By June 22, 1944 preparation big operation of strategic importance in Belarus was completed. On June 22, Soviet troops conducted reconnaissance in force. The forward battalions, supported by artillery and tank fire, penetrated the defense in a number of sectors and captured the first enemy trenches.

On June 23, the main forces of the three Soviet fronts launched an offensive. The 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts delivered the main blows in the Vitebsk, Bogushev, and Orsha directions. The 2nd Belorussian Front was advancing in the Mogilev direction. The 1st Belorussian Front launched a decisive offensive a day later - on June 24th. The armies of Rokossovsky dealt the main blow in the Bobruisk direction.

A unit of the 3rd Belorussian Front is forcing the Luchesa River. June 1944

Vitebsk-Orsha operation

1st Baltic Front. During reconnaissance in combat on June 22, the advanced battalions of the 22nd Guards Rifle Corps under the command of Major General Ruchkin from the 6th Guards Army (6 GA) broke through the enemy’s tactical defenses, advanced 4-6 km. There was a threat to the flank and rear of the German 9th Army Corps. The German command was forced to begin the transfer of part of the tactical reserves of the 9th Corps to the area east of Obol. As a result, the Germans were deprived of reserves on the first day, which contributed to the offensive of the 6th Guards Army and the 43rd Army. The forward battalions of the 23rd Guards Rifle Corps 6 GA and the 1st Rifle Corps 43 A also achieved some success, wedged into the enemy defenses.

The success of June 22 led to the fact that significant adjustments were made to the plan of the artillery offensive. So, in 6 GA they reduced the time of artillery preparation and reduced the amount of artillery involved by up to 50%. On the morning of June 23, the strike force of the 1st Baltic Front - the 6th Guards Army under the command of Chistyakov and the 43rd Army of Beloborodov, went on the offensive. The infantry, supported by close support tanks, aircraft and artillery, broke through the enemy front in a 30 km sector.

Soviet troops began to move rapidly in the western direction. The Germans tried to contain the Soviet offensive with artillery fire and infantry counterattacks with forces from a company to a battalion, supported by groups of tanks of 3-8 vehicles. However, the Soviet troops continued the offensive. The 1st Rifle Corps 43 A, with the support of units of the 6 GA, bypassed the strong center of resistance Shumilino from the flanks and rear and, after a short but stubborn battle, captured the settlement. The garrison of the stronghold was partly destroyed, partly surrendered.

On the first day of the offensive, the Soviet command planned to bring Butkov's 1st tank corps into battle. He was supposed to advance in the general direction of Beshenkovichi. The corps began to advance at 10 o'clock (it was located 14-18 km from the front line), but the rain significantly worsened the movement on the roads, and outside of them in the swampy terrain, the movement of tanks was almost impossible. As a result, the tankers could not join the battle until dark. By this time, infantry with support tanks were fighting in the area of ​​inter-lake defiles to the west and south-west of Shumilin. Due to the significant delay and the presence of difficult terrain ahead - inter-lake defiles, the Bagramyan commander forbade the entry of a tank corps into battle until the infantry overcame the inter-lake defiles.

The 23rd Guards and 1st Rifle Corps advanced 16 km in a day. On the right flag of the 6th GA, the 22nd Guards Corps, overcoming the stubborn resistance of the enemy's tactical reserves, advanced 2-7 km. On the same day, at the junction of two guards corps, part of the forces of the 103rd rifle corps of the 6 GA were brought into battle. The 2nd Guards Rifle Corps was concentrated for the offensive.

Cloudiness and variable rain somewhat limited the actions of Soviet aviation, but it made 746 sorties (of which 435 were ground-attack sorties). The German Air Force was limited to reconnaissance that day.

Thus, already on the first day of the offensive, the strike force of the 1st Baltic Front managed to achieve major successes. The enemy's front was broken. The German 9th Army Corps was defeated, its units, abandoning equipment (6 tanks, 66 guns and other property were captured), hastily retreated to the western and southern banks of the Western Dvina. The German command tried to create a stable defense in the Obol region and on the Western Dvina from the remnants of the corps and the redeployed reserves, preventing the gap from expanding. The Soviet command, in order to maintain the pace of the offensive and prevent the enemy from gaining a foothold on new lines, formed advanced mobile detachments reinforced with tanks and artillery.

On June 24, the Soviet armies continued their offensive, widening the gap to 90 km along the front and 25-30 km in depth. The Germans fiercely resisted - the Soviet troops repelled 27 counterattacks. By the end of the day, the 6th GA reached the Western Dvina. The forward detachments crossed the river on the move and captured small bridgeheads. The 43rd Army, continuing to advance in a southwestern direction, also reached the Western Dvina. The 1st Rifle Corps, under the command of Vasiliev, immediately occupied bridgeheads on the southern bank of the river. On the left flank of 43 A, units of the 92nd Rifle Corps broke through the German defenses and reached the distant approaches to Vitebsk (8 km north of the city). On the right flank of the front, the offensive of the 4th shock army of Malyshev did not bring success. The Germans offered stubborn resistance, and units of the 4th shock army were unable to break through the enemy defenses.

The 1st Panzer Corps began to move towards the Western Dvina. However, a few roads became impassable after the rains, almost all the bridges were destroyed by the Germans, they had to be restored. In addition, the roads were clogged with second echelons, artillery, pontoons, and convoys of the advancing armies. Numerous bottlenecks formed. Only after it was possible to organize the movement, tanks, artillery and pontoons were let forward. The tank corps reached the Western Dvina only towards the end of the day and began preparations for crossing the arm. Aircraft of the 3rd Air Army made 1,127 sorties that day (weather conditions improved).

By the end of the second day of the offensive, units 43 A of the 1st Baltic Front and 39 A of the 3rd Belorussian Front went to the rear of the enemy's Vitebsk grouping. The German command, trying to prevent the catastrophe that threatened the Vitebsk group and prevent the Red Army from forcing the Western Dvina, hastily pulled together reserves and troops from other directions. Two infantry divisions began to be transferred to the Polotsk region from the Idritsk direction; two security divisions, as well as various sapper, construction, security, penal and other units, were advanced to the line of the Western Dvina. The 212th Infantry Division was transferred from the Pskov region.

Forcing the Western Dvina. Parts 6 GA and 43 A, without waiting for the approach of pontoon connections, immediately began to force the river on various improvised watercraft. Regimental, divisional artillery and part of the anti-tank artillery regiments and light cannon artillery brigades were transported on rafts shot down by the gunners themselves. This artillery played a big role in holding and expanding bridgeheads.

The German command, trying to stop the Soviet offensive at all costs, threw hastily assembled units into battle. The Soviet troops located on the bridgeheads were subjected to numerous violent counterattacks. However, the German attacks failed to stop the advance. Soviet troops. All day on June 25, the crossing of Soviet units continued. So, the 23rd Guards Rifle Corps crossed the river and expanded the previously captured bridgehead. By the end of the day, sappers had built pontoon crossings, which greatly accelerated the transfer of artillery and tanks. Parts 6 GA and 43 A liberated the city of Beshenkovichi by the end of the day. Formations 43 A, together with the troops of the 39th Army, completed the encirclement of the enemy's Vitebsk grouping. On the same day they brought ferry crossing for the transfer of a tank corps. It should be noted that the impact force of this corps could not be used in this operation.

On June 26, the troops of the shock group of the front fought 10-20 km. The German command of the remnants of the broken units and the introduction of new divisions (290th Infantry and 221st Security) tried to stop the Soviet offensive. During the day, Soviet troops repulsed up to 30 counterattacks, each with forces from a battalion to an infantry regiment, supported by 10-12 tanks. The 43rd Army part of its forces participated in the liquidation of the Vitebsk group. The Luftwaffe, like the previous days, showed no activity. Thus, on June 25-26, Bagramyan's front solved the difficult task of forcing such a large water barrier as the Western Dvina. Less significant water barriers were also overcome - the Ulla and Svechanka rivers. The bridgehead was deepened to 18 km.

On June 27-28, the troops of the 1st Baltic Front developed an offensive in a westerly direction. The 100th Rifle Corps was included in the 4th shock army, and Malyshev's army regrouped forces for a subsequent offensive on Polotsk. The 22nd Guards Rifle Corps of the 6th Civil Aviation took Obolon as a strong enemy stronghold. The troops of the 43rd Army, with the assistance of the forces of the 3rd Belorussian Front, stormed an important stronghold and highway junction - Lepel. The 1st Tank Corps, after crossing the Ulla River, together with units of the 2nd Guards Corps of the 6th Civil Aviation, took the enemy's stronghold Kamen.

As a result, during the six days of the offensive, the troops of the 1st Baltic Front successfully completed the task set by the Headquarters. The shock grouping of the front broke through the enemy defenses, together with the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, destroyed the Vitebsk grouping, crossed the Western Dvina, Svechanka, Ulla and, having advanced 80 km with the left wing, occupied the large strongholds of the Wehrmacht - Beshenkovichi and Lepel. During this time, Soviet troops destroyed more than 25 thousand enemy soldiers and officers, and a lot of military equipment, including 51 aircraft, 322 guns. More than 5 thousand people were captured, 474 guns, more than 1400 vehicles and other weapons and equipment became Soviet trophies.

The offensive of the 3rd Belorussian Front

On June 22, in the afternoon, the forward battalions of the divisions of the first echelon of Krylov's 5th Army, with the support of artillery, went on the offensive and broke into the enemy's first trench with a powerful, sudden blow and captured it. Developing the first success, advanced units advanced 2-4 km. At the same time, in the direction of the main attack, Soviet soldiers captured not only the first trench, but the second and third. The Germans counterattacked, trying to restore the situation, but their blows were repelled. In this direction, Soviet troops defeated two regiments of the 299th Infantry Division of the 6th Army Corps and a penal battalion.

At the same time, the advanced battalions of the 11th Guards Army of Galitsky attacked the German positions. They advanced along the Minsk highway. The advanced units of the army broke into the first trench. However, they met strong resistance and could not advance further. Here the German troops relied on well-fortified positions. The advanced battalions of the 31st Army of Glagolev were not successful. In the Orsha direction, the German 78th assault division of the 27th army corps held the defense, it was well equipped and reinforced with about 50 assault guns.

Reconnaissance in force showed that the Germans had the weakest defense in the Bogushev direction. Five battalions of 5 A penetrated deep into the enemy defenses and captured several small bridgeheads on the Sukhodrovka River. At night, the engineering units of 5A built three 60-ton bridges across the river for crossing tanks and artillery, and three light bridges for vehicles. In addition, on the first day of the battle, the German command used all divisional reserves and the reserve of the 6th Corps, parts of the 14th Infantry Division, in the offensive zone 5 A. As a result, the Germans did not have the strength to parry the blow of the main forces of the 5th Soviet army.

On June 23, a powerful artillery strike was dealt to enemy positions. The first 5 minutes is a fire raid by all artillery, 105 minutes is the period of destruction of German defensive structures by aimed fire, 20 minutes is the destruction of fortifications by direct fire, and 40 minutes is the suppression of the front line and the nearest depth. In lane 5 A, changes were made to artillery preparation: artillery fire was shifted into the depth of the enemy's defense.

15 minutes before the start of the assault on German positions, the Soviet Air Force launched an assault bombing attack on German troops. German fighters in groups of 4-6 attempted to impede the Soviet attacks, but without much success. The 1st Air Army maintained air supremacy. In just a day, Soviet aircraft made 1769 sorties, conducted 28 air combat and shot down 15 enemy aircraft.

At 9 o'clock, the Soviet infantry, with the support of tanks, went on the offensive along the entire front. The 39th Army of Lyudnikov broke through the enemy's front for 6 km and crossed the Luchesa River. At the forefront of the blow was the 5th Guards Rifle Corps. Advancing to the west, the Guards Corps advanced 12-13 km and intercepted the Vitebsk-Orsha railway. During the battle, the army defeated the 197th Infantry Division of the 6th Army Corps. An attempt by the Germans to stop the Soviet offensive with the help of part of the forces of the 95th Infantry Division failed. German troops were driven back to the west.

Krylov's 5th Army dealt the main blow with its right flank. Parts of the 72nd and 65th rifle corps attacked here. Connections 5 A expanded the breakthrough to 35 km and advanced to a depth of 10 km. The army crossed Luchesa and cut the Vitebsk-Orsha railway. The opposing 5 A 299th Infantry Division of the 6th Corps was defeated.

The 11th Guards Army of Galitsky also broke into the enemy defenses, advancing to a depth of 2 to 8 km. On the left flank, in the strip of the Minsk highway, the Soviet troops met a powerful enemy defense. Therefore, the command of the army, with the permission of the commander, decided to transfer the main blow from the left flank to the right, in the zone of the 16th Rifle Corps, where success was outlined.

The 31st army of Glagolev wedged into the enemy defenses for 3 km and fought stubborn battles with the German troops. The German infantry, supported by tanks, constantly counterattacked. In this direction, the German command advanced from the reserve up to two infantry regiments reinforced with tanks and artillery.

As a result, the right flank of the front achieved the greatest success. Parts of the 39th and 5th armies broke through the German defenses 10-13 km in depth and expanded the breakthrough to 30 km. The armies that advanced in the center and on the left flank ran into more serious enemy resistance. In addition, the most developed defensive structures of the enemy were located here. They wedged into the enemy's defenses, but could not break through it.

On June 24, units of the 39th Army reached the Ostrovno area. Soviet troops intercepted the Wehrmacht's withdrawal route from Vitebsk to the southwest. At the same time, units of the 84th Rifle Corps reached the eastern outskirts of the city. The Germans offered stubborn resistance. The 5th Army, overcoming the resistance of the defeated divisions and the arriving German reserves, advanced 10-14 km. At 9 pm, after a powerful bombing and assault strike by 270 bombers and attack aircraft, Soviet soldiers with a swift blow from the north broke through the German defensive formations and stormed Bogushevsk, an important stronghold of the enemy. In this case, 24 guns were captured. In connection with the success of 5 A in its offensive zone, Oslikovsky's cavalry-mechanized group was introduced into the breakthrough.

The 11th Guards Army, using the success achieved by the right flank, captured the district center of Babinovichi and defeated several enemy regiments in its area. By the end of the day, the troops of the 11th Army expanded the breakthrough to 30 km and advanced to a depth of 14 km. The 31st Army, repulsing the fierce counterattacks of the enemy, made little progress.

On June 25, Chernyakhovsky's armies continued to develop the offensive. The left flank of 39 A reached the southern bank of the Western Dvina in the area of ​​Dorogokupovo, Gnezdilovichi. Here the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front joined forces with the forces of the 43rd Army of the 1st Baltic Front. As a result, the encirclement around the enemy's Vitebsk grouping was closed. In this regard, Tippelskirch noted that three divisions were cut off by the enemy and soon destroyed. In fact, in the Vitebsk region, the 53rd army corps of F. Gollwitzer was surrounded - the 206th and 246th infantry, the 6th airfield and part of the 4th airfield divisions, as well as the 197th infantry division of the 6th corps. The commander of the 3rd Panzer Army, Reinhardt, offered to withdraw the troops, but Hitler initially forbade the withdrawal of the corps, and when permission was received, it was already too late.

At the same time, the center of 39 A took possession of the eastern part and the center of Vitebsk with a decisive attack. The encircled German units launched up to 18 counterattacks against the 5th Guards Rifle Corps, desperately trying to break through to the west and southwest, but all enemy attacks were repelled.

The cavalry-mechanized group of Oslikovsky captured the city of Senno with a swift jerk. The forward detachments of the KMG cut the Lepel-Orsha railway. The troops of the 5th Army, building on the success of the KMG, advanced 20 km, destroying scattered enemy detachments along the way. Parts of the army liberated more than 100 settlements. In addition, taking into account the major success in the offensive zone of the 5th Army, where the Soviet troops broke through all the German defensive lines and broke into the operational space, at the direction of the Vasilevsky Headquarters representative in the Bogushevsky direction, they decided to throw the 5th Guards Tank Army under the command of Rotmistrov into battle .

The 11th GA successfully advanced and broke through two fortified lines of the enemy. On June 25, in the offensive zone of the 11th Civil Aviation, the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps was led into the breakthrough under the command of Burdeyny. He received the task of intercepting German communications: the Minsk road northwest of Orsha and the Orsha-Lepel railway. The 31st Army on the right flank broke through the German defenses on the Dnieper.

Thus, in three offensives, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front completely broke through the German defenses. Soviet troops advanced to a depth of 30 to 50 km and a front of 100 km. Vitebsk and Orsha groupings were separated, in the Vitebsk region surrounded by five enemy divisions. Seven German divisions were defeated or suffered heavy losses. All this time, Soviet aviation firmly held air supremacy, destroying 52 enemy aircraft and making more than 2,500,000 sorties just to attack or bombard enemy forces.

The German command, having lost the main defensive line and suffered a defeat in the Vitebsk and Bogushevsky directions, diverted the rear of the 3rd Panzer and 4th Army to the line of the Berezina River. At the same time, the Germans tried to delay the offensive of the Soviet troops at intermediate lines. The German command began to commit operational reserves into battle. The Germans continued to provide especially fierce resistance in the Orsha direction. In an attempt to hold the Minsk road, the German command transferred the 260th Infantry Division from the Kopys region and the 286th Security Division from the Tolochin region to this direction.

Liquidation of the Vitebsk group

Already on June 25, the Vitebsk group was divided into two parts. On the night of June 26, units of the 39th and 43rd armies completely liberated Vitebsk. During June 26, the encircled group tried to break out of the encirclement. The Germans made up to 22 counterattacks with forces from one to two regiments supported by tanks, assault guns and artillery. As a result of fierce battles, part of the Vitebsk grouping, with heavy losses, broke into the forests in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bLake Moshno. However, the narrow corridor was soon closed. Commander Chernyakhovsky ordered to turn three divisions of the 5th Army, the German group of about 5 thousand soldiers that had broken through was again surrounded around Lake Moshno.

In the afternoon, the 26th part of the 39th and 43rd armies continued to compress, surrounded by enemy groups. At the same time, the Soviet Air Force inflicted powerful bombing and assault strikes on them. On the morning of June 27, Soviet troops launched a decisive offensive and broke the enemy's resistance. Most of the Germans were destroyed. The commander of the 53rd Army Corps, Gollwitzer, his chief of staff, Colonel Shimidt, and a number of other senior officers surrendered. Among those who surrendered were divisional commanders: Müller-Büllow (246th Infantry Division), Hitter (206th Infantry Division).

One German group - the remnants of the 4th airfield division of General R. Pistorius and other units (about 8 thousand people in total), was able to break through in the direction of Beshenkovichi. However, she ran into the forces of the 1st Baltic Front and was destroyed in the Yakubovshchina area. Special detachments of Soviet divisions continued to pursue and destroy small enemy groups until June 28. As a result, the Germans lost 20 thousand people killed and 10 thousand prisoners. The entire Vitebsk enemy grouping was destroyed. So, according to V. Haupt, only two hundred people from the 53rd Army Corps broke through to the German units, and the 6th Corps was defeated and suffered heavy losses.

The defeat of the Orsha group

The horse-mechanized group continued to develop the offensive in the western and southwestern directions. Oslikovsky's cavalry liberated Oboltsy and Smolyan from the Nazis, creating a threat from the north for the Orsha group of the Wehrmacht. Rotmistrov's army liberated Tolochin. As a result, the main communications of the German troops in the Orsha region were cut. The Germans tried to recapture Tolochin with strong counterattacks, but they were not successful.

At the same time, Burdeyny's 2nd Guards Tank Corps intercepted the Minsk road 15 km northwest of Orsha and continued moving south. On June 26, the 11th GA reached the northwestern outskirts of Orsha. 31 A took a strong enemy stronghold Dubrovno. Thus, the Soviet troops created a threat to the northern flank and rear of the Orsha group. The German counterattacks were not successful. It was necessary to withdraw the troops so that they would not suffer the fate of the Vitebsk group.

On the morning of June 27, 31 A broke through the outer defense belt of Orsha and broke into the city. Troops of the 11th GA also took part in the liberation of the city. Soon the city was liberated from the enemy. On the same day, Rotmistrov's tankers, developing an offensive along the Minsk road, liberated Beaver, Krupki and reached the Borisov area. The horse-mechanized group of Oslikovsky entered the area south of Kholopenichy. On June 28, the troops of the front marched from 22 to 38 km. KMG Oslikovsky assisted the forces of the 1st Baltic Front in the liberation of Lepel and went to the Berezina.

The defeated troops of the German 3rd Panzer and 4th armies retreated with their left flank and center to the Berezina. At the same time, they continued to offer stubborn resistance on the right wing, trying to keep Borisov and cover the retreat of the Mogilev group, which was defending itself in front of the 2nd Belorussian Front. So, parts of the tank army of Rotmistrov encountered formations of the German 5th tank division, transferred to the Borisov direction.

Results

During the five days of the offensive, the troops of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts fully completed the tasks assigned to them. The northern flank of Army Group Center was destroyed, and thus the Red Army took the first step towards the destruction of the entire Minsk group.

The 1st Baltic Front under the command of Bagramyan broke through the enemy defenses, crossed the Western Dvina, liberated Beshenkovichi and Lepel, contributed to the liberation of Vitebsk and the destruction of the Vitebsk enemy grouping.

The troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front under the command of Chernyakhovsky broke through the enemy defenses, destroyed the enemy's Vitebsk grouping, and defeated the Orsha grouping. Orsha, Vitebsk and more than 1600 settlements were liberated. Soviet troops advanced 115 km in depth, creating a breakthrough 150 km along the front.

The German 53rd Army Corps was destroyed or captured, the 6th and 9th Army Corps suffered heavy losses in manpower and equipment. The Germans lost more than 40 thousand people only killed, more than 18 thousand soldiers and officers were taken prisoner. 126 tanks and assault guns, more than 1 thousand guns and mortars, etc. were destroyed. About 70 tanks and self-propelled guns, more than 1.1 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3 thousand vehicles, 32 steam locomotives, more than 1 5 thousand wagons, 255 warehouses with weapons, ammunition, provisions, equipment, etc. Soviet aviation destroyed over 70 German aircraft in air battles and on the ground.

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Vitebsk-Orsha offensive

During the summer-autumn campaign of 1944, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command planned to prepare and consistently conduct a series of strategic offensive operations in a vast area from the Arctic to the Black Sea. At the first stage of the campaign (June-August), it was planned to deliver powerful blows and defeat large enemy groupings in turn: first on the Karelian Isthmus and in South Karelia, then on the central sector of the front, in Belarus, and then in the western regions of Ukraine, on the Lvov-Sandomierz direction. At the second stage (September - November), it was planned to carry out operations in the Balkans, in the Baltic states and in the Far North.

Naturally, the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht was also preparing for the summer-autumn campaign. But in assessing the possible actions of the Red Army, it made a serious miscalculation, believing that the main events would unfold not in the central, but in the southwestern direction. This blunder was skillfully used by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff of the Red Army.

In the plans of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, priority in the future campaign was given to the central sector of the Soviet-German front. The liberation of Belarus was possible only if such a large enemy grouping as Army Group Center was destroyed (Field Marshal E. von Busch, from June 28 - Field Marshal V. Model). Together with the right-flank formations of the 16th Army of the Army Group "North" and the left-flank formations of the 4th Tank Army of the Army Group "Northern Ukraine", it numbered 1.2 million people, 9.5 thousand guns and mortars, 900 tanks and assault guns. They were supported and covered by about 1350 aircraft of the 6th and part of the forces of the 1st and 4th air fleets. The main enemy forces were concentrated in the areas of Polotsk, Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk and Kovel, where they covered the most accessible directions for the offensive. The enemy occupied a defense in depth prepared in advance (250-270 km) and had the task of firmly holding the Belarusian ledge, or, as the enemy called it, the "balcony", along which the shortest routes to the German borders passed. However, the enemy, misled and not expecting the main attack of the Red Army troops in Belarus, had insufficient reserves here, moreover, some of them were pinned down by the actions of the partisans.

On May 20, 1944, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army A.I. Antonov introduced I.V. Stalin was given a plan that provided for the simultaneous breakthrough of the enemy’s defenses in six sectors, the dismemberment of his troops and the defeat in parts. Particular importance was attached to the elimination of the most powerful flank groupings of the enemy in the areas of Vitebsk and Bobruisk, the rapid advance to Minsk, the encirclement and destruction of the main enemy forces east of Minsk at a depth of 200–300 km. The Soviet troops had to build up their strikes and expand the front of the offensive, relentlessly pursue the enemy, not allowing him to gain a foothold on intermediate lines. As a result of the successful implementation of the operation plan, which received the name Operation Bagration, it was supposed to liberate all of Belarus, reach the coast of the Baltic Sea and reach the borders East Prussia, cut the enemy's front, create favorable conditions for strikes against him in the Baltic.

The 1st Baltic (General of the Army I.Kh. Bagramyan), 3rd Belorussian (Colonel General I.D. Chernyakhovsky), 2nd Belorussian (Colonel General, from July 28 - General of the Army G.F. . Zakharov), 1st Belorussian (general of the army, from June 29 Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky) fronts and the Dnieper military flotilla(captain of the 1st rank V.V. Grigoriev); in total more than 2.4 million people, 36 thousand guns and mortars, 5200 tanks and self-propelled guns. They were supported by the 1st (Colonel General of Aviation T.T. Khryukin), 3rd (Colonel General of Aviation N.F. Papivin), 4th (Colonel General of Aviation K.A. Vershinin), 6th (Colonel General of Aviation F.P. Polynin), 16th (Colonel General of Aviation S.I. Rudenko) air armies; a total of 5,300 aircraft; long-range aviation was also involved (marshal, from August 19 - chief marshal Aviation A.E. Golovanov) - 1007 aircraft and aviation of the Air Defense Forces of the country - 500 fighters. The partisans worked closely with the troops.

May 30 I.V. Stalin finally approved the plan for Operation Bagration, which was decided to begin on June 19-20. No major changes were made to the plan. Her intention remained the same. On Marshal G.K. Zhukov was entrusted with the coordination of the actions of the troops of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts, and Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky - 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts.

The idea of ​​the Belarusian strategic offensive operation at the initial stage was to defeat the enemy troops on the flanks of the Belarusian ledge. And later - in delivering powerful dissecting strikes in converging directions towards Minsk, encircling and destroying the main forces of Army Group Center. In the future, it was supposed to develop an offensive along the entire front from the Western Dvina to Pripyat, with access to the borders of East Prussia and the banks of the Vistula. The troops of the 1st Baltic Front, in cooperation with the formations of the 3rd Belorussian Front, were to strike on the northern flank of the Belarusian ledge, surround and destroy the Vitebsk enemy grouping and go to the Chashniki-Lepel area. It was assumed that at the same time the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front would defeat the Bogushev-Orsha enemy grouping, delivering the main blow in the direction of Orsha, Borisov, Minsk.

Formations of the 2nd Belorussian Front, advancing in the Mogilev direction, were supposed to tie down the main forces of the 4th Army of the enemy and prevent it from retreating beyond Minsk until it was completely surrounded by troops of the 3rd and 1st Belorussian Fronts. The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front surrounded and destroyed the Bobruisk grouping of the enemy and subsequently advanced on Minsk from the southeast in cooperation with the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front.

In order to misinform the enemy, the fronts were ordered to create at least three defensive lines at a depth of up to 40 km. Settlements adapted to the all-round defense. Front, army and divisional newspapers published materials on defensive topics. As a result, the attention of the enemy was largely diverted from the impending offensive. The troops strictly observed the regime of radio silence, and a narrow circle of people was involved in the development of the operation plan. Only six people knew the plan of Operation Bagration in full: the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, his deputy, the chief of the General Staff and his first deputy, the head of the Operations Directorate and one of his deputies. The regrouping of troops was carried out in compliance with all camouflage measures. All movements were carried out only at night and in small groups.

In order to give the enemy the impression that the main blow would be delivered in the summer in the south, at the direction of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, on the right wing of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, north of Chisinau, a false grouping of 9 rifle divisions reinforced with tanks and artillery. In this area, models of tanks and anti-aircraft artillery guns were installed, and fighter jets patrolled in the air.

As a result, the enemy failed to reveal either the plan of the Soviet Supreme High Command, or the scale of the upcoming offensive, or the direction of the main attack. Therefore, Hitler from 34 tank and mechanized divisions kept 24 formations south of Polissya.

According to intelligence, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front in the Vitebsk and Bogushev directions were defended by the 53rd and 6th army corps of the 3rd tank army and in the Orsha by the 27th army corps of the 4th field army. They were part of Army Group Center. During the operation, the enemy could bring up strategic reserves and reinforce Army Group Center by an additional 50% with artillery, tanks, aircraft and people. Half of them may be against the 3rd Belorussian Front.

During the preparatory period, all types of reconnaissance established that the enemy's tactical defense zone included two lanes. The first strip has two or three positions, each of which has two or three continuous trenches. The second lane is prepared weaker. In addition, defensive lines were created in the operational depth, especially along the banks of the Berezina and Shchara rivers. One of the vulnerable sides of the enemy's defense was the insufficient separation of the operational formation of Army Group Center. The infantry was mainly located on the first defensive line.

In total, by the beginning of the operation, the 3rd Belorussian Front had 1169 tanks, 641 self-propelled guns, 1175 anti-tank guns (45 mm and 57 mm), 2893 guns (76 mm and above), 3552 mortars, 689 rocket artillery installations, 792 anti-aircraft guns , 1864 aircraft. Without taking into account the army and front logistics institutions and units in the front, there were almost 390 thousand people.

At the first stage of Operation Bagration, the 3rd Belorussian Front, in cooperation with the troops of the 1st Baltic and 2nd Belorussian Fronts, was to defeat the enemy's Vitebsk-Orsha grouping. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command determined the direction of Orsha, Minsk as the direction of the main attack. However, the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, General I.D. Chernyakhovsky, given the presence of powerful enemy defensive lines here, managed to convince I.V. Stalin in the need to deliver two main blows at the same time. The second strike was planned to be carried out in the direction of Liozno, Bogushevsk at the junction between the flanks of the enemy's 3rd Panzer and 4th armies. There was a certain risk in this: the defenses here were weaker, but the swampy terrain made it difficult to use the main striking force front - tanks. To implement his plan, General Chernyakhovsky asked to strengthen the front with one tank army. Stalin went to meet him and ordered to transfer the 5th Guards Tank Army and the artillery division of the RGK breakthrough to the command of the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front.

On the night of May 31, private directives and instructions were sent to the fronts of the Belarusian direction and instructions to immediately begin preparing the offensive. Stalin approved the plan for the Vitebsk-Orsha offensive operation without comment. Directive No. 220115 of the Supreme Command Headquarters to the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front stated:

“The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders:

1. Prepare and conduct an operation with the aim, in cooperation with the left wing of the 1st Baltic Front and the 2nd Belorussian Front, to defeat the enemy’s Vitebsk-Orsha grouping and reach the river. Berezina, for which purpose to break through the enemy’s defenses, inflicting two blows:

a) one strike by the forces of the 39th and 5th armies from the area west of Liozno in the general direction of Bogushevskoye, Senno; part of the forces of this grouping, advance in a northwestern direction, bypassing Vitebsk from the southwest, with the aim of defeating the enemy's Vitebsk grouping and capturing the city of Vitebsk in cooperation with the left wing of the 1st Baltic Front;

b) another strike by the forces of the 11th Guards. and the 31st Army along the Minsk highway in the general direction to Borisov; part of the forces of this grouping to capture the city of Orsha with a blow from the north.

2. The immediate task of the troops of the front is to capture the Senno-Orsha line. In the future, to develop the offensive on Borisov with the task, in cooperation with the 2nd Belorussian Front, to defeat the Borisov grouping of the enemy and reach the western bank of the river. Berezina near Borisov.

3. Use mobile troops (cavalry, tanks) to develop success after a breakthrough in the general direction of Borisov ...

6. Readiness and the beginning of the offensive - according to the instructions of Marshal Vasilevsky ... " .

Commander of the 1st Baltic Front, General of the Army I.Kh. Bagramyan, in cooperation with the 3rd Belorussian Front, was ordered to cross the Western Dvina and capture the Beshenkovichi area, together with his right wing, defeat the enemy’s Vitebsk grouping and capture the city of Vitebsk. In the future, develop the offensive in the general direction of Lepel, firmly securing the main grouping of the front from the Polotsk direction.

In accordance with the decision of General Chernyakhovsky, approved by Stalin, on June 20, the front headquarters made adjustments to the operation plan. The operational formation of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front was supposed to be in two echelons. Four combined-arms armies (39th, 5th, 31st, 11th Guards) were allocated to the first echelon, since the enemy had stretched his main forces on the main defensive line 6–8 km deep and only insignificant reserves were located in the operational zone. The second echelon included the 5th Guards Tank Army and the horse-mechanized group. At the same time, the tank army was to prepare for entry into battle in the directions of Orsha, Borisov and Liozno, Bogushevsk. A horse-mechanized group with infantry reaching the line of the river. Luchesa was introduced into the breakthrough in the direction of Liozno, Bogushevsk. The total width of the enemy defense breakthrough sections was determined at 33 km, or 23.6% of the total width of the strip occupied by the front troops. The length of the breakthrough sections in the armies was different. So, the 39th army was supposed to break through the enemy defenses in a section 6 km wide, the 31st - about 7 km, and the 5th and 11th guards armies - 10 km each. In order to ensure success in the army sectors of the breakthrough, the following were concentrated: 5764 guns and mortars, or 80.1% of the total number of barrels; 1466 tanks and self-propelled guns, or 80.9% of the total. This made it possible to have high densities per 1 km of the front - up to 175 guns and mortars, 44 tanks and self-propelled guns.

The duration of artillery preparation was determined at 2 hours and 20 minutes. Artillery support for the attack was planned to be carried out with a single barrage of fire in combination with a consistent concentration of fire to a depth of 1.5–2 km. Artillery support for the introduction of mobile formations into the breakthrough was planned to be carried out by additionally strengthening them with artillery and attracting army groups. Aviation of the 1st Air Army was to carry out preliminary and direct air preparation for the offensive, and then carry out its support and escort; fight against enemy aircraft in the air and strike at enemy airfields.

Particular attention was paid to maintaining the strictest secrecy in the preparation of the operation. To this end, the front headquarters determined the procedure and deadlines for bringing tasks from subordinates, classes starting position troops, the time of sighting of artillery, change of command and observation posts. It was forbidden to publish any documents on the preparation of the operation and to use for this technical means connections. The newly arrived troops were to use only mobile means of communication, and the formations and units that had previously been part of the front, when regrouping, the radio stations that were working were to be temporarily left at the points of their previous deployment. The front's written directives for the operation were prepared by 20 June. With their receipt, the commanders of the armies were allowed to issue their orders or directives.

On June 12, the commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, Marshal armored forces P.A. Rotmistrov. Representative of the Stavka Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky and front commander General I.D. Chernyakhovsky carefully worked out with him questions about the place and timing of the concentration of army troops, reconnaissance of possible directions of its actions.

“Preparation for the fulfillment of your task is in full swing, with the development of the smallest details. The available troops will certainly be ready by the date you have indicated. Everyone has complete confidence in success. There are still fears for the timely approach by rail of the 4th and 15th artillery brigades, Oslikovsky's cavalry corps, ammunition, fuel and Rotmistrov's formations ... Once again I report that the final start date depends entirely on the work of the railways, we, for our part we have done and are doing everything to meet the deadlines you have set.” .

On the morning of June 14, Stalin informed Vasilevsky that due to a delay in rail transport, the start of the operation was postponed to June 23.

On June 18, Marshal Vasilevsky arrived in Moscow, where, at a meeting with Stalin, he once again agreed on the entry into battle of the 5th Guards Tank Army in the Orsha-Borisov direction, as in the shortest and most favorable terrain for maneuver. “After listening to my brief report on the preparation of the 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts for the fulfillment of the tasks assigned to us,” Vasilevsky recalled, “Stalin was satisfied and especially dwelled on the use of the 5th Guards Tank Army on the front near Chernyakhovsky. I reported that in the Orsha-Borisov direction against the 11th Guards Army, the enemy’s defense was much more developed in engineering terms than in the sector of the 5th Army, and the grouping of enemy troops there was much denser. Therefore, I considered the Orsha direction for introducing a tank army into a breakthrough to the Borisov direction less promising than the Bogushevsko-Borisov one. We agreed that for the time being the main direction of the introduction of the tank army into the breach will be considered the Orsha-Borisov, as the shortest and most convenient for maneuver in terms of the nature of the terrain. The final decision was postponed until the first days of the operation. Therefore, we agreed that the 5th Guards Tank Army would remain in the reserve of the Stavka for the time being, and at the right moment, as a representative of the Stavka, I would give instructions to hand it over to the front. At the same time, the Headquarters provided that in all cases the main task of the tank army was to quickly reach the Berezina River, capture the crossings and liberate the city of Borisov.

On the night of June 20, partisan detachments operating in Belarus launched an operation to massively blow up the rails, destroying 40,865 rails in three days. As a result, enemy transportation was partially paralyzed on many sections of the railways.

On June 22, in the entire zone of the 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts, reconnaissance was carried out in battle by the forces of advanced battalions, which in a number of sectors wedged into the enemy’s defenses from 1.5 to 8 km and forced him to bring divisional and partially corps reserves into battle. The advanced battalions met the stubborn resistance of the enemy in the Orsha direction. The commander of the 4th Army reported to Field Marshal von Busch that the Soviet troops had attacked positions in the direction of Orsha with large forces. The army commander, not having accurate data and overestimating the strength of the 3rd Belorussian Front, made an irreparable mistake. A message was received from the headquarters of the 3rd Panzer Army that an attack by Soviet troops had been successfully repulsed in the Vitebsk direction.

Field Marshal von Busch continued to consider the main direction Orsha, Minsk. He ruled out the possibility of an offensive by large Russian forces in the Bogushev direction, in the conditions of swampy terrain and many lakes, and focused his main attention on the Minsk highway. Bush ordered the commander of the 4th Army to bring the reserves of divisions into battle and stop the advance of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front to Orsha. Bush had no idea that General Chernyakhovsky had misled him by passing off reconnaissance in force as the start of a general offensive in order to uncover the enemy's defensive fire system.

Less than a day remained before the decisive offensive. Aviation delivered powerful strikes against enemy reserves and airfields in the areas of Orsha, Borisov and Minsk. On the night of June 23, the weather changed dramatically. The weather was dry and hot all day, and then it rained heavily. Artillery preparation began in the morning. The enemy, mistaking the reconnaissance carried out the day before for a general offensive, advanced reserves into the tactical defense zone, thus exposing his troops to the attack of artillery and aviation of the 3rd Belorussian Front. The strike force of the front, consisting of the main forces of the 11th Guards and 31st Armies, met fierce resistance in the Orsha direction of the enemy, who occupied a defense in depth with long-term structures. By the end of the day, both armies managed to advance only from 2 to 8 km. The troops of the 39th Army cut the Vitebsk-Orsha railway near the Zamostochye station by one o'clock in the afternoon.

The official report of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht dated June 23 noted: “On the central sector of the front, the Bolsheviks launched the offensive we expected ... Fierce battles are still going on on both sides of Vitebsk ...” . Ernst von Busch admitted in the evening of the same day: “A major offensive northwest of Vitebsk meant ... complete surprise, since until now we did not assume that the enemy could concentrate such large forces in front of us.”

On the morning of June 24, the troops of the 11th Guards Army, after fierce fighting, overcame the swamps and reached the rear defensive line of the enemy, covering the Vitebsk-Orsha roadway.

The offensive of the 5th Army in the Bogushevsky direction was successfully developing. On June 25, its troops occupied Bogushevsk, which was the junction connecting the defenses of Orsha and Vitebsk, and, as it were, the castle of the entire Vaterland line in this region. Troops of the 1st Baltic Front reached the river. The Western Dvina in the area of ​​Beshenkovichi, Gnezdilovichi, and formations of the 6th Guards Army crossed the river.

The commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, making sure that the 11th Guards Army would not be able to complete the breakthrough of the enemy defenses by the morning of June 25, decided to bring into battle the cavalry-mechanized group of General Oslikovsky in the Bogushevsky direction in the band of the 5th Army. She, having successfully overcome the wooded and swampy terrain, occupied the city of Senno on June 25 and cut the Orsha-Lepel railway. Using its success, the troops of the 5th Army advanced westward up to 20 km.

At eight o'clock in the evening on June 24, the 5th Guards Tank Army was transferred to the command of the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front from the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters. General Chernyakhovsky decided to take her to a waiting area at night, regroup in the 5th Army zone and, at dawn on June 26, introduce her into the breakthrough also in the Bogushev direction. Stalin approved the decision of the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, about which Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky informed the commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army. “I should note that Pavel Alekseevich Rotmistrov reacted to the decision of the Headquarters (both to transfer his army from the Headquarters to the front, and to change the direction of its entry into the breakthrough) without much enthusiasm,” Vasilevsky noted. - This did not escape the attention of the front commander I.D. Chernyakhovsky. The true reasons for this are unknown to me, and it would hardly be right to attach special importance to this if it were not for the fact that the 5th Guards Tank Army, which has always brilliantly shown itself, in this case acted worse than before.

On June 26, the troops of the 5th Guards Tank Army entered the gap. Its forward detachment, using a wide maneuver, bypassed the resisting enemy groups and by half past one reached the area east of Tolochin. An attempt to shoot down the units of the security division defending here on the move failed. The main forces of the 3rd Kotelnichesky Guards Tank Corps, advancing after the advance detachment, were 20 km away. Corps Commander Major General I.A. Vovchenko, following the directive of the front commander, instructing the mobile troops to introduce second echelons and reserves, did not give the enemy time to regroup and pull up his reserves. As a result, he managed to quickly deploy the main forces of the corps on the outskirts of Tolochin. The enemy did not expect the appearance of Soviet troops here. The corps, having made a maneuver with the forces of one tank brigade around Tolochin from the north, and the other from the south, cut off the enemy's path to the west and prevented the withdrawal of his Orsha grouping to Tolochin. As a result of this maneuver, by the evening of June 26, Tolochin was taken. Front troops cut the highway and railway Orsha - Borisov for 30 km and captured a large number of trophies.

In the direction of action of the 29th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army, events did not develop so well. Parts of the corps advanced slowly, with heavy losses. In order to find out the reasons for the slowdown in the offensive, Chernyakhovsky sent a special commission to the corps. She determined that the enemy widely used ambushes in battles against parts of the corps. General I.I. Lyudnikov, a participant in the investigation of the circumstances of one of these battles, made the following conclusion: “The Germans in some areas used our tactics against us, which Katukov, then still a colonel, successfully used in the battles against Guderian’s tanks on the distant approaches to Moscow: to strike from ambushes ... ".

Despite all the difficulties, the sudden introduction of a tank army into battle had a decisive influence on the outcome of the Vitebsk-Orsha operation. The troops of the 11th Guards and 31st armies were finishing overcoming the enemy defenses in the Orsha area. On the morning of June 26, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps of General A.S. was introduced into the zone of the 11th Guards Army. Burdeyny, who began to bypass Orsha from the northwest. V. von Haupt, assessing the course of Operation Bagration, noted: “On the twenty-sixth of June, the rest of the armies of Army Group Center also fought the last battles in their history.”

On the evening of June 27, troops of the 11th Guards and 31st Armies, with the support of formations of the 1st Air Army and long-range aviation, liberated Orsha. In the zone of the 1st Baltic Front, the troops of the 43rd Army, having crossed the Western Dvina on June 25, by the end of the day reached the Gnezdilovichi region and entered into contact with the troops of the 39th Army that had come out here, part of whose forces broke into Vitebsk from the east. The next day, Vitebsk was liberated, and by three o'clock in the afternoon on June 27, the enemy grouping was completely liquidated, over 19 thousand people surrendered.

Formations of the 5th Guards Tank Army, during their further advance towards Borisov, met stubborn resistance from the enemy's 5th Tank and 253rd Infantry Divisions, which had arrived from near Kovel. The horse-mechanized group of General Oslikovsky, by the end of the day on June 28, captured the crossings on the Berezina, only 14 km northwest of Borisov.

As a result of the Vitebsk-Orsha operation, the left wing of Army Group Center was defeated. The troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, advancing 80-150 km, formed a wide gap in the enemy defenses, created conditions for the rapid development of the offensive in the Minsk and Vilnius directions. The gates to Belarus were open. According to the front headquarters, during the operation, the 246th, 106th infantry, 4th and 6th airfield divisions were surrounded and completely destroyed, the 299th, 14th, 95th, 197th infantry divisions were defeated, heavy losses were inflicted on the 256th th, 260th infantry, 286th security divisions and a number of separate units. The enemy lost 41.7 thousand soldiers and officers, 126 tanks and self-propelled guns, 796 guns, 290 mortars, 1840 vehicles. About 17.8 thousand people were captured, 36 tanks, 33 self-propelled guns, 652 guns, 514 mortars, 3300 vehicles, 225 warehouses with military equipment were taken as trophies.

The features of the operation were: a quick breakthrough of the enemy's tactical defense zone due to the skillful choice of the directions of the main attacks, their sudden delivery, the timely introduction of second echelons and mobile groups into battle; the encirclement and destruction of the Vitebsk enemy grouping in the tactical and immediate operational zones of its defense by the forces of rifle divisions without the participation of tank formations. At the same time, the following shortcomings were revealed in the course of the offensive: the lag of the bulk of reinforcement artillery during the development of the offensive in the operational depth; delay in the delivery of ammunition and fuel due to the slow pace of restoration of bridges and weak management of the commandant's service.

Immediately after the withdrawal of the 1st Tank Corps to the reserve of the 1st Baltic Front, its intensive preparation for the summer campaign of 1944 began.

The corps stationed on the border of the Vitebsk and Pskov regions in the area of ​​the Ezerishche station began to receive reinforcements.

On April 1, 1944, tank brigades received a third tank battalion each. Now each tank brigade consisted of sixty-five tanks in the state instead of the previous forty-four. In addition, the T-34 tanks, which arrived to replenish the hull, were armed with 85 mm ZIS-S-53 cannons, capable of penetrating the armor of heavy Tigr tanks at a point-blank range with their armor-piercing projectile. These two important circumstances significantly increased the combat potential of the corps.

By this time, the configuration of the central section of the Soviet-German front had taken on new outlines.

As a result of the victorious offensive of the Red Army in the winter and spring of 1944, our troops moved far ahead in two directions.

In the southwestern direction, after the defeat of the Nazi troops on Right-Bank Ukraine our troops reached the state border of the USSR with Romania.

In the northwestern direction, after the blockade of Leningrad was lifted, our troops pushed the enemy back from Leningrad by 200-220 km, reached the enemy's Pskov-Ostrovsky fortified area, and began the liberation of the Baltic republics.

And only in the center of the Soviet-German front, a ledge occupied by the enemy, which the Nazi command dubbed the "Belarusian balcony", was wedged into the depths of the disposition of our troops.

The presence of this "balcony" gave the Nazi command certain strategic advantages. Firstly, it served as a powerful barrier covering the direction to Warsaw and Berlin. Secondly, it made it possible to inflict flank attacks on our troops in the event of their offensive in the northwestern direction - towards the borders of East Prussia or in the southwestern direction - on Lvov and Hungary. From the same "balcony" planes could take off to bombard Moscow.

Preparing for the summer campaign of 1944, the enemy concentrated on this "balcony" large forces of Army Group Center, led by Field Marshal E. von Busch (3rd Panzer, 4th and 9th Armies) and a number of formations of neighboring army groups - a total of 63 divisions and 3 brigades.

The Soviet high command was also busy preparing for the summer campaign. The tasks of the Red Army for the summer and autumn were formulated in the order Supreme Commander dated May 1, 1944. They included the completion of the expulsion of the invaders from Soviet territory, the restoration of the state border of the USSR along its entire length, the withdrawal of European allies from the war on the side of Germany and the liberation of the Poles, Czechs, Slovaks and other peoples of Europe from fascist captivity.

The plan for the Belarusian strategic offensive operation, codenamed "Bagration", was simple in concept, but impressive in scope.

The plan provided:

simultaneous powerful strikes of four fronts - the 1st Baltic (General of the Army I. Kh. Bagramyan), the 3rd Belorussian (Colonel General, and from 26.06 General of the Army I.D. Chernyakhovsky), the 2nd Belorussian (Colonel General, and from 28.07 Army General G.F. Zakharov) and the right wing of the 1st Belorussian (Army General, and from 29.06 Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky) - to break through the enemy’s defenses in the Vitebsk, Bogushevsky, Orsha, Mogilev and Bobruisk directions;

crush the enemy's strategic defense front, encircle and destroy his grouping in the area of ​​Vitebsk and Bobruisk;

rapidly develop the offensive in depth, encircle and liquidate the troops of the 4th Army east of Minsk.

These actions were supposed to create favorable conditions for a further offensive to the west in general directions towards Siauliai, Vilnius, Bialystok, Brest.

As follows from the foregoing, in the implementation of this plan, the stake was placed on the swiftness of the offensive. Therefore, the decisive role was assigned to the tank troops.

Taking into account the scope of hostilities, the location and structure of the main nodes of enemy defense, the Belarusian strategic offensive operation "Bagration" was carried out in the form of ten relatively independent, but interconnected operations: Vitebsk-Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk, Polotsk, Minsk, Siauliai, Vilnius, Bialystok, Lublin-Brest and Kaunas. The share of the 1st Baltic Front, which included the 1st Tank Corps, had to participate in three of these operations: Vitebsk-Orsha, Polotsk and Siauliai. Therefore, further narration will be mainly devoted to these operations.

The Vitebsk-Orsha operation of 1944, an offensive operation of the troops of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts in the Great Patriotic War, carried out on June 23-28 during the Belorussian operation of 1944. Purpose V.-O. o.-the defeat of the troops of the lion. German wings. Army Group "Center" (command, Feldm. Gen. E. Bush) in the Vitebsk-Lepel and Orsha directions. German-Fash. the troops, using the conditions of the wooded and swampy terrain, created a defensive line 20-45 km deep in these directions (conventional name "Panther"). The cities of Vitebsk and Orsha were turned by the pr-kom into strong defense centers. In the Vitebsk-Lepel direction, formations of the 3rd tank of the army were defending, in the Orsha direction - of the 4th army of the German-fascist. troops. Troops of the 1st Baltic. front (commands, army general I. Kh. Bagramyan) were to inflict ch. strike by the forces of the 6th Guards, 43rd Armies and the 1st Tank, Corps with the support of the 3rd Air. army in the general direction of Beshenkovichi and, in cooperation with part of the forces of the 3rd Belorus, the front, defeat the Vitebsk-Lepel grouping, force the West. Dvina and get off in the district of Lepel, Chashniki. The troops of the 3rd Belorus, front (command, colonel general I. D. Chernyakhovsky) delivered 2 blows: one - by the forces of the 39th and 5th armies on Bogushevsk, Senno (part of the forces of this grouping in cooperation with the left wing 1st Baltic Front were to defeat the Vitebsk grouping of the pr-ka and capture the city of Vitebsk), the other - by the forces of the 11th Guards. and the 31st Army along the Minsk highway to Borisov with the aim of defeating in cooperation with the 2nd Belorus, the front of the Orsha grouping of the pr-ka. Both shock groups were supported by the 1st air. army. To develop success in the operational depth, front-line mobile groups were created: KMG (horse-mechani; shrovanny group - 3rd Guards Mechanic and 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps) and the 5th Guards Tank Army; in the 11th Guards Army, the mobile group was the 2nd Guards. tank, body. As a result of the decisive concentration of forces and means in the areas of action of the strike groups, it was achieved, which means superiority over the pr-com in forces and means: on the 1st Baltic. front - 3 times for infantry, 3 - 6 times for artillery, tanks and aviation; on the 3rd Belorus, front - 3-4 times for infantry, 4-6 times for artillery, tanks and aviation. On the eve of the onset of forces of the 1st Baltic. and 3rd Belorus, fronts on June 22, reconnaissance in battle was carried out by advanced battalions, supported by artillery and aviation. On the night of June 23, aviation training was carried out at strong points and artillery and pr-ka. On the morning of June 23 after art. and aviation training (in the latter involved St. 1000 aircraft of two air armies and long-range aviation) went on the offensive Ch. forces of the 1st Baltic. and 3rd Belorus, fronts. Troops of the 1st Baltic. front for the day of the battle advanced up to 16 km in depth, expanding the breakthrough to 30 km. The 39th and 5th armies of the 3rd Belorus, front in the Bogushev direction, successfully advanced. Having cut the Vitebsk - Orsha, they advanced 10-13 km, expanding the breakthrough to 50 km. In the Orsha direction, the 11th Guards. and the 31st Army met stubborn resistance from the pr-ka and advanced to an insignificant depth. By the end of June 24, the troops of the 1st Balt. front went to the river. Zap. Dvina on the section Beshenkovichi, Gnezdilovichi. Owl troops. The shock group of the 3rd Belorus, the front, overcame the resistance of the pr-ka and, having repelled its counterattacks, advanced 10-16 km, captured the city of Bogushevsk. To develop success in the 2nd half of the day in the band of the 5th Army in the direction of Senno, the KMG was introduced into the breakthrough. By the end of June 25, the troops of the 43rd Army of the 1st Baltic. front went to the Gnezdilovichi district and established non-resources. communication with the troops of the 39th Army of the 3rd Belorus, Front, and part of the forces broke into Vitebsk from V. Five divisions of the 3rd tank, the enemy armies were surrounded in the Vitebsk region and cut into 2 parts. On June 26, the city was completely liberated. Significantly increased the rate of advance of the troops of the 3rd Belorus, the front and in the Orsha direction; connections II-th Guards. armies advanced 20 km in this direction and reached the approaches to Orsha. The 5th Army, working closely with the KMG of the front, advanced to the west. in the direction of 20 km and took possession of Senno on the move, and KMG cut the railway. v. Orsha - Lepel zap. Senno. On June 25, in the zone of the 5th Army, the 5th Guards was introduced into the breakthrough. tank, army, edges on the trail. day took possession of the city of Tolochin and cut the communications of the pr-ka zap. Orsha. June 27 troops of the 11th Guards. and the 31st Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front liberated the city. On this day, the 43rd Army of the 1st Balt. Front and the 39th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front completed the liquidation of the pr-ka group in the Vitebsk region. The aviation of the fronts, firmly holding air supremacy, made more than 8,000 sorties in 3 days. Developing the offensive in the west. direction, ch. forces of the 1st Baltic. front by the end of the day on June 28, they reached the Lysaya, Lepel line, and on the 3rd Belorus, the front - to the river. Berezina, sowing. Borisov. As a result, V.-O. O. the lion was defeated. wing of Army Group Center, the troops advanced 80-150 km. During the operation with owls. Belarusians and partisans closely cooperated with the troops. Fast break tact, defense zone pr-ka means. degree contributed in a timely manner. the introduction of second echelons into battle, the initiative and energetic actions of commanders and troops. One of the features of the use of art was the allocation of a large number of guns for direct fire. Armored tank. and fur. troops were used massively, in the directions of Ch. frontal strikes, 70-90% of tanks and self-propelled guns operated. The units and formations of the fronts that distinguished themselves in battle were awarded the honorary titles of Vitebsk and Orsha. Purposefulness contributed to the success of the operation. and active party-political work aimed at creating a high offensive. impulse, exemplary performance of combat missions during the liberation of Belarusians, land from German-Fash. invaders. The political organs paid the main attention to the ideological education of the individual. composition and organizational the strengthening of parties and organizations, the correct placement of communists and Komsomol members in companies, batteries, crews, and other combat units. In propaganda work, a document of great political importance published on June 22 in the newspapers - “Three Years of the Great Patriotic War Soviet Union".

M. M. A. Alekseev

Used materials of the Soviet military encyclopedia in 8 volumes, volume 6.

Come. operation of the troops of the 1st Balt. and 3rd Belorus. fr., carried out on June 23-28 during the Belarusian operation of 1944. The goal is to defeat the troops of the lion. wing German-Fash. Army Group "Center" (General Feldm. E. Bush) in the Vitebsk-Lepel and Orsha directions. German-Fash. troops, using the conditions of the wooded and swampy terrain and numerous. rivers with wide swampy floodplains created defenses in these directions. depth limit 20-45 km (conditional name "Panther"). Vitebsk and Orsha were turned into strong defense centers. In the Vitebsk-Lepel direction, formations of the 3rd TA were defending, in the Orsha direction - the 4th field A pr-ka.

Troops of the 1st Baltic. fr. (Army General I. Kh. Bagramyan) applied ch. strike by the forces of the 6th Guards. and the 43rd A and the 1st TC with the support of the 3rd VA in the general direction of Lepel, with the goal of defeating the 3rd Belorus in cooperation with part of the forces. fr. Vitebsk-Lepel grouping, pr-ka, force Zap. Dvina and take possession of the district of Lepel, Chashniki. 3rd Belarusian. fr. (gen.-regiment., from June 26, the general of the army I. D. Chernyakhovsky) inflicted 2 blows: one by the forces of the 39th and 5th A on Bogushevsk, Senno (part of the forces of this grouping should have been in cooperation with the 43rd And on the 1st Baltic French, defeat the Vitebsk grouping of the pr-ka and capture Vitebsk); the second - by the forces of the 11th Guards. and 31st A along the Minsk highway to Borisov and part of the forces to Orsha with the aim of defeating in cooperation with the 2nd Belorus. fr. Orsha grouping of troops pr-ka and access to the river. Berezina. Both shock groups were supported by the 1st VA. To develop success in the 3rd Belarusian. fr. intended horse-mechanic. group (3rd Guards MK and 3rd Guards KK) and 5th Guards. TA. In the 11th guard. And the mobile group was the 2nd guard. mk.

On the eve of the onset of forces of the fronts on June 22, reconnaissance in battle of the forward battalions was carried out. On the night of June 23, a preliminary air raid was carried out. preparation. On the morning of June 23 after art. preparation of Ch. front forces went on the offensive. On the very first day, the defense of the pr-ka north-west and south of Vitebsk was broken through to the depths. 10-16 km. Developing the offensive, the troops of the 43rd and 39th A liberated Vitebsk on June 26, in the region of which they were surrounded and cut into 2 parts by 5 divisions of the 3rd TA. At the same time, the pr-k lost 20 thousand killed, 10 thousand prisoners, a lot of weapons and military equipment. In defense, the pr-ka formed means. gap. On the morning of June 26, in the 5th A band, the 5th guard was introduced into the breakthrough. TA, which began to move in the direction of Tolochin, Borisov, which facilitated the coverage of German-fascist. troops in Orsha. June 27 troops of the 11th Guards. and 31st A liberated Orsha. Continuing the offensive, by June 28, the troops of the 1st Balt. fr. reached the line 30 km southeast of Polotsk, Lepel, and the 3rd Belorus. fr. - to the river. Berezina, north of Borisov. During the operation, the troops of the fronts interacted with Belorus. partisans.

As a result, V.-O. O. the lion was defeated. wing of Army Group Center. Owls. troops advanced 80-150 km. Favorable conditions have been created for further development offensive with the goal of encircling and defeating the German-fascist. troops near Minsk.