Kerch Feodosia landing operation. Alexei IsaevMarshal Shaposhnikov's offensive. The history of the Second World War, which we did not know. Fight on the beach

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Kerch landing operation- a major landing operation of the Soviet troops in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. Passed from December 26 to May 20. Despite initial success, the operation ended in a major setback: three Soviet armies were surrounded and defeated. The total losses amounted to more than 300 thousand people, including about 170 thousand prisoners, as well as a significant amount of heavy weapons. The defeat of the landing party had a serious impact on the fate of the besieged Sevastopol and facilitated the Wehrmacht's summer offensive into the Caucasus.

Commanders
After a successful counter-offensive near Rostov, the Soviet command decided to capture the Kerch Peninsula by the end of 1941 and create conditions for the liberation of the entire Crimea. The commander of the Transcaucasian Front, Lieutenant-General D.T. Kozlov, in December sent a plan to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, which was called the Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation. The concept of the operation provided for the simultaneous landing of amphibious assault forces on the entire coast of the Kerch Peninsula from the Arabat Spit to Feodosia (the width of the landing front was 250 km), followed by the encirclement and destruction of the Kerch enemy grouping. This group included: the 46th infantry division of the 42nd army corps of the Wehrmacht, the Romanian 8th cavalry and 4th mountain rifle brigades, and two tank battalions. During the fighting, it was reinforced by the German 73rd Infantry Division, the Romanian Mountain Corps and a number of separate units. The forces of the Transcaucasian Front were involved in the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation: the 44th (Major General A.N. Pervushin), the 51st (Lieutenant General V.N. Lvov) Army and the Air Force of the Front (Major General of Aviation S. K. Goryunov). The landing was assigned to the Black Sea Fleet (Vice Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky), the Azov Flotilla (Rear Admiral S.G. Gorshkov) and the Kerch Naval Base (Rear Admiral A.S. Frolov), which had in the general complexity of more than 250 ships and vessels, including 2 cruisers, 6 destroyers, 52 patrol ships and torpedo boats, 161 aircraft. The ratio of forces and means at the beginning of the operation, with the exception of armored vehicles, was on the side of the Soviet troops (in manpower - 2.1 times, artillery and mortars - 2.8 times, and in combat aircraft - 2.3 times). The Black Sea Fleet still dominated the Black Sea. According to the plan of the operation, the 44th Army delivered the main blow in the Feodosia region, and at the same time the 51st Army advanced in the Kerch direction. However, by the end of the day on December 17, the Germans, having a numerical advantage in forces and using the element of surprise, noticeably pressed the Soviet troops in the Sevastopol region, where a critical situation had developed. In this regard, the Supreme High Command had to weaken the upcoming landing on the Kerch Peninsula and, at the expense of it, significantly strengthen the defense of Sevastopol. Due to the current situation, the timing and procedure for the Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation were changed. Now the landing of troops was planned to be carried out not simultaneously, but sequentially: the 51st Army - on December 26th. 44th - three days later. By December 25, the troops had basically completed their concentration in the loading areas: the 51st Army - in Temryuk, Kuchugury, Taman; 44th Army - in Anapa, Novorossiysk, Tuapse. The difficulty in transferring the required number of aviation units of the Front's Air Force by the beginning of the operation to advanced airfields deprived the Soviet side of the opportunity to immediately seize air supremacy. The landing operation began on the morning of 26 December. The passage of the landing by sea and its landing on the northeastern coast of the Kerch Peninsula took place in extremely difficult storm conditions. Despite the lack of special means for unloading heavy equipment and landing troops on an unequipped shore, part of the landing force, under heavy enemy fire, by the end of the day managed to capture a small bridgehead in the Zyuk cape area. Tarkhan, Khroni (about 2.5 thousand people, 3 tanks, up to 20 guns and mortars) and in the Kamysh-Burun area (about 2.2 thousand people). Due to the intensified storm, the landing resumed only on December 28. In total, by the end of December 30, over 17 thousand people, 9 tanks, more than 280 guns and mortars were landed on the ships and vessels of the Azov military flotilla and the Kerch naval base on the Kerch Peninsula, 240 tons of ammunition were delivered. On the night of December 30, an airborne assault was thrown out to capture the airfield in the area of \u200b\u200bthe settlement of Vladislavovka. The landing in the area of Feodosia was carried out from the warships of the Black Sea Fleet, including from the cruisers "Red Crimea" and "Red Caucasus", and from transport ships. At 3 am on December 29, a detachment of warships of the Black Sea Fleet under the command of Captain 1st Rank N.E. Basistoy secretly approached Feodosiya and, on the move, under the cover of naval artillery fire, landed assault detachments of the Marine Corps right in the port. Following them, transport ships and other ships approached the port berths, delivering the advance detachment and part of the forces of the first echelon of the 44th Army to the landing area. In the evening, his remaining troops arrived on sea transports. By the end of December 29, army troops, after fierce street fighting, liberated Feodosia and launched an offensive to the west and northwest, and the 236th rifle division to the northeast, to the Ak-Monai isthmus. Led by the German-Romanian grouping on the Kerch Peninsula, the commander of the 42nd Army Corps, Lieutenant-General G. Shponek, fearing encirclement, ordered the troops to hastily retreat to the previously prepared Akmopay defensive line. On the night of December 30, they secretly left Kerch, where the troops of the 51st Soviet Army soon entered. As a result of insufficiently organized reconnaissance on the part of the leadership of the landing operation, the enemy was able to safely withdraw the main forces from the blow. Meanwhile, during December 31, ships and vessels of the Black Sea Fleet delivered to Feodosia the rest of the troops of the 44th Army (23 thousand people, 34 tanks, 133 guns and mortars, 344 vehicles, over 1.5 thousand horses, 1 thousand tons of ammunition, etc. .loads). In the next two days, the grouping of Soviet troops on the Kerch Peninsula was reinforced by two more rifle divisions. Due to the sharp complication of the situation, the command of the German 11th Army began an urgent transfer of troops from near Sevastopol to the Kerch direction. By January 1, 1942, in addition to the German and Romanian troops that had withdrawn from the Kerch Peninsula, the 76th German Infantry Division and the Romanian Mountain Rifle Corps were already operating there. Two more German infantry divisions advanced from Sevastopol to help them. By the end of January 2, Soviet troops, advancing westward to a depth of 10 km, reached the line of Kiet, Novaya Pokrovka, Koktebel, where they met stubborn resistance from the enemy and went on the defensive. During the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation, Soviet troops lost: 42 thousand people, including irretrievable losses - 32.5 thousand people. In addition, 35 tanks, 133 guns and mortars, and 39 aircraft were lost during the operation. The navy lost one minesweeper and several transport ships. Thus, the Soviet command failed to completely encircle and destroy the enemy grouping on the Kerch Peninsula, which, having managed to slip out of the prepared "bag", entrenched itself on the well-fortified Akmonai defensive line and blocked the Soviet troops from entering the central part of Crimea. As a result of the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation, Soviet troops liberated the Kerch Peninsula, Kerch and Feodosia and forced the enemy to temporarily stop the offensive against Sevastopol. The troops of the Crimean Front deployed on the peninsula averted the threat of an enemy invasion of the Caucasus through the Taman Peninsula and significantly eased the situation of Sevastopol, which was besieged by the enemy, for several months.	Germany Romania
D. T. Kozlov,	E. von Manstein, von Sponeck, Himer, von Richthofen
Forces of the parties
Crimean Front: 47th Army KV and T-34 battalions RGK artillery
Losses
more than 300 thousand, incl. more than 170 thousand prisoners 1100 guns, 250 tanks;	about 10 thousand people

Previous events

1st stage: landing

Forces of the parties

Soviet troops The landing force included 8 rifle divisions, 2 rifle brigades, 2 mountain rifle regiments - a total of 82,500 people, 43 tanks, 198 guns and 256 mortars:

For their support, 78 warships and 170 transport ships were involved, in total over 250 ships and vessels, including 2 cruisers, 6 destroyers, 52 patrol and torpedo boats:

Black Sea Fleet (Vice Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky)
Azov Military Flotilla (Rear Admiral S. G. Gorshkov)

The air forces of the Transcaucasian Front and the armies operating on the Taman Peninsula, as of December 20, had a total of about 500 aircraft (excluding air defense fighter aircraft), the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet had approximately 200 aircraft.

German troops: the protection of the Kerch Peninsula was carried by:

Part of the troops of the 46th division (42nd army corps of the 11th army)
8th Romanian Cavalry Brigade
4th Mountain Brigade
2 field regiments and 5 anti-aircraft artillery battalions

Landing

Monument to the participants of the Kerch-Feodosia landing in Feodosia

At that moment, the enemy forces on the Kerch Peninsula were represented by one German division - the 46th Infantry and the Romanian Regiment of Mountain Riflemen, guarding the area of the Parpach Range. The landing forces in Kerch were many times superior to the forces of the Wehrmacht in this area, in addition, the landing in Feodosia threatened encirclement, so the commander of the 42nd Corps, Gen. von Sponeck immediately gave the order to withdraw. Later, Manstein ordered to hold the defense, but it was no longer possible to fulfill it. The German troops retreated, thus avoiding encirclement, but at the same time leaving behind all heavy weapons. For a formal violation of the order, von Sponeck was removed from command and put on trial.

results

As a result of the landing, the position of German troops in the Crimea became threatening. The commander of the 11th Army, E. von Manstein wrote:

If the enemy took advantage of the situation that had arisen and quickly began to pursue the 46th [infantry division] from Kerch, and also struck decisively after the Romanians retreating from Feodosia, then a situation would be created that was hopeless not only for this newly emerged sector ... the fate of the entire 11th Army.

However, the 51st Army, advancing from Kerch, did not move forward fast enough, and the 44th Army from Feodosia, with its main forces, moved not to the west, but to the east, towards the 51st Army. This allowed the enemy to create a barrier at the turn of the Yaila spurs - the Sivash coast west of Ak-Monai. The defense of the line was held by the 46th division of the Wehrmacht, reinforced by an additional infantry regiment, and the Romanian mountain units. To strengthen the combat capability of the Romanian units, officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the rear units of the German army, including those from the army headquarters, were included in their composition.

Planning errors

When planning the operation, significant miscalculations were made:

there was not a single medical institution on the bridgehead, the nearest hospital was in the Kuban. The wounded fighters, having received the initial dressing in the regimental squadron, were brought from their positions to Kerch, from there they independently reached Novorossiysk on steamboats.
air defense systems were not delivered to the port of Feodosia in a timely manner. As a result, before January 4, 5 transports were killed by enemy aircraft: Krasnogvardeets, Zyryanin, and others; the cruiser Krasny Kavkaz received heavy damage.

Losses

During the landing, the losses of Soviet troops amounted to more than 40 thousand people, of which about 32 thousand were killed, frozen and missing, 35 tanks, 133 guns and mortars.

2nd stage: battles for the Parpach Range

In the first days of January 1942, for the troops that landed at Feodosia and approached from Kerch, the path to the vital artery of the 11th Army, the Dzhankoy-Simferopol railway, was actually opened. The weak defensive front that we managed to create could not withstand the onslaught of large forces. On January 4, it became known that the enemy already had 6 divisions in the Feodosia region.

However, the commander of the landing forces, D.T. Kozlov, postponed the offensive, referring to the insufficiency of forces and means.

Loss of Theodosius

Despite the loss of the port in Feodsia, the Soviet command retained the ability to deliver reinforcements across the ice of the Kerch Strait.

Crimean front

This time, 8 rifle divisions and 2 tank brigades advanced in the first echelon. Of the latter, during the first three days of the offensive, 136 tanks were knocked out. Nevertheless, a critical situation was created in a number of areas. How stubborn the fighting was is evidenced by the fact that the regiments of the 46th [infantry division], in the zone of which the main blow was delivered, repelled from 10 to 22 attacks during the first three days.

Despite all efforts, decisive success was not achieved this time either.

SIMFEROPOL, December 28 - RIA Novosti Crimea, Alexey Vakulenko. These days, 76 years ago, a truly unprecedented Kerch-Feodosia landing operation was unfolding on the Kerch Peninsula - the first in the history of the Russian marines. On the captured bridgehead, which became the entire Kerch Peninsula, the Red Army deployed the troops of the Crimean Front. Thus, they pulled the enemy forces away from Sevastopol, thwarted the plan for the Nazis to capture Taman and advance to the Caucasus. Currently, the assault on Feodosia from the sea is being studied at the special courses of the American Marines.

Completely liberate Crimea

On October 18, 1941, the 11th Wehrmacht Army under the command of Infantry General Erich von Manstein launched an operation to seize the Crimea. 10 days later, after stubborn fighting, the Germans entered the operational space. By November 16, the entire peninsula, except for Sevastopol, was occupied. To continue the siege of Sevastopol, Manstein pulled most of the available forces to the city, and left one infantry division to cover the Kerch region. Given this circumstance, the Soviet command decided to strike back with the forces of the Transcaucasian Front and the Black Sea Fleet.

The plan of the operation provided for the simultaneous landing of the 51st and 44th armies in the Kerch region and in the port of Feodosia, the encirclement and destruction of the enemy's Kerch grouping. Then it was supposed to develop an offensive deep into the peninsula, unblock Sevastopol and completely liberate the Crimea. From the side of the Soviet troops, the landing force included 8 rifle divisions, 2 rifle brigades, 2 mountain rifle regiments - a total of 82.5 thousand people, 43 tanks, 198 guns and 256 mortars.

In preparation for the operation, the Crimean officers of the NKVD formed five reconnaissance groups for operational work in the territory planned for liberation. Before the start of the operation, the Chekists began the transfer of small reconnaissance groups to the coast. So, on December 3, 1941, a reconnaissance group led by Khersonsky was abandoned from Sevastopol on a speedboat. Having safely landed near the village of Dalnie Kamyshi, 4-5 kilometers from Feodosia, they took refuge in an abandoned trench. Khersonsky once went to his relatives and did not return to the group. As it turned out, he was identified by the invaders and shot. The leadership of the group was taken over by his deputy Yeremeev. He went to Feodosia, established a connection there with an agent through whom he began to receive intelligence. Continuing to visit the city, despite the great danger to life, the scouts transmitted the information obtained by radio to Sevastopol. Bad weather did not allow either to change the group or to deliver provisions for the already working one. Overcoming the cold and hunger, the scouts held out until the landing of the Theodosian landing, and then joined with colleagues.

In advance, exploration was also carried out on the western coast of the Kerch Strait. This operation, by order of the head of the NKVD task force, Major Modin, was headed by the detective of the Kerch department of the NKVD Ryndin. Knowing the coast of the Kerch Strait, he delivered four scouts to the other side of the boat on a two-oared boat and chose a hiding place where the leader of the group was supposed to deliver information. Several times at night in bad weather, Ryndin had to swim across the strait to pick up intelligence. I must say that the secret connection worked smoothly. The radio station was allowed to be used only in exceptional cases. Ryndin met with the members of the group after the liberation of Kerch.

The main landing force from Taman began to land on several sections of the coast of the Kerch Peninsula on December 26, 1941, and the operational groups of the NKVD arrived with it. Troopers from Novorossiysk landed in the port of Feodosia on the night of December 29, 1941. The initial number of troops was more than 40 thousand people. In Feodosia, the landing forces were unloaded at the port. The resistance of the German garrison (3 thousand people) was broken by the end of December 29th. Then reinforcements began to arrive in the city. In the Kerch region, infantry landed directly into the icy sea and went chest-deep in water to the shore. Alas, hypothermia fighters led to heavy losses. A few days later, frost hit, and most of the 51st Army crossed the ice of the frozen Kerch Strait.

German soldiers on the streets of occupied Feodosia in 1942

Historian Sergei Tkachenko cites the testimonies of the landing in Feodosia, collected in the 60s of the last century by the Crimean journalist Sergei Titov.

“On the night of December 29, at 03.48, on the orders of Captain I rank Basisty, the cruisers Krasny Kavkaz, Krasny Krym, destroyers Shaumyan, Nezamozhnik and Zheleznyakov opened ten-minute artillery fire on Feodosia and the Sarygol station,” he quotes Titov's manuscript. - With them from Novorossiysk there was a transport "Kuban" and 12 boats. The weather was stormy, 5-6 points, frost. On the way, the destroyer "Able" was blown up by a mine, killing about 200 people and all communications of the regiment. The Germans in Feodosia We met the Christmas holidays and did not expect landings, especially in such a storm. And then, under the cover of artillery fire, hunter boats under the command of Lieutenant Commander Ivanov broke right into the port and began to land an assault detachment of 300 people. The detachment was commanded by a senior lieutenant (Arkady - ed. ) Aidinov and political instructor (Dmitry - ed.) Ponomarev. Behind him, destroyers entered the port. The cruiser "Red Caucasus" moored directly to the pier, and the "Red Crimea" stood in the roadstead and unloaded with the help of various watercraft under furious fire reluctant Germans ... At dawn, a cold northeast wind pulled, a snowstorm began. But the German aviation carried out the bombing of the port and the attackers. However, it was too late, the landing groups entrenched. The spotter of fire, the foreman of the 1st article, Lukyan Bovt, was already on the shore, and the pockets of resistance of the Nazis were quickly suppressed from the ships. At the railway bridge, the Germans concentrated two guns and machine guns. But their swift attack was taken by a platoon of Lieutenant Alyakin, and the boy Mishka helped the Red Navy. He led a platoon through the courtyards of sanatoriums, bypassing the German position. Alas, no one remembered the names of the brave boy ... By noon on the penultimate day of 1941, all of Feodosia was liberated, and the offensive went in a northeasterly direction. By the end of the first day, the Sarygol station was also captured. There were heavy losses here, the political officers Shtarkman and Marchenko, the company commander Poluboyars, officers Vakhlakov and Karluk were killed.

The commander of the assault group during the Kerch-Feodosia operation, Senior Lieutenant Arkady Aydinov and political instructor Dmitry Ponomarev. Newsreels filmed at the moment of farewell to the dead paratroopers

Cognac, ammunition and traitors

In the first days of January 1942, the correspondent of the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper, poet and writer Konstantin Simonov visited Feodosia. Prior to that, in September 1941, he had already visited Perekop, Chongar, the Arabat Spit, where he even raised infantry to attack, went into battle and went with a reconnaissance group behind the front line.

This time, Simonov arrived on the peninsula from the Taman Peninsula, where he flew from Moscow on a bomber, sitting in the compartment for the air gunner. “All the berths, the entire coast were cluttered with boxes of ammunition, some other boxes and cars,” Simonov described in his diary the picture that appeared to him in Feodosia in the early morning of January 2. rooftops in the sky.<…>All this happened between Christmas and New Year. Edibles from all over the European continent were brought into the apartments where German officers and soldiers lived. French champagne and cognac, Danish bacon, Dutch cheese, Norwegian herring, and so on and so forth.

Simonov recalled how, introducing himself as "one for all" (until no other authority arrived in the city), a state security lieutenant complained about the abundance of "bastards" among the townspeople.

"From his tone, I understood: the words that there are an awful lot of bastards are not the result of official zeal or professional suspicion, but the sad words of a really surprised person<…>I told the lieutenant that I would like to talk to some of those arrested for collaborating with the Germans,” writes Simonov. - He replied that it would hardly be possible today, because before nightfall he would not interrogate anyone, and he had no assistants at hand, and in general he was alone.

“All right,” he said. - Here is the burgomaster Gruzinov, inveterate bastard. Or the chief of police - everything is clear! But you explain to me, comrade. Here the Germans two weeks ago, on New Year's Eve, opened open recruitment to a brothel. They just offered to volunteer there. So here I have documents from the magistracy. There were women who applied there. Well, what to do with them now? The Germans did not have time to open the brothel - we interfered. I have statements. Well, now what to do with these women? Where did they come from? You can’t shoot them for this, there’s nothing to do with it, but put them in jail ... Well, let’s say you plant them, and then what to do with them?

Destroyer "Shaumyan"

With the active support of the Feodosians, the Chekists detained and identified a number of traitors to the Motherland, punishers, accomplices of the Nazis, including the chief of the Feodosia district Andrezheevsky, deputy chief of police Baramidze (formerly a Georgian Menshevik), a local Jew Razumny, recruited by the SD as an agent and appointed by the occupiers as the head of the Jewish communities. With the help of the latter, the Nazis searched for and destroyed hiding Jews.

It turned out that according to the list signed by Andrezheevsky, the occupiers ordered all Jews to come to the assembly point. Then, in groups, together with young children, they were taken out of the city and shot. During their stay in Feodosia, the Nazis killed more than 2,000 Jews. The task force managed to identify and arrest 103 traitors to the Motherland, but in connection with the withdrawal of army units, 46 obvious criminals were shot with the sanction of the prosecutor, including Andrezheevsky, Baramidze and Razumny. Another 16 people were taken to Kerch for further investigation, the rest were released.

During the operation, the Chekists seized documents from the Feodosia SD, the police, and the city government.

"The fate of the entire 11th Army would be decided..."

According to journalist Sergei Titov, the 44th Army, under the command of Major General Alexei Pervushin, landed in Feodosia following the assault groups and "developed the success of the military sailors." "But the fleet suffered losses: Jean Zhores, Tashkent, Krasnogvardeysk were sunk in the port during unloading, Kursk, Dmitrov were damaged. However, ships and transports delivered more than 23 thousand soldiers, more than 330 guns to the bridgehead and mortars, 34 tanks, hundreds of vehicles, many other cargoes," writes Titov.

The dead in Feodosia transports. In the foreground "Zyryanin", behind him "Tashkent"

Already on January 15, the Germans launched a general offensive of superior forces. "A terrible blow was dealt along the entire line of advance of the Soviet troops - from the ground, from the air," Titov continues. Army commander Pervushin was wounded, a member of the military council brigade commissar A.T. Komissarov was killed, the chief of staff S. Rozhdestvensky was shell-shocked ... A protracted battle on the night of January 15 and all day on the 16th ... The Germans, with their four divisions and the Romanian brigade, broke through the defenses of our 236th rifle division and rushed to the city. On January 17, they had to leave Feodosia and retreat to Ak-Monai (now the village of Kamenskoye in the Leninsky district - ed.) ".

Fighting on the streets of Feodosia during the Great Patriotic War

The commander of the 11th Wehrmacht Army, Erich von Manstein, admitted in his memoirs: “If the enemy had taken advantage of the situation and quickly began to pursue the 46th Infantry Division from Kerch, and also struck decisively after the Romanians retreating from Feodosia, then a hopeless situation would have been created not only for this newly emerged section ... The fate of the entire 11th Army would be decided. A more determined enemy could paralyze all the supply of the army with a swift breakthrough on Dzhankoy. The troops withdrawn from Sevastopol - the 170th and 132nd Infantry Divisions - could arrive in the area west or northwest of Feodosia not earlier than in 14 days. On January 28, the Headquarters decided to allocate the troops operating in the Kerch direction to an independent Crimean Front under the command of General Dmitry Kozlov. The front was reinforced with new rifle divisions, tank units and artillery, as well as armored vehicles. The counteroffensive was scheduled for February 26-27, 1942. The offensive began on 27 February. At the same time, the Seaside Army attacked from Sevastopol, but failed to break through the encirclement. The offensive on the Kerch bridgehead developed extremely slowly, the movement of tanks was hindered by heavy rains. As a result, the enemy repelled all attacks. Stubborn fighting lasted until March 3. The troops of the Crimean Front failed to break through the enemy defenses to the full depth. On May 18, the encircled grouping of the Red Army ceased resistance. According to Russian historians, only for the period from May 8 to May 19, the Crimean Front lost 162.3 thousand people killed, died from wounds and missing.

Instead of an epilogue

In July 1983, a buoy was solemnly opened on the inner road of the Feodosiya Bay - a monument to the "Heroes-paratroopers", where the Red Navy sailors of the two legendary cruisers "Red Caucasus" and "Red Crimea" were immortalized on a bronze memorial plaque.

At a time when the Germans were conducting a decisive assault on Sevastopol, the forces of the defenders were uncontrollably dwindling. The supply of reinforcements and ammunition by sea by transports and warships did not have time to compensate for the loss. There was a threat that in the first week of January 1942 the city would fall. In such a difficult situation, the Soviet command decides to conduct a landing operation in the area of Kerch and Feodosia in order to pull the enemy forces away from Sevastopol.

The Kerch enemy group consisted of units of the 46th Infantry Division of the 11th German Army, the 8th Romanian Cavalry Brigade, two tank battalions, two field artillery regiments and five anti-aircraft artillery battalions. By the beginning of January 1942, the enemy grouping was reinforced by the 73rd Infantry Division. Its total number did not exceed 25 thousand people. From the air, the troops covered two air groups. It was taken into account that with the start of the operation, the enemy could transfer reinforcements to the Kerch Peninsula from near Sevastopol. The basis of the defense on the peninsula was a system of fortified strongholds, which were located along the coast and consisted of field-type fortifications that were in fire interconnection. The city of Feodosiya was turned into a center of antiamphibious defense. Its garrison numbered more than 2 thousand people. The total number of enemy troops on the Kerch Peninsula reached: personnel - up to 25 thousand people, guns - up to 180, tanks - 118.

In addition, two aviation groups with up to 100 aircraft were based at airfields in the Kerch region. It could also be supported by aircraft from airfields located in the areas of Simferopol and Saki. The enemy naval forces operating in the Black Sea were based in the ports of Romania and Bulgaria and did not undertake active combat operations against the Black Sea Fleet, limiting themselves to providing sea communications along the coast of Bulgaria and Romania.

The idea of the operation was to simultaneously land the 51st (Lieutenant General V.N. Lvov) and 44th (Major General A.N. Pervushin) armies in the Kerch region and in the port of Feodosia to encircle and destroy the Kerch enemy grouping . In the future, it was supposed to develop an offensive deep into the peninsula, release the troops of the Sevastopol defensive region and completely liberate the Crimea. The landing of troops was assigned to

The Black Sea Fleet and the Azov military flotilla that was part of it. The general management of the operation was carried out by the commander of the Transcaucasian (from December 30 - Caucasian) Front, General D.T. Kozlov.

The development of the operation plan was entrusted to the headquarters of the Transcaucasian Front, taking into account its addition to the proposals of the Black Sea Fleet command. For its implementation, the lion's share of all the combat-ready forces of the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov military flotilla, a number of units of the marines, as well as the 51st and 44th combined arms armies were involved. The airborne detachments included several tank companies equipped with T-26 light tanks and T-38 amphibious tankettes.

The landing was planned to be carried out simultaneously on a wide 250-km front of the coast of the Kerch Peninsula (from the Arabatskaya Strelka to Feodosia), which was supposed to disperse the attention and efforts of the defending enemy troops. The main blow was planned to be delivered in the Feodosiya direction by the forces of the 44th Army in cooperation with the Black Sea Fleet. The second blow was to be delivered by the 51st Army in cooperation with the Azov military flotilla and the Kerch naval base in the Kerch direction. The preparation of the operation was ordered to be completed by December 19 in order to start it on December 21.

In addition, the plan of the Kerch-Feodosiya operation also provided for the use of airborne troops up to a brigade to capture Vladislavovka. Options for a more daring use of paratroopers were also worked out, up to the airborne assault on Dzhankoy, the largest railway junction in the Crimea north of Simferopol.

In accordance with the operation plan, on December 26-27, landing units were landed on several bridgeheads north and south of Kerch. However, during their landing, the paratroopers suffered serious losses, and then, having already captured the bridgeheads, they were surrounded by the enemy. Especially the situation of the landed troops worsened in the next two days, when a strong storm and the freezing of the Sea of \u200b\u200bAzov disrupted the delivery of reinforcements and supplies to the bridgeheads. As a result, the goal of the landings - the capture of Kerch - was not achieved in the first three days.

Despite this, it was decided, in accordance with the plan, to land troops in the area of Feodosia. At the same time, the ships of the squadron were assigned the following tasks: to land an advanced landing detachment consisting of two regiments in the port of Feodosia, to suppress enemy opposition in the landing areas with artillery fire, and then to support the landing operations with artillery.

To solve these problems, two detachments of ships were formed under the general command of Captain 1st Rank N.E. Bassist. In the landing and artillery support detachment, commanded by the captain of the 1st rank V.A. Andreev, the cruisers Krasny Kavkaz and Krasny Krym, the destroyers Nezamozhnik, Zheleznyakov and Shaumyan (all three of the Novik type), as well as the Kuban transport, entered. This unit was assigned the letter "A". A detachment of landing craft under the command of Lieutenant Commander A.I. Ivanov was formed from the minesweepers "Shield", "Explosion" and 12 hunter boats of the MO-4 type.

In total, the first (assault) landing echelon included two cruisers, three destroyers, two minesweepers and 12 MO-4 boats. The landing force itself consisted of units of the 251st Mountain Rifle Regiment and the 633rd Rifle Regiment with a total strength of over 5,000 fighters and commanders.

After the landing of the first echelon and the capture of the bridgehead, two detachments of transports with security forces were to deliver the main forces of the 44th Army to Feodosia - the 263rd Rifle and 63rd Mountain Rifle Divisions. Also, on the Jean Zhores transport, 20 T-38 light amphibious tanks were delivered to the landing site, and 14 T-26 tanks on the Kalinin transport.

In total, the operation plan provided for the landing of almost 23 thousand soldiers of the 44th Army in three echelons in Feodosia. But the sailors in this landing operation had to play the most important role - to ensure the capture of the landing bridgehead.

To solve this problem, as part of the first echelon of the landing, an assault detachment of marines numbering 600 people was formed under the command of Senior Lieutenant A.F. Aidinova. Along with the assault detachment, reconnaissance detachments of the fleet headquarters and the hydrographic department of the fleet, as well as corrective groups of ships of the landing detachment and artillery support, also landed. This detachment was supposed to land on land from the boat MO-4.

Landing detachment "A" approached Feodosia on the night of December 29, and at 3 hours 48 minutes N.E. Basisty ordered to begin artillery preparation for the landing.

The ships opened fire on the port and artillery batteries. The destroyers fired their first volley of illuminating shells, then the cruisers opened fire. At 4 o'clock the landing craft began to move in the port.

The first boat to break into the waters of the Feodosia port was the MO-0131 boat (commander - Lieutenant I.G. Chernyak), the second - MO-013 (commander - Lieutenant

N.N. Vlasov) with the commander of the landing craft detachment, Lieutenant Commander A.I. Ivanov on board. They landed marines and spotters on the Protective (Long) pier.

The landing group was led by the commander of the detachment of small hunters, senior lieutenant V.I. Chupov. The Marines quickly captured the lighthouse building on the pier, and then began to advance along the pier towards the shore. The hydrographers who were part of this group measured the depths at the pier to determine the mooring places for ships.

After the capture of the lighthouse, the signal “Entrance is free” was transmitted from it to the ships. Having received it, at 4 hours 10 minutes N.E. Basisty gave the order to break into the port of minesweepers and destroyers.

The destroyer Shahumyan was the first to moor at Shirokiy Mole at 04:26 and begin the landing of paratroopers. But at this time, having come to his senses after an unexpected invasion, the enemy concentrated his fire on a stationary ship. And although the landing of paratroopers took only a few minutes, but the debarcation of cargo, mainly ammunition, required much more time. Therefore, several shells hit the ship, fragments of which killed and wounded about 20 people. However, only after fully completing the unloading of cargo, "Shaumyan" left the port. In the same difficult conditions, landings were made in the port from the destroyers Nezamozhnik and Zheleznyakov.

The time has come to land troops from the cruisers "Red Caucasus" and "Red Crimea". To do this, in accordance with the plan, the "Red Caucasus" was to be moored on the left side to the outside of the Wide Mole. However, due to a strong squeezing wind, he immediately failed to perform this maneuver. Then, at 0508 hours, two mines hit this cruiser, several people were killed by their explosion, and a fire started in the first pipe. Then an enemy shell hit the foremast and caused a fire in the area of the chart house. At 05:23, an artillery shell pierced the armor and exploded inside the fighting compartment of the second turret. Despite this, the cruiser began the landing.

All this time, the cruiser fired at the enemy, using a 180-mm main gun, 100-mm and 76-mm guns. He suppressed the enemy batteries located on the heights around the city, and also dispersed a column of vehicles with infantry approaching the city. At 08:15, having completed the landing and unloading of equipment, the Krasny Kavkaz moved away from the pier to the outer roadstead, from where it continued to fire at the enemy based on data from the correction posts.

The cruiser "Krasny Krym" anchored in the outer roadstead three cables from the entrance to the port and from 4 hours 50 minutes also began landing, using first ship's watercraft, and then the MO-4 boats and the minesweeper "Shield". The landing of troops from this cruiser was completed at 0930 hours.

At 7:20 a.m., the Kuban transport moored in the port captured by the assault detachment, from which 627 troops were landed and 9 guns, 6 mortars, 15 vehicles and about 112 tons of ammunition, food, etc. were unloaded.

Thus, in the period from December 28 to 31, the 157th and 236th rifle divisions, the 63rd mountain rifle division and the 251st rifle regiment of the 9th mountain rifle division were transported and landed in the Feodosia region. In total, these forces included 23 thousand personnel, 1550 horses, 34 tanks, 109 guns, 24 mortars, 334 vehicles and tractors, 734 tons of ammunition and 250 tons of other cargo.

By that time, from 5 o'clock in the morning, street fighting was already underway in Feodosia. By the end of December 29, the paratroopers captured the city, although individual enemy groups continued to resist on December 30.

The writer Konstantin Simonov, who arrived in Feodosia on January 1, 1942, saw the following picture: “All the berths, the entire coast were cluttered with boxes of ammunition, some other boxes and cars. In the distance one could see the fantastic outlines of shattered warehouses, blown up iron, roofs curved and rearing up into the sky. At the low port wall, which I remembered in Feodosia from childhood, from the age of twenty-four, the twisted corpses of the Germans were lying around.

After a little wandering among all this labyrinth of ruins and debris - the result of the shelling of our artillery on the night of the landing and the German bombing that followed our landing - we got out of the port ... By the appearance and number of cars it was not difficult to determine what and where the Germans were located . The corpses lying on the streets were sometimes half-naked: the Germans, taken by surprise, often jumped out of the houses in anything, and many were killed right in the houses.

Having landed in Feodosia and entrenched in this city, the landing forces began to advance to the west and south-west, in the directions to Stary Krym, Karagoz and Koktebel, as well as to the north to Vladislavovka, which was a major road junction.

At that time, the Kerch Peninsula was held by the 42nd German Army Corps from the 11th Army under the command of Lieutenant General Count von Sponeck. This corps included the 46th Infantry Division and a number of separate units. In addition, von Sponeck was also subordinate to the Romanian 8th Cavalry Brigade and a very combat-ready motorized brigade under the command of Colonel Radu Cornet, which is better known as the Cornet Brigade. According to estimates, the total number of troops under the control of Sponeck reached 35 thousand people. But since the enemy did not expect the landing, only the duty units actually carried the defense, and both Romanian brigades at that time were on the march, far east of Feodosia. In the event of a successful strike by landing troops on Vladislavovka and to the north, there was a threat that the 42nd Army Corps and the Romanian units could be cut off on the Kerch Peninsula.

In such a situation, the commander of the 42nd Army Corps decides to withdraw troops from Kerch in order to attack paratroopers in the area of Vladislavovka and Feodosia together with the Romanian brigades in order to avoid encirclement and connect with the main forces of the 11th Army. This allowed the Soviet troops to capture Kerch with minimal effort, essentially bloodless.

At the same time, the main battles between the advanced units of the 44th Soviet Army and the 42nd Army Corps of the enemy on December 30 - January 1, 1942 took place in the vicinity of Vladislavovka and in the village itself. In addition to infantry, artillery and Romanian cavalry, Soviet T-26 tanks, Romanian R-1 tankettes and several German StuG assault guns took part in these battles. III. The witness of these battles, the German historian Paul Karel, described what happened near Vladislavovka as follows:

“On the morning of December 31, 1941, the forward battalions of the 46th Infantry Division reached the Parpach Isthmus. But the head units of the Soviet 63rd Infantry Division were there before them and captured Vladislavovka, north of Feodosia ...

Attack, break through and take Vladislavovka! ordered General Gimer of the 46th Infantry Division. The troops quickly lined up for the attack on a flat snow-covered plateau. The icy wind blowing from the Caucasus pierced their thin overcoats and made the blood run cold in their veins. Tears of weakness and helplessness trickled down his unshaven cheeks.

The exhausted regiments advanced another six and a half kilometers. Then they stopped. Exhausted, the soldiers simply fell into the snow.

But this is poetry, albeit bitter ... In the battles near Vladislavovka, the 42nd Army Corps of the Germans suffered a heavy defeat, almost all of its heavy materiel was lost, and above all, all artillery. The Soviet troops left Kerch, Feodosia, the entire Kerch Peninsula. However, subsequently the troops of the 44th and 51st armies failed to move further to the west - to Dzhankoy and Simferopol. Manstein, having removed several divisions from near Sevastopol, was able to stop the Soviet offensive in the area of Vladislavovka and Kieta.

In order to develop the offensive by the decision of the Soviet command on December 31, in the area of \u200b\u200bthe village of Ak-Monaya, located at the base of the Arabatskaya Strelka Spit, northeast of Vladislavovka, an airborne assault was landed with a strength of up to a battalion under the command of Major Nyashin. The landing was carried out by a group of 19 TB-3 heavy bombers from the 250th and 14th heavy bomber regiments.

Immediately after landing, Soviet paratroopers captured a German stronghold and coastal battery in the Ak-Monai area. How this happened was later recalled by the landing party S.P. Vyskubov:

“The Nazis abandoned cars, weapons, property and fled to the west of the Crimean peninsula ...

A group led by the battalion commander Nyashin operated next to us. The paratroopers attacked the convoy escorting the column of Soviet prisoners of war and destroyed it, freeing sixty people, some of whom were immediately armed with captured weapons.

Soon, all together raided the village of Kiet, where the Romanian infantry regiment was located. This operation was so swift that the enemy left all his property, staff documents, military maps and fled in horror, suffering heavy losses ...

A few days later, on the steamer Anatoly Serov, we returned from our first raid to Krasnodar, presenting a valuable trophy to the intelligence department of the front - the headquarters documents of the 46th German infantry division and the Romanian regiment, as well as operational intelligence reports and orders for the 42nd corps of the 11th th German army, two cipher machines.

As a result of the Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation, in a few days of hostilities, the Soviet marines, ground army, paratroopers were able to recapture the ports of Kerch and Feodosia, as well as many other settlements, from the enemy and move west 100-110 km.

In the battles, the enemy suffered significant casualties, 100 different guns and mortars were captured, as well as over 800 trucks and cars. But most importantly, the most important strategic task was solved: the German command was forced to interrupt the assault on Sevastopol at the most critical moment.

Hitler was very dissatisfied with the actions of the commander of the 42nd Army Corps, General von Sponeck. For the panicked abandonment of Kerch, he was removed from his post, put on trial and sentenced to death. True, at the last moment, Hitler replaced the execution of the general with imprisonment by personal decree, but on July 23, 1944, von Sponeck was nevertheless executed during the mass repressions that followed the assassination attempt on Hitler.

Of particular interest is how the commander of the 11th German Army E. von Manstein describes in his memoirs the events that took place in the region of Kerch and Feodosia in his book “Lost Victories”. The reader is offered this material with slight abbreviations:

“On December 26, the enemy, having ferried two divisions across the Kerch Gulf, landed troops on both sides of the city of Kerch. This was followed by the landing of smaller landings on the northern coast of the peninsula.

The command of the 42nd AK (General Count Sponeck), which had at its disposal only one 46th Infantry Division for the defense of the peninsula, was, of course, in an unenviable position. Count Sponeck therefore requested permission from the army command to leave the Kerch Peninsula, meaning to block the exits from it at the Parpach Isthmus. But the army command did not share his opinion ...

The army command ordered the 42nd AK, using the weakness of the enemy that had just landed, to throw him into the sea. In order to / complete this task / the army command sent to the Feodosia region ... the 4th Romanian mountain brigade ... the 8th Romanian cavalry brigade and ... the last of the regiments of the 73rd infantry detachment withdrawn from the Crimea (reinforced 213th regiment ).

By December 28, the 46th Infantry Division really succeeded in eliminating the enemy bridgeheads north and south of Kerch, with the exception of a small strip of land on the northern coast. Nevertheless, Count Sponeck again requested permission to leave the Kerch Peninsula. The army command categorically objected to this.

On December 29, we received a report from Feodosiya that at night the enemy had landed troops there under the cover of considerable fleet forces. The insignificant forces of our troops stationed near Feodosia (one sapper battalion, anti-tank destroyer artillery and several coastal batteries; the Romanians arrived in Feodosia only during the first half of the day) were not able to prevent the landing. Telephone communication with the headquarters of the 42nd Corps, located approximately in the center of the peninsula, was interrupted.

At 10 o'clock a radiogram was received from him stating that Count Shponek, in view of the enemy's landing near Feodosia, ordered the immediate abandonment of the Kerch Peninsula. The order of the army command, which forbade this withdrawal, was no longer accepted by the radio station of the corps headquarters. Although we could agree with the fear of the headquarters of the corps, which was afraid of being cut off from the 46th Infantry Division on the Kerch Peninsula by the landing of the enemy, we still believed that an overly hasty withdrawal could in no way help to improve the situation ...

Simultaneously with the order forbidding to leave the Kerch Peninsula (this order, as mentioned above, could no longer be accepted by the headquarters of the 42nd ak), the army command ordered the Romanian mountain corps to immediately drop in the sea landed at Feodosia enemy landing. True, we had no illusions about the offensive spirit of the Romanian formations. But the enemy could not yet have large forces on land near Feodosia. Decisive action could exploit this weakness of his. We had reason to hope that the Romanians would at least be able to keep the enemy within the small bridgehead at Feodosia until the German troops approached. But this hope was not destined to come true. The offensive of the Romanian mountain corps on Feodosia not only failed, but moreover, the Romanians retreated in front of a few Soviet tanks, moving away from the line east of the city of Stary Krym.

The 46th Infantry Division entered the Parpach Isthmus in a forced march. But at the same time, she had to leave most of her guns on icy roads. In addition, its personnel were completely exhausted by the hardships of this retreat.

Following the 46th Infantry Division, the enemy was immediately able to start the pursuit from the small bridgeheads remaining behind him. The Kerch Strait froze, which allowed the enemy to quickly bring up new forces. If the enemy took advantage of the situation that had arisen and quickly began to pursue the 46th Infantry Division from Kerch, and also struck decisively after the Romanians retreating from Feodosia, then a situation would be created that was hopeless not only for this newly emerged sector of the Eastern Front of the 11th Army. The fate of the entire 11th Army would be decided. A more resolute enemy could paralyze the entire supply of the army with a swift breakthrough on Dzhankoy. The troops withdrawn from Sevastopol - the 170th Infantry Division, and after the cessation of the offensive from the north and the 132nd Infantry Division - could arrive in the area west or northwest of Feodosia no earlier than 14 days later.

But the enemy did not manage to use the favorable moment ... From the operational maps we captured, it was clear that the 4th Army, which had landed at Feodosia, had only one goal - to reach the area west and northwest of the city of Stary Krym by January 4, which had by that time in it has six divisions at its disposal, in order to then take up defense at the reached line ... But the enemy did not actually reach the above-mentioned line to the west of the city of Stary Krym.

The 51st Army, advancing through Kerch, pursued the 46th Infantry Division very indecisively. The 44th Army, which had landed near Feodosia ... to our surprise, sent its main forces ... to the east, towards the 51st Army. The enemy clearly saw in front of him only his tactical goal - the destruction of our forces on the Kerch Peninsula - and completely lost sight of the operational goal - the intersection of the main vital artery of the 11th Army.

Thus, we managed to create from the exhausted 46th Infantry Division, which had arrived in the meantime the reinforced 213th Infantry Division and the Romanian units, a very, however, fragile front of cover at the turn of the northern spurs of the Yayla near Stary Krym - the Sivash coast west of Ak-Monai. All officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers (including from the army headquarters) who could be released were sent to strengthen the Romanian units, they also had to ensure the correct use of heavy weapons by the Romanians ...

Finally, on January 15, everything was ready for a counterattack on Feodosia by the forces of the 30th and 42nd ak. It was not easy, however, to decide on this offensive. It was to be carried out by three and a half German divisions and one Rumanian mountain brigade against the enemy, whose forces had now increased to eight divisions and two brigades. While the enemy had tanks, albeit in limited numbers, we had none. Aviation support was questionable due to non-flying weather. Nevertheless ... thanks to the courage of the troops ... the offensive was successful ... By January 18, Feodosia was in our hands. The enemy lost 6,700 men killed, 10,000 prisoners, 177 guns and 85 tanks.

Also of particular interest is the opinion of E. von Manstein regarding the case of General Sponeck, who was his direct subordinate. In particular, he wrote that “the case of Count Sponeck shows how tragic it is for a military leader to conflict between the obligation to obey an order and his own opinion about operational necessity. He knows that by disobeying an order, he risks his head, and yet he may be forced to act contrary to the order ...

Having received a report that, contrary to the repeated orders of the army commander forbidding a withdrawal from the Kerch Peninsula, the corps commander nevertheless ordered his troops to withdraw, I removed Count Sponeck from command ... because I was not sure that he was capable of that time to cope with the critical situation that has developed on the Kerch Peninsula ...

As a circumstance mitigating the guilt of Count Sponeck, it was necessary to admit that he found himself in an extremely difficult situation, that he, finding himself in an extremely difficult situation, was deeply convinced that it was impossible to do otherwise.

As soon as I found out about the verdict, in a report addressed to the commander of the army group, I stood up for Count Sponeck and demanded that, first of all, they listen to me again. Field Marshal von Bock fully supported my position. However, we received only Keitel's reply, which, in a completely unjustifiably harsh form, rejected our point of view ... My repeated attempts to achieve complete rehabilitation / Sponeck / were unsuccessful. Then he was vilely shot on the orders of Himmler after July 20, 1944. .

Thus, as a superior commander, Field Marshal E. von Manstein, to a certain extent, even justifies the unauthorized act of his subordinate, referring to the operational rationality of his decision in the current situation. On the one hand, this is a somewhat new approach to relations between a superior and a subordinate, on the other hand - and this should not be forgotten - Manstein's book was written after the end of the war, at a time when it was no longer dangerous to openly accuse Hitler of injustice. It is possible that it was the latter circumstance that played a decisive role in his assessments and conclusions.

In general, if we talk about the Kerch-Feodosia operation, it should be noted that this is the first major landing operation of the Red Army since the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. Its implementation to a large extent contributed to the improvement of the situation on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, and led to the disruption of the second enemy offensive on Sevastopol. With the capture of the Kerch Peninsula at the beginning of 1942, Soviet troops eliminated the threat of an enemy offensive from the Crimea to the Kuban and the Caucasus.

It lasted for nine days and was conducted on a front of about 250 km. The maximum depth of advance of the Soviet troops was 110 km, the average daily rate of advance of rifle formations fluctuated within 10-12 km per day. During this operation, the Soviet troops (together with the fleet) irretrievably lost almost 35 thousand people killed, captured and missing, about 9.5 thousand people were wounded and sick.

At the same time, this landing operation, as the most complex method of combat operations, showed the need for special clarity in its preparation and conduct, especially in the field of command and control of land, sea and air forces.

It must be admitted that in this operation there was, in essence, no unified command. The commander of the Caucasian Front had a command post in Tbilisi, and a task force in Krasnodar. The command of the Black Sea Fleet was located in Novorossiysk and also could not exercise overall control of the operation, since the Azov military flotilla and the Kerch naval base were operationally subordinate to the commander of the 51st Army. At the same time, the commander of the Azov military flotilla and the commander of the Kerch naval base were on land and, therefore, could not control all the detachments at sea. In addition, detachments of ships at sea were not united by a single command.

As a result of major shortcomings in command and control, the landings landed in the Kerch region and in Feodosia were delayed at the landing points and slowly moved deep into the Kerch Peninsula. The enemy was forced out of the peninsula, but was not surrounded and destroyed.

It was not possible to achieve secrecy in preparation, surprise and swiftness of the landing in the operation. The landing of troops on ships was discovered by enemy air reconnaissance, as it was carried out not only at night, but also during the day. The secrecy of the transition of the detachments of the Azov military flotilla and the Kerch naval base was also violated - most of them did not have time to complete the transition by sea by morning.

A special detachment of ship support was not formed to provide fire support for the landing in the Azov military flotilla, while the detachments of the ships did not have sufficient firepower, and therefore the landing forces suffered significant losses from enemy fire during the landing.

The operations clearly showed the great importance of air support for landings, as well as the importance of the air defense system. The Air Force of the Black Sea Fleet did not fulfill its main task of gaining air supremacy. Due to the remoteness of the airfields, our fighter aircraft could not organize reliable air cover for the landing detachments when crossing by sea, in the landing areas, especially in the most remote places (Cape Zyuk, Feodosia), and also during the development of the operation on land. Having refused to land an airborne assault in Vladislavovka, the Soviet command was deprived of the opportunity to quickly relocate part of the fighter aircraft to the local airfield, from where it was possible to organize effective support for the troops. At the same time, the activity of Soviet aviation was quite high. So, for the period from December 26 to January 2, she made 1250 sorties.

In the operation, due attention was not paid to the organization of the defense of the landing points captured by the first amphibious assaults. Often the unit that made up these forces sought to move as far as possible in depth, while the flanks remained open. The enemy, inflicting blows on the flanks, prevented the landing of subsequent echelons.

The Azov military flotilla and the Kerch naval base did not pay enough attention to organizing communication with the floating assets involved in the operation (seiners, tugboats). When going out to sea, communication with these means, as a rule, ceased. The weather service did not work satisfactorily. All this as a whole significantly reduced the effectiveness of the operation and negatively affected its course and outcome.

Notes

. Manstein E. Lost victories. M.: AST, 2003. S. 255-258.

. Manstein E. Lost victories. pp. 258-264.

Russia and the USSR in the wars of the XX century. Statistical research. M., 2001. S. 277.

A new super project of a leading military historian.

From Manstein's breakthrough through the Perekop positions to the failure of the first assaults on Sevastopol, from the Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation and the unsuccessful offensive of the Crimean Front to the Kerch disaster and the fall of the Main Base of the Black Sea Fleet, from the long German occupation of the peninsula to the swift (in just a month) liberation of Crimea in the victorious spring of 1944 year, when our advancing troops lost four times less than the defending enemy - this book analyzes in detail all the operations of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army in the struggle for the Crimea.

Separately considered are the actions of our ground forces - tankers, infantry, artillery - and the combat work of the Soviet Air Force and the Black Sea Fleet.

Sections of this page:

The general counteroffensive of the Red Army, which began in November near Tikhvin and Rostov and continued near Moscow in December 1941, could not leave the Crimean peninsula aside. The interception of the strategic initiative by the Soviet troops in the winter of 1941/42 took place according to a single scheme: a strike on the extended flank of the enemy strike force. Accordingly, in the Crimea, a blow was struck on the coastal flank of the 11th Army. The coast of the peninsula was a fairly long area that needed to be defended, even if in sparse formations. The concentration of the main efforts of the German troops in the Crimea against Sevastopol made the defense of the entire coast almost formal. She focused on several areas.

The plan for the landing of sea and air assault forces on the Kerch Peninsula appeared at the command of the Transcaucasian Front at the end of November 1941, shortly after the Soviet troops left the Crimea. The first report outlining the main ideas of the operation was sent to the Headquarters of the Supreme Command on November 26, 1941. The proposal was received with interest, and on November 30, a detailed report was sent to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command by the Military Council of the front, detailing the plan and calculating the number of allocated troops. Initially, it was supposed to seize the landing force only in the eastern part of the Kerch Peninsula and move further to Feodosia. In this document, for the first time, two armies appear, which subsequently carried out a landing - the 51st A and the 44th A. The first was supposed to use three rifle divisions and one sbr, as part of the second - three rifle divisions with reinforcement units. Accordingly, the first aimed at capturing Kerch, and the second - to the south, to the Chongelek Tatar region. Also in the plan dated November 30, for the first time, a landing appears in the area of the city of Opuk (by the forces of one gp). At the same time, the front command planned an airborne landing in the area of the Salyn and Bagerovo stations in order to capture the Turkish Wall and prevent the approach of enemy reserves. In the first days of December, there were already relatively detailed studies with the order of forces and specific landing sites. Planning for the 51st Army was led by General P.I. Batov, later replaced by V.N. Lvov. Already in the plan, dated December 2, 1941, Tarkhan, Khroni and Mama Russkaya appear as landing sites on the northern coast of the Kerch Peninsula.

Landing on the cruiser "Red Caucasus". On December 28, 1941, the cruiser was to land infantrymen at night, moored to the Feodosia pier.

Landing on board the "small hunter". Kerch-Feodosiya operation, December 1941

In early December, the front command issued preliminary orders, in particular on artillery. The landing was supposed to be supported by artillery from the triangle m. Akhileon, Spit Chushka, Battery. It also provided for the landing of artillery and mortars already in the first echelon of the landing, without means of traction, based on rolling manually. At the same time, orders were given to prepare infantry units for landing with exercises with boarding and disembarking from ships and ships.

Transports from the Temryuk pier went to sea at 14.00-17.00 on December 25, from the Kuchugury pier - at 19.00, from the Taman and Komsomolskaya piers - at 2.00-3.00 on December 26, 1941. Already during the landing period, Lieutenant-General V.N. Lvov changed his mind, reducing the Ak-Monai detachment to 500 men, and ordered it to be landed not at Ak-Monai, but in Kazantip Bay. Due to this detachment, the landing at Cape Khroni was intensified. However, at the end of the day, the weather worsened, which seriously hampered the landings. As the commander of the AzVF S.G. Gorshkov: “Due to the large difference in speed, different seaworthiness, the marching order of ships and vessels of various types was violated, many of them fell behind and were forced to follow alone. The seiners, canoes and boats that were towed by the landing craft were flooded with water, and sometimes they were torn off and carried away to the sea. Due to the storm, headwind and rolling waves, the landing forces were late in approaching the landing sites from two to six hours and landed already in daylight.

The 1st detachment, delayed by a storm, did not reach the Kazantip Bay, and the landing force landed somewhat to the west of the 2nd detachment. As a result, instead of an ambitious landing at Ak-Monai, it was landed in the area of heights. 43, 1 (3 km west of Novy Svet) an incomplete battalion of the 83rd MBR under the command of Lieutenant Kapran (193 people), who took up defense 2 km from the coast.

The 2nd detachment approached the shore in the area to the west of Cape Zyuk by 07:00 on 26 December. From the shore, fire was opened by the "47-mm cannon", suppressed by the Don gunboat. The seiners could not come close to the shore due to their draft, the boats were thrown ashore and wrecked. As indicated in the naval report, the landing fighters went ashore chest-deep in icy water. It was not possible to unload artillery and tanks. Toward the middle of the day, the situation worsened due to the appearance of enemy aircraft. The self-propelled scow "Fanagoria" was sunk, taking with it about 100 people. Already in the dark, the Khoper barge was brought closer to the shore, gangways were made and three tanks and artillery were unloaded along them. According to the order for the defense of the coast of the 46th Infantry Division, the entire section from Cape Zyuk to Chelochin was entrusted to ... a communications battalion of the formation. Accordingly, the resistance to landing on the coast was less than in other areas where infantry units were defending (see below).

A collision occurred at the landing site of the 2nd detachment, showing how important it is to use specially trained units for landing operations. When about 1000 people had already been landed, the commander of the 224th Rifle Division, Colonel A.P. Degtyarev demanded to make ... a reverse landing. He motivated this by the impossibility of completing the task by the forces landed per day (according to the plan, it was supposed to land 2900 people). The return landing was not made. As a result, in the region 43, 1 west of Cape Zyuk, 878 people, 3 tanks, 2 37-mm guns (anti-aircraft), 9 120-mm mortars, 2 76-mm guns were landed. According to the operational report of the 51st Army, a rifle company of the 185th Rifle Regiment, a battalion of the 143rd Rifle Regiment and 200 Marines landed.

To parry the landing at Cape Zyuk, the German command had to advance the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 97th Infantry Division of the 46th Infantry Division, located in the depths and on the coast of the Kazantip Bay. Their first task is to form a barrier on the dominant heights to the west of Lake Chokrak. The estimate of the number of those who landed in the report on the actions of the 97th paragraph, it must be said, was quite accurate - 1000 people.

At Tarkhan, the 3rd detachment, under fire from the shore and air strikes, according to the army report, landed only about a platoon. The Voroshilov dredger of the 3rd detachment, which delayed the landing, came under air attack and was sunk, killing 450 people. 200 people were rescued by the Hurricane Hurricane, the Dofinovka tugboat and KL No. 4 and Dniester. Crowded with people raised from the Voroshilov, the boat minesweeper returned to Temryuk due to the obvious disruption of the landing.

On the first day of the landing, the 4th detachment operated most successfully near Cape Khroni, landing with the help of the Taganrog barge (bolinder), which was then used as a berth. "At Cape Khroni" here means that it was actually landed at the heights. 71, 3 west of Cape Khroni for a battalion from the 143rd joint venture, 160th joint venture and 83rd MBR (1556 people) and three tanks. The landing force was led by the commander of the 83rd MBR, Colonel I.P. Leontiev, who immediately launched an offensive in the direction of Adzhimushkay. The landing force manages to reach Bulganak, where it engages in battle with the soldiers of the German rear units.

As indicated in the report on the actions of the 72nd checkpoint, already at 3.30 a strong noise of battle was heard in the area of the neighboring 42nd checkpoint (where the KVMB landing force landed). Soon the command of the division reports that "the Russians have landed at Kamysh-Burun". To conduct a counterattack, the 1st battalion of the regiment is withdrawn from positions in the Kerch region, but the counterattack does not begin immediately, but only closer to 15.00. The action report notes that the attack, supported by artillery, is "not in the direction of the bridgehead, but in the direction of Hill 164.5 into the deep flank of the enemy." The army report on the results of the operation indicates that the units of the 143rd joint venture “began to flee, throwing their weapons and surrendering.” However, the disorderly retreat was stopped, and the detachment entrenched itself on the northern slopes of the heights for the night. 154, 4. According to German data, the counterattack does not really achieve a decisive result. According to the report of the 72nd paragraph, "The left wing is stopped by a large enemy force, which has entrenched itself in well-equipped old field fortifications and is offering fierce resistance." Also, the German strike group is fired from the flank from the sea (gunboats remaining off the coast). The capture of any significant number of prisoners on December 26 does not appear in the German data; probably, the army report was somewhat ahead of events.

The 5th detachment did not land at all. Due to strong resistance in the Yenikale area, it was redirected to the Khroni metro station, but eventually stopped at the Akhileon metro station. According to the naval report, the minesweepers of the detachment lost the canoes and boats that were in tow, the storm also upset the movement of the seiners. The detachment commander turned back to search for boats and seiners, as a result, the landing of the detachment on December 26 did not take place.

As a result, on the first day of the operation, about 2,500 people were landed on a wide front, with very approximate observance of the landing areas, some of the ships returned to Temryuk with a landing force. In essence, this can be called, if not a failure, then a great failure of the landing force landed by the Azov military flotilla.

On the same day, December 26, the Kerch naval base began landing units of the 51st Army in the Kamysh-Burun area. According to the plan of the KVMB, it was supposed to land at the points of Stary Karantin, Kamysh-Burun, Eltigen, Nizhne-Burunsky lighthouse and the Initiative commune. Kamysh-Burun was chosen as the direction of the main attack. The first throw at each landing point, consisting of 325 fighters, was supposed to be made from 2 torpedo boats and 4 seiners. In total, 1300 fighters and commanders landed in the first throw. The 302nd Rifle Division, allocated by the army for landing, had no combat experience, but still managed to receive minimal landing training. Since December 15, 10 landing and disembarkation exercises from seiners and a minesweeper have been conducted with its fighters.

As in the case of the AzVF, the KVMB ships allocated for the landing were divided into detachments, there were three of them. The landing began at 16.00 on 25 December. As noted in the naval report: "Despite the predetermined plan, the landing was slow and disorganized." At the appointed time, only the 1st detachment completed the landing of troops (by 1.00 am on December 26). This was due to the fact that the seiners approached the berths from the raid at their own discretion, out of plan, and also with the delay of some parts of the landing force. In total, 1154 people were accepted by the 1st detachment, 744 people by the 2nd detachment and 3327 people by the 3rd detachment.

The disorganization of the landing was exacerbated by stormy weather, as a result, only the 1st detachment reached the landing site in a timely manner. Accordingly, the 2nd detachment was late with the release by an hour, and the 3rd detachment - by 2 hours. The situation was aggravated by the need to follow the detachments through the ravine between the Tuzla Spit and Cape Tuzla, which was difficult in navigation due to the shallow depths and narrowness of the fairway. However, following another route between Pavlovsky Cape and Tuzla Spit was excluded due to the danger of enemy shelling. The passage at night in stormy conditions, with the fencing of dangerous areas torn off by the storm, led to the grounding of part of the vessels. Transports, barges, "bolinder" were removed from the shallows before 11.00 and followed the shore already in the light of day.

As a result, by 5.00 on December 26, almost on schedule, only the 1st detachment, consisting of 20 seiners and 8 torpedo boats, reached Eltigen, Kamysh-Burun and Stary Karantin. According to German data, the landing begins at about 4.45 am Berlin time. The report on the actions of the 42nd paragraph reported on a report from the 1st battalion at 4.45: “Several large and small ships are trying to moor to the Rybatsky Peninsula near Kamysh-Burun. At the same time, boats are trying to enter the bay near the shipyards. At 4.50 a message follows from the III battalion: "The enemy, numbering 70 people, has landed in the southern part of Eltigen." At that time, the 42nd regiment of the 46th infantry regiment consisted of 1461 soldiers and officers and defended the coastline with a length of 27 km. The 1st and 3rd battalions of the regiment were the main opponents of the landing by the KVMB forces, the 2nd battalion was in Kerch and its environs.

The landing at Kamysh-Burun turns out to be the most effective, where the first throw was fixed on the Kamysh-Burun Spit and the pier of the shipyard. The landing was supported by artillery, the Germans especially note this: “During the entire time, the entire coast is under fire from the enemy’s heavy and heavy guns from the opposite coast.”

Much more dramatic is the fate of other units. Due to strong opposition in the Old Quarantine, only 55 fighters were landed, led by the commander of the landing point, quartermaster 1st rank Grigoriev. The rest of the landing force went to Kamysh-Burun. This is confirmed by the report on the actions of the 42nd paragraph, which says about the landing in the strip of the 1st battalion: "Most of the enemy boats under concentrated fire are forced to turn back." Regarding those who landed, the German report cites the testimonies of the prisoners, according to which "the boat approached the shore by several hundred meters, and the soldiers were forced to wade through shallow water."

Grigoriev's group was quickly defeated, which is confirmed by both the naval report and the report on the actions of the 42nd paragraph. The latter states: “Parts of the 3rd company destroy the enemy who landed on its sector and take prisoner an officer and 30 soldiers. One commissar was shot." According to Soviet data, the detachment broke into two groups and tried to break through to Kamysh-Burun, a group of fighters led by Grigoriev was surrounded and died, the second group, led by senior political officer Grabarev, found a boat and retreated to their ships. Landed in Eltigen, 19 people, led by the commander of the landing point, Major Lopata, fought surrounded. In the report on the actions of the 42nd paragraph on the resistance of this small group, it is written: “In the zone of the III battalion, the enemy manages to gain a foothold in the southern houses of Eltigen. Fierce street fighting unfolds. The last stubborn resistance was broken closer to noon, 2 commissars were shot dead. Scrupulous marks about commissars, most likely, are connected with the implementation of the notorious order about commissars.

The cruiser "Red Caucasus" in the sea. The cruiser was a completed ship, laid down before the First World War under the name "Admiral Lazarev". The main caliber of the cruiser was four 180-mm guns in single-gun turrets.

The next wave of landings approaches the shore already in the light of day and, as expected, meets a barrage of fire. Part of the seiners under fire turns back to Taman. The second detachment of 12 seiners approaches at 7.00. Moreover, the newly arrived German anti-tank guns open fire, even a slight delay worsened the situation. The main part of the landing force landed on the Kamysh-Burun Spit and the pier of the ship repair plant, where the first throw was fixed. Here, at Kamysh-Burun, the landing achieves partial success, surrounding and defeating the 2nd and 12th companies of the 42nd Infantry Division, which made their way to their own, leaving the transport. Another private success is the landing south of Eltigen (it is not possible to land in Eltigen itself). As indicated in the report of the 42nd paragraph, "the enemy manages to capture the iron plant, not occupied by our troops, located west of the Kamysh-Burun-Eltigen road." Here, by all indications, there was an omission in the organization of the defense of the coast by the Germans.

The 3rd detachment, consisting of 9 seiners, 3 tugs, a "bolinder" and 2 barges, arrived only at 13.00. According to German data, this happened a little earlier, around noon. The main forces of the 823rd Guards Rifle Regiment of the 302nd Guards Rifle Regiment on a "bolinder" (removed from the shoal, which it ran into in the dark) reached the Kamysh-Burun Bay. Here he becomes a victim of artillery fire and air strikes, killing up to 300 people and almost all of the materiel. As stated in the report of the 42nd paragraph: “One large tug gets hit and lists. About 200 Russians jump overboard and swim or wade to the Rybatsky Peninsula. The sinking of the "bolinder" by an air strike confirms the report of the 42nd paragraph. According to an army report, part of the landing party did swim to the shore: "the personnel rushed into the sea, to the shore." As the commander of the 51st A V.N. Lvov in negotiations with the headquarters of the front, most of those who escaped from the "bolinder" did not have weapons. It was obviously thrown into the sea as it interfered with getting to the shore by swimming. The barge with the main forces of the 825th Guards Rifle Regiment (up to 1,000 landing troops) caught fire and was returned back to Taman.

As a result, as indicated in the naval report, on December 26, about 2,200 people were landed by the KVMB. Of these, 1,500 people are in Kamysh-Burun, 120 on the Kamysh-Burun Spit, 500 people south of Eltigen (in the area of the Commune "Initiative") and 55 - in the Old Quarantine. Small detachments were almost immediately destroyed. As it is directly written in the army report: "The main forces of the 302nd Guards Rifle Division did not land." Simultaneously with the landings by the forces of the AzVF and the KVMB, on December 26, an attempt was made to land the “B” detachment near Mount Opuk. However, already at sea, the ships were scattered in the dark by the wind. Arriving at the place on the “Red Adjaristan” canoe, the commander of the detachment, Rear Admiral N.O. Abramov did not find the rest of the ships and decided to return to Anapa, gather the detachment together and land on December 27th. In essence, the landing was thwarted. Summing up the events of December 26, one has to admit that the successes of the first day of the landing were extremely limited.

The Soviet troops failed to turn the tide in their favor on the second day of the operation. On December 27, the landing was practically not carried out due to a strong storm (7–8 points). The German command, in turn, tried to drop landings into the sea with counterattacks. The gathering of forces of the 97th point for a counterattack on the units landed near Cape Zyuk (more precisely, height 43, 1) is completed only on the morning of December 27, as a result, the counterattack on the bridgehead took place only at 13.00. The landing response was a counterattack with tanks, but all three vehicles were hit by the Germans. Also, this detachment was isolated from other landing groups by mining the isthmus near Cape Zyuk (which was the result of a miss with the landing site).

Despite the lack of reinforcements, the detachment of Colonel Leontiev tried on the morning of December 27 from the area of high. 154, 4 to resume the attack on Adzhimushkay. According to German data (report of the 72nd paragraph), he manages to achieve initial success with competent actions: “Shortly before dawn, the enemy passes between the positions of the 2nd and 3rd companies and, with the forces of about two companies, attacks the positions of anti-aircraft guns on the northern outskirts of Adzhim-Ushkay” . However, this attack was eventually repulsed by the Germans. At the same time, Leontiev's attack forces the Germans to postpone their own counterattack on the bridgehead, it begins after 9.00 in the morning. According to the report of the 72nd Infantry Division, two battalions were used by the Germans against this bridgehead (which coincides with the Soviet estimate). The detachment turns out to be quite a “tough nut”, the report on the actions of the 72nd paragraph notes “stubborn resistance from a well-entrenched enemy and artillery fire from ships”. Later, when summing up the results in the report of the 72nd paragraph, it was noted: "The frequent fire of enemy naval artillery created great difficulties for our troops." Enemy pressure and the threat of encirclement force the detachment to withdraw to the sea at high altitudes. 106.6. Detachment Art. Lieutenant Kapran is attacked, but holds the position, having suffered minor losses.

Destroyer Nezamozhnik. The ship belonged to the "novik" destroyers inherited from the tsarist fleet.

An attempt by the Germans to drop the landing force of the KVMB into the sea was also unsuccessful. The counterattack on the detachment in the area of Eltigen (Commune Initiative) fails. The report of the 42nd paragraph states: “In a completely devoid of shelters, in conditions where the enemy has dug in for more than a kilometer, only a little can be advanced. The enemy is supported from the other side of the strait and from ships with guns of heavy and heavy caliber. On the whole, an unstable balance is maintained on the bridgeheads.

At the same time, due to the pause that has arisen, the German defense in the Kerch region is being strengthened. South of Kerch, on Cape Ak-Burnu, 88-mm and 20-mm anti-aircraft guns are placed, which can flank both the approaches to Kerch and Kamysh-Burun. The Battalion of the 97th Infantry Division of the 46th Infantry Division, removed from Feodosia II, arrives in Kerch.

The landing resumes on 28 December. In the area of Cape Khroni, the landing is carried out early in the morning by the forces of the 3rd detachment, about 400 people are able to land (according to the army report, 300 people of 143 joint ventures). The report of the 72nd paragraph confirms the fact of the landing, despite the shelling: "The Russians are landing up to the battalion and are trying to move south."

In general, the pause that arose on December 27 had a negative impact on the position of the detachments on the northern coast of the Kerch Peninsula. They did not receive additional forces, and the enemy received time to assemble strike groups and provide them with artillery support. The attack of two battalions of the 97th pp on located near the heights. 43, 1 detachment begins on the morning of December 28, and by noon the landing force is pushed back to a narrow space near the steep bank. Here the paratroopers take the last battle. The report of the 97th paragraph stated: “Here he defends himself especially stubbornly in crevices and between cliffs. Sometimes enemy soldiers stand in the water, they have to be killed one by one, because they mostly do not surrender. Soon the main landing forces are defeated. The Germans claimed 468 prisoners (including one officer), 300 killed and wounded Soviet soldiers. Unloaded guns, including two 37-mm anti-aircraft guns and 5 tractors, became their trophies. The remnants of the detachment held several nests of resistance on the shore, in which, according to the prisoners interrogated by the Germans, there were about 200 more people. This fits in perfectly with the number of 878 men mentioned in the naval report. It should be said that nothing is said in the army report about the fate of this detachment, which resisted to the end.

On December 28, Leontiev's detachment was knocked out of position, suffered heavy losses, and began to retreat to Cape Tarkhan. As a result of the counteroffensive, the Germans manage to take the landing site. The report of the 72nd paragraph states: "The remnants of the enemy are still holding on to the very shore and in the quarries just to the east of height 115.5." Detachment Art. Lieutenant Kapran was cut off from the sea and surrounded, although his destruction did not take place.

Events developed south of Kerch somewhat less dramatically. December 28 KVMB at 4.00-5.00 lands in Kamysh-Burun 678 people of the 827th gp. The landing at night is confirmed by the enemy. However, attempts to develop the offensive from the bridgehead held at Kamysh-Burun to the west and to connect with the landing force at Eltigen were not successful. At the same time, the Germans' attempts to liquidate the bridgeheads end in nothing. The factory in the area of Kamysh-Burun passes from hand to hand. Only in the area north of Eltigen do they manage to somewhat limit the size of the Soviet bridgehead, in the report of the 42nd paragraph this is described as follows: “The offensive is developing well, the enemy has been thrown back to a small coastal strip and forced to huddle in a narrow space.”

Detachment "B" of the 44th Army (2393 people) was also redirected here, to Kamysh-Burun, on three gunboats, originally built as landing craft, and another "bolinder". However, this landing was not particularly successful. The gunboats ran aground 50–150 m from the shore, the landing force had to be transported by boats. Bolinder is out of order.

As a result, by the morning of December 29, the landing of the 51st Army found itself in a difficult, close to catastrophic, situation. In the ZhBD of the 11th Army, the assessment of the situation near Kerch was quite unambiguous: “The army command believes that on December 28 the situation on the Kerch Peninsula is under control, the destruction of the enemy units still on the peninsula will take place on December 29.” Given the plight of the landing forces, this statement does not look like empty boasting. In the report on the actions of the 42nd paragraph, the situation on the morning of December 29 is assessed as stable: “In the morning of December 29, both enemy bridgeheads were reliably blocked, after receiving reinforcements, counterattacks were launched, and the first successes were noted.” In negotiations with A.M. Vasilevsky, held on the night of December 28-29, D.T. Kozlov admitted: "The situation at the end of the day today on the front of the 51st Army was not in our favor." At that moment, the situation changed dramatically in favor of the Soviet troops - a landing took place in Feodosia, deep in the rear of the German troops on the Kerch Peninsula.

Another Black Sea “novik” is the destroyer Shaumyan.

While fighting was going on on the Kerch Peninsula with landing forces pressed to the sea, at 13.00 on December 28 in Novorossiysk, the landing of the first landing on the cruiser Krasny Kavkaz and Krasny Krym, the destroyers Zheleznyakov, Shaumyan, Nezamozhnik began and transport "Kuban". At 17.00, 300 fighters of the assault groups and a hydrographic party were taken on 12 patrol boats at 17.00. As part of the first landing, 5419 fighters and commanders, 15 guns and 6 mortars, 100 tons of ammunition and 56 tons of food sank. As indicated in the report of the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet: "Despite the fact that the ships were placed in the Novorossiysk port according to a pre-approved disposition, well known to the leading command staff of the Red Army units, the loading and landing of the troops were not organized enough." Parts approached late, confused the names of the ships. Some ships were loaded with more troops than planned.

Despite the withdrawal of the 79th brigade from the troops planned for landing, the front command tried to select the most well-trained units for the first strike. As D.T. Kozlov in negotiations with A.M. Vasilevsky on the night of December 28-29, 1941: “The first echelon is one regiment of the 9th Guards Rifle Regiment, a regular regiment trained for amphibious assaults, a battalion of marines and one regiment of the 157th division, staffed by Kuban”. On the whole, the formations of the 44th Army were well equipped by the standards of December 1941 (see Table 1).

In advance, from the evening of December 26, in Novorossiysk, the loading of materiel and horses began on the transports of the 1st detachment (“Zyryanin”, “Jean Zhores”, “Shakhtar”, “Tashkent”, “Azov” and “Kr. Profintern”). Two more transports, "Serov" and "Nogin", were busy transporting to Sevastopol and got up for loading, respectively, on the morning of December 28 and the evening of December 27. The loading of the troops of the 44th Army on the transports began at 17.30 and ended at 23.00 on December 28. The 236th Rifle Division was loaded onto the 1st detachment of transports, and the 63rd Guards Rifle Division (without one regiment) onto the 2nd detachment. As a result, the 1st detachment of transports received 11,270 people, 572 horses, 26 45-mm guns, 18 76-mm guns, 7 122-mm howitzers, 199 vehicles (mostly "one and a half"), 18 tractors, 20 light tanks, ammunition, food forage and other property. At 3.00 on December 28 in Tuapse, the loading of materiel and horses began, and then the landing of the personnel of the 63rd Guards Rifle Division on the transports of the 2nd detachment (Kalinin, Dimitrov, Kursk, Fabricius and Krasnogvardeets). 6365 people, 906 horses, 31 76-mm guns, 27 122-mm howitzers, 92 vehicles, 14 tanks, ammunition, food forage and other property were accepted for transports of the detachment. Thus, by the evening of December 28, the Soviet command had assembled a fairly large force of infantry and artillery capable of radically changing the situation in the Crimea.

Scheme from the report of the commander of the 46th engineer battalion. It is clearly seen that at night the battalion was a stone's throw from the harbor.

It would be expected that the non-simultaneity of the landings in the Crimea would have a negative impact on the conditions of the landings in Feodosia. However, the situation was very ambiguous. On the one hand, the landing in the Kerch region weakened the German defense in the Feodosia region due to the withdrawal of reserves. According to the defense plan, the 46th Infantry Division of the II Battalion of the 97th Infantry Division formed the Feodosiya coastal defense section from Koktebel to Dalniye Kamyshi (including settlements). With the beginning of the landing of the 51st Army, he was removed from Feodosia and hastily sent to the eastern tip of the Kerch Peninsula. The German defense of Feodosia is deprived of units that had the opportunity to explore the city and its environs. On the other hand, in the last days of December, the regrouping of the 11th Army was in full swing with the general goal of countering the landings, both those that had already landed and those that were just planned. To strengthen the defense of the Kerch Peninsula, the command of the 11th Army advanced the 46th sapper battalion (a separate motorized unit) under the command of Captain Streit, previously involved in the assault on Sevastopol. It was then, even before the landings, called "the last reserve of the 11th Army."

Moreover, it should be emphasized that Streit's battalion was not intended to organize the defense of Feodosia. As indicated in the report on the actions of the 46th Sat, the end point of the route was Ak-Monai: “Here the battalion was supposed to take over the coastal defense and, together with 6 companies of various construction battalions that were planned to be subordinated to it, build a position in the narrowest point of the peninsula Kerch from Ak-Monai in a southerly direction. That is, the task of the 46th Sat was to re-equip the Soviet Ak-Monai positions in the event of a radical change in the situation on the Kerch Peninsula. On the afternoon of December 28, while in Novorossiysk, with varying degrees of organization, Soviet troops were boarding ships and vessels, the 46th Sat was on the march from Karasubazar to Ak-Monai. The battalion goes to the area of Feodosiya in the afternoon.

A night march to a designated area in an unfamiliar area on bad roads was deemed inexpedient, and the 46th Sat makes a stop. As indicated in the action report, “with the permission of the commander of the sapper units of the corps, the battalion settled down for the night in Feodosia, so that the next morning at dawn, resume movement on Ak-Monai.” That is, by and large, the battalion ends up in Feodosia by chance. Later, two companies of the road construction battalion join him. The commandant's office of the city indicates the location to the sappers and builders.

A very significant issue for assessing subsequent events is the action plan of the German units in Feodosia. In his report on what was happening, the commander of the 46th SB, Captain Streit, wrote the following on this issue: “... there was no information about the plan of action for alarm, there were no instructions about the actions of the battalion in the event of an enemy landing or other attack. As it turned out later, there was an action plan for alarm and defense for the units located in Feodosia, in addition, a few days earlier everyone should have been put on high alert. In this situation, the fact that the relevant orders were not brought to the attention of the units arriving in Feodosia had a negative impact.

Here Streit, most likely, has in mind the plans of the 46th Infantry Division and its bringing to combat readiness at the signal "Christmas Man" (see above). This allows us to conclude that, firstly, the command of the 11th Army did not undertake a purposeful radical reinforcement of troops in Feodosia after the landings in the Kerch region, and secondly, that the commanders on the ground showed a general careless attitude to the organization of defense. The orders and defense plans were not brought to the attention of the units following in transit through Feodosia. The situation was aggravated by the fact that German sappers arrived already at dusk in an unfamiliar city. At the same time, despite the egregious facts of negligent attitude to the organization of defense, the very fact of the presence in the Feodosia region of the 46th Sat, which had extensive combat experience, worsened the conditions for the landing of the planned Soviet landing. Also in Feodosia there was a company of heavy weapons of the 186th subdivision of the 73rd infantry regiment, in division from the 77th artillery regiment and the 54th artillery regiment, and the 902nd assault boat team (100 people), one anti-tank company, one coastal battery. Another factor influencing the situation in the Feodosia region was the presence in the city of a senior commander in the person of Colonel Boehringer, chief of the sapper units of the 11th Army. He could subjugate any units in the city.

At 3 am on December 29, a detachment of warships approached Feodosia. Orientation at night for entering the port was given by the lights of the Shch-201 and M-51 submarines, advanced to the port in advance, this was typical for the navigation support of Soviet landing forces. Under the cover of naval artillery fire, specially assigned boats broke into the Feodosiya harbor and landed a group of scouts on the protective pier, who captured the lighthouse and two anti-tank guns. Not only was the harbor not mined, but the boom gates were opened on the night of the landing. In total, 266 people of the assault detachment were landed by boats in the harbor.

Following the boats, the destroyers broke into the harbor: the first, according to the report of the Black Sea Fleet headquarters, entered the port of the Shaumyan EM at 4.40, followed by the Nezamozhnik EM at 4.56 and the Zheleznyakov EM at 5.00. The first landed 330, the second - 289 and the third - 287 people. The destroyers completed the landing by 5.35-5.51 (Shaumyan and Nezamozhnik), the last was Zheleznyakov - by 7.00.

For the reasons described above, the beginning of the landing of Soviet troops becomes a very unpleasant surprise for the German sapper units located in the city. On the one hand, all units of the 46th sb were located approximately in the center of the city, partly near the harbor (according to the map attached to the report, south of the harbor). On the other hand, they were completely unfamiliar with the area and did not have a clear plan of action. At the first, most important moment of the landing, they only took up the defense of their location. Communication with construction companies in the southern part of the city was absent.

With an experienced ear, sappers define "the shooting of a large number of Russian automatic weapons," that is, a landing in large forces. In the documents of the 11th Army (appendices to the ZhBD) there is evidence that Boehringer contacted the army headquarters. It sounds like this: “At 7.00, a call from Colonel Boehringer from Feodosia. He established contact with the field commandant's office (lieutenant colonel von Kohler). Fierce fighting in the harbor of Feodosia". The response to Boehringer's report was the order to "defend every quarter."

However, the head of the engineering service of the army, Manstein, did not comply with this order. On the contrary, he makes a radical decision to withdraw the sappers from Feodosia (which threatened to become a mousetrap) and orders the withdrawal of the 46th Sat to the fork in the roads Kerch - Simferopol (on the outskirts of Feodosia). The order is immediately transmitted to the companies, in addition, an order is given to immediately withdraw transport from the city. By that time, some of the vehicles that were in the immediate vicinity of the harbor were lost. The purpose of such a maneuver was, as the commander of the 46th Sat later wrote, "to deprive the enemy of the opportunity to advance both to Simferopol and to Kerch." How justified was the failure to comply with the order? Moreover, the artillery battalions of the 46th Infantry Division remained in the city.

Actually, it was the German artillery battalions located in Feodosia that provided the first opposition to the landing. At 05.08, the cruiser Krasny Kavkaz received a hit in the area of the first pipe, which caused a fire. At 5.21 a German shell hit the cruiser's turret, pierced the armor and caused a fire. On the cruisers and destroyers were killed and wounded from fire from the shore. Boehringer himself reported all this to the headquarters of the 11th Army by phone: “Fierce battles in the harbor of Feodosia. German artillery takes an active part in them. One enemy ship is on fire.

However, the pace of the landing left much to be desired. At 5.02 the cruiser Krasny Kavkaz approached a wide pier from the outside and began to moor. At the same time, the landing of part of the landing force by longboats began. The cruiser's mooring took place in extremely difficult conditions due to strong squeezing winds. For the mooring of the cruiser, the tug "Kabardinets" was included in the detachment, which arrived at the landing site from Anapa in a timely manner. However, seeing the intense shelling of the ships, the tug captain got cold feet and returned to Anapa (he was put on trial).

"Red Caucasus" managed to unmoor and give the gangway only at 7.15. Because of the cluttered berth No. 3, only fighters and commanders landed, unloading artillery and vehicles turned out to be impossible. Under these conditions, a few companies with combat experience could significantly change the situation in the harbor. Instead, Boehringer leaves the city and takes them with him. The height of cynicism in this regard is Boehringer's report already from Karasubazar (on the road to Simferopol) around 15.00: "The coastal artillery fired to the last shell, then the gunners picked up carbines." The question of why the subordinates of Boehringer himself did not stand shoulder to shoulder with the gunners remained unanswered.

The reaction of the command of the 11th army to the landing in Feodosia was quite quick. Already between 6.30 and 8.00, orders are given to send the Romanian 4th mountain brigade and 3rd MP (Cornet regiment) and the 240th anti-tank division to Feodosia. That is, in the first place, either closely spaced or motorized units were put forward. Aviation was ordered to operate only in Feodosia. At 8.00 a meeting was held with the participation of Manstein. The head of the operational department, T. Busse, is given the task of finding out what forces, primarily artillery, can be released for Feodosia on the west coast and in the XXX AK zone. Artillery is requested, including from near Kherson (210-mm howitzers). At 9.30, Manstein's decision follows on the immediate withdrawal of one regiment of the 170th Infantry Division from the front and send it to Alushta at night, as well as prepare the withdrawal of another regiment from the front.

On the morning of December 29, when a battle had been raging in Feodosia for several hours, attempts by units of the 46th Infantry Division to drop landing detachments into the sea were still ongoing in the eastern part of the Kerch Peninsula. A surprise for the Germans was an attempt by the Kapran detachment to break through to the sea. This forced the 97th Infantry Division to go on the defensive. Thus, an attempt was made to eliminate 200 daredevils who had settled in the coastal rocks. Leontiev's detachment, according to the Soviet version of events, tried to advance, but later "the detachment fought in an environment." According to the German version of events, the detachment was defeated. The report of the 72nd paragraph states: “At 9.15, the List group and the 2nd battalion jointly destroy the last enemy forces (300 prisoners). The enemy's landing site has been completely cleared, the enemy in the regiment's sector has been eliminated. The Soviet detachment at Kamysh-Burun itself tried to advance, there were battles with varying success on the territory of the factory. The Germans considered the attack on the bridgehead near the Commune Initiative to be very effective, the report of the 42nd paragraph states: “The offensive is developing well, the Russians are suffering heavy losses. They account for at least 100 killed and 200 wounded, 60 people were taken prisoner. At the same time, it is not claimed that the bridgehead has been liquidated.

However, the psychological effect achieved by the very fact of the landing in Feodosia exceeded even the wildest expectations. Boehringer's disregard for a direct and unequivocal order faded before the actions of XXXXII AK headquarters. If at the headquarters of the 11th Army the mood was far from panicky, on the ground things came to direct arbitrariness. Closer to noon on December 29, Manstein gives the order to the XXXXII AK command: “The 46th infantry division must destroy the landed enemy. The main forces should be concentrated on the northern coast. I forbid leaving. The army takes over the isthmus at Feodosia. The orders given there to the Romanian CBR and MP remain in force. The order is transmitted at 11.09 December 29. However, already at 10.00 on December 29, the commander of the XXXXII Corps, Count Shponek, orders the 46th Infantry Division to leave the Kerch Peninsula. This infuriated Manstein, Sponeck was removed, subsequently arrested and imprisoned in a fortress. Later, in his memoirs, E. von Manstein wrote: “The case of Count Sponeck shows how tragic it is for a military leader to conflict between the obligation to follow an order and his own opinion about operational necessity.”

Aerial view of the Feodosiya Bay.

What annoyed Manstein the most was that Sponeck gave the order to withdraw and turned off the radio, that is, he acted in such a way as not to hear a reciprocal ban. Such "tricks" were periodically thrown out by various German commanders, but in this case for Sponeck it had the most far-reaching consequences.

The losses of the 46th Infantry Division in a rapid retreat along the snowy Kerch Peninsula amounted to 9 heavy field howitzers, 12 light field howitzers, 4 heavy and 8 light infantry guns, 14 heavy and 73 light machine guns, 12 heavy and 25 light mortars, 3 heavy and 34 light PTO. Casualties from 25 December to 3 January were moderate, with 152 killed, 429 wounded and 449 missing.

While the scandal was unfolding with the withdrawal of the 46th Infantry Division from Kerch, the sappers withdrawn from Feodosia tried to hold the crossroads north of the city. However, they were soon outflanked and driven from their original position. Command of the defense in the area of Feodosia is taken by Lieutenant Colonel von Alfen (commander of the 617th sapper regiment). Artillerymen depart from the city, having abandoned their materiel. Meanwhile, the Soviet units are moving forward, covering the positions of the 46th sb.

Finally, the idea of defending the crossroads was buried with the landing of a small detachment (reinforced company) in Sarygol, on the road from Feodosia to the east. According to the report of the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet, he was landed at about 23.00 from the BTShch-26. The detachment shells the positions of the 46th sb with mortars. For the night, Lieutenant Colonel von Alphen orders to take up a circular defense around the village of Blizhnyaya Baibuga. This is quite consistent with the Soviet data, which speak of the advance of the landing force to the city of Lysay to the north-west of Feodosia and nearby heights with the right flank 5–6 km and the left flank 3–5 km from the city. In Feodosia itself, at that moment, small scattered groups of Germans were destroyed. By the morning of December 30, Feodosia was completely liberated from the enemy. 2,000 Red Army soldiers were released from captivity. Judging by the loss report of the quartermaster of the 11th Army on December 31, 1941, 7 leFH18, 3 sFH18, 1 10-cm K18 and 2 sFH M / 37 (t) were lost during the previous ten days. In all likelihood, most of the lost refers specifically to Feodosia (the losses of the 46th Infantry Division were higher and were dealt with later). During the night, parts of the Romanian mountain brigade approached the Near Baibuga area.

The counterattack scheduled for the morning, the striking force of which was to be the Romanian units, ended in complete failure. As the commander of the 46th Sat later reported: “It was impossible to induce the Romanians to take at least one step forward. The Romanian officers were not with their units, but in a house located in the rear. Artillery was lost, so not a single shot was fired as artillery preparation.

Meanwhile, the units that landed in Feodosia went on the offensive. The decisive advantage was gained through the use of tanks. As indicated in the ZhBD of the 11th Army: “The Russian tanks that broke through caused the same panic among the Romanians as in September during the breakthrough north of Melitopol. The panicked retreat of the Romanians, unfortunately, dragged the German soldiers along with it. As the commander of the 46th Sat later wrote, the two anti-tank guns he had jammed due to frost, and the Romanians did not use their anti-tank guns. The attack of Soviet tanks pushes back the Romanians and the 46th sb 1.5 km west of the village of Dalnie Baibugi. Here are the Romanian units, reinforced by German artillery.

In the period from December 29 to 31, 23 thousand people, 1550 horses, 34 tanks, 109 guns, 24 mortars, 334 vehicles and tractors, 734 tons of ammunition and 250 tons of other cargo were transported and landed in the Feodosia region. By the end of December 31, the troops of the 44th Army, which landed in Feodosia, managed to advance 10-15 km from the city and capture Vladislavovka. The Romanian units pulled up to Feodosia, although they were not able to drop the landing into the sea, could still hold back its advance until the German divisions approached. On the morning of December 31, the chief of staff of the 11th Army, in a conversation with the chief of staff of the GA "South", uttered a phrase that largely determined the further development of events: "The situation at Feodosia may pose a danger to the Crimea and the 11th A". Accordingly, it was proposed to stop the offensive against Sevastopol and reinforce XXXXII AK at the expense of forces withdrawn from LIV AK. As a result, Hansen receives an order to stop attacks on Sevastopol.

During January 1, 1942, the troops of the 44th Army could not advance in a northerly direction. By the end of January 2, Soviet troops reached the line of Kiet, Nov. Pokrovka, Izyumovka, Koktebel, where they met organized enemy resistance. The losses of the landed 63rd Guards Rifle Division, 236th and 157th Rifle Divisions, the 251st Guards Rifle Regiment and the naval detachment of the 44th Army during this period can be assessed as moderate. From 30 December 1941 to 2 January 1942 they lost 431 killed, 161 missing and 705 wounded.

The landing of the 51st Army continued, and the landings switched to pursuit. Commander of the Caucasian Front D.T. On January 1, 1942, Kozlov reported to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command a plan for the liberation of Crimea by a blow to Perekop, approved the next day.

In negotiations with the Chief of Staff of the 44th Army on Christmas Day on January 2, D.T. Kozlov said bluntly: "The question is this - who will concentrate the troops sooner and more, I want General Pervushin, you and all your workers - to understand this." However, the conditions of the troop concentration race were extremely difficult. In negotiations with A.M. Vasilevsky in the evening of the same day, the front commander admitted: “The ice situation on the Kerch p / o [probably still a“ strait ”. - Note. auto.] doesn't allow anything to be forwarded" .

In the vicinity of Kerch, the 51st Army took rich trophies, however, part of the weapons and equipment were domestic samples recaptured from the enemy. So, as of January 10, 1942, ABTU 51st A reported the capture of 232 domestic and 77 German trucks, 44 domestic and 41 German cars, 35 tractors and 12 Soviet-made tanks. All this equipment was defective.

4 steam locomotives of the OB brand and 80 wagons and platforms became an exceptional value trophy. They managed to be repaired and brought to a condition suitable for movement. The capture of 10,000 tons of coal in Kerch became a serious help. This made it possible to organize a railway. transportation in the interests of the troops of the front, albeit on a limited scale. This was another omission on the part of the command of XXXXII AK and the 46th pd - railway. the transport was not taken away or destroyed.

The dead in Feodosia transports. In the foreground "Zyryanin", behind him "Tashkent".

However, in addition to the obvious advantages, the idea of landing in Feodosia also had obvious disadvantages. The large distance from the bases of the front aviation did not allow providing reliable air cover. As a result, German bombers hit the transports in the port. The Tashkent was the first to die (5552 brt), which had time to unload. The next on January 4 was the Zyryanin (3592 brt), carrying liquid fuel and shells, hit by bombs at the time of pumping fuel. On the same day, the Nogin (2150 brt) was attacked and sunk. On January 9, Spartakovets and Chatyr-Dag were sunk. January 16 was blown up by a mine "Jean Zhores" (3972 brt). Cargoes were also slowly taken out from the berths of Feodosia, and therefore a lot of ammunition was destroyed during the bombardment of the port by enemy aircraft.

All this led to a decrease in the rate of accumulation of troops in the bridgehead near Feodosia and a shortage of the most necessary supplies. On the contrary, the Germans hastily concentrated the troops withdrawn from the grouping aimed at Sevastopol. This allowed them to achieve a quantitative and qualitative superiority and go on the counteroffensive. E. von Manstein writes: “It was to be carried out by three and a half German divisions and one Romanian mountain brigade against the enemy, whose forces have now increased to eight divisions and two brigades. While the enemy had tanks, albeit in limited numbers, we had none. Here Manstein is somewhat disingenuous, because the assault group assembled near Feodosia included assault guns. In the realities of 1941–1942 they were an extremely problematic model of German armored vehicles for the Soviet anti-tank defense and light tanks. As of January 8, XXXXII AK had two assault gun platoons under its control: 4 self-propelled guns from the 197th battalion and 2 self-propelled guns from the 190th battalion. The main body of these two assault gun battalions remained under the control of LIV AK near Sevastopol.

The German offensive began on January 15, and by January 18, the attackers completely occupied Feodosia, surrounding part of the forces of the 44th Army. It was announced the capture of 10 thousand prisoners, 177 guns and 85 tanks. The remnants of the 44th Army retreated to the Parpach Isthmus. The commander of the army, General A.N., was seriously wounded. Pervushin, member of the Military Council A.G. Komissarov, the chief of staff, Colonel S.E., was shell-shocked. Christmas. General I.F. took command of the army. Dashichev. The main consequence of the German counterattack was the loss of Feodosia as a supply port for Soviet troops in the Crimea.

The state of the troops of the 44th Army after Feodosia can be assessed as depressing (see Table 2).

Entrusted to the ill-fated D.T. Kozlov, the troops tried to recapture the peninsula in a difficult period for the Red Army in peculiar natural conditions. The landing in Feodosia on December 29, 1941 was a "knight's move" that dramatically changed the operational situation in the Crimea, but this success was not consolidated. The accumulation of troops, ammunition, fuel in Feodosia was slow. The advance along the thaw-soaked roads of the Kerch Peninsula of the 51st Army was also late. All this allowed the German 11th Army to counterattack on January 15, 1942 and soon re-occupy Feodosia.

Already on the evening of January 17, order No. 0183 / OP of the front headquarters follows: "The Caucasian Front in the morning of 17.1 goes on the defensive on the line of the Ak-Monai positions." Accordingly, Tulumchak, Korpech, Koi-Asan and Daln were designated as a cover position. Reeds, and Ak-Monai positions became the main line of defense.

In the middle of the day on January 17, a conversation took place between D.T. Kozlov with A.M. Vasilevsky, where the front commander firmly and consistently defended the expediency of the measures taken. Kozlov motivated his orders as follows: "I did not decide to risk the final loss of divisions and proposed to withdraw to the Ak-Monai positions in order to pull up and exhaust the enemy." Moreover, he stated bluntly: "The situation that has developed today does not necessitate a review of the decision taken." In a conversation with Moscow, the front commander also assessed the enemy's intentions as the most resolute: "Blow from the right and left to throw our units into the sea." In the end, Vasilevsky, who began the conversation with Kozlov with a rather capricious assessment of the enemy near Feodosia, by the end of two hours of rather tense negotiations, agreed with the arguments of the comfort front. As a result, the troops retreated to Ak-Monai positions.

Faced with a serious crisis in the Crimea, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command sent its representatives to the Crimea - army commissar 1st rank L.Z. Mekhlis and Deputy Chief of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff, Major General P.P. Eternal. Mehlis arrived at the front already on January 20, 1942. A new stage of the struggle for the Crimea began.

Conclusions. The Kerch-Feodosiya operation and the struggle for Feodosia that followed it give rise to polar assessments in Russian historiography, both positive and negative. An important issue is the viability of the bridgeheads formed as a result of the landing of the troops of the 51st Army by the forces of the AzVF and the KVMB. The study of the documents of the parties leads to the disappointing conclusion that by the morning of December 29, 1941, most of the landing detachments were either defeated or were on the verge of defeat. On the other hand, it cannot be said that all bridgeheads were close to disintegration. The most stable was the position of the units of the 302nd Guards Rifle Division near Kamysh-Burun. The liquidation of this detachment on December 29 (as indicated in the ZhBD of the 11th Army) seems unlikely. Unlike other bridgeheads, it was also supported by the artillery of the 51st Army. At the same time, the elimination of other bridgeheads made it possible to release at least two or three infantry battalions to attack the bridgehead. This would be a serious test for him, if not a disaster.

The tragic fate of a significant part of the landing detachments makes us think about the viability of the plan for the landing operation on the Kerch Peninsula as a whole. Here, the study of German documents leads to the conclusion that the positions of the 46th Infantry Division near Kerch were by no means an impregnable fortress. The area of \u200b\u200bCape Zyuk, defended by signalmen, could become a gap in the defense of the 46th Infantry Division and XXXXII Corps as a whole. However, this required the massing of landing craft for landing and supplying large forces. For example, the involvement of gunboats (former "epildiphores") from the Black Sea Fleet for landing in the Sea of Azov.

At the same time, failures in the Kerch region simultaneously became a magnet for German reserves. In particular, the battalion of the 97th paragraph put on the defensive in the Feodosia region. This paved the way for the success of the landing in Feodosia, which made it possible to seize the initiative from the enemy for a long time.

However, as practice has shown, it was not enough to land troops, they still needed to be fully supplied. In this regard, the assessment made in the hot pursuit of the events in 1943 in the "Collection on the study of the experience of the war" is indicative. An unsightly picture was given of the release of weakened formations onto the peninsula: “Some division was loaded and transported, weakened in artillery terms and without convoys, and its “rear” (as it was customary to call the remnants of the division, although these rears included 7/8 artillery regiment) with several thousand horses and a hundred (sometimes more) vehicles remained on the Caucasian coast. As a result, the transported units could not “really fight or live” for a long time. The 44th Army, in the face of the concentration of large enemy forces, needed to really fight.

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