Before the general offensive of the Red Army, the 4th and 6th Soviet armies were created and the Southern Front was formed, headed by M.V. Frunze. Frunze's offensive plan was to encircle and destroy the Russian Army in Northern Tavria, preventing it from leaving for the Crimea through the Perekopsky and Chongarsky isthmuses. The following took part in the general offensive on Crimea: the 6th, 13th and 4th armies, the 1st cavalry army of Budyonny, the 2nd cavalry army of Guy and Makhno’s gangs.

The commander of the 6th Army, Comrade Kork (1887-1937), Estonian by birth, graduated from the Chuguev Infantry School in 1908, and from the General Staff Academy in 1914 and held the rank of lieutenant colonel in the Imperial Army. After the occupation of Crimea, Comrade Kork was the commander of the 15th Infantry Division and subsequently the head of the Frunze Academy of the General Staff. In gratitude for his exploits for the glory of the dictatorship of the world proletariat, he was shot by Stalin, after whose death he was rehabilitated.

To attack Perekop, the already known Blucher 51st Infantry Division is assigned, which for this purpose is reinforced by a strike and fire brigade, a separate cavalry brigade, cavalry regiments of the 15th and Latvian divisions and an armored vehicle group.

October 26/November 7. Frunze ordered to take the Perekop shaft. For this purpose, Blucher, who united the entire strike group at Perekop, divides it: 1) the shock-fire brigade and the 152nd rifle brigade to storm the Turkish Wall; 2) He allocates the 153rd rifle and two cavalry brigades as a strike group for an attack through Sivashi on the Lithuanian Peninsula and to reach the rear of the Perekop fortifications.

To prepare for the assault on Perekop, 55 guns and 8 escort guns were fired. The operation begins on November 7 at 22:00.

October 27/November 8. In the morning, the enemy spent three hours making real preparations for the assault on the rampart from twenty batteries of various calibers. Our old trenches not only have not been improved, but have already partially collapsed or have now been destroyed by the Reds. The line of trenches ran along the very crest of the rampart, and the shelters were on our slope, so the enemy’s shells hit the slope of the rampart facing it or flew over the rampart and exploded behind the rampart, which saved us. But there was trouble with the supply - dozens of horses were torn to shreds. From ten o'clock, as far as the eye could see, twelve chains of red infantry covered the entire field in front of us - the assault began.

The temporary commander of the division, General Peshnya, arrived at the site and gave the order not to shoot until the Reds approached the ditch. The Perekop fortifications consisted of a huge, massive old Turkish rampart and a deep ditch in front of it, once filled with water from the bay, but now dry, fortified with wire fences along both of its slopes and located north of the rampart, that is, towards the enemy. With the approach of the Red infantry, their artillery transfers the full force of its fire to our rear. Using this, the shock troops fill the trenches along the crest of the shaft and bring ammunition. The Reds, apparently, were confident in the strength of their artillery fire and quickly rolled towards us. Their obvious enormous superiority in strength and our retreat inspired them. Perhaps our deathly silence created in them the illusion that we had already been killed, and therefore they “perlied” cheerfully, with warlike cries. I even saw with a simple eye that the first chains were in zipuns, pulled up and, as those remaining on our wire later said, this was some kind of best division named after Comrade Frunze. The first chain was already at a distance of 300 steps from us, the machine gunners’ hands were already itching, but there was no order to shoot. The Reds became completely bolder, and some ran up to the ditch. Although we were confident in ourselves, our nerves were still very tense and the first to break our silence was the division chief himself, General Peshnya, who knew the machine gun very well and took it up himself. The effect of fire from at least 60 machine guns and four battalions, this only in the sector of the 2nd regiment, was amazing: the slain fell, the rear chains pressed and thereby encouraged the remnants of the forward chains, which in some places reached the ditch. Our advantage, despite our small numbers, was that the Red artillery could not hit us due to the proximity of their riflemen to us, and the enemy machine guns could have hit us perfectly, but for some reason they only pulled them and did not shoot over their heads. Maybe they had no experience in this kind of use of their weapons? We were also lucky in that as the Reds approached closer to the ditch and rampart, they clearly imagined the full significance for them of such an obstacle, which, as they were convinced, even their numerous artillery could not destroy. After a quarter of an hour, the entire attacking mass mixed up and lay down. It was impossible to imagine a worse situation for the Reds on purpose: for us, from the height of the rampart, they presented excellent targets, without the opportunity to hide anywhere, and it was here that they suffered the greatest losses. Our artillery also hit them, but not in the same way as always. It turns out that, in addition to damage from enemy artillery fire, it was partially withdrawn to the right, to the sector of the Drozdovskaya division, where the Reds broke through the estuary. Until the evening, this entire mass did not move under our fire, filling the air with the cries of the wounded. I happened to read in a history of the civil war published in the USSR a description of the attacks on Crimea, where it was reported that their losses at that time were up to 25 thousand people and that they stormed the Perekop Wall and destroyed our brother with bombs in reinforced concrete shelters, which we did not have there , but we had simple dugouts, covered with boards with earth. But despite this, the entire field was covered with Lenin and Trotsky killed and wounded in the name of the International of the proletarian revolution, while our situation kept getting worse.

The book “Blücher” describes this offensive as follows:

“On November 6 of the new style, on the eve of the celebration of the third anniversary of the great proletarian revolution, we were ready for the assault. The 15th and 52nd rifle divisions were moving towards the battlefield. Together with the 153rd Infantry Brigade and a separate cavalry brigade of the Perekop group, they were planned to strike through Sivash on the Lithuanian Peninsula, on the flank and rear of the Perekop position. The 152nd Rifle and Fire Shock Brigades were preparing for a frontal attack on the Turkish Wall. M.V. Frunze arrived at the headquarters of the 51st Infantry Division, located in Chaplinka, to personally supervise the operation. Wrangel concentrated his best units on the defense of Perekop. On the night of November 8, when the country celebrated the third anniversary of October, the 15th and 52nd rifle divisions and the 153rd and separate brigade of the 51st rifle division were in the piercing cold, drowning in the swamps of Sivash, shot by artillery and machine-gun fire, dragging carrying machine guns and guns, moved to attack the Lithuanian Peninsula. Early in the morning of November 8, they reached the White trenches and, breaking through the wire, drove out the troops of General Fostikov with bayonets (this was a detachment of Kuban soldiers with two machine guns).

There was silence at the artillery positions under the Turkish Wall. Thick fog covered the Turkish Wall. The tension was growing. From the Lithuanian Peninsula there are continuous requests: “What’s the matter?”

At nine o'clock the fog slowly cleared and all our 65 guns opened rapid fire. From the Turkish Wall the Whites bombarded us with fire. The seven-kilometer space under the shaft and on the shaft turned into a continuous sea of ​​craters. At about 12 o'clock the regiments of the shock and 152nd brigades with the 453rd regiment rushed to the assault. Suffering huge losses, they approached the Turkish Wall faster and closer. On the Lithuanian Peninsula, the Whites attack the 13th and 34th divisions (I remind you that the divisions of the Russian Army had three regiments, while the Reds had nine regiments, with one cavalry regiment per division. By this time, these two of our divisions were no more than two battalions ). At about 18 o'clock we attack the Turkish Wall again. Armored cars are in the first rows. At the very ditch, unexpectedly encountering wire, the infantry stopped again. The whole day of unprecedented battle had not yet brought victory, but the goal was already close. About 200 white guns and up to 400 machine guns hit our units.”

(The number of guns in our sector is exaggerated ten times, and the number of machine guns - four times. The Perekop Wall was occupied by only two Kornilov Shock Regiments, and the third regiment stood facing east, towards Sivashi, to protect against an attack from there).

During the battle on October 26/November 8, the 2nd Kornilov Shock Regiment lost 8 people killed and 40 people wounded. 35 horses were killed. All injuries were from artillery fire.

October 27/November 9. The Kornilov Shock Division left the Perekop Wall by one hour and retreated to the Yushun positions. The night was dark and starless. The battalion of Colonel Troshin was left in the rearguard of the division, which by one hour also abandoned the Perekop Wall. This is written about this in the book “Kornilov Shock Regiment”: “On the evening of October 26th art. Art. Colonel Levitov summoned Colonel Troshin and told him that with the onset of darkness, the entire Kornilov Shock Division had received orders to retreat to the Yushun positions, and his 2nd battalion was assigned to the rearguard. In order not to reveal your retreat to the enemy, it is necessary to shoot from rifles until the last moment. The impregnable Perekop Wall began to empty. The machine guns are taken away, the companies leave one after another. Colonel Troshin stretched his battalion along the trenches. The ominous silence was occasionally broken by a single shot. Finally the 2nd battalion withdrew. Without a single light of cigarettes, the Kornilovites passed through the Armenian Bazaar and, in the dead of night, were drawn into the first line of the Yushun fortifications.”

The combat logs of all three regiments of the Kornilov Shock Division noted that these fortifications were poorly equipped for defense.

Let's see how this assault on the Perekop positions is illuminated by Blucher's headquarters: “At night, about 24 hours (October 26/November 8), Frunze orders the attack to be resumed and demands to capture the rampart at any cost. We again threw the exhausted units into the assault and at about 3 o’clock on October 27/November 9, the impregnable Perekop fell.”

In fact, Perekop was abandoned by the Kornilovites without a fight and even before the Reds approached, according to the order of October 26, November, at 24 hours.

It is interesting what Blucher wrote in his reports to the commander of the 6th Soviet Army about the reasons for the failure of the assault on the Perekop fortifications: “It was not possible to take the Perekop fortified position by raid. The enemy provided himself with a small garrison, but it was equipped with colossal material. Positions are adapted to the tactical conditions of the terrain. This makes the isthmus almost impregnable."

In one gorgeously published history of the USSR, I read the same fabrication about the assault on the Perekop fortifications, where the Reds allegedly smoked out officers with bombs and flamethrowers from concrete fortifications, which in fact were not on the Perekop shaft, just as there was no “LEGENDARY STORM OF PEREKOPSKY” SHAFT IN RED" at 3 o'clock on October 27/November 9.

28 of October. At dawn, the enemy in large forces, supported by strong artillery fire, went on the offensive on the division's front. Despite the small number of the regiment and the fatigue of the people from long and difficult marches, accompanied by continuous and overwhelming battles, the regiment with courage held back the onslaught. However, the right-flank 1st Regiment was driven out of the first line by a Red attack from the Drozdovskaya Rifle Division, and the 3rd Regiment was under threat of attack from the rear. At this time, the temporary division commander, General Peshnya, took an armored car from the 2nd regiment and ordered the 3rd and 2nd regiments to launch a counterattack by telephone. I, the commander of the 2nd regiment, dared to point out the danger of the weak 3rd regiment being forfeited, and then the 2nd regiment would be pressed against the bay, but at that time I was informed that the 3rd regiment was already going beyond the wire to attack.

I then considered the attack unnecessary and risky, but the inappropriate haste of the commander of the 3rd regiment was forced to expose his regiment to the bullets of the Reds, and not throw them back again with the force of his fire. When the 2nd Regiment went beyond the wire, the 3rd Regiment, in a thin chain, led by its regimental commander, Colonel Shcheglov, on horseback, was already moving towards the Red trenches under the howl of enemy machine guns. The futility of a counterattack in the conditions created for us weighed heavily on me. Shells and bullets rained down on the 2nd Regiment, which calmly and unitedly launched a counterattack. Busy with the fate of my regiment, I did not pay attention to the actions of the 3rd regiment, but when I looked at its sector, I saw a sad picture of its retreat, now without the regiment commander, who was wounded in this sortie. Here I ordered them to retreat to their trenches under the cover of machine guns.

Passing through the wire fence, I stopped to take another look at the situation in the 3rd Regiment’s sector, but here came the end of my command of the valiant 2nd Kornilov Shock Regiment. The bullet hit me in the left groin, piercing a thick bag of maps, and stopped in the spine of the spine. She knocked me off my horse, almost instantly paralyzing both legs. Eight years later, in Bulgaria, Dr. Berzin performed an operation on me and presented me with a Russian sharp-pointed bullet with a bent end, which inflicted my thirteenth wound in the struggle for the honor and dignity of national RUSSIA, as a souvenir of the Motherland. At the same time as me, my assistant Colonel Lysan, Anton Evtikhievich, was also wounded in the groin, but right through. Colonel Troshin took command of the regiment, and Captain Vozovik became his assistant.

In this battle, the following officers were wounded: the temporary commander of the division, General Peshnya, and the commander of the Kornilov artillery brigade, General Erogin, took temporary command of the division; the commander of the 1st Kornilov Shock Regiment, Colonel Gordeenko, and the regiment was received by Lieutenant Colonel Shirkovsky; the commander of the 3rd Kornilov Shock Regiment, Colonel Shcheglov, and his assistant Colonel Pooh, and the regiment was received by Colonel Minervin.

Despite the failure, the division still held on to its sector.

In the book: “Markovites in battles and campaigns for RUSSIA,” page 345, they paint a picture of their approach to the right flank of our division to relieve us and incorrectly indicate the distribution of regiments that actually occupied sectors like this: on the right flank of the division, to Lake Salt, there was the 1st regiment, to the left - the 3rd regiment, and on the very left flank stood the 2nd regiment, all the way to the Perekop Bay.

On October 28, General Wrangel gathered representatives of the Russian and foreign press and informed them of the current situation, saying: “An army that fought not only for the honor and freedom of the Motherland, but also for the common cause of world culture and civilization, an army that had just stopped the bloody war that had spread over Europe. the hand of the Moscow executioners, abandoned by the whole world, bled to death. A handful of naked, hungry, exhausted heroes continue to defend the last inch of their native land. Their strength is coming to an end, and if not today, then tomorrow they may be thrown into the sea. They will hold out to the end, saving those who sought protection behind their bayonets. I have taken all measures to take out everyone who is in danger of bloody reprisals in case of misfortune. I have the right to hope that those states for whose common cause my Army fought will show hospitality to the unfortunate exiles.”

29th of October At dawn, under strong enemy pressure, the Kornilov Shock Division, according to orders, began to retreat to Yushun. From there, due to the complicated situation, the division retreats further south, along the Yushun - Simferopol - Sevastopol road.

* * *

After describing the last battles for Perekop and our abandonment of Crimea, according to our data, we should also be interested in our enemy’s view of this, which I take from the newspaper “Russkaya Mysl” dated December 7, 1965, set out in an article by D. Prokopenko.

TAKING THE DIGGING

For the forty-fifth anniversary.

The 6th Soviet Army, which stormed the Perekop-Yushun positions of the Whites in November 1920, was commanded by Kork (1887-1937). Estonian by birth, he graduated from the Chuguev Military School in 1908, and from the General Staff Academy in 1914. In the old Army he had the rank of lieutenant colonel (I insert: in 1937 he was shot for his service in the Red Army. Now, probably, he is registered in the synod of the Red Commanders-in-Chief: “repressed”, “rehabilitated”). Kork made a report on the capture of Perekop and the Yushun positions at the Yekaterinoslav garrison military-scientific audience on November 1, 1921 (“Stages of the Great Path”, military publishing house of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Moscow 1963),

“The troops of the 6th Army approached Perekop on the evening of October 29. The 1st and 2nd cavalry, the 4th and the 13th armies merged into the 4th arrived in the area of ​​the Chongar Peninsula a few days later. The white positions were divided into three groups: the Turkish Wall (the main fortifications), then a number of Yushun positions (their strength lies in depth), and to the east - the Sivash positions, along the southern shore of the Sivash (Rotten Sea), these fortifications were weak. The White command did not mean that the northwestern part of Sivash was dry. The summer and autumn of 1920 were dry, there were almost no winds from the east, and therefore the water went to the southeast. Information about this state of the sea began to reach the red headquarters only after October 29.

Strengths of the parties. In total, Wrangel had on the Perekop Isthmus up to 13 and a half thousand infantry soldiers, up to 6 thousand cavalry soldiers, about 750 machine guns, 160 guns and 43 armored cars (I ask the reader to pay attention to the fact that Perekop was occupied at that time by only two Kornilovskaya regiments The shock division, the 3rd regiment was in reserve, with a retreat back, to the south, and a front to Sivashi, to protect our rear, and plus, all three regiments, when retreating from the Dnieper, suffered enormous losses and were reduced by 2/3 of their small strength , that is, in total the division had no more than 1,200 bayonets. There could be no more than STA machine guns in three regiments, and as for our Kornilov artillery brigade, from its composition in three divisions in the last battle for Perekop, some of them were taken to repel attacks Reds from the Sivash side. There was no cavalry on Perekop, not even our regimental cavalry squadrons. In general, the commander of the 6th Red Army greatly exaggerated our forces on Perekop with the express purpose of increasing the merits of his army, when in fact our fate was then decided by Pilsudski with the support France by concluding peace, as during the Battle of Orel, when Pilsudski concluded a truce with Lenin, and the Red Army crushed us with its colossal superiority. Colonel Levitov).

Red forces: 34,833 infantry soldiers, 4,352 cavalry, 965 machine guns, 165 guns, 3 tanks, 14 armored cars and 7 aircraft.

If we compare the forces of the parties, - Kork reports, - then our numerical superiority over Wrangel is immediately striking: in infantry we outnumbered him by more than twice, while Wrangel had more cavalry, but here we need to take into account the presence of the 1st and 2nd th cavalry armies, which could be transferred at any moment to the Perekop Isthmus with the aim of crossing it and advancing to the Crimea. As for artillery, in general the enemy seemed to have superiority, but his artillery was extremely scattered. If we compare the number of artillery in attack directions, then superiority in artillery was on our side.

So, comparing the number of sides, it should be admitted that enormous superiority was on our side.”

The Red High Command believed that the fight for Perekop would be positional, as in the “imperialist” war. But, having learned that the northwestern part of Sivash was passable, the commander of the 6th decided to deliver the main blow through Sivash and the Lithuanian Peninsula to Armyansk. Preparation for the operation was as follows; 2 brigades of the 51st Infantry Division were to strike at the Turkish Wall, and the other two brigades from the 1st Cavalry were to advance around the right flank of the Whites occupying the Perekop Isthmus. The 52nd and 15th divisions were supposed to go behind enemy lines through Sivash and the Lithuanian Peninsula. The Latvian division was left in the army reserve.

Military operations began on the night of November 7–8. The 51st Division, due to fog, began artillery preparation on the Turkish Wall at 10 a.m., and at 2 a.m. the attackers began cutting the wire, but were repulsed by concentrated white fire. In the attack resumed at 6 p.m., the Reds suffered heavy losses and retreated. The Whites counterattacked the Red Brigade (153rd), which was going around their right flank.

On the night of November 7–8, other red units begin an attack on the Lithuanian peninsula and advance deeper into it, despite vigorous counterattacks by white infantry with armored vehicles.

So, by 18:00 on November 8, the Reds had no success either in front of the Turkish cash or on the Lithuanian Peninsula, since the Whites were constantly launching counterattacks. But the entry of two rifle divisions into the flank and rear of the Whites occupying the Turkish Wall created a critical situation for them. The Red Command gives the order to storm the rampart with two brigades, and the remaining units to strike in the direction of Armyansk. The assault on the rampart began at 2 a.m. (152nd Rifle and Fire Brigade), but only the rearguards of the Whites remained on it, who had already begun their retreat... The Turkish rampart was taken without great losses (no losses at all).

On the morning of November 9, stubborn fighting began everywhere, but the White reserves (with Barbovich’s cavalry) could not delay the Reds’ advance. The 51st Division on the evening of November 9 approached the first line of the Yushun positions... Breakthrough of the Yushun positions on November 10 and 11. Here begins a series of decisive battles on which the fate of Crimea depends. In his order, General Barbovich says: “There cannot be a single step back, this is unacceptable in the general situation, we must die, but not retreat.” The following take part in the breakthrough: the 51st, 52nd and 15th rifle divisions, and then the Latvian one. Cork, due to severe frosts and the lack of fresh water in this area, orders all Yushun police to pass through in one day, regardless of losses. The task was not completed completely, but nevertheless, on November 10, the 51st Division broke through three lines, here the white defenders were supported by artillery from ships (as the commander of the 2nd Kornilov Shock Regiment, which occupied the very left flank of the white positions, all the way to the Perekop Bay, I testify, that I did not see or hear about the firing of our ships in these battles. Colonel Levitov),

On the left flank they were able to capture only the first fortified line. On the morning of November 11, the Latvian and 51st rifle divisions attacked the last line and broke through it. A series of White attacks failed to stop the movement, and the Reds occupied Yushun railway station around 9 am. On the left flank of the Reds, the Whites were preparing a decisive blow to eliminate the offensive. Fierce attacks alternated from both sides. At about 11 o'clock, the white units, with the support of the officer (which then no longer existed) Kornilov and Drozdov divisions, resumed counterattacks and pushed back the Reds. Then Cork orders two brigades to strike in the rear. The white resistance was broken and they began a gradual retreat...” “The operation to capture the Perekop-Yushun positions was completed by the evening of November 11,” says Cork, “and with this the fate of Wrangel’s army was decided.” Further movement deeper into Crimea took place without fighting.

In Cork, Red losses were 45 command personnel and 605 Red Army soldiers. He explains such small losses by the combination of maneuver with attack and the speed of the offensive, which did not allow the enemy to put his units in order. The overall goal - the destruction of the enemy - was not achieved, since the cavalry did not break forward in a timely manner (here Kork, in order to raise his authority, recalled the definition of the value of battle in the opinion of the authorities of the Imperial Army: “Success with small losses is the joy of the commander,” but in fact Cork this could not have happened, and the Soviet Marshal Blucher seemed to have a different opinion about the same battles. In the book “Marshal Blucher”, page 199, in the order for the 51st Moscow Division dated November 9, 1920 No. 0140/ops , Chaplinka village, § 4, the losses during the capture of Perekop are stated as follows: "The brigade commanders act decisively, the main obstacles are in our hands. Remember that energy is in pursuit WILL REWARD FOR HEAVY LOSSES, suffered in battles for the impregnable positions of the Turkish Wall. Signed: Chief of the 51st Blucher, Head of the General Staff Dadyak.” So, according to the Reds, they stormed the Perekop shaft in THREE hours November 9, knocking us out of concrete fortifications, when we didn’t have any of those at all, and there was no one to knock out, since Colonel Troshin's last battalion left the rampart by order at 24 hours on November 8. I also dare, at least in my humble position as commander of the 2nd Kornilov Shock Regiment, which was then defending the left part of the Perekop Wall, to assure Comrade Kork that the losses just in front of the rampart should be ten times greater. Cork should not especially regret that they did not exterminate us, but they saved the prepared gas cylinders in case General Wrangel had not appreciated the hopelessness of our situation and had not prepared ships for the patriots of RUSSIA who wished to leave their Homeland. And yet we have to believe that retribution exists: the famous Soviet heroes of these battles, Kork and Blucher, deservedly received a bullet in the back of the head from their leader for betraying their Motherland. Colonel Levitov).

The defensive system of the Perekop bridgehead consisted of two fortified areas, on which parts of the Russian Army of P. N. Wrangel took positions.

The Perekop fortified area was a fortified zone of three lines of defense. The main line of defense was the Perekop shaft, called the Turkish one - this ancient fortification, 9 km long, was interrupted at the city of Perekop, where a stone fortification was erected.

Two other lines of defense were located north of the Turkish Wall, covering the city of Perekop from the north, and stretched in a northeast direction, abutting the Sivash Bay. The flanks of the fortifications were covered by the Perekop Bay and Sivash.

The second - Yushunsky fortified area was a second line of fortifications and consisted of four defensive lines surrounded by wire fences, interrupting the isthmuses formed by the lakes and Sivash. Rifle trenches stretched along the bank of the Sivash, abutting the Taganash fortified junction, consisting of two defensive lines.

On the Perekop Isthmus, units of the Russian Army concentrated a large number of machine guns, light and heavy artillery, which was reinforced by the installation of new guns removed from the Sevastopol forts and ships of the Black Sea Fleet.

But Sivash in the northwestern part was almost dry, and its bottom, hardened by frost, was solid soil, convenient for crossing the bay not only with infantry, but also with artillery. The only obstacle to the crossing of the bay by Soviet troops was the east wind, which drove water from the Sea of ​​Azov - and the water flooded the dry bottom.

The units of the Soviet 6th Army, brought up to the isthmus by the beginning of November 1920, concentrated as follows.

The 1st Rifle Division guarded the Black Sea coast from the Kinburn Spit to Alekseevka; The 51st Rifle Division, having advanced the 153rd and separate cavalry brigades to the Pervokonstantinovka area, units of the 151st and Fire brigades were located in front of the Turkish Wall (the 151st brigade occupied the area from Perekop Bay to the highway, and the Fire brigade - from the highway to Sivash) ; The 15th Infantry Division occupied the Stroganovka - N. Nikolaevka - Sergeevka - Gromovka section; The 52nd Rifle Division was concentrated in the Agaiman - Novorepyevka - Uspenskaya area; The Latvian Rifle Division was in the army reserve.

The combat strength of the army units intended to storm the positions of the white troops (minus the 1st Infantry Division, which guarded the Black Sea coast) was 27.5 thousand bayonets and 2.7 thousand sabers.

The Perekopsky sector was defended by the following troops of the Russian Army: Perekopsky Val - by units of the 13th Infantry Division; The Lithuanian Peninsula - by units of the 1st Brigade of the 2nd Kuban Division and the Consolidated Guards Regiment, and the 34th Infantry Division was concentrated in reserve in the area of ​​Armyansk. The combat strength of the white group is 2.2 thousand bayonets and 720 sabers.

From November 1 to 7, the Reds made systematic preparations for the assault on the fortifications; They looked for fords across Sivash, brought up artillery, and carried out engineering work to equip infantry positions and destroy enemy wire barriers.

The 6th Army, reinforced by the 2nd Cavalry and Insurgent Armies, was ordered to cross the Vladimirovka-Stroganovka-Kurgan section and strike in the rear of the Perekop positions, while simultaneously storming them from the front. The rebel army of N.I. Makhno was ordered to be immediately transported to the Kurgan-Kat metro station and thrown to the rear of the Perekop positions in the direction of Dyurmen.

The divisions of the 6th Army were assigned the following tasks:

51st - attack the Turkish Wall along the Chaplinka-Armenian Bazaar road, striking the enemy occupying the Turkish Wall in the rear - by moving at least two brigades in the direction of Vladimirovka-Karajanai-Armenian Bazaar.

52nd - strike in the direction of the Lithuanian Peninsula and further south.

15th - interact with the Rebel Army and secure the Lithuanian Peninsula.

The Latvian Rifle Division and the 2nd Cavalry Army are in reserve.

Considering the fact that the 13th and 34th infantry divisions, having suffered heavy losses in previous battles, were numerically weak, the white command on November 5-6 began regrouping units, according to which the 2nd Army Corps was replaced by units of the 1st ( Markovskaya, Kornilovskaya and Drozdovskaya shock divisions) and were withdrawn to the rear for reorganization. Units of the 1st Corps were reinforced by units of cadet schools and had behind the right flank the Cavalry Corps of I. G. Barbovich, consisting of the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Divisions and the Terek-Astrakhan Brigade. These were tested, strong and persistent units, welded together by a long joint struggle. The combat strength of the defending units increased noticeably. But the command of the Russian Army was late with the regrouping: only on November 8, already during the fighting, parts of the 1st Army Corps arrived in the Perekop region and began to replace units of the 2nd Corps, leaving parts of the Markov Division in the area of ​​the station. Dzhankoy. The Drozdovskaya division was supposed to replace units of the 13th Infantry Division on the Turkish Wall, and the Kornilovskaya division was to take positions east of Armyansk. But since the Kornilov division was late, and the red units had already occupied the Lithuanian peninsula, knocking down parts of the 1st brigade of the 2nd Kuban division and the Consolidated Guards regiment, the command of the Drozdovskaya division was forced to leave two regiments on the Turkish Wall, and abandon the other two to fend off strike of the Reds in the area of ​​the Lithuanian Peninsula.

At 22:00 on November 5, the Rebel Army began crossing Sivash, but, not even halfway through, the Makhnovists returned back, citing the fact that the wind had driven a lot of water and Sivash was supposedly impassable.

At 22:00 on November 7, the active phase of the operation began - units of the 52nd and 15th divisions began crossing Sivash. Communist strike groups, assault teams and demolition men were sent forward to cut the wire.

Thanks to searchlights, the defenders discovered the Reds, opening deadly artillery and machine-gun fire on them. Suffering heavy losses, by 2 o'clock on November 8, Soviet units approached the barbed wire barriers located 100-150 steps from the Lithuanian Peninsula, and by 7 o'clock units of the 15th and 52nd divisions broke through the fortified zone and captured white positions.

At the same time, the 153rd brigade of the 51st division crossed the bay and launched an offensive in the direction of Karajanai.

At dawn on November 8, the right-flank units of the 51st Division located in front of the Perekop Wall began to destroy the wire barriers. The demolitions, suffering heavy losses, did their job.

At 10 o'clock the first attacks on the fortifications of the Turkish Hall began.
By this time, units of the 15th and 52nd divisions occupied the Lithuanian Peninsula. White began to retreat behind his first fortified line.

Two brigades of the 16th division and one brigade of the 52nd launched an attack on fortified positions from Sivash to the Armyansk - Kolodezi road, and the 154th brigade of the 52nd division and parts of the 153rd brigade of the 51st division - in a southwestern direction to Armyansk.

In this sector, the White command brought into battle, in addition to the brigade of the Kuban Division and the Consolidated Guards Regiment, units of the 34th and 13th Infantry Divisions, which had not yet managed to retreat to the rear.

At about 2 p.m., units of the 152nd and Fire brigades, despite the hurricane fire of the defenders and heavy losses, approached the rampart at a distance of 100 steps. In front of the Red Infantry chains there was a third line of barbed wire and a ditch surrounded by barbed wire. The demolition men moved forward again. Now the whites could fire at the attackers not only with machine-gun and artillery fire, but also with the fire of bombs, mortars, and throw hand grenades at them.

By the end of the day, the Soviet units, having come within 50 steps of the rampart, were forced to retreat to their original position.

By the end of the day, the Whites pushed back the Soviet units in the area of ​​the Lithuanian Peninsula. Strong units, reinforced with armored vehicles, were thrown at the 153rd and 154th brigades, but with the support of reserves, the Reds held out.

Outflanked from the east and fearing to be completely cut off, the Whites began to withdraw their units from the Perekop Wall to the Yushun positions on the evening of November 8th.

At 2 o'clock on November 9, units of the 152nd Rifle and Fire Brigades again stormed the Turkish Wall, captured it at 4 o'clock, and by 15 o'clock they reached the first line of the Yushun fortified positions. At the same time, units of the 153rd brigade occupied Karajanai, and the 152nd brigade occupied Armyansk.

On the afternoon of November 9, all Soviet divisions began an attack on the Yushun positions.

The command of the Russian army, deciding to wrest the initiative from the hands of its enemy, launched a counterattack. On the night of November 9, having pulled up the cavalry corps of I. G. Barbovich to Lake Bezymyanny (up to 4.5 thousand sabers with 30 guns, 4 armored vehicles and 150 machine guns), it struck the left flank 15th Division, capturing fortified positions on the southern bank of Sivash. But with the approach of the reserve, the further advance of the white cavalry was stopped.

Trying to get to the rear of the 15th division, at about 15 o'clock the cavalry group, supported by armored vehicles, was thrown a second time onto the left flank of this formation - and it managed to break through in the Sivash - Bezymyannye Lake section. Parts of the Soviet division began to retreat, but in time the machine-gun regiment of the Insurgent Army, which was transferred to the breakthrough area, restored the situation with dagger machine-gun fire. The Makhnovist machine-gun carts played a key role.

Having captured the entire Perekop fortified area, by the evening of November 9, Soviet units positioned themselves in front of the Yushun positions.
The Latvian Rifle Division was brought into battle.

The dawn of November 10th began with the Whites' offensive - they again attacked the Reds' left flank and again pushed it back.

Units of the 51st Division (152nd and Fire Brigades), which by this time had occupied the Yushun positions, were moved eastward - to strike in the rear of the white units. The flanking maneuver saved the left flank of the Soviet group - fearing to be cut off, the Whites stopped further advance and began to retreat in the southern and southeastern directions. On the shoulders of the enemy, Soviet units captured the last White fortifications and poured into the Crimea in a rapid stream.

The main reasons for the rapid success of Soviet troops during the Crimean operation were the following: a) the surprise of the assault on defensive positions; b) successful use of workaround maneuvers; c) the lack of reliable large reserves among the white command (the offensive caught the command of the Russian Army at the stage of reorganizing a number of formations, which greatly facilitated the task of the attackers); d) the small number of units of the defender; e) belated replacement of weak units of the 13th and 34th infantry divisions of the Russian Army with persistent shock units of the 1st Army Corps; f) the specifics of the terrain of the Perekop Isthmus - the white cavalry, initially numerically superior to the red one, could not turn around to strike and, if it managed to make a breakthrough, then falling into the rear of the red units, it came across large reserves.

All these circumstances were of key importance at the final stage of the Civil War in southern Russia - during the battle for Crimea.

Assault on Perekop

“The decisive battle in Northern Tavria ended. The enemy captured the entire territory captured from him during the summer. Large military booty fell into his hands: 5 armored trains, 18 guns, about 100 wagons with shells, 10 million cartridges, 25 locomotives, trains with food and quartermaster's property and about two million poods of grain in Melitopol and Genichesk. Our units suffered severe losses in killed, wounded and frostbitten. A significant number were left behind as prisoners and stragglers, mainly from among the former Red Army soldiers brought into service at different times. There were isolated cases and mass surrender. So one of the battalions of the Drozdovsky division surrendered entirely. However, the army remained intact and our units, in turn, captured 15 guns, about 2000 prisoners, many weapons and machine guns.

The army remained intact, but its combat effectiveness was no longer the same. Could this army, relying on a fortified position, withstand enemy attacks? Over six months of hard work, fortifications were created that made the enemy’s access to Crimea extremely difficult: trenches were dug, wire was woven, heavy guns were installed, and machine-gun nests were built. All technical means of the Sevastopol fortress were used. The completed railway line to Yushun made it possible to fire at the approaches with armored trains. Only dugouts, shelters and dugouts for the troops were not completed. The lack of labor and the lack of forest materials slowed down the work. The frosts that arrived at an unprecedentedly early time created especially unfavorable conditions, since the defense line lay in a sparsely populated area and the housing problem for the troops became especially acute.

Even in the first days after the conclusion of peace with the Poles, having decided to take the battle in Northern Tavria, I took into account the possibility of an unfavorable outcome for us and that the enemy, having won, would burst into Crimea on the shoulders of our troops. No matter how strong a position is, it will inevitably fall if the spirit of the troops defending it is undermined.

I then ordered General Shatilov to check the evacuation plan drawn up by the headquarters, together with the fleet commander. The latter was designed to evacuate 60,000 people. I ordered that calculations be made for 75,000; ordered the urgent delivery of the missing supply of coal and oil from Constantinople.

As soon as it became clear that our departure to the Crimea was inevitable, I ordered the urgent preparation of ships in the ports of Kerch, Feodosia and Yalta for 13,000 people and 4,000 horses. The assignment was explained by the supposed landing in the Odessa area to establish contact with Russian units operating in Ukraine. In order to completely conceal my assumptions, all measures were taken to ensure that the version about the preparation of ships for a future landing operation was believed. Thus, the headquarters was ordered to spread rumors that a landing was planned for Kuban. The very size of the detachment was planned in accordance with the total number of troops, so it could not arouse any special doubts in those even knowledgeable about the size of the army. The ships were ordered to load food and military supplies.

Thus, having a certain amount of free tonnage in the Sevastopol port, in case of an accident, I could quickly load 40-50 thousand people in the main ports - Sevastopol, Yalta, Feodosia and Kerch and, under the cover of retreating troops, save those under their protection women, children, wounded and sick” - this is how Wrangel assessed the situation that had developed by the time the Reds reached Perekop.

Back on September 21, 1920, by order of the Revolutionary Military Council, the Southern Front was formed, headed by M.V. Frunze. The new front included the 6th (formed from the Right Bank Group), 13th and 2nd Cavalry Armies. At the same time, the 12th and 1st Cavalry Armies were transferred to the Southwestern Front, and the latter was preparing to be transferred to the Southern Front.

In October 1920, the Reds concluded the Starobel Agreement with Nestor Makhno. Makhno received “some internal autonomy” and the right to recruit into his army on the territory of Soviet Russia. All units of the Makhnovist army were operationally subordinate to the Southern Front. Now a number of incompetent authors have gone so far as to claim that it was the Makhnovists who took Perekop and liberated Crimea. In fact, by the beginning of 1920, Makhno had about four thousand bayonets and a thousand sabers, as well as a thousand non-combatants. They had 12 cannons and 250 machine guns.1

Wrangel chose Dzhankoy for his bet. On October 22 (November 4), the baron gave the troops a directive:

“The defense of Crimea was entrusted to General Kutepov, in whose hands the troops united; from the Sea of ​​Azov to the Chuvash Peninsula inclusive, the 3rd Don Division was located, until it was replaced in this sector by the 34th Infantry Division, which in turn was to be replaced on the right section of the Perekop Wall by the 1st Brigade of the 2nd Kuban Division on October 24;

The 1st and 2nd Don divisions were to concentrate in reserve in the area north of Bohemka; The 3rd Don Division was supposed to be deployed to the same area after the shift;

the middle section of Sivash was defended by the Don Officer Regiment, the Ataman Junker School and dismounted rifle squadrons of the cavalry corps;

the cavalry corps with the Kuban division was ordered to concentrate in reserve in the area south of Chirik;

By October 26, the Kornilov division was supposed to replace the 13th Infantry Division on the left section of the Perekop rampart; the latter temporarily, until the arrival of the Markov division, remained in the reserve of the 1st Army Corps in the Voinka area; The Drozdov division was supposed to concentrate in the Armenian Bazaar by October 26;

The Markov Division, retreating along the Arbat Spit to Akmanai, was to be transported by rail to the Yushuni area.

Upon completion of the regrouping of all units of the 1st Army by October 29, the right combat sector from the Sea of ​​Azov to the Chuvash Peninsula inclusive was to be defended by units of the 2nd Army Corps of General Vitkovsky; the left section, from the Chuvash Peninsula to the Perekop Bay, was transferred to the 1st Army Corps of General Pisarev.”

And that same night the baron, just in case, went to Sevastopol. As Slashchev quipped: “Closer to the water.”

On October 25 (November 7), Wrangel declared Crimea under a state of siege. In the Notes, the baron paints a rosy picture:

“The measures taken managed to dispel the emerging anxiety. The rear remained calm, believing in the inaccessibility of the Perekop strongholds. On October 26, a congress of representatives of cities opened in Simferopol, in its resolution welcoming the policy of the government of the South of Russia and expressing its readiness to help the government with all its might. A congress of press representatives was being prepared for October 30th in Sevastopol. Life went on as usual. Shops were trading briskly. The theaters and cinemas were full.

On October 25, the Kornilov Union organized a charity concert and evening. Having drowned out the painful anxiety in my heart, I accepted the invitation. My absence at the evening organized by the union of the regiment, on whose lists I was a member, could give rise to alarming explanations. I stayed at the evening until 11 o’clock, listening and not hearing musical numbers, straining every effort to find a kind word to the wounded officer, a courtesy to the lady manager...”

In mid-October, Wrangel, having examined the Perekop fortifications, smugly declared to the foreign representatives who were with him: “Much has been done, much remains to be done, but Crimea is already impregnable for the enemy.”

Alas, the baron was wishful thinking. The construction of fortifications at the Perekop-Sivash position was led by General Ya.D. Yuzefovich. Then he was replaced by General Makeev, who was the head of work on the fortifications of the Perekop Isthmus. Back in July 1920, Makeev in a report addressed to Wrangel’s assistant, General P.N. Shatilov reported that almost all capital work to strengthen Perekop is carried out mainly on paper, since building materials are supplied “in pharmaceutical doses.” There were practically no dugouts or dugouts where troops could take refuge in the autumn-winter period on the isthmus.

The head of the French military mission, General A. Brousseau, who inspected the Chongar fortifications from November 6 to 11 (NS), wrote in a report to the French Minister of War: “... the program allowed me to visit the location of the Cossack division in Taganash and three batteries located near the railway bridge via Sivash. These are the following batteries:

Two 10-inch guns east of the railroad;

Two old-style field guns on the very bank of the Sivash;

The 152 mm Kane guns are slightly behind the previous ones.

These batteries seemed to me to be very well equipped, but little suited, with the exception of field guns, to the role which the troops were to play in the coming battles. The 10-inch battery had concrete shelters and consisted of at least 15 officers among its personnel. Her fire was well prepared and could fit well into the entire organization of artillery fire, in which the defense of positions at close range would be carried out by field guns. But these were precisely the guns that were missing! Fire support for the infantry was also poorly organized. On the bank of the Sivash, near the stone embankment of the railway, there were approximately up to a company of personnel; the nearest military units were located five miles from there, in Taganash. In response to the remark I made, they answered that the lack of equipped positions forced the troops to be withdrawn to places where they could get shelter from the cold.

It must be agreed that the temperature remained very low in early December, that the soldiers were very poorly dressed, and that there was a shortage of firewood in the area.

The terrain otherwise made the defense easier, despite the poor disposition of the troops. From this point of view, Crimea is connected to the continent only through a dam and a railway bridge (the bridge was blown up). Of course, there are fords across Sivash, but the shore is a clay mountain with peaks 10 to 20 meters high, absolutely insurmountable.

In the division that I saw in Taganash, there was no confidence in victory. The commander-in-chief told me that the Cossacks were not suitable for this trench warfare and that it was better to take them to the rear and reorganize them into more serious units. The division's personnel had the same number of fighters in the rear as on the front line.

Meanwhile, I crossed three lines of defense established in the rear of Sivash; the first two of them were an insignificant network of fortifications, the third line was a little more serious, but they were all located in one line, without flanking positions, on the slopes facing the enemy, or on the very crest of the hill, too close to each other (from 500 to 800 m) and did not have any trenches in depth."

Soviet military historians significantly exaggerated the power of the enemy fortifications. Nevertheless, I think it is worth citing their opinion. Moreover, the question of defense capabilities on the isthmus is very important, and not so much for the Civil War as for the Great Patriotic War.

“The main line of defense of the Perekop positions was created on an artificially poured ancient Turkish rampart, which had a width at the base of over 15 m and a height of 8 m and crossed the isthmus from southwest to northeast. The length of the shaft reached 11 km. The rampart was equipped with strong shelters, trenches, machine gun nests, as well as firing positions for light guns for direct fire. In front of the rampart there was a ditch 20-30 m wide and 10 m deep. A wire fence with 5-6 rows of stakes was installed along the entire length in front of the fortified position. All approaches to the wire fences and the ditch were flanked by machine-gun fire.

The second line of fortifications on the Perekop Isthmus ran northwest of Ishun, 20-25 km southeast and south of the Turkish Wall. At this position, 4-6 lines of trenches with wire fences and long-term defensive structures were built.

Behind the Ishun positions there was long-range enemy artillery, capable of keeping the entire depth of the defense under fire. The artillery density at the Perekop positions was 6-7 guns per 1 km of front. There were about 170 guns at the Ishun positions, which were reinforced by artillery fire from 20 ships from the sea.

The positions of the Lithuanian Peninsula were not completely completed. They consisted of trenches and in some areas had wire fences.

The Chongar fortifications were even more impregnable, since the Chongar Peninsula itself is connected to the Crimea by a narrow dam several meters wide, and the Sivash railway and Chongar highway bridges were destroyed by the Whites.

On the Taganash Peninsula, the enemy created two fortified lines, and on Tyup-Dzhankoysky - six fortified lines. All fortified lines consisted of a system of trenches (in a number of areas connected into continuous trenches), machine-gun nests and dugouts for sheltering manpower. Wire fences were built in all areas. On the Arabat Strelka, the enemy prepared six fortified lines that crossed the spit along the front. The Chongar Isthmus and the Arabat Spit had a small width, which made it difficult for the attacking troops to maneuver and created advantages for the defenders. Chongar positions were reinforced with a large amount of artillery, armored trains and other equipment.”2

Indeed, white armored trains played an important role in the defense of Crimea. By 1914, only one railway line, Salkovo - Dzhankoy, led to Crimea, passing through the Chongar Peninsula and Sivash. In 1916, the Sarabuz-Evpatoria line was put into operation. And in 1920, the Whites completed the construction of the Dzhankoy - Armyansk branch in order to be able to deliver equipment and troops to Perekop. It is clear that this was not enough. It was necessary to build several rolling railways near the isthmus for the transfer of troops and the operation of armored trains.

Exactly how many guns there were at the Perekop-Sivash position is not available in the historical literature; I was not able to find them in the archives. True, I found a file about the removal of heavy White guns from Perekop positions at the end of 1924. There they were talking about three 203-mm English howitzers MK VI, eight 152/45-mm Kane guns, two 152-mm fortress guns of 190 pounds3 and four 127 mm English guns.

I will outline the Reds’ plan for capturing the Crimean Isthmus according to the Soviet official closed publication “History of Domestic Artillery”: “Planning the operation to defeat Wrangel in Crimea, M.V. Frunze based it on a historical example. Using it, he planned to bypass the enemy's Chongar positions along the Arabat Spit with crossing Sivash at the mouth of the Salgir River. “This maneuver to the side,” wrote M.V. Frunze, “was carried out by Field Marshal Lassi in 1737. Lassi’s armies, having deceived the Crimean Khan, who stood with his main forces at Perekop, moved along the Arabat Spit and, having crossed to the peninsula at the mouth Salgir, went to the rear of the khan’s troops and quickly captured Crimea.”

Preliminary reconnaissance showed that the enemy had a relatively weak defense on the Arabat Spit, and the eastern coast of the peninsula was guarded only by horse patrols.

For the safe movement of troops along the Arabat Spit, it was necessary to ensure an operation from the Sea of ​​Azov, where a flotilla of small enemy vessels was operating. This task was assigned to the Azov flotilla, located in Taganrog. However, the Azov flotilla, due to the ice that bound Taganrog Bay in early November, was unable to arrive in the Genichesk area. Therefore, Frunze abandoned the original plan of using the Arabat Spit for the main attack and made a new decision. New decision by M.V. Frunze's conclusion was that the 6th Army should, no later than November 8, with the forces of the 15th and 52nd rifle divisions, the 153rd brigade of the 51st division and a separate cavalry brigade, cross the Sivash in the Vladimirovka, Stroganovka, Cape Kugaran section and strike a blow to the rear of the enemy occupying the Perekop fortifications. At the same time, the 51st Division was supposed to attack the Perekop positions from the front. To develop success, the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Armies were brought up to the Perekop direction. The start of the operation was scheduled for the night of November 7–8.

The troops of the 4th Army were supposed to break through the Chongar fortifications.

Thus, the troops of the Southern Front struck in two directions with a concentration of forces on the right wing of the front, where the main task of the operation was being solved...

The strike group of the 6th Army, intended to cross Sivash and bypass the Perekop fortifications, concentrated 36 light guns of the 52nd division. This gave triple superiority over the artillery of the Kuban-Astrakhan brigade of General Fostikov, which occupied the Lithuanian Peninsula and had only 12 guns.

For direct artillery support of the first echelon of troops that were supposed to cross Sivash, two escort platoons were allocated from the 1st and 2nd divisions of the 52nd Infantry Division. These platoons, to assist them in moving through Sivash, received half a company of riflemen each. The rest of the artillery of the strike group occupied firing positions in the area of ​​Vladimirovka and Stroganovka with the task of supporting the infantry advance with battery fire from the northern bank of Sivash. After the strike group captured the 1st line of fortifications of the Lithuanian Peninsula, it was planned to move the 1st and 2nd divisions to the peninsula: the 3rd division was supposed to support the infantry advance from its previous positions and cover the retreat of the strike group in case the crossing failed.

The 51st Rifle Division, operating against the Perekop positions, was reinforced by the artillery of the 15th Division and had 55 guns, which were united in the hands of the chief of artillery of the 51st Division V.A. Budilovich and are reduced to four groups: right, middle, left and anti-battery.

The first group, consisting of twelve light and three heavy guns under the command of the commander of the 2nd division of the 51st division, had the task of ensuring a breakthrough by the 152nd brigade of the 51st division of the Perekop fortifications.

The middle group, consisting of ten light and four heavy guns, also had the task of ensuring a breakthrough by the 152nd brigade of the Perekop fortifications and therefore it was subordinate to the commander of the right artillery group. Consequently, the right and middle groups actually constituted one group of 29 guns, which had a single mission and a common command.

The left group, consisting of twelve light and seven heavy guns, had the task of ensuring a breakthrough of the Perekop positions by the shock and fire brigade of the 51st division.

The anti-battery group consisted of seven guns (42 mm - two and 120 mm - five) and had the task of fighting artillery and suppressing enemy reserves."4

From these very unconvincing quotes it follows that the Reds had seventy 76-mm field guns for the assault5. In addition, Frunze had as many as twenty-one “heavy guns”. Of the latter, the most powerful were the 107-mm guns mod. 1910, 120 mm French guns mod. 1878 and 152-mm howitzers mod. 1909 and 1910

Under the Tsar Father, 107-mm cannons and 152-mm howitzers were considered heavy field artillery and were intended to destroy light field (earthen) fortifications. French guns were more of a museum value than a combat one.

The Southern Front did not have more powerful guns. In the deep rear of the Reds, several guns of high and special power were stored in warehouses, inherited from the royal TAON (special purpose heavy artillery corps). But by November 1920, they were in a deplorable technical condition; there were no trained crews or means of propulsion for them. Only by March 24, 1923, the Reds with difficulty managed to introduce eight 280-mm Schneider howitzers and three 305-mm howitzers mod. 1915

With the available artillery, Frunze could still win a battle in an open field against Wrangel’s troops or the Poles. But the assault on well-fortified positions was doomed to failure. 19 years later, the Red Army stormed the relatively well-defended Mannerheim Line and suffered huge losses due to the disdainful attitude of incompetent strategists like Tukhachevsky and Pavlunovsky towards special-power artillery.

On the Karelian Isthmus, even the powerful 203-mm B-4 howitzers could not penetrate the Finnish pillboxes. Four years later, in the summer of 1944, 305-mm howitzers coped with them perfectly.

So what happens? “Red Eagles” accomplished an inhuman feat by capturing the Crimean Isthmus? Yes, indeed, many heroic deeds were accomplished on both sides. But in general, the Reds fought with an enemy programmed to flee, and most importantly, the “Wrangel Line” turned out to be a “Potemkin village.” Our baron’s classmate and drinking buddy, Baron Mannerheim, turned out to be much smarter. But in “Notes” Wrangel will shamelessly lie when speaking about the fight at Perekop: “The Reds concentrated colossal artillery, which provided powerful support to their units.” By this time, the Soviet “Agitprom” had begun to fabricate legends and myths about the storming of Perekop.

So how did the assault on Perekop take place?

On the night of November 8, in difficult weather conditions - with strong winds and frost of 11-12 degrees - the strike group of the 6th Army (153rd, 52nd and 15th rifle divisions) crossed the seven-kilometer water barrier - Sivash. On the afternoon of November 8, the 51st Division, which attacked the Turkish Wall head-on, was driven back with heavy losses.

The next day, the Reds resumed their assault on the Turkish Wall, and at the same time the strike group of the 6th Army captured the Lithuanian Peninsula. White's defense was completely broken.

In the battles for Crimea, I wanted to particularly focus on the actions of the fleet and armored trains. The 3rd detachment of the Black Sea Fleet was introduced into Kartinitsky Bay. The detachment included: the minelayer “Bug”, on which the detachment commander, Captain 2nd Rank V.V., held the flag. Wilken, gunboat "Alma", messenger ship "Ataman Kaledin" (former tugboat "Gorgipia") and four floating batteries.

Floating batteries (former barges), armed with five 130-152 mm guns, took up positions at Kara-Kazak to support troops in the Ishun positions. Already during the first attempt of the Reds to break into the Crimea, the B-4 floating battery helped repulse their attacks with its rapid fire. On the night of November 8, 1920, the red units crossed the Sivash and approached the Ishun positions. On November 9 and 10, the floating batteries and the gunboat Alma, receiving target designations and adjustments by telephone, fired intensely at the advancing enemy. The movements of the ships and partly the shooting were hampered by a northeast storm, and the bay was covered with a 12-centimeter layer of ice. Despite the unfavorable conditions, the fire from the ships was effective, and units of the Red 6th Army suffered losses from flanking fire from Karkinitsky Bay.

On the night of November 11, the Yishun positions were abandoned by the Whites, but the ships remained in their positions and bombarded the Yishun station in the morning. On the afternoon of November 11, a detachment of ships received orders to go to Yevpatoria, but due to dense ice, the floating batteries could no longer move from their positions.

The next morning, November 12, the detachment entered dense fog, and due to an error in timing at 9:40 a.m. four miles from Ak-Mechet, the minelayer "Bug" ran aground. It was not possible to refloat the minesail with the help of tugs, and on the night of November 13, the crew was removed from it, and the ship itself was rendered unusable.

Armored trains played an important role in the struggle for Crimea. By October 1920, the Reds at Perekop had 17 armored trains, but used only part of them. Armored trains were running in the area of ​​the Salkovo station, fortunately the bridge over the Sivash was blown up by the Whites and the tracks were dismantled. So the Red armored trains never managed to break into Crimea.

Nevertheless, the heavy armored trains of the Reds provided significant support to the units advancing on the Chongar Peninsula. The most powerful armored train of the Reds was armored train No. 84, built at the end of 1919 - beginning of 1920 in Sormovo. It consisted of two armored platforms with 203-mm naval guns, created on the basis of a 16-axle and 12-axle platform. Armored train No. 4 “Kommunar”, which included 4 armored platforms, was also active. On one of them there was a 152-mm howitzer, and on the others - one 107-mm cannon mod. 1910

White armored trains were much more active. The light armored train “St. George the Victorious” (formed on July 27, 1919 in Yekaterinodar) was on the Ishun branch (Dzhankoy - Armyansk line) from October 12 to October 26, 1920. The armored train "Dmitry Donskoy" arrived on October 26 at the Ishun position under the command of Colonel Podoprigor and fought against the advancing Reds together with units of the Markov and Drozdov divisions.

At dawn on October 27, the armored train “St. George the Victorious” moved to Armyansk, north of Ishuni, already occupied by the Reds. There he found himself among the advancing units of the red cavalry. The cavalrymen, supported by artillery fire and armored vehicles, attacked the armored train with several lavas and surrounded it. The armored train hit the attackers with artillery and machine-gun fire at point-blank range. The Red Army suffered heavy losses, but did not stop attacks. The Reds' mounted patrol tried to blow up the railway track on the armored train's retreat route, but was destroyed by machine-gun fire from the armored train. At this time, "St. George the Victorious" came under fire from a three-inch Soviet battery. As a result of the shell hit, the locomotive's boiler was damaged and the officer and mechanic were shell-shocked.

With the engine fading, the armored train slowly moved back, without stopping the battle with the Red battery and cavalry. At the northern points of the siding, the damaged locomotive died out. Before darkness fell, the armored train, unable to maneuver, nevertheless drove back the attacking enemy with its fire. In the evening, a serviceable locomotive arrived and took the combat personnel of the armored train to the Yishun station.

During the battle on October 27, the head gun of the armored train “Dmitry Donskoy” was smashed, one officer was wounded and one volunteer was killed.

On October 28, the armored train “St. George the Victorious” entered position with an unarmored locomotive. The Reds advanced in large forces, occupying two lines of trenches and pursuing the retreating white units. The armored train suddenly crashed into the thick lines of the Reds and shot them with machine-gun and grapeshot fire from a distance of up to 50 steps. The Reds showered the white armored train with bullets and rushed to attack it with unprecedented tenacity, but, having suffered huge losses, they began to retreat, and “St. George the Victorious” pursued them. This allowed the white infantry to launch a counterattack.

Meanwhile, the armored train that had advanced was again attacked by fresh infantry forces. A chain of Reds lay down near the railway track. On the armored train, 4 soldiers and a mechanic were wounded and the only working injector on the locomotive was broken, as a result of which the water supply to the boiler stopped. But the armored train nevertheless threw back the Red chains with its fire, inflicting heavy losses on them. After the arrival of the white armored car "Gundorovets", "St. George the Victorious" managed to withdraw with the dying locomotive to the Yishun station.

Meanwhile, the White command learned that the Reds were preparing an invasion of Crimea by their other troops from the northeast, along the main railway line laid along a dam near the Sivash station. The heavy armored train "United Russia" (new, built in Crimea) was on October 28 at the Sivashsky bridge in the area of ​​the 134th Feodosia infantry regiment and was exchanging fire with Red units.

The light armored train "Officer" arrived on the morning of October 28 at the Dzhankoy junction station. By order of the chief of staff of the 1st Corps, he went from there to the Taganash station, about 20 versts from the Dzhankoy station, to participate in the defense of the Sivash positions.

On October 29, at 9 a.m., the “Officer” entered the Sivash dam consisting of one armored platform with two 3-inch cannons, one platform with a 75-mm cannon, and an unarmored locomotive. Despite the fire from the Red batteries standing in shelter on the opposite bank, the “Officer” moved towards the bridge. When the armored train was 320 meters from the bridge, a landmine exploded under its second safety platform. The explosion tore out a piece of rail about 60 cm long. By inertia, one armored platform and the tender of a steam locomotive passed through the exploded area. The stopped armored train partially killed and dispersed the Reds who were at the blown-up bridge with grapeshot and machine-gun fire. Then the “Officer” opened fire on the positions of the Red artillery, which continued to fire at him.

Despite the damaged tracks, the "Officer" managed to return to his trenches. There he remained until one o'clock in the afternoon, maneuvering under fire from enemy guns. After this, on the orders of the head of the armored train group, Colonel Lebedev, the “Officer” went to Taganash station.

At this time, units of the Reds broke through the Chongar Peninsula and launched an offensive from the east, bypassing the Taganash station. The armored train "Officer" fired at their columns advancing from the direction of the village of Abaz-kirk. By the fire of white armored trains (including the heavy armored train "United Russia"), as well as positional and field artillery, the Reds, who attacked in large forces, were stopped in the evening south of the village of Tyup-Dzhankoy. Until dark, the armored train "Officer" remained at Taganash station.

On the evening of October 29, the “Officer” again went to the Sivash dam, but soon returned back and met with the “United Russia” armored train. Then both armored trains moved towards the dam. “United Russia” walked behind “Officer” at a distance of just over 200 meters. Not reaching 500 meters from the line of the Whites' forward trenches, Captain Labovich stopped the "Officer" armored train, as he received a warning from an officer of the Feodosia Regiment, who was passing along the railroad bed at that time, that the Reds were apparently preparing to undermine the track, as they could hear hitting the rails with a pickaxe. The “officer” began to slowly retreat to discover the digging site.

Suddenly there was an explosion from behind. The explosion occurred under the safety platforms of the United Russia armored train following behind. Two safety platforms flew into the air. "United Russia" was thrown back along the rails at a distance of about half a mile. The rear platform with the 75-mm cannon of the “Officer” armored train, which did not have time to brake, fell into the hole formed by the explosion. The "officer" stopped. Then, in complete darkness, the Reds opened fire from seven machine guns, stationed mainly on the left side of the railway track.

The United Russia armored train returned fire. On the "Officer" armored train, two guns could not fire: the rear 75-mm gun could not fire due to the inclined position of the combat platform, which had fallen into a hole, and the middle three-inch gun did not have a sufficient number of crew numbers. Thus, the "Officer" opened fire with only one main three-inch gun and all machine guns.

A few minutes later, the Reds, and these were soldiers of the 264th regiment of the 30th division, launched an attack on the armored train. With shouts of “hurray,” they began throwing grenades at the “Officer’s” armored platform. However, there the team had already fled to the armored train “United Russia”, which went to the rear to the Taganash station.

On the same day, October 29, from 7 o’clock in the morning, the armored trains “Dmitry Donskoy” and “St. George the Victorious” located on the Ishun branch entered into battle with the advancing Soviet units and restrained the enemy’s advance from Karpova Balka. Around noon, the armored train "Dmitry Donskoy" was hit. Its armored platforms were so seriously damaged that the armored train could not continue the battle and retreated towards the Dzhankoy junction station.

The armored train "St. George the Victorious" was left alone. However, he managed to hold back the advance of the Red units until the retreating White troops reached the great Simferopol road. Then “St. George the Victorious” withdrew to the Yishun station and from there repelled the attacks of the red cavalry, which tried to begin the pursuit of the white units.

When the armored train “St. George the Victorious” was leaving, one of its safety platforms came off the rails. Late in the evening, about two miles from the Dzhankoy junction station, a collision occurred between the armored trains “St. George the Victorious” and “Dmitry Donskoy”. The armored platforms were not damaged, and only the reserve car of the armored train “St. George the Victorious” and three workshop cars that were attached to the armored train “Dmitry Donskoy” derailed.

Apparently, on the same night, the armored train “Ioann Kalita”6 passed through the Dzhankoy station to Kerch, with the task of covering the withdrawal of units of the Don Corps towards Kerch.

On the morning of October 30, the armored train "St. George the Victorious", having joined one of the combat platforms of the armored train "United Russia", moved together with the reserve from the Dzhankoy station towards Simferopol. About 5 versts south of Dzhankoy, the reserve armored train was abandoned, as it turned out that its locomotive did not have time to receive supplies.

The United Russia armored train was the last to leave the Taganash station. When United Russia approached the Dzhankoy station, it had to stop and wait for the damaged track to be repaired. “United Russia” moved on when part of the city of Dzhankoy was already occupied by the Reds. At the siding south of the Dzhankoy station, the armored trains “St. George the Victorious” and “United Russia” connected and moved on as a united train.

At about 2 o'clock in the afternoon on October 30, the armored trains approached the Kurman-Kemelchi station, which is 25 versts south of the Dzhankoy station. At this time, the red cavalry unexpectedly appeared, coming from the Ishun positions, bypassing the retreating white troops. The united white armored trains opened fire on the advancing cavalry, drove them back and gave the white units the opportunity to move on in order.

During their further movement towards Simferopol, the connected white armored trains were blocked by an obstacle made of stones and sleepers piled on the rails. A four-gun battery of the Reds opened fire on the armored trains, and their cavalry was a thousand paces from the railway track.

The red cavalrymen moved to attack the white armored trains, but were driven back with heavy losses. With further withdrawal, the teams of white armored trains had to clear the path several times from sleepers and stones, which the red ones managed to throw in order to cause a crash. By nightfall, the armored train “Dmitry Donskoy” and the reserve armored train “Officer” arrived at the Simferopol station. Later, the combined armored trains “St. George the Victorious” and “United Russia” arrived in Simferopol.

At 11 o'clock on October 31, the armored train "St. George the Victorious" was the last to leave the Simferopol station. Upon arrival at the Bakhchisarai station, a locomotive was launched on its northern switches. Then, on the orders of the commander of the 1st Army, General Kutepov, the railway bridge over the Alma River was blown up and the bridge on the highway was burned. At night the order was received to depart to Sevastopol for loading onto ships.

At dawn on October 31, the armored train “Dmitry Donskoy” and the reserve armored train “Officer” approached the Sevastopol station and stopped near the first piers. It was impossible to move further, since at the turn the combat platform of the Dmitry Donskoy came off the rails and the track needed to be repaired.

Meanwhile, information was received that troops were already being loaded onto the Saratov steamer at the neighboring pier. This ship was boarded by the crew of the armored train "Grozny", which, before landing, rendered the guns that had just been repaired unusable and threw the locks into the sea.

At about 9 o’clock in the morning on November 1, the armored trains “St. George the Victorious” and “United Russia” reached Sevastopol, in the Kilen Bay area. Along the way, the material on the armored platforms was damaged. At about 10 o'clock the derailment was carried out so that the armored trains would not fall to the Reds in their entirety. The combat trains of the armored trains “St. George the Victorious” and “United Russia” were launched as quickly as possible towards each other.

The team of the armored train "St. George the Victorious" with six machine guns boarded the steamer "Beshtau". The team of the armored train "United Russia", which arrived on the combat unit, was also loaded onto the steamer "Beshtau". Part of the team, which was part of the reserve, was loaded earlier onto the ship "Kherson".

Taking advantage of the fact that the main forces of the Red Army were sent to fight the White Poles, the White Guards somewhat recovered from their defeats and in the spring of 1920 began preparations for the next battle with the Soviet Republic.

This time Crimea became their stronghold. Foreign ships with weapons and uniforms for the 150,000-strong army of General Wrangel sailed here along the Black Sea. English and French specialists supervised the construction of fortifications on PerekopskyIsthmus, taught the White Guards how to handle the latest military equipment - tanks and airplanes.

In the midst of the fighting between the Red Army and the White Poles, Wrangel’s troops left Crimea, captured part of the southern Ukrainian regions and tried to break through to Donbass. Wrangel dreamed of a campaign against Moscow.

“Wrangel must be destroyed, just as Kolchak and Denikin were destroyed.” This task was set by the Central Committee of our party before the Soviet people. Communist detachments and military echelons moved south through Kharkov and Lugansk, through Kyiv and Kremenchug.

While the Red Army was fighting the White Poles, the Soviet command could not concentrate the necessary forces against Wrangel to launch a decisive offensive. During the summer and early autumn, our troops held back the enemy's onslaught and prepared for a counteroffensive.

In those days, fierce battles took place near the then legendary Kakhovka. Here, in the lower reaches of the Dnieper, where the mighty river with its bend seems to hang over the entrance to the Crimea, the red troops crossed to the left bank and created a base there for a further offensive. The fighters of the famous 51st Infantry Division under the command of V.K. Blucher created an impregnable fortified area near Kakhovka.

Wrangel's troops tried their best to drive our units out of here. The White infantry and cavalry, reinforced by a large number of armored cars, regardless of losses, rushed forward. Vran Gel threw a then rare type of weapon - tanks - onto this section of the front. But the armored miracles did not frighten the Red Army soldiers.

Clumsy hulks of tanks slowly moved forward, crushing barbed wire barriers and firing continuously. There seemed to be no force that could stop them. But then the Soviet artillerymen rolled out a gun and knocked out one tank with direct fire. A group of Red Army soldiers with bundles of grenades rushed towards another enemy vehicle: a deafening explosion was heard - the tank froze and fell to one side. TwoThe brave warriors captured the other tanks unharmed.

Despite all efforts enemy, the troops of the Red Army pinned down large strength Wrangel's troops and kept the city in their hands.

By the end of October 1920 everything was ready to go on the offensive. The commander of the Southern Front, M.V. Frunze, gave the troops the order to attack the enemy. On the morning of October 28, the front line began to move. The earliest to rush into battle were the regiments of the First Cavalry Army, which had recently arrived from the Western Front after the conclusion of peace with Pan-Poland. For several days there were stubborn battles on the approaches to Crimea. Southern Ukraine would be liberated from the White Guards. However, a significant part of Wrangel’s army managed to escape to Crimea. Our troops had to storm the fortifications covering the path to the peninsula. Look at the map and you will understand the extraordinary difficulty of such a task. You can get to Crimea only through a narrow isthmus or through Sivash - the “rotten sea”. The Wrangel troops were firmly entrenched here. Across the 15-kilometre-long Perekop Isthmus stretches the Turkish Wall, rising steeply to 8 m. In front of the rampart there is a deep ditch 20 m.

All around, wherever you look, there are lines of trenches, covered with rows of barbed wire barriers. Shelters, deep dugouts, loopholes, and communication passages were dug into the thickness of the Turkish Wall. Dozens of enemy cannons and machine guns kept the entire space in front of these fortifications under fire.

“Crimea is impregnable,” the White Guard generals confidently declared. But for ourthe soldiers had no impregnable positions. “The crossing must be taken, and it will be taken!” - this thought possessed the red fighters and commanders of the Southern Front.

They decided to strike the main blow at Perekop.The 51st Division was to attack the Turkish Wall from the front; part of our troops had to ford the Sivash, bypass the Perekop fortifications and hit the enemy from the rear. On the Chongar Isthmus, the Red Army launched an auxiliary attack.

The final preparations were underway for the decisive assault.In coastal estuaries, sappers built rafts to transport machine guns and light artillery. Standing waist-deep in icy water, the Red Army men strengthened the fords across the Sivash, laying straw, wattles, boards, and logs on the bottom. It was necessary to quickly pass through Sivash before the wind drove the water into the Sea of ​​​​Azov.

November 7, 1920, the day of the third anniversary of the Great October Revolution, 10 o'clock in the evening. Night darkness enveloped the earth. From the Crimean coast, cutting through the depths, the beams of searchlights searched. And so our advanced units moved through Sivash. The guides, residents of coastal villages, showed the way. This transition was incredibly difficult. People, horses, carts got stuck in the muddy bottom.

Straining all their strength, the red warriors moved forward, with difficulty pulling their guns out of the quagmire. Only three hours later did they feel solid ground under their feet.

Illuminated by enemy searchlights, under a shower of bullets, amid shell explosions, an assault column - communists and Komsomol members - marched forward.

In a fierce battle they threw back the enemy and gained a foothold on the Crimean coast. The poet N. Tikhonov wrote about this feat:

They pave Sivash with living bridges!

But the dead, before they fall,

They take a step forward.

On the morning of November 8, thick fog shrouded the Turkish Wall. After artillery preparation, our regiments moved to the assault. The attacks followed one after another, but to no avail. The fighters were unable to overcome the murderous fire of the whites; Having suffered heavy losses, they lay down near the enemy's wire fences.

By evening the situation became more complicated. The wind changed, and the water in the estuary began to rise. Our troops, having crossed Sivash, could have been completely cut off. At the suggestion of M.V.Frunze residents moved to Sivashnearby villages. They carried with them logs, boards, armfuls of straw and branches to strengthen the flooded fords. New regiments went through Sivash to pull the enemy forces away from the Turkish Wall.

After midnight, the fighters again rushed to storm the Turkish Wall. Gritting their teeth, they moved forward, made their way through the barbed wire, and climbed the steep slopes of the rampart. The wounded remained in the ranks.

And when the sun, peeking out from behind the gloomy November clouds, rose above the surface of the Black Sea, it illuminated the red banner, pierced by bullets, fluttering victoriously over the Turkish Wall. Perekop has been taken!

Pressuring the White Guards, the Red Army also broke through the next fortified enemy lines. Divisions of the First Cavalry Army quickly rushed into the breakthrough.

Wrangel's troops were completely defeated. The remnants of the White Army hastily loaded onto foreign ships and fled from Crimea. In battles with Wrangel’s troops, units of the already mentioned 51st Rifle Division especially distinguished themselves, andalso units of the 15th, 30th, 52nd rifle divisions, soldiers and commanders of the 3rd cavalry corps.

In a telegram to V.I. Lenin, M.V. Frunze wrote on November 12, 1920: “I testify to the highest valor shown by the heroic infantry during the storming of Sivash and Perekop. The units walked along narrow passages under deadly fire against the enemy's wire. Our losses are extremely heavy. Some divisions lost three quarters of their strength. The total loss of killed and wounded during the assault on the isthmuses was at least 10 thousand people. The front armies fulfilled their duty to the Republic. The last nest of the Russian counter-revolution has been destroyed, and Crimea will again become Soviet.”

The Soviet country celebrated victory. “With selfless courage and heroic exertion of strength, the glorious forces of the revolution defeated Wrangel. Long live our Red Army, the great army of labor!” - in these words the Pravda newspaper reported the victory over the enemy.

At the intersection of the road from Kakhovka to Crimea with the Perekopsky shaft, a rather original monument was erected, dedicated to the three assaults on Perekop. The first assault took place back in 1920 - the Reds attack, the Whites defend, then there will be the Great Patriotic War, there will be the Red Army against the Germans and Romanians, even later there will be a labor assault, but today we are talking about the beginning of the last century.

November 8, 2010 will mark the 90th anniversary of the first assault on Perekop. Of course, there were much more than three assaults in the history of the Turkish Wall. We are, of course, talking about those assaults that the Soviet state cared about perpetuating the memory of.

The civil war, caused in the Russian Empire by the well-known events of 1917, was nearing its end in 1920. The storming of the Perekop fortifications ends the last stage of the struggle on the Wrangel Front, the last major front of the Civil War. Ukraine had powerful grain reserves. But the presence of Wrangel’s troops in Ukraine and a widely developed insurgent movement in the Ukrainian countryside eliminated “Ukrainian bread” from the food funds of the country of the Soviets. The proximity of Wrangel to the industrial Donetsk-Krivoy Rog region paralyzed the work of this only coal and metallurgical base at that time.

It is worth noting that already in August 1920, Wrangel’s government was officially recognized by France. In September, there were already missions of all the most important capitalist states in Crimea, including distant Japan and the USA.

The organizer of the expulsion of the troops of General P.N. Wrangel from Crimea was the Bolshevik M.V. Frunze, commander of the Southern Front at that time. Frunze fought against the Wrangelites together with the Insurgent Army of Father Makhno (N.I. Makhno), with whom in October 1920 he signed an agreement on unity of action against the white troops and established good personal relations.

Since the ideas of Bolshevism, both declarative and propaganda, and actual, are well known, let us dwell a little on the ideas of their Crimean opponent.
On July 5, 1920, the newspaper “Great Russia” published an interview with newspaper correspondent N.N. Chebyshev with General P.N. Wrangel.

“What are we fighting for?”

“To this question,” said General Wrangel, “there can only be one answer: we are fighting for freedom.” On the other side of our front, in the north, arbitrariness, oppression, and slavery reign. You can hold the most varied views on the desirability of this or that state system, you can be an extreme republican, a socialist and even a Marxist, and still recognize the so-called Soviet republic as an example of the most unprecedented sinister despotism, under the yoke of which Russia is perishing, and even its new supposedly the ruling class, the proletariat, pressed to the ground, like the rest of the population. Now this is no secret in Europe either. The veil has been lifted over Soviet Russia. Nest of reaction in Moscow. There are enslavers sitting there, treating the people as a herd. Only blindness and dishonesty can consider us reactionaries. We are fighting for the emancipation of the people from the yoke, which they have not seen in the darkest times of their history.

For a long time in Europe they did not understand, but now, apparently, they are beginning to understand what we clearly understand: the entire global significance of our domestic feud. If our sacrifices go in vain, then European society, European democracy will have to stand up in armed defense of its cultural and political gains against the enemy of civilization, inspired by success.

“With all my soul I long for an end to the civil war.” Every drop of spilled Russian blood resonates with pain in my heart. But the struggle is inevitable until consciousness clears up, until people understand that they are fighting against themselves, against their rights to self-determination, until real state power is established in Russia, based on the principles of legality, security of personal and property rights, on the principles of respect for international obligations; there will never be any lasting peace or improvement in economic conditions in Europe. It will be impossible to conclude any more or less durable international agreement and agree on nothing properly. The cause of the Russian Army in Crimea is a great liberation movement. This is a holy war for freedom and right.

Baron Pyotr Nikolaevich Wrangel (08/15/1878 - 04/25/1928) - Russian, general, Knight of St. George, commander-in-chief of the Russian Army in Crimea (1920) - advocated a federal structure of the future Russia. He was inclined to recognize the political independence of Ukraine. He developed a number of legislative acts on agrarian reform, including the “Land Law,” adopted by the government on May 25, 1920. He recognized the legal seizure of landowners’ lands by peasants in the first years of the revolution (albeit for a certain contribution to the state). He carried out a number of administrative reforms in Crimea, as well as a reform of local self-government. Promulgated a number of decrees on regional autonomy of Cossack lands.

Negotiations with the Bolsheviks, which the British government, which supported the Whites, insisted on, were absolutely unacceptable and even insulting to the White command. It was decided to continue the fight to the end. Wrangel's successes in the summer of 1920 alarmed the Bolsheviks. The Soviet press sounded the alarm, calling for the destruction of the “baron entrenched in the Crimea” and to drive him into the “Crimean bottle.”

In September 1920, the Wrangelites were defeated by the Reds near Kakhovka. On the night of September 8, the Red Army launched a general offensive, the goal of which was to capture Perekop and Chongar and break through to Crimea.

Attack of Perekop positions.

The battle began on November 8 at dawn on the approaches to the Lithuanian Peninsula. Having crossed the Sivash at night, the vanguards of the 52nd and 15th rifle divisions approached unnoticed 1 km to the Lithuanian Peninsula. Here they were already discovered by the enemy and got involved in a battle for the northern exits of this peninsula. By 7 o'clock the Red Army soldiers had overcome the resistance of the Kuban White Brigade and occupied the entire northern part of the peninsula. At about 8 o'clock the Reds occupied the entire Lithuanian peninsula.

By 10 o'clock, the Whites brought the nearest reserves into battle and launched a counterattack with the Drozdovskaya brigade from Karadzhanai, and with units of the II Corps from Karpova Balka to the southern exits from the peninsula. The counterattack was initially successful, parts of the Reds were pushed back, but then the Reds restored the position. The Turkish Wall, which was the basis of the line of fortifications, found itself under a decisive threat from the rear.

In the morning, due to thick fog, the artillery could not begin artillery preparation. Only at 9 o'clock the artillery preparation began. By 13:00, units of the 51st Infantry Division tried to advance to the wire barriers, but the White fire system was unbroken. Artillery preparation was extended by an hour. Meanwhile, by 1 p.m. the artillery began to feel a shortage of shells. The firing calculation was made before 12 o'clock, but it took much longer to shoot, and it turned out to be impossible to transport shells due to the completely open rear. Units of the 15th and 52nd Infantry Divisions were pushed back by a white counterattack, and in their rear areas the rising waters in Sivash became visible (they crossed the Sivash at low tide).

At 1 p.m. 25 min. units of the 51st Division were ordered to "simultaneously and immediately attack the Turkish Wall." At 1 p.m. 35 min. parts of the division went on the offensive, but were repulsed by destructive machine-gun and artillery fire.

Around 10 p.m. The attackers managed to overcome the wire fences and get to the ditch, but here, in front of the wire running along the outer slope of the ditch, the attack again floundered, despite the exceptional heroism of the Red Army soldiers. Some regiments suffered up to 60% losses.

The Red Command gathered at dawn on November 9 to resume the attack along the entire front. All orders for this decision have been made. But the enemy assessed the situation differently: on the night of November 8-9, he hastily retreated to his Ishun positions. His departure was discovered by the Red units only on the morning of November 9. The Turkish rampart was taken, but the enemy still left, although broken, but not defeated.

Before the battles for the isthmuses of the Crimean peninsula, the number of whites, according to the intelligence data of the reds (subsequently confirmed by battles), was 9850 bayonets, 7220 sabers.

The number of Reds (according to V. Trandafilov’s “Perekop Operation of the Red Army”) was 26,500 bayonets and sabers on the Perekop Isthmus. The Whites on the isthmus had 467 machine guns against the Reds' 487 machine guns and 128 guns against the Reds' 91 guns.

However, ideas do not become true or false depending on the availability of military equipment and military success.