at the Penza Theological Seminary in 1879 and from 1880 began working as a teacher of the Russian language at the Narovchatsky district school. Having worked in Narovchat for more than 20 years, he moved in August 1902 by the leadership of the Kharkov educational district to the Krasnoslobodsk city 4-grade school.
By this time he was already a collegiate assessor and a well-known amateur theatergoer in Narovchat. For his success in the field of public education, he was awarded the Order of St. Stanislav, 3rd degree (1904) and the Order of St. Anne, 3rd degree (1911).
Pyotr Eliseevich was married to Olga Semenovna Zheleznikova, who belonged to the noble family of the Zheleznikovs, who owned small lands in Narovchatsky, Kerensky and Nizhne-Lomovsky districts of the Penza province.
8 children were born into the Frinovsky family: Alexander (1882), Dmitry (1884), Leonid (1891), Mikhail (1900), Nikolai (1901), Varvara (1903), Maria (1906), Georgy (1908).
Having received the basics of home upbringing and education, Mikhail Frinovsky became a student at the Krasnoslobodsky Theological School in 1909, which he successfully completed in May 1915. A certificate of completion found in the archive indicates that Mikhail Frinovsky succeeded in all subjects and received 9- These subjects received “good” grades and 5 “very good” grades, while showing “excellent” behavior.
According to the rules of those years, graduates who successfully completed theological school became 1st class students of theological seminary without exams.
At the Penza Theological Seminary (1915-1916)
So, it is documented that not only the historian V. Klyuchevsky, academician N. Burdenko, singer A. Mozzhukhin studied within the walls of the Penza Theological Seminary, but also the future deputy people's commissar of internal affairs, corps commander, and
then Army Commander Mikhail Frinovsky. He also tried not to tell the whole truth about this period of his biography.
Archival materials in the collections of the Penza Theological Seminary confirmed the fact that M. Frinovsky studied there in 1915-1916. The documents again indicate the real date of his birth - January 25, 1900, the time of entry into the seminary - 1915, the year of future conscription for military service - 1921.
These are very important facts, because in the biography of M. Frinovsky it will be indicated that he will graduate from college in 1914, and already in January 1916 he will be in the army, where he allegedly enlists as a volunteer.
The materials we found indicate something else: in 1915-1916. he studied in the 1st year of theological seminary and studied very poorly. He finishes his first year of seminary underachieving, having 5 bad marks out of 7 basic subjects. Following the results of the first year of study, Mikhail Frinovsky was retained in the 1st grade for the second year.
Documents also confirm the fact of his studies at the seminary in 1916-1917, and there are also his grades for the 1st and 2nd quarter. He finishes the first quarter without even failing grades, and for the second he has only 2 marks (3 - Greek, 2 - French). Behavior for the first quarter – 5, for the second quarter – 5-.
As we can see from the above documents, he could not have been in any army in January 1916, since he completed the first year of the seminary only in the summer, and began studying for a repeat course in the fall of 1916.
In addition, according to the rules existing at that time, he could not become a volunteer until he completed two courses at theological seminary and reached at least 17 years of age.
Apparently, the environment in which he found himself at the seminary was not conducive to receiving theological education. Students of the Penza Seminary have always been highly revolutionary; among them there were many supporters of the Socialist Revolutionaries and anarchists. Surely, Mikhail Frinovsky also came under the influence of anarchist-minded students.
Together with them, he most likely decides to quit training and join the army, but this could only happen after January 25, 1917, when he turned 17 years old.
How he manages to do this without sufficient education is another mystery of his biography. Perhaps this is where the new date of his birth appears - January 25, 1898.
Moscow, year 1917.
Then, as follows from his official biography, he deserts (August 1916?) from the army, ends up in Moscow, where, together with his anarchist friends, he participates in the storming of the Kremlin in November 1917.
In these battles, Mikhail Frinovsky was seriously wounded and was treated for several months at the Khodynka hospital (until the summer of 1918), where, after recovery, he began working as an assistant caretaker. And suddenly his career takes a sharp turn 
mountain: he became a member of the RCP (b), in July 1918 - the Red Army.
Special department of the Cheka-OGPU (1919-1927)
In 1919, M. Frinovsky was transferred to the organs of the Cheka, with which the remaining 20 years of his short life would be associated. In August-November 1919, he participated in the most important operations of the Moscow Cheka, smashing his former comrades - anarchists. From December 1919 to April 1920 he served in the Special Department of the Southern and then the Southwestern Front. In 1921-1922 he is the deputy head of the Special Department of the All-Ukrainian Cheka, then - in the Kiev department of the GPU.
It is clear that it was possible for a person who joined the party only in the summer of 1918 to occupy such positions only if he had large patrons in the leadership of the Cheka. The leaders who helped him make a successful career in the punitive agencies of the young Soviet state were people with extensive revolutionary experience: V.N. Mantsev (1889-1938), party member since 1906, participant and organizer of the armed uprising in Moscow. From December 1918 he served in the organs of the Moscow Cheka, and from 1920 he headed the Special Departments of the Southern and Southwestern Fronts.
The second person who took the aspiring security officer M. Frinovsky under his wing was E. G. Evdokimov (1891-1940), a former anarchist sentenced to four years of hard labor back in 1905, an active participant in the storming of the Kremlin in November 1917.
The further fate of M. Frinovsky in the Cheka is connected with him. At all areas of work where E. Evdokimov’s party was sent, his young student Mikhail Frinovsky was nearby. From these old and experienced revolutionaries he will learn lessons in the fight against counter-revolution of all stripes.
Under their leadership, mass executions of civilians would be carried out in Ukraine (1919) and Crimea (1920): nobles, merchants, clergy, intelligentsia, and former officers. Their unpunished activities in Ukraine will even require the intervention of V.I. Lenin, who sent M. Latsis there with a demand to replace and punish the “Chekist bastard.”
The years spent in Ukraine turned out to be useful for Frinovsky in terms of necessary acquaintances. After all, here in 1919-1922. the entire flower of the then party and military leadership of the Soviet republic was concentrated: I. Stalin, M. Frunze, K. Voroshilov, A. Egorov, I. Uborevich, I. Yakir.
In 1923-1927 M. Frinovsky headed the Special Department of the North Caucasus Military District. These were the years of forceful pacification of Chechnya and Dagestan. Combat operations here were led by his former mentor E. Evdokimov.
Again in Moscow (1927-1930)
Almost 10 years of struggle against internal and external counter-revolution in the ranks of the Cheka-OGPU ended for M. Frinovsky with receiving the first Order of the Red Banner (1924) and returning to Moscow. In 1927, he became assistant to the head of the Special Department of the Moscow Military District. In 1928-1930 M. Frinovsky commands the special purpose division named after. F. Dzerzhinsky at the Collegium of the OGPU of the USSR.
In the GPU of Azerbaijan (1930-1933)
On September 1, 1930, Frinovsky became chairman of the GPU of the Azerbaijan SSR. Historians tend to believe that this was just another increase. And here they are clearly wrong. This, of course, was a link and it was connected with criticism of the activities of the deputy chairman of the OGPU G. Yagoda and his inner circle, which included M. Frinovsky. Criticism came from party organs and led to his forced trip to the Caucasus.
The three years spent at the head of the GPU of Azerbaijan were the years of collectivization here, associated with mass dispossession, executions and eviction of socially alien elements, as well as the years of suppression of numerous armed protests against the policies pursued by the Soviet government. The 3 orders received by M. Frinovsky (Order of the Red Banner, Order of the Red Banner of Labor of the Azerbaijan SSR, Order of the Red Banner of Labor of the ZSFSR) indicate that he coped with these tasks successfully.
Head of the USSR border troops (1933-1936)
In April 1933, M. Frinovsky became the head of the Main Directorate of Border Guard of the OGPU of the USSR, and from July 1934 - the head of the Main Directorate of Border and Internal Security of the NKVD of the USSR. So for 3 years (1933-1936) M. Frinovsky will head one of the main departments of the OGPU-NKVD; by 1936, his apparatus consisted of 498 people. and significantly exceeded many NKVD departments of that time.
In this position, his organizational skills were fully demonstrated. Numerous connections in government, the army and the OGPU also helped. He becomes an official at the state level: this is evidenced by the start of summons to the Kremlin to I. Stalin himself. In 1933 - 3 times, in 1934 - 5 times, in 1935 - 4 times, in 1936 - 8 times.
During these years, he carried out enormous tasks in organizing reliable protection of the USSR border, trained and replaced personnel of border district leaders, resolved issues of construction and equipment of border outposts, and inspected especially dangerous border territories (the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Far East). At this post, M. Frinovsky received his 3rd Order of the Red Banner.
In addition, he had to carry out a number of special operations in the territory of neighboring states (Xinjiang, Western China). So in December 1934, he led the transfer from the USSR of the so-called Altai Army, which participated in the military operation on the side of the pro-Soviet government.
Deputy of N. Yezhov (1936-1938). Years of the “Great Terror” (1937-1938)
The last and most tragic period of M. Frinovsky’s life, which will erase everything that he did so selflessly while serving in the OGPU-NKVD, were the years of his collaboration with the People’s Commissar of the NKVD N. Yezhov as his deputy (from 10/16/1936), and from April 15, 1937 - First Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs. During these years he also headed the Main Directorate of State Security.
This period went down in our history as the period of the “Great Terror” - a time of mass repressions of the leadership of party and Soviet bodies, the leaders of the Red Army and the NKVD. At the same time, so-called “national operations” were carried out, covering all the small nations of the country (Germans, Poles, Finns, Lithuanians, Moldovans, etc.).
M. Frinovsky, as the first deputy people's commissar, not only participated in their organization and implementation, but, as the investigation showed, actively contributed to the falsification of the cases of the “military-fascist conspiracy” in the Red Army, which resulted in the liquidation of the most prominent military leaders of that time. More than 30 thousand commanders and political workers of the Red Army were arrested and executed. As FSB archival documents confirm, most of the arrest warrants for the top officials of the Red Army and the NKVD were signed personally by Frinovsky.
The importance of his role is also indicated by the fact that in the 7th paragraph of the NKVD operational order No. 0047 dated July 30, 1937 “On the operation to repress former kulaks, criminals and other anti-Soviet elements”, signed by N. Yezhov, it is stated that “1 . I entrust the general management of the operation to my deputy - the Head of the Main Directorate of State Security - Komkor Comrade. Frinovsky."
In 1937-1938, i.e. during the years of the “Great Terror”, he was 28 times in Stalin’s office with reports on the progress of repressions in the country. It should be noted that every time during his visits, the top officials of the state were in the office: V. Molotov, K. Voroshilov, L. Kaganovich, S. Ordzhonikidze, A. Andreev, etc. This convincingly indicates that the general leadership of all repressive activities of the NKVD carried out by I. Stalin and his inner circle in the Politburo.
In addition to conducting numerous repressive operations within the country, M. Frinovsky participated in July-August 1937 in eliminating the objectionable leadership of Mongolia. On August 27, Soviet troops were introduced into Mongolia, the KGB escort for this entry was organized by
M. Frinovsky. The “troikas” created in Mongolia according to the Soviet model destroyed more than 20 thousand lamas, representatives of the army, intelligentsia, and government.
Having fulfilled their bloody role of destroying old personnel, both in the army and in government structures, N. Yezhov and his deputies were no longer needed. In addition, they knew and were able to do a lot. Their time is up.
On August 21, 1938, M. Frinovsky’s old friend from the Caucasus, Lavrentiy Beria, became the first deputy people’s commissar N. Yezhov.
On September 8, 1938, M. Frinovsky was appointed People's Commissar of the USSR Navy; on April 6, 1939, he was arrested, and on February 4, 1940, he was shot on charges of
in participation in a “conspiracy in the NKVD” to seize power in the country.
Even earlier, on January 22, 1940, his 17-year-old son Oleg was shot, and on February 3, 1940, his wife Nina Stepanovna was shot.
By this time, all the leaders of the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD and their deputies, with whom he began his service back in the 20s, will be executed.
Stalin outplayed his security officers. Having completed the organizational, often bloody tasks of creating a new state, they were destroyed by it. J. Stalin will shift all responsibility for the massive repressions that took place against Soviet citizens, party leaders and state leaders to the heads of the NKVD (G. Yagoda, N. Ezhov, M. Frinovsky, etc.).
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Mikhail Frinovsky was born at the beginning of 1898 in the village of Narovchat, Penza province, in the family of a teacher. Before the First World War, he studied at a religious school and was a criminal.
In January 1916 he entered the cavalry as a volunteer and served with the rank of non-commissioned officer. In August 1916 he deserted. He was associated with anarchists, participated in the murder of Major General M.A. Bem.
Since March 1917, Frinovsky worked as an accountant. In September of the same year, he joined the Red Guard in Khamovniki (Moscow), commanded a group of Red Guards, participated in the storming of the Kremlin, and was seriously wounded.
In March-July 1918 he worked as an assistant superintendent of the Khodynka hospital. He joined the RCP(b), in July 1918 he enlisted in the Red Army, served as a squadron commander, and head of the Special Department of the 1st Cavalry Army.
In 1919 he was transferred to the Cheka. In the second half of 1919, he served as assistant to the head of the active part of the Special Department of the Moscow Cheka. Participated in the most important operations of the Cheka - the defeat of the anarchists, the liquidation of anarchist and rebel groups in Ukraine, etc.
From December 1919 to April 1920 he served in the Special Department of the Southern Front. In 1920, he was the head of the active part of the Special Department of the Southwestern Front, deputy head of the Special Department of the 1st Cavalry Army. In 1921-1922 - deputy head of the Special Department, deputy head of the operational detachment of the All-Ukrainian Cheka.
In 1922-1923, Frinovsky was the head of the general administrative part and secretary of the Kyiv department of the GPU (from June 23, 1923 - head of the OGPU plenipotentiary office in the South-East).
In November 1923, he was transferred to the North Caucasus to the post of head of the Special Department of the North Caucasus Military District. Since March 1924, Frinovsky has been the first deputy plenipotentiary representative of the OGPU for the North Caucasus, and since January 1926, the first deputy plenipotentiary representative and chief of the GPU troops.
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On July 8, 1927, he was transferred to Moscow to the position of assistant to the head of the Special Department of the Military District. In 1927, he completed courses for senior command personnel at the Frunze Military Academy of the Red Army. From November 28, 1928 to September 1, 1930, he was commander and commissar of the special purpose division named after F. E. Dzerzhinsky at the board of the OGPU of the USSR.
On September 1, 1930, Frinovsky was promoted and appointed to the post of chairman of the GPU of Azerbaijan. On April 8, 1933, he became the head of the Main Directorate of Border Guard of the OGPU of the USSR, and already on July 10, 1934 - the head of the Main Directorate of Border and Internal Guard of the NKVD of the USSR.
After the fall of G. G. Yagoda and the appointment of N. I. Yezhov as head of the NKVD, Frinovsky was appointed Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR (October 16, 1936), and then First Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR (April 15, 1937).
From April 15, 1937 to June 9, 1938, he headed the Main Directorate of State Security, and from March 28, 1938 - the State Security Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR. Since 1937, member of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. One of Yezhov’s closest collaborators and the main organizers of mass repressions. Frinovsky personally (without the prosecutor's sanction) signs many arrest warrants.
After Yezhov was removed and L.P. Beria joined the NKVD, Frinovsky was appointed People's Commissar of the USSR Navy (September 8, 1938), which is a sign of his disgrace.
On April 6, 1939, Frinovsky was arrested. He is accused of “participating in a conspiracy in the NKVD” and on February 4, 1940 he is sentenced to death. The former head of state security was shot on February 4, 1940 in Moscow.
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