In an interview with L. Radzikhovsky (in the newspaper “New Look”, 1992) Ryzhkov recalled:

In November 1982, completely unexpectedly, I was elected secretary of the Central Committee and Andropov introduced me to the team preparing the reforms. This included Gorbachev, Dolgikh... I don’t regret this work on preparing reforms. The situation was difficult, the crisis was ripe. We began to understand the economy, and from this began perestroika in 1985, where the results of what we did in 1983-84 were practically used. If we didn't do this, it would be even worse.

(“Andropov instructed PB member Gorbachev, PB candidate Dolgikh and Central Committee Secretary for Economics Ryzhkov to carefully study the current situation in the economy and prepare proposals for its reform,” Ryzhkov wrote in his memoirs.)

In 1971, the Uralmash production association was founded, the leadership of which was entrusted to Nikolai Ryzhkov. Five factories and a research institute were united under one roof. The consortium collapsed during the time of new Russia - in 1992, each enterprise set off on an independent voyage.

After graduating from college, Nikolai Ryzhkov begins his career path. He connected his life with the Ural Machine-Building Plant. In 1950 he came to Uralmash, where he worked for 25 years. He starts as a shift foreman, then quickly moves up the career ladder: flight supervisor, shop manager, chief technologist, chief engineer, general director. At the age of 40, he was appointed head of an enterprise of union importance. Very few people manage to achieve such heights, and this testifies to the extraordinary abilities of Nikolai Ryzhkov.

Nikolai was born on September 28, 1929 in the Donbass - in the village of Dyleevka, Donetsk region, Ukrainian SSR. All the men in his family worked as miners. At the beginning of the 20th century, grandfather Fedor and his family moved to the Donbass, where he got a job at the Severny mine. Nikolai’s father, Ivan Fedorovich, and his brothers spent their entire career in mining. Nikolai’s younger brother Evgeniy served three years in the army, returned to Donbass and also connected his life with the mine, working there for almost a quarter of a century.

But Nikolai, despite such a mining pedigree, was strongly drawn to study and aviation. He entered Air Force Preparatory School several times, but the attempts were unsuccessful.

Ryzhkov Nikolai had a very difficult childhood, since during this period the country was just beginning to move away from the colossal and tragic consequences of the destructive Great Patriotic War. Of course, this state of affairs forced the guy to grow up very quickly and make his choice professionally. And so the young man entered the Kramatorsk Mechanical Engineering College at the Faculty of Mechanics. Then from 1953 to 1959. Ryzhkov Nikolay studied at the Ural Polytechnic Institute named after Kirov, from which he successfully graduated with a degree in technology and equipment for welding production.

After graduating from the Kramatorsk Mechanical Engineering College, Ryzhkov, at his own request, was sent to Sverdlovsk. From 1950 to 1975, Nikolai Ryzhkov worked in engineering and technical positions at the Ural Heavy Engineering Plant named after. Sergo Ordzhonikidze (PO "Uralmash"). From 1971 to 1975, he served as general director of the enterprise.

Ryzhkov: Firstly, I was not delighted with the word “perestroika”. The fact is that this word is not new, the Provisional Government of Kerensky had it, but journalists picked it up and away they went. I prefer the definition of “reform”. At first I was categorically for reforms, I was even one of their initiators, because my life experience and work at the factory, in the ministry and in the Central Committee of the Party showed that we had exhausted the possibilities of the economic model in which we lived before the war, during the war, after the war . A rigid planned system was extremely necessary - without it we would not have defeated the Germans, we would never have restored the national economy. They took it from someone, of course, but gave it to someone - that’s natural. But later, many, including myself, began to believe that this system had exhausted itself - it was heavily bureaucratic. How many workers do you need to keep, how many main workers, how many auxiliary ones, how many engineers, how many technicians, auxiliary workers, cleaners? I had 52 thousand workers at the plant... Therefore, we very persistently wrote that something had to be done. Before me and Gorbachev, there were already attempts at reform, for example, Alexei Nikolaevich Kosygin (Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR from 1964 to 1980 - Lenta.ru note), who, by the way, did a good job for his time. What he did was enormous progress, one cannot blame him for anything, and one must give him his due: he was ahead of his time. Then there was another attempt after Kosygin - they let it go.

“With all disrespect to Gorbachev, he did not want to destroy the country”

Former Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Nikolai Ryzhkov on how perestroika began

Thirty years ago, in March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the USSR. A month after his appointment to the post of General Secretary, he, imitating Lenin, voiced the famous “April theses”, from which it is customary to begin perestroika. Member of the Federation Council Nikolai Ivanovich Ryzhkov, who served as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR from 1985 to 1991, expressed his view on the events of 30 years ago to Lenta.ru.

"Lenta.ru": How did you assess perestroika in 1985? And has your attitude towards her changed much now?

Ryzhkov: Firstly, I was not delighted with the word “perestroika”. The fact is that this word is not new, the Provisional Government of Kerensky had it, but journalists picked it up and away they went. I prefer the definition of “reform”. At first I was categorically for reforms, I was even one of their initiators, because my life experience and work at the factory, in the ministry and in the Central Committee of the Party showed that we had exhausted the possibilities of the economic model in which we lived before the war, during the war, after the war . A rigid planned system was extremely necessary - without it we would not have defeated the Germans, we would never have restored the national economy. They took it from someone, of course, but gave it to someone - that’s natural. But later, many, including myself, began to believe that this system had exhausted itself - it was heavily bureaucratic. How many workers do you need to keep, how many main workers, how many auxiliary ones, how many engineers, how many technicians, auxiliary workers, cleaners? I had 52 thousand workers at the plant... Therefore, we very persistently wrote that something had to be done. Before me and Gorbachev, there were already attempts at reforms, for example, Alexei Nikolaevich Kosygin (Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR from 1964 to 1980 - approx. "Tapes.ru"), which, by the way, did a good job for its time. What he did was enormous progress, one cannot blame him for anything, and one must give him his due: he was ahead of his time. Then there was another attempt after Kosygin - they let it go.

Photo: Vasily Shaposhnikov / Kommersant

Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov included me in the group for developing reforms. Our team (Gorbachev, Dolgikh and Ryzhkov) used the documents and ideas that had accumulated. This is how, in April 1985, Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev laid out on the speaking table a program of action that we had been working on for three years.

That is, at first you had a positive attitude, participated in the preparation of reforms, but what became the turning point?

I supported Gorbachev until 1987, after which our paths diverged. Thanks to the haste, thoughtlessness and talkativeness of Gorbachev and the Jesuit methods of the “architect of destruction” Alexander Yakovlev, perestroika failed. And the split between us occurred in 1987, when we summed up the results of our work (we conducted an experiment on ministries with different features) and saw where it was good and where it was bad. We began to think about what to do next. Gorbachev, together with Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, and Medvedev, prepared a report in Volynsky.

Is it in Matveevsky, where is Stalin’s dacha?

Yes. I didn't prepare that report. Gorbachev called me, they say, come and look at the theses here, I need to decide what to present. Secretary of the Central Committee Slyunkov, a member of the Politburo for economics, went with me, and we began to discuss everything point by point. They suggested that we include the following thesis in Mikhail Sergeevich’s report at the April plenum - to avoid detailed planning. This means no construction of housing, kindergartens, clubs...

What did they offer instead of the plan?

Nothing! They say that the market itself will regulate all this, it will force us to do something. I jumped up and said categorically: “What are you doing? You will destroy the country, the country is absolutely not ready!” Imagine, all my life I was shown what to do, and suddenly everything was crossed out and they said: go look! And to look, you have to go for another year or two! Let's have some kind of transition period. For example, we will give state orders to enterprises for at least 50 percent, and let them look for orders outside for 50 percent. At least the plant will be running.

What are they?

"No". It is necessary to have all this at once. In general, it was a very difficult conversation. I say: what about housing, kindergartens? “Well, the market is omnipresent, it will demand everywhere, and so on.” In general, an old liberal song. That is, they proposed to do what Yeltsin did on January 2, 1992.

That is, shock therapy and everything else?

Yes, that's exactly what they suggested. And I said that I am categorically against this whole business.

Couldn't they decide without you?

They could, why couldn't they? I told them: “Please, if you think that planning is not necessary, then cancel it all and there will be no schools or kindergartens. But you remember, Mikhail Sergeevich, that you and I both spoke at the congress: you gave a political report, and I gave an economic report. And I talked about all this and recorded everything, how much housing, how much of what is planned to be built. If you want to remove something, call a congress; even the plenum is not able to do this, because the congress approved it.” And I told him: “Mikhail Sergeevich, you will not get support with this.”

So, all this was postponed until the 90s?

Yes, for 1992. And all these questions came to the Politburo, and then the Politburo did not go very well, it was incorrect - they grabbed each other by the chests. Do you know that there were no metal detectors at the Politburo? People came, sat and listened, and then came out and said: they are fighting there, who is leading us? And my soul was very uneasy, I called Gorbachev and offered to meet one-on-one. We met on Saturday at 11 am, and I told him: “Mikhail Sergeevich, I will take my position - they will beat me, kill me. I hold on to it consciously, because I understand that there is no other way. I believe that if we move away from this position, we will ruin the country. The country is not ready." And so we talked many times, sometimes we met three times a day (at that time there were no announcements that such a person was dating that person). Once again I tell him: “This is the last time I came to you, either let’s find a common language in work, or I’m leaving. I won’t work in such an environment, why should I listen to insults addressed to me?”

Then they started calling you “a log in the way of perestroika”?

Yes, just after that. I told him: “Either you follow the path of our concept, or stay with Shevardnadze and others - they have not straightened out the rusty nail in their lives, but are taking over to govern the country.” In general, he gave up. But the crack was still there. And it was then that I began to hesitate regarding the perestroika that was underway.

I have come across the opinion of historians that Andropov did not plan the same reforms as those implemented by Gorbachev. You, as a person who directly participated in the development of these reforms, tell me which of them were really conceived under Andropov, and which were the result of the influence of Yakovlev, Shevardnadze and the same Gorbachev?

We really began to work on Andropov’s instructions, I was elected on November 22, 1982 (Secretary and Head of the Economic Department of the CPSU Central Committee - approx. "Tapes.ru"), two weeks later he invited Gorbachev, Dolgikh and me. The chain of command was quite strict: one member of the Politburo, one candidate member and me, the secretary. And we started working. Andropov is a unique person, they write a lot about him now, I think they even write too much. Some say that he was a Jew, others say that he was Russian, but it doesn’t matter. Yes, we never asked ourselves the question of who was of what nationality, the main thing was who worked how. But the fact that he is a politician to the core is yes. He quickly grasped fundamental economic issues; he did not need to chew. For example, he calls me directly and says: what are you doing? Working. Well, come on over. This means that he has freed up time - I take the folder and go to him. And he tells me: leave the folder, and starts chasing me with questions: what is happening in our country with concessions? Yes, in my opinion, nothing is being done. What do you know about this? Exactly the same as everyone else who went through school. You don't have much knowledge. He paused and added: me too, go ahead and study this issue and come to me again. I came to my staff and said: look for what literature there is on concessions. A day later we found some woman in Leninka defending her work on this topic.

After he had already died, and I lived for these five years and resigned, there was time to think, and I increasingly came to the conclusion that Andropov would have carried out soft reforms in the country, and not like Gorbachev and Yakovlev. Andropov was familiar with the basics of the Chinese version of reforms. If he had lived longer, we would essentially have China.

That is, if Andropov had lived longer, the reforms would have been more successful and the Union would have been preserved? Was there a possibility of preserving the Union under Gorbachev?

Under the “early” Gorbachev, the country could have survived; under the “middle” Gorbachev, it was difficult, but it could, but under the “late” Gorbachev, of course, it could not. You see, the “late” Gorbachev is like a sick executioner. Crisis - what is it? One recovers after it, and the other - feet first. I don’t think that Gorbachev tried to destroy the Union; then you’d have to be a complete idiot. The situation was such that his actions - publications and other things - led to this. And in the beginning, when he just began to preach, he could save the Union. The first half of his activity, with all his shortcomings (verbalism, praise, hating - he always had this), we were pleased that he was a new person - as many old ones as possible. But after 1987 a crack appeared, and it never came together again. And Yeltsin took advantage of this.

And Andropov’s soft reform, if he had remained alive, how long should it have taken?

You see, Andropov was an ardent communist, he had no doubts. That's why he didn't do what Gorbachev did. This same one always fought with the party together with his wife. But with all disrespect to Gorbachev, he didn’t want to destroy the country, he didn’t want to. He just led to this with his stupid actions. He felt dizzy when they shouted “Gorbi-Gorbi”, and when he saw that the crisis had arrived and he had to decide what to do next... they drank all night and signed what was required. Gorbachev still had this mistake: they always started with the economy, the question of the party and the state was not raised.

You anticipate my next question: why destroy the system if it was only about the economy.

Yes, it was necessary to give new wind to the sails, but Yakovlev all the time propagated opposite values: this party will not work, this government will not work, the economic field, that is, the real sector, will not work, which means everything must be broken. Gorbachev was in Canada for another ten days, I think he was treated well there. Instead of breaking only the economy, finding a foundation and building a new economy, we went to scrap everything. No country in the world undertakes economic reform if it does not have strong government.

So how many years should Andropov’s soft reforms have lasted?

This is one of the questions that people pecked at me back then. Do you remember the ill-fated “500 days”?

Yes, of course, this is a well-known economic program of that time.

So, this is great stupidity. When I formed the government, I think it was 1987, I went like this: I needed ministers who knew the old system well and who would take on everything today, then ministers whom I know as progressive people, and then we created a commission Led by academician Leonid Abalkin, there were 50 people on this commission. And they worked for about five months in Sosny, in a rest home, I came there every Saturday, worked, had lunch and left. Every other day they worked out everything we said, and came to the Council of Ministers in the evening at about seven o’clock, and we were here until about nine or ten o’clock, looking at everything and preparing resolutions. It included many famous scientists - economists, production workers (Evgeny Yasin, who is now at the Higher School of Economics, was also a member of this commission, Stanislav Anisimov, Pyotr Katsura, Stepan Sitaryan, Gennady Melikyan, the same Stanislav Shatalin and others).

I had an assistant then, engineer Vladimir Lukyanovich Savakov, he worked with the commission constantly. So, we were sitting one evening, tired as dogs, and he said: Nikolai Ivanovich, there is also the “400 Days Action Program”. I say: “What are these ‘400 days’?” He replies: “They want to do all the reforms that we are developing in 400 days.” I say: “Volodya, go with it, why fool around?” In short, I sent him away. There was stupidity in this program: a change in forms of ownership, for example, was proposed to be carried out on the hundredth day, while there were no corresponding laws or regulations. It was said that if there was a special situation in the country, then it would be necessary to set up field kitchens on the streets. Among the developers were Alexey Mikhailov and Mikhail Zadornov. I read it and forgot.

And Grigory Yavlinsky?

At first Yavlinsky was not among them; he worked for us in the Abalkin commission. Then one day he comes to me and says: “Nikolai Ivanovich, I want to report to you that I have been appointed Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR for Reform.” I tell him: “Are you flying away from the nest, Grigory? Agree, of course. We have to go, this is a promotion, but keep in mind that if you don’t go with us in terms of reform, we will ruin everything, you know about all these “days.” He promised that he would work together. But, as you know, everything went the other way around.

We wanted our man, Lev Voronin, to become Yeltsin’s deputy, but they chose their own, Ivan Silaev. And then Mikhail Bocharov, the director of a small brick factory, spoke, he came out with this program, only it was already called “500 days”. He and the guys there rewrote something, recalculated it, and it turned out to be 100 days more. Of course, he was persecuted and criticized, but after that the program began to live and became not just a program, but a political manifesto. Imagine, I proposed to carry out reforms in 6-8 years, and they said: “Why so long? We’ll do everything in two years.” And everything started spinning around her, I still don’t understand what it was? Maybe the influence of the Sun, remember how Chizhevsky wrote: “And again spots rose on the Sun, and sober minds were darkened.”

Maybe the fact is that the people demanded changes here and now, and not in eight years, and they responded to this request?

The people were thinking, no, of course, it was not only that. Everyone then became kind of crazy, then they cooled down and became normal again. Maybe it really has to do with some spots on the Sun.

I spoke at a session of the Supreme Council and proposed three options: fast with large losses, medium, also with large losses, and our option for 6-8 years, it was also not without losses and risks, but much smaller. Any reforms lead to certain losses. A political fuss ensued. Yeltsin, of course, without reading anything, began to criticize me.

Why do you think he didn't read the programs?

I don't know if he read Mumu as a child, I would be surprised. He didn’t read the program, it was 480 pages, a small program. He began to criticize: “Ryzhkov is a conservative, we need it in 500 days, but he offers 8 years, where is he taking us?” And away we go: about the log, about the fact that I “put a knife in the back.” I still have posters: “A log on the path of perestroika”, “The Ryzhkov government is a government of poverty.”

On December 25, 1990, I suffered a massive heart attack and was taken away for treatment. And somewhere on January 1-2, 1991, I had a one-on-one meeting with Gorbachev.

We talked about business, I told him: “Do you see what’s going on? I officially declare to you that the congress will end, and I am leaving, I will not work anymore. I worked hard, I didn’t leave the podium for a year, I defended the country for a whole year, and all this time I was bullied! Dear General Secretary, newspapers in our country are an organ of the CPSU Central Committee, and they torture me. I’m a communist, why are they doing this, why are you silent? They call me whatever they want, all that remains is to call me a homosexual. Why does Vadim Medvedev (headed the ideological commission of the CPSU Central Committee - approx.) arrange all this? "Tapes.ru")? He's a fool! Well, I’ll leave, put Vadim in, let him work!” Gorbachev hesitated and only said: “Maybe he doesn’t know anything, but he writes books.” I laughed: “Stop it, Mikhail Sergeevich, what kind of books does he write?” Then I told him, it will be hard for you, look, now there is a triangle: Yeltsin - Gorbachev - Ryzhkov. Yeltsin himself is a fool, but he has good assistants, and they understand perfectly well that while we are together, it is difficult to fight with us. As soon as I'm gone, you'll be left alone with them, and I don't envy you.

How did he react?

He began to reassure: “Well, what are you pushing, it’s not so,” etc. I decided to leave completely. I worked for a week on my last speech, summing up all the results in it. The first thing I said was: “Perestroika in the form it was intended did not take place.” There was noise throughout the hall. No one had said this before, everyone was sure that she was coming. Then I said that the attack was not on Ryzhkov’s government, but on the country, on the collapse of the country. I’m not a prophet, but look, on December 25, I was taken to the hospital with a heart condition, and exactly a year later, on December 25, 1991, the red flag was lowered when Gorbachev abdicated his post.

What is your attitude towards the State Emergency Committee? What was it? A coup attempt or a provocation that Yeltsin took advantage of?

I was far from this, and no one invited me there, although I was well acquainted with all the members of the committee. Therefore, I will speak as a person looking from the outside, especially since I would not want to offend any of them. So, all this was some kind of childhood. Not serious. There are no subjunctive moods in history, but let's imagine that if these people really, seriously thought, they would not have done this. They brought in tanks, everyone remembers how the girls sat on the tankers’ laps and on the armor of the vehicles. Well, what is it? This is all nonsense.

So you think that Yeltsin’s arrest was possible?

Listen, the State Emergency Committee had the entire KGB subordinate, the head of the KGB Kryuchkov was a member of the committee. This service then was at the level... Lord, they even knew who was in bed with whom. They knew everything and could do everything; there were people there who could develop a plan. Yes, it would be difficult, but possible. I had a friend Wojciech Jaruzelski (the head of socialist Poland - approx. "Tapes.ru"), we have lost each other in recent years, he died last year. So, he declared martial law in Poland. He actually saved the country, but a certain part of the population hated him after that and did not forgive him for it. Once, he told me this himself, there was such a case with him: he was signing books of his memoirs for readers, and a reader supposedly approached him and, under the guise of a book, hit him on the head with two bricks. That is, when people go to extreme measures, they must understand that these are not jokes, these are not girls and boys on tanks. It was some kind of farce. They, unfortunately, accelerated the collapse of the Union.

I would like to end the conversation with a personal question: maybe you regret something you did then, maybe you wanted to change something?

I am 85 years old, I have had a difficult but quite interesting life. I love reading philosophical books, and they say that the greatest mystery for a person is death, and that you need to appreciate every day you live. I believe that there are three such great mysteries: death, mind and peace. It remains a mystery to me what infinity is, and I’m sure it does for many too, because everything that surrounds us is finite. They say the Universe is many billions of years old, but I can’t understand what the Universe is, well, I can’t wrap my head around it. That's what I think about and every day I say thank you that God gave me another day to live. Therefore, I do not curse or regret a single day of my difficult life. I would like my parents to appear again, for my whole family to be together again, for me to be smarter, so that I can distinguish friends from foes well. I am not a churchgoer, although I built a temple, but I think that I have been carried away by materialistic philosophy for too long. She told us that matter is primary, but now I understand that the main thing is the soul.

Representative in the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation from the administration of the Belgorod region since September 2003, member of the Committee on Local Self-Government, member of the Commission on Natural Monopolies; born September 28, 1929 in... ... Large biographical encyclopedia

- (b. 1929) Russian politician. Since 1970 director of Uralmashplant (Sverdlovsk). Since 1975, 1st Deputy Minister of Heavy and Transport Engineering of the USSR. In 1979 82 1st Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR. In 1982 85 Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee ... Big Encyclopedic Dictionary

- (b. 1929), statesman and politician. Since 1970 director of Uralmashplant (Sverdlovsk). Since 1975, 1st Deputy Minister of Heavy and Transport Engineering of the USSR. In 1979 82 1st Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR. In 1982 85 secretary... encyclopedic Dictionary

- (born September 28, 1929, Dylevka village, Dzerzhinsky district, Donetsk region), state. activist, business executive. From a miner's family. Graduated in 1950. Kramatorsk mechanical engineering. technical school, in 1959 evening department of UPI with a degree in engineering. welding mechanic... Ekaterinburg (encyclopedia)

Ryzhkov, Nikolai Ivanovich- (09/28/1929, Dylevka village, Dzerzhinsky district, Donetsk region) state. activist, business executive. From a miner's family. In 1950 he graduated from the Kramatorsk Machine Building. technical school, in 1959 evening department. UPI with a degree in mechanical engineering for welding production. At UZTM... ... Ural Historical Encyclopedia

Nikolai Ivanovich Ryzhkov ... Wikipedia

Nikolai Ivanovich Ryzhkov ... Wikipedia

October 31, 1736 May 30, 1816 Tischbein, Johann Friedrich August Portrait of N.I. Saltykova Affiliation ... Wikipedia

Nikolai Ivanovich Saltykov October 31, 1736 May 30, 1816 Tischbein, Johann Friedrich August Portrait of N.I. Saltykova Affiliation ... Wikipedia

Books

• Russia: about the national idea and the connection of times, Ryzhkov Nikolai Ivanovich. In his new book, a prominent political figure and economic leader, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR in 1985-1990. N. I. Ryzhkov generously shares with readers the results of his...
• The Great Patriotic War. Lend-Lease, Ryzhkov Nikolai Ivanovich. A new book by a prominent political figure and economic leader, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR in 1985-1990. N.I. Ryzhkova directly continues the previous author’s monographic...

Times, as we know, do not choose... Nikolai Ryzhkov headed the USSR Council of Ministers in difficult years, when the country was at a crossroads, not knowing “where should we go.” A man with enormous experience, the general director of a major machine-building plant, he was until recently working on a farm in a huge and already collapsing state. Was it possible to prevent the collapse, retain Crimea for Russia, protect the people from the experiments of Yeltsin’s young reformers - Alexander Sargin talks about this with the last chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

Death of an Empire

In Soviet times, there were many people from Ukraine in the country's leadership. So you, Nikolai Ivanovich, were born in the Donetsk region...

— To be honest, I don’t consider Donbass Ukraine. Geographically, yes. It so happened that this region ended up there. But Donbass is dismembered: approximately two-thirds of it is located on the territory of Ukraine and one-third is on the territory of the Rostov region. I don’t know how it is now, but in not so long ago Soviet times there were about 75%, if not 80, Russians, and very few Ukrainians. Donbass is actually Russian. We didn’t even really think about the fact that this was Ukraine.

But now Ukraine and Russia are two independent states...

— Ukraine has always been part of Russia. As such, there was no Ukraine at all, but during Soviet rule there was the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. It so happened that in our country we go through border guards, through customs officers. They tell us that this is Ukraine, and this is Russia. I can't wrap my head around it! We were born, lived and worked in a single state. And take him and dismember him like that...

There was also Crimea...

— Well, Crimea is a special matter. I think Nikita Sergeevich was in some special state when he gave up Crimea. By the way, Boris Nikolaevich too. When they gathered in Belovezhye in 1990, if they were normal, and not drunk, he would have thought first...

I read somewhere that, on the contrary, they were sober, which is more surprising for making such a decision.

- Why sober? Everyone knows perfectly well that this is not so. After all, they drank for every line, and much has already been written on this issue. I read many materials, including those by Kravchuk, who was then in power. He said frankly: we, they say, that Yeltsin will raise the issue of Sevastopol and Crimea. And, as far as I understand, they believed that in the name of Ukraine’s independence they would have to sacrifice Sevastopol, they would have to give it up. But Yeltsin did not raise this question, and they breathed a sigh of relief. But Yeltsin was obliged to raise this question! Well, okay, Khrushchev did the wrong thing then, but at that time we were one country, and it was not very painful. But when we became different states... Crimea was Russian all its life, and Sevastopol had a special status. I didn’t come up with this; the status of special allied subordination to Sevastopol was granted by Stalin after the war. There are documents - by the way, no one thought to cancel them. Many people are either lying or really don’t know.

What, in your opinion, is the main reason for the collapse of the USSR - Gorbachev’s compliance, his inability to resist the West, the Belovezhskaya conspiracy, or really some objective circumstances that launched an irreversible process?

“Over these twenty years, many different arguments and justifications have been given. Here someone, out of ignorance or thoughtlessness, says: “The Roman Empire fell apart, Austria-Hungary fell apart, Great Britain fell apart...” They say, such is the fate of empires, sooner or later they all fall apart. Then I have a question: isn’t the USA an empire? It's just that this country is called differently. They have 50 states, but in reality they are the same republics as the 15 republics of the former USSR. And try to say in a conversation with the American president or some other politician that sooner or later they will fall apart. Such a cry will rise!

But the USSR was divided into republics based on nationality, it turned out that this was a time bomb! The US has a different approach.

- Yes, it's a mine! I wondered: why did Lenin do this? He was not a stupid man and understood everything perfectly, but he followed this path. Stalin insisted on administrative division. By the way, Zhirinovsky is now offering the same thing, he says: there are no Kalmyks, Tatars... There is simply a Kazan region or some other...

I think Lenin was sure that nothing like that would happen, because after

After the civil war, only one party remained - the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), then the CPSU. The party lived and worked according to the principle of democratic centralism, only from top to bottom, and this was written down in all the charters. Lenin understood perfectly well that, for example, from the primary party organization of Ukraine to the central apparatus in Moscow, everything was built vertically. And the party did not take into account anything, any administrative or national-geographical divisions. He understood that the party would hold the country. And this binding factor was considered stronger, more of a priority, perhaps, than the “right of nations to self-determination”

But objectively, the USSR was not a survivor?

- I have a completely different opinion. The USSR is a monolithic single state. Yes, there were union republics, but there was also a policy towards the union republics. There was a party, and it held everything in its hands: Ukraine, keep in mind that according to the party line you are subordinate to Moscow and try to do something! And, of course, there was a different personnel policy. My second secretary in Georgia was a friend of mine, now deceased. The head of the republic was always a person of the titular nationality, and the second secretary was always a nominee of Moscow, the center. And when in 1986 they did something stupid and put a Russian, Gennady Vasilyevich Kolbin, at the head of Kazakhstan (we lived and worked with him in the Urals), then big troubles happened: rallies, young people rioted. I believe this was a management mistake. In my opinion, Ligachev then dragged him through, thinking that since the majority there were Russians and Germans, then why put a Kazakh in charge... That’s what fired. By the way, this was the first shot during perestroika. Both Georgia and the Baltic states existed later, and there was no Yeltsin yet.

The Messiah is coming

Gaidar wrote in his book that at a certain point Gorbachev began to take out politically related loans. That is, dismantling the system in exchange for certain preferences. How important do you think this was?

“I don’t know if the formulation that Gorbachev took the money in order to destroy the Soviet Union is even correct. I don't think that was the case. Of course, there were some private agreements - for example, the same withdrawal of troops from the GDR... But first there was a political decision to withdraw them, and then, so to speak, financial mechanisms also came into play. By the way, they clutched their stomachs when they found out the amount we charged them for the unification of Germany, it was so meager. I don’t remember now, in my opinion, 16 billion dollars... Yes, we were paid money, but if you take into account what costs we incurred, what transportation costs... When all this began, I spoke with Defense Minister Yazov. He very much complained that we were forced to export some of the troops, equipment and people by sea, because it was unprofitable to drive trains through the GDR and especially through Poland. There are such prices for each axle of a railway car that there was not enough money!
But, you know, with all my disrespect for Gorbachev, for what he did, I still have hope in my soul to some extent, some small confidence that he did not raise the question of destroying the country. He raised the question of the unification of Germany, disarmament, dialogue with the West...

How critical was the situation? Was it impossible to prevent the collapse?

“At first she wasn’t critical. But they made her like this. In 1990, I did not leave the podium and said: “What are you doing? Stop!” The country had already gone into chaos in 1990, and we were absolutely not prepared for the next year. In our country, everything was interconnected, and Ukraine says: give us new equipment, but does not offer anything in return... With such a mess that was in 1990, it was difficult to expect anything at all. In August, Gorbachev returned from vacation from the south, and I asked him to meet. He received me and all my deputies. I said that the country is no longer governable today, and no one listens to anyone. Yeltsin says: “Give me the gold, give me the currency, and I won’t pay any taxes.” He came up with single-channel taxes, that is, he collects everything, and then says, well, for culture I’ll give you a piece, for defense I’ll give you a piece... By the way, today there are two channels - regional and federal. Then we prepared a short decision that the budget for 1991 is formed according to the same principle as all previous years. Lord, how they beat me then - there was no living space left on me! What happened!

Instead of figuring it out, they pulled out the “500 days” program and started messing with it. I say: listen, what are you talking about 500 days, when you somehow have to live today and tomorrow!?

Gerashchenko once said that Yavlinsky borrowed this program from Abalkin. There were not 500 days, but 400 step-by-step solutions...

- This is nonsense! What kind of economy could we talk about in 1990, when, in fact, everything got out of control? In general, I thought a lot about all these reforms that took place, for example, in China in 1979, and in other countries. Everywhere they were carried out under strong government. We started everything correctly and started working on the economy. And perestroika was proclaimed to modernize the economy. It was then, a couple of years later, that they said that the economy was not enough, that the political and government system needed to be changed. I believe that Gorbachev simply succumbed to the West, which praised him, said that he was the messiah, Gorbi, Gorbi... And Yakovlev was an eminence grise.

It seems Gorby still believes that he is the messiah...

“He believed that he descended from somewhere 2000 years after Jesus Christ, so he decided to do everything. I remember a conversation with Thatcher, with whom during her visit, like now with you, we sat face to face. She told me: “Mr. Ryzhkov, you are doing something very stupid!” I ask which one? “Gorbachev wants to eliminate atomic weapons...” We really, to some extent, naively thought that too many reserves had accumulated and that the world might collapse. She then said: “Mr. Ryzhkov, you are doing this in vain. Understand, only thanks to atomic weapons we do not have a world war.” And when I thought about her words, I realized how right she was. Everyone understands perfectly well that no one will be the first to press the button, but everyone knows that such a button exists. There is a suitcase, there is a button, there are missiles (though Yeltsin later redirected them to God knows where!).

By the way, Thatcher later said in her memoirs that when Gorbachev came again, pulled out a map, showed the missile points and told how the missiles would be targeted, they were simply shocked! They would never have believed it and thought it was a provocation. After all, the head of state cannot reveal all his cards to another country!

With all that he has done, I still think that his main negative role is that through his actions (not at one moment, this lasted for several years) he led to the fact that the process became irreversible.

Russian with Chinese...

Do you regret that we did not follow the Chinese path?

- I'm sorry. About five years after my resignation, I was invited several times by the Chairman of the Chinese Government, Li Peng, and in the end I flew there. They organized a trip around the country for me, and I talked a lot with him. Although I was already retired, and he was the current prime minister. He spoke Russian because he studied with us at the Institute of Energy. He said: “Nikolai Ivanovich, we met in 1990. You told me about how you look at the prospects for economic modernization. But she should have followed approximately our path...” I answered: “Not quite like that. You have your own soil, we have ours. But according to some fundamental provisions, yes, the economies are similar.” And the Chinese Prime Minister asked: “So why didn’t you follow this path and turn into an unknown direction?” So, I still think that we should have followed a path like the Chinese one, and there would have been a completely different picture.

But at first you and Gorbachev had complete mutual understanding?

- No, it was not. He was unhappy that I was taking my clear position. There was no warmth in our relationship. But until 1987, I sincerely supported him, because I believed that he could do a lot for the country.

But there were battles in the Politburo. I read it and almost got to the point of swearing...

- And to the point of squealing, and to the point of swearing. When, at my request, even at my demand, the issue of an anti-alcohol campaign was raised at the Politburo. After all, then we saw that something incredible was happening with alcohol matters! I asked Mikhail Sergeevich twice or three times to consider this issue at the Politburo, which has become worse than ever. On the one hand, people are terribly unhappy - queues, crush. On the other hand, Solomentsev and Ligachev are punishing my ministers because, let’s say, this month they sold 1% more cognac than last month. But we were losing a lot of money. Gorbachev said, okay, okay, we’ll figure it out, but he himself did nothing.

And then there were fights when you were against the shock price release, and after that you decided to leave...

“There were two reasons for my leaving. Firstly, I understood that the 500 days program was winning. That is, the point of view that suggested shock therapy, those arguments. I remember telling someone from the team of young reformers: “What are you doing? After all, people will die!” And he answers: “Nothing, let them jump. Someone will break their head on the asphalt, and someone will fall into the water.” He didn't care that the country would break its head. At the beginning of December, three weeks before the Congress of People's Deputies, I announced that I would no longer work and that after the congress I would resign. I categorically do not accept what Gorbachev is going to do. This will be scary for the country. The country is not ready for this! The 90s showed everything...

And the second reason is the destruction of the country. I told everyone: “Stop, you can’t, having such separatist aspirations, not evaluate them!” So-called democracy and openness led to all this. One on one, I told Gorbachev: “We will crumble the country!” And he said to me, Nikolai Ivanovich, you always push things.

Gaidar is ahead

Now Gaidar's supporters say that he saved the country from the threat of famine, chaos, civil war...

“Then people came who absolutely did not understand and did not know the country. Gaidar worked in the magazine "Communist" and in the newspaper "Pravda". Nechaev worked in some institute or laboratory, Chubais, I don’t know where he worked, also Shokhin, Aven... There were six people there, and they did not undergo any kind of work - neither factory, nor state, nor territorial work in the republics or regions ! And here in Moscow they did not hold government positions. That is, they were absolutely far from the real economy. Yes, they read a lot of books, and the Americans came here, dozens of some people wore jeans and commanded, like, do this and that, they introduced vouchers and other nonsense. These people, the young reformers, did not have the right to do all this. Yes, Yeltsin had to recruit someone, and yes, he had no choice. But he had to call us (not me personally, but people who understood what was what), but he didn’t want to. This is politics...

And we followed the Polish path...

— Back in 1987, we quarreled with Gorbachev - precisely on the issue of further economic development. He proposed, starting in 1988, to do what Gaidar did on January 2, 1992: let go of prices, eliminate planning, etc. We then talked very seriously. I said: “Either you accept our concept of a gradual transition, or I’m leaving, I won’t work, and you do what you want. This will be a terrible harm for the state!” Then Gorbachev agreed, but then Gaidar did it!

Now a monument has been erected to him at the Higher School of Economics. Would you erect a monument to Gaidar?

- To him? Of course not. He ruined the country and people, so what now? Rejoice at the theory that he adopted and which has been in effect for these 15 years? Why are they playing the fool, making him a savior? Pensioners were not given money for six months, pensioners went into garbage dumps!.. And today they say that he saved the country!? Yes, they, together with Yeltsin, humiliated the country, let it down, as the thieves say.

Your detractors criticize you for creating a loophole for cooperatives and private ownership in 1988. Do you regret it now?

“I remember everything perfectly and now I think it should have been done.” Another thing is that initially one idea was laid down, and then the Congress of People’s Deputies and the new Supreme Council appeared, completely different people appeared and led in a different direction. Before making such a decision, we didn’t just start from scratch. We have a rich, powerful country, a powerful economy. I have always imagined it as such boulders-pyramids - this is metallurgy, this is mechanical engineering, this is the military-industrial complex, this is chemistry... But between them there are voids, and they were supposed to be filled with consumer goods, what the people need. During the war and after the war, the people reluctantly put up with everyday hardships. But the moment came when it was necessary to live differently. I believed that with the help of cooperation we could fill these niches, but heavy industry would never be able to do this. This was our task, and it was for this purpose that we passed the law. But in 1989-1990, the loudmouths spread cooperation and made it possible to create cooperatives directly in factories. Here the products are made by a factory, the state, and there by a cooperative, and the result was a complete imbalance. What about the financial side of this issue? No, the idea was right. Of course, you can criticize and ask why we switched to market relations? But we have always said that government regulation is needed! We understood perfectly well, studied the French and English experience, and everywhere about 50% are state-owned enterprises. And we thought it should be about the same. The military-industrial complex and heavy industry must remain in the hands of the state. Everything else could be given to joint stock companies, private companies, etc. Because, say, a shoe repair shop will be private, will the country come to a critical state? No, nothing will happen. This is normal.

Remember when Sobchak called you a crying Bolshevik?

- Do you really believe that the general director of Uralmash, who had 52 thousand employees (of which 43 thousand at the main plant and 9 thousand at branches), which had a social city with a population of 200 thousand people, where there were schools, hospitals, transport , 50 factory canteens... Do you really think that a “rag” can work at such a factory? God forbid, this is simply unacceptable! Yes, maybe I'm not a tyrant. I was very demanding of myself and of people, but I was also friendly when necessary.

So, if Sobchak saw how, after the earthquake in Spitak, where I arrived, a woman in black hugged me somewhere in the mountains, and tears welled up in my eyes, is this a moral crime? Well, who is he himself after that?

The West is rubbing its hands

You have known Yeltsin from the Urals for a long time. Has your attitude towards him changed over time?

- He was always the same. Only then did he start drinking more. You see, this man was very strong in destruction. And not only in Moscow, not only in the capital’s party organization, when he was rampaging here and people were jumping from floors. Wherever he worked, he destroyed everything. Although he is a builder by training, and it seemed that he should be a creator. But it was precisely in creation that he was absolutely weak, he did not understand the mechanisms of action. That’s how it is with the country: I have a feeling that this power fell to him, and he didn’t know what to do with it. I rushed back and forth, found this Gaidar...

There are two of them - he and Gorbachev. Great power was contraindicated for both of them. This was our mistake, including mine. I also supported Gorbachev when he came to power in 1985. And others supported him, but he couldn’t be installed because he was simply not suited for this! Now, if there was a preacher position in the country, he would do a great job! He would talk and talk for hours... But to govern, to lead the country in a planned and balanced manner... He is very impulsive, disorganized. And Yeltsin is also contraindicated for great power, though for other reasons: he is a destroyer.

Is some form of reintegration possible? Well, okay, the Balts, everything is clear with them, although they come to us for gasoline. But other republics - Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Belarus... We are neighbors.

— With the Balts, I think it’s really useless. These are the kind of people who will always have someone under their wing. They were under our wing, sucked us as much as they could, walked around in bast shoes, and then became normal. Today they have the Americans and the West, that is, they have always been tied to someone, and it is useless for us to continue talking with them. But everyone else... My personal opinion is that it is unrealistic today to recreate the Soviet Union in the form in which it was, even if I really wanted it. This will be a war between republics. Of course, something needs to be done, and we can’t leave it like that. We need to create something close to the European Union. Each country there seems to be independent - the same France, Belgium, Germany, but there are general principles by which they live. For example, it's been more than 40 years since they created a unified organization for coal and steel. Now, step by step, they have reached a single currency. They do not sit still, they have a parliament, some decisions are made. Yes, this is a boring matter, you need the consent of all members... But with independent states, they pursue a single policy.

We have scattered in different directions, and no one here is trying to pursue a unified policy. In the CIS, which will soon be 18 years old, we only have some general principles, that’s all. Kravchuk and everyone else, by creating the CIS, essentially created a club for divorces. They were terribly afraid of some kind of supranational structure. What we have in Europe - parliament, executive power. They were terribly afraid: they say, you will infringe on us, suppress us, etc. I’m not saying that we need to repeat the path of Europe one for one. But taking into account the specifics, something similar should be done. But there is one “but”. There, Türkiye is pulling in one direction, Germany in the other. And these republics are pulling us apart, so they don’t see the need to group. There is a crude but correct saying: “Until the roast rooster pecks in one place, nothing will happen.” If this cockerel pecks for some reason, then everyone will come and say: “Let's live together. Separately it is impossible.” But what kind of rooster it will be when it pecks is unknown.

And the West is rubbing its hands: how good it is that Russia has a conflict with Georgia! What's left for us now - just an oil pipeline?

— Unfortunately, yes, gas, pipe. We talked about this a long time ago, when big money appeared due to wildly soaring prices. Of course, it was necessary to invest in the processing industry, in the real sector of the economy. I understand that this money saved the country from the crisis. But I don’t think they were specially saved for this. Who thought it would erupt? By the way, scientists knew, they warned for a long time... This money should not have been kept in the West in America at 2%, but invested here! We need to build roads, give preferential loans to factories, for modernization, to replace equipment... I shudder to think, why do we need to join the WTO, and what will happen when we join there? This will be something incredible for us! This will end with businesses closing left and right. The textile industry will not survive, light industry too, etc. Yes, it really needs to be modernized. But not the country as a whole, but specifically.

How much longer will Soviet equipment last?

- Let's do some arithmetic. Today we have 70% of outdated equipment. So consider it. We'll last a few more years. It is no longer suitable today. We are still doing something for internal consumption. But we are no longer able to compete at a serious global level.

DOSSIER
Nikolai Ivanovich Ryzhkov. Born on September 28, 1929 in Ukraine, in the village of Dyleevka, Donetsk region, in a working-class family. Graduated from the Kramatorsk Mechanical Engineering College and the Ural Polytechnic Institute. Since 1950 he worked at the Ural Machine-Building Plant named after. Sergo Ordzhonikidze (now Uralmash Production Association) as a foreman, then a foreman, a shop manager, a chief welding technologist, a chief engineer, and a general director. Since 1975 - First Deputy Minister of Heavy and Transport Engineering of the USSR. In 1985-1990 - member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. In 1991, he ran for the post of President of the RSFSR and received more than 15% of the votes, finishing second after Yeltsin. Since 2003 - representative of the administration of the Belgorod region in the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. Married, has a daughter, as well as a grandson and granddaughter.

Studying the lives of many politicians, one can sometimes conclude that in order to become a real professional in the field of government, it is not enough to just be a competent specialist. Definitely, to be effective in your detail in the entrusted field, you also need to be a truly extraordinary person. Nikolai Ivanovich Ryzhkov is precisely such a Man with a capital P, whose biography will be discussed in this article.

Birth

The future outstanding politician of our country was born into the family of a miner on September 28, 1929. This happened in a village called Dyleevka (Donetsk region, Ukraine). Our hero's father's name was Ivan Fedorovich, and his mother's name was Alexandra Pavlovna. It goes without saying that the guy’s worker-peasant origins did not bode well for him with great prospects in later life, but fate wanted to make him a very influential person.

Early life and education

Ryzhkov Nikolai had a very difficult childhood, since during this period the country was just beginning to move away from the colossal and tragic consequences of the destructive Great Patriotic War. Of course, this state of affairs forced the guy to grow up very quickly and make his choice professionally. And so the young man entered the Kramatorsk Mechanical Engineering College at the Faculty of Mechanics. Then from 1953 to 1959. Ryzhkov Nikolay studied at the Ural Polytechnic Institute named after Kirov, from which he successfully graduated with a degree in technology and equipment for welding production.

Worker's career

In 1950, a young guy begins his career. He goes to work at the Ural Machine-Building Plant. He worked at this enterprise until 1975 and was able to go through all levels of the hierarchy. So, he managed to visit:

• Shift foreman (1950-1951)
• Head of the flight (1951-1955).
• Head of the workshop (1955-1959).
• Chief technologist for welding works (1959-1965).
• General Director of the production association (1970-1975).

Let us note that the man was appointed to the highest post at the plant, which at that time had all-Union significance, at the age of forty. And this testifies to his very strong character and truly extraordinary abilities as a leader.

Projects

Nikolai Ryzhkov, when he was the manager of Uralmash, showed his subordinates how efficient and responsible he was. In addition, he turned out to be a real ace in welding and even wrote two monographs and a certain number of scientific articles on this topic. Such achievements did not go unnoticed by the country's leadership, and Ryzhkov was twice awarded the State Prize.

Transition to the position of a high-ranking official

After some time, Nikolai Ryzhkov, whose biography includes many interesting facts, was enrolled in the state personnel reserve. And I must say that he did not have to stay in reserve for long. Already in 1975, he was approved for the post of First Deputy Minister of Transport and Heavy Engineering. And after another 4 years, he finally found himself in the post of first assistant to the Chairman of the State Plan of the USSR. As a statesman, Nikolai Ryzhkov was characterized by particular adherence to principles in resolving key issues, the ability to think big and keep up with technological progress.

Work in the CPSU Central Committee

Here we should make a small digression: back in 1956, our hero joined the ranks of the Communist Party, which was then a prerequisite for all those specialists who planned to occupy leadership positions in the future. And in 1981, Nikolai Ryzhkov made another career transition - he was elected as a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. And in the period from November 22 to October 15, 1985, he was the Secretary of this main organization in the country. In parallel with this, he was also the head of the Economic Department of the CPSU Central Committee. Also for five years he was a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee.

The politician himself says that he ended up in such high positions thanks to Yuri Andropov’s very good personal attitude towards him. Immediately after entering the political elite, Ryzhkov began to delve into the situation in the country and propose reforms in order to correct the difficult economic situation in the state.

Nikolai Ivanovich accepted the beginning of Gorbachev’s reign with joy, because he believed that this person had the ability to reform a decaying power. In 1985, Nikolai Ryzhkov was a government figure of the highest rank, because he was entrusted with the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which automatically made him the second person in the country. As Prime Minister, he was able to make a huge contribution to minimizing the consequences of the Chernobyl accident and the earthquake in Spitak. It was Ryzhkov who was involved in developing the economic restructuring program. For this, he suffered from liberals, who accused him of indecisiveness, and communists, who believed that Nicholas had become a traitor and moved away from the ideals of communism. As a result, in December 1985, the politician literally suffered a heart attack, and therefore he was forced to retire.

New era

But many were mistaken in thinking that Nikolai Ryzhkov had finally left politics. In 1991, he decided to run for the presidency of Russia and only slightly lost to Yeltsin. And in 1995 he entered the State Duma, where he could subsequently serve for three convocations. In 2003 he joined the Federation Council. There he deals with issues of natural monopolies. Fully supports the policies of Vladimir Putin.

Personal life

Despite the fact that Nikolai Ryzhkov is the chairman of many government agencies, both in the past and present, he is still the same person as the rest of us. This can be judged by his affections. So, he really likes to communicate with people, write articles, read domestic and foreign literature, listen to music, watch good films. Nikolai Ivanovich has been living with his wife for many years. In 1956, their daughter Marina was born, who subsequently gave her parents two grandchildren.

On May 24, 1990, during a live broadcast from the session hall of the Supreme Council, he stated that the cost of bread and other food products was unjustifiably low and should be higher, which led to huge panic in the consumer environment.

In December 1991, he was one of the initiators of an appeal to the President of the USSR, which spoke of a ban on the dissolution of the state in Belovezhskaya Pushcha.

On the first day of March 2014, during a meeting of the Federation Council, he voted positively for issuing permission for President Putin to send troops into Ukraine if necessary. Ryzhkov has an extremely negative attitude towards Maidan itself, believing that this riot brought nationalists to power in the republic. And within two weeks, Nikolai Ivanovich was included in the sanctions list of the European Union.

During his life, Ryzhkov managed to visit not only the political and industrial environment, but also worked as the head of the board of directors of Tveruniversalbank.

The now deceased oppositionist Boris Nemtsov considered Nikolai Ivanovich Ryzhkov an excellent leader of any enterprise, but an extremely disgusting and useless prime minister.

Our hero has many state awards, and is also an honorary resident of several cities.