Brest peace, Brest-Litovsk (Brest) peace treaty - a separate peace treaty signed on March 3, 1918 in Brest-Litovsk by representatives of Soviet Russia, on the one hand, and the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria) - on the other . It marked the defeat and exit of Russia from the First World War.
Panorama of Brest-Litovsk

On November 19 (December 2), the delegation of the Soviet government, headed by A. A. Ioffe, arrived in the neutral zone and proceeded to Brest-Litovsk, where the Headquarters of the German command on the Eastern Front was located, where they met with the delegation of the Austro-German bloc, which included also included representatives from Bulgaria and Turkey.
The building where the peace talks were held.

Armistice negotiations with Germany began in Brest-Litovsk on November 20 (December 3), 1917. On the same day, N. V. Krylenko arrived at the headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army in Mogilev, who assumed the post of Commander-in-Chief.
Arrival of the German delegation to Brest-Litovsk

On November 21 (December 4), the Soviet delegation laid out its terms:
the truce is concluded for 6 months;
hostilities are suspended on all fronts;
German troops are being withdrawn from Riga and the Moonsund Islands;
any transfer of German troops to the Western Front is prohibited.
As a result of the negotiations, an interim agreement was reached:
the truce is concluded for the period from November 24 (December 7) to December 4 (17);
troops remain in their positions;
all transfers of troops are stopped, except for those that have already begun.
Peace talks in Brest-Litovsk. Arrival of Russian delegates. In the middle is A. A. Ioffe, next to him is secretary L. Karakhan, A. A. Bitsenko, on the right is Kamenev.

Peace negotiations began on December 9 (22), 1917. The delegations of the states of the Quadruple Union were headed by: from Germany - State Secretary of the Foreign Affairs Department R. von Kuhlmann; from Austria-Hungary - Minister of Foreign Affairs Count O. Chernin; from Bulgaria - Minister of Justice Popov; from Turkey - Chairman of the Mejlis Talaat Bey.
Officers of the Hindenburg headquarters meet the arriving delegation of the RSFSR on the platform of Brest in early 1918.

The Soviet delegation at the first stage included 5 commissioners - members of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee: the Bolsheviks A. A. Ioffe - the chairman of the delegation, L. B. Kamenev (Rozenfeld) and G. Ya. Sokolnikov (Brilliant), the Socialist-Revolutionaries A. A. Bitsenko and S. D. Maslovsky-Mstislavsky, 8 members of the military delegation (Quartermaster General under the Supreme Commander of the General Staff, Major General V. E. Skalon, General Yu. N. Danilov, who was under the Chief of the General Staff, Rear Admiral V. M. Altvater, head of the Nikolaev Military Academy of the General Staff, General A. I. Andogsky, Quartermaster General of the 10th Army of the General Staff, General A. A. Samoilo, Colonel D. G. Fokke, Lieutenant Colonel I. Ya. Tseplit, Captain V. Lipsky), secretary of the delegation L. M. Karakhan, 3 translators and 6 technical employees, as well as 5 ordinary members of the delegation - sailor F. V. Olich, soldier N. K. Belyakov, Kaluga peasant R. I. Stashkov, worker P. A. Obukhov , warrant officer of the fleet K. Ya. Zedin
The leaders of the Russian delegation arrived at the Brest-Litovsk station. From left to right: Major Brinkmann, Joffe, Mrs. Birenko, Kamenev, Karakhan.

The conference was opened by the Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Front, Prince Leopold of Bavaria, and Kühlmann took the chair.
Arrival of the Russian delegation

The resumption of armistice negotiations, which involved agreeing on conditions and signing a treaty, was overshadowed by the tragedy in the Russian delegation. Upon arrival in Brest on November 29 (December 12), 1917, before the opening of the conference, during a private meeting of the Soviet delegation, a representative of the Stavka in a group of military consultants, Major General V. E. Skalon, shot himself.
Armistice in Brest-Litovsk. Members of the Russian delegation after arriving at the Brest-Litovsk station. From left to right: Major Brinkman, A. A. Ioffe, A. A. Bitsenko, L. B. Kamenev, Karakhan.

Proceeding from the general principles of the Decree on Peace, the Soviet delegation already at one of the first meetings proposed to adopt the following program as the basis for negotiations:
No forced annexation of territories captured during the war is allowed; the troops occupying these territories are withdrawn as soon as possible.
The full political independence of the peoples who were deprived of this independence during the war is being restored.
National groups that did not have political independence before the war are guaranteed the opportunity to freely decide the question of belonging to any state or their state independence by means of a free referendum.
Cultural-national and, under certain conditions, administrative autonomy of national minorities is ensured.
Refusal of contributions.
Solution of colonial issues on the basis of the above principles.
Prevention of indirect restrictions on the freedom of weaker nations by stronger nations.
Trotsky L.D., Ioffe A. and Rear Admiral V. Altvater are going to the meeting. Brest-Litovsk.

After a three-day discussion by the countries of the German bloc of Soviet proposals on the evening of December 12 (25), 1917, R. von Kuhlmann made a statement that Germany and its allies accept these proposals. At the same time, a reservation was made that nullified Germany's consent to peace without annexations and indemnities: “It is necessary, however, to indicate with complete clarity that the proposals of the Russian delegation could be implemented only if all the powers involved in the war , without exception and without reservation, within a certain period of time, pledged to strictly observe the conditions common to all peoples.
L. Trotsky in Brest-Litovsk.

Having stated the accession of the German bloc to the Soviet formula of peace "without annexations and indemnities", the Soviet delegation proposed to announce a ten-day break, during which one could try to bring the Entente countries to the negotiating table.
Near the building where the negotiations were held. Arrival of delegations. Left (with beard and glasses) A. A. Ioffe

During the break, however, it turned out that Germany understands a world without annexations differently than the Soviet delegation - for Germany, we are not talking about the withdrawal of troops to the borders of 1914 and the withdrawal of German troops from the occupied territories of the former Russian Empire, especially since, according to the statement Germany, Poland, Lithuania and Courland have already declared themselves in favor of secession from Russia, so that if these three countries now enter into negotiations with Germany about their future fate, this will by no means be considered an annexation by Germany.
Peace talks in Brest-Litovsk. Representatives of the Central Powers, in the middle, Ibrahim Hakki Pasha and Count Ottokar Czernin von und zu Khudenitz, on their way to negotiations.

On December 14 (27), the Soviet delegation at the second meeting of the political commission made a proposal: “In full agreement with the open statement of both contracting parties that they have no conquest plans and that they want to make peace without annexations. Russia is withdrawing its troops from the parts of Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Persia occupied by it, and the powers of the Quadruple Alliance from Poland, Lithuania, Courland and other regions of Russia. Soviet Russia promised, in accordance with the principle of self-determination of nations, to provide the population of these regions with the opportunity to decide for themselves the question of their state existence - in the absence of any troops other than national or local militia.
German-Austrian-Turkish representatives at the talks in Brest-Litovsk. General Max Hoffmann, Ottokar Czernin von und zu Hudenitz (Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister), Mehmet Talaat Pasha (Ottoman Empire), Richard von Kühlmann (German Foreign Minister)

The German and Austro-Hungarian delegation, however, made a counterproposal - the Russian state was invited to "take note of the statements expressing the will of the peoples inhabiting Poland, Lithuania, Courland and parts of Estland and Livonia, about their desire for complete state independence and for the allocation of from the Russian Federation" and acknowledge that "these statements under the present conditions must be regarded as an expression of the people's will." R. von Kuhlmann asked if the Soviet government would agree to withdraw its troops from all of Livonia and from Estland in order to give the local population the opportunity to connect with their fellow tribesmen living in the areas occupied by the Germans. The Soviet delegation was also informed that the Ukrainian Central Rada was sending its own delegation to Brest-Litovsk.
Peter Ganchev, Bulgarian representative on his way to the place of negotiations.

On December 15 (28) the Soviet delegation left for Petrograd. The current state of affairs was discussed at a meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b), where by a majority of votes it was decided to drag out peace negotiations as long as possible, in the hope of an early revolution in Germany itself. In the future, the formula is refined and takes the following form: "We hold on until the German ultimatum, then we surrender." Lenin also invites the People's Commissariat Trotsky to go to Brest-Litovsk and personally lead the Soviet delegation. According to Trotsky's memoirs, "the prospect of negotiations with Baron Kuhlmann and General Hoffmann was not very attractive in itself, but 'to drag out negotiations, you need a delayer,' as Lenin put it."
The Ukrainian delegation in Brest-Litovsk, from left to right: Nikolay Lyubinsky, Vsevolod Golubovich, Nikolay Levitsky, Lussenty, Mikhail Polozov and Alexander Sevryuk.

At the second stage of the negotiations, the Soviet side was represented by L. D. Trotsky (leader), A. A. Ioffe, L. M. Karakhan, K. B. Radek, M. N. Pokrovsky, A. A. Bitsenko, V. A. Karelin, E. G. Medvedev, V. M. Shakhrai, St. Bobinsky, V. Mitskevich-Kapsukas, V. Terian, V. M. Altvater, A. A. Samoilo, V. V. Lipsky
The second composition of the Soviet delegation in Brest-Litovsk. Sitting, from left to right: Kamenev, Ioffe, Bitsenko. Standing, from left to right: Lipsky V. V., Stuchka, Trotsky L. D., Karakhan L. M.

The memoirs of the head of the German delegation, Secretary of State of the German Foreign Ministry Richard von Kühlmann, who spoke of Trotsky as follows, have also been preserved: “not very large, sharp and piercing eyes behind the sharp glasses of glasses looked at his counterpart with a boring and critical look. The expression on his face clearly indicated that he [Trotsky] would have been better off ending the unsympathetic negotiations for him with a couple of grenades, throwing them over the green table, if this was in any way consistent with the general political line ... sometimes I wondered if he generally intends to make peace, or he needed a platform from which he could propagate Bolshevik views.
During negotiations in Brest-Litovsk.

A member of the German delegation, General Max Hoffmann, ironically described the composition of the Soviet delegation: “I will never forget the first dinner with the Russians. I was sitting between Joffe and Sokolnikov, then Commissar of Finance. Opposite me sat a worker, who, apparently, a lot of appliances and utensils caused great inconvenience. He clutched at one thing after another, but he used the fork exclusively for brushing his teeth. Across from me, next to Prince Hoenloe, was the terrorist Bizenko, on the other side of her was a peasant, a real Russian phenomenon with long gray curls and a beard overgrown like a forest. He caused a certain smile in the staff when, when asked whether he prefers red or white wine for dinner, he answered: “Stronger” ”

Signing of a peace treaty with Ukraine. Sitting in the middle, from left to right: Count Ottokar Chernin von und zu Khudenitz, General Max von Hoffmann, Richard von Kuhlmann, Prime Minister V. Rodoslavov, Grand Vizier Mehmet Talaat Pasha.

On December 22, 1917 (January 4, 1918), German Chancellor H. von Gertling announced in his speech at the Reichstag that a delegation of the Ukrainian Central Rada had arrived in Brest-Litovsk. Germany agreed to negotiate with the Ukrainian delegation, hoping to use this as leverage both against Soviet Russia and against its ally, Austria-Hungary. Ukrainian diplomats, who held preliminary negotiations with the German General M. Hoffmann, the chief of staff of the German armies on the Eastern Front, first announced claims to join the Kholmshchyna (which was part of Poland) to Ukraine, as well as the Austro-Hungarian territories - Bukovina and Eastern Galicia. Hoffmann, however, insisted that they reduce their demands and limit themselves to one Kholm region, agreeing that Bukovina and Eastern Galicia form an independent Austro-Hungarian crown territory under the rule of the Habsburgs. It was these demands that they defended in their further negotiations with the Austro-Hungarian delegation. Negotiations with the Ukrainians dragged on so much that the opening of the conference had to be postponed to December 27, 1917 (January 9, 1918).
Ukrainian delegates communicate with German officers in Brest-Litovsk.

The Germans invited a Ukrainian delegation to the next meeting, which took place on December 28, 1917 (January 10, 1918). Its chairman, V. A. Golubovich, announced the declaration of the Central Rada stating that the power of the Council of People's Commissars of Soviet Russia does not extend to Ukraine, and therefore the Central Rada intends to independently conduct peace negotiations. R. von Kuhlmann turned to L. D. Trotsky, who headed the Soviet delegation at the second stage of negotiations, with the question of whether he and his delegation intended to continue to be the only diplomatic representatives of all of Russia in Brest-Litovsk, and also whether the Ukrainian delegation should be considered part of Russian delegation or it represents an independent state. Trotsky knew that the Rada was actually at war with the RSFSR. Therefore, by agreeing to consider the delegation of the Ukrainian Central Rada as independent, he actually played into the hands of the representatives of the Central Powers and provided Germany and Austria-Hungary with the opportunity to continue contacts with the Ukrainian Central Rada, while negotiations with Soviet Russia were marking time for another two days.
Signing of documents on a truce in Brest-Litovsk

The January uprising in Kyiv put Germany in a difficult position, and now the German delegation demanded a break in the meetings of the peace conference. On January 21 (February 3), von Kuhlmann and Chernin went to Berlin for a meeting with General Ludendorff, where they discussed the possibility of signing peace with the government of the Central Rada, which does not control the situation in Ukraine. The decisive role was played by the dire food situation in Austria-Hungary, which was threatened with starvation without Ukrainian grain. Returning to Brest-Litovsk, the German and Austro-Hungarian delegations on January 27 (February 9) signed peace with the delegation of the Central Rada. In exchange for military assistance against the Soviet troops, the UNR undertook to supply Germany and Austria-Hungary by July 31, 1918 with one million tons of grain, 400 million eggs, up to 50 thousand tons of cattle meat, lard, sugar, hemp, manganese ore, etc. Austria-Hungary also undertook to create an autonomous Ukrainian region in Eastern Galicia.
The signing of a peace treaty between the UNR and the Central Powers on January 27 (February 9), 1918.

The signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk Ukraine - the Central Powers was a major blow to the Bolsheviks, in parallel with the negotiations in Brest-Litovsk, did not abandon attempts to Sovietize Ukraine. On January 27 (February 9), at a meeting of the political commission, Chernin informed the Russian delegation about the signing of peace with Ukraine represented by the delegation of the government of the Central Rada. Already in April 1918, the Germans dispersed the government of the Central Rada (see Dispersal of the Central Rada), replacing it with the more conservative regime of Hetman Skoropadsky.

At the insistence of General Ludendorff (even at a meeting in Berlin, he demanded that the head of the German delegation stop negotiations with the Russian delegation within 24 hours after the signing of peace with Ukraine) and by direct order of Emperor Wilhelm II, von Kühlmann presented Soviet Russia in an ultimatum form with a demand to accept the German peace conditions. On January 28, 1918 (February 10, 1918), at the request of the Soviet delegation how to resolve the issue, Lenin confirmed the previous instructions. Nevertheless, Trotsky, violating these instructions, rejected the German terms of peace, putting forward the slogan "Neither peace, nor war: we do not sign peace, we stop the war, and we demobilize the army." The German side stated in response that Russia's failure to sign a peace treaty automatically entails the termination of the truce. After this statement, the Soviet delegation defiantly left the negotiations. As A.A. Samoilo, a member of the Soviet delegation, points out in his memoirs, the former officers of the General Staff who were part of the delegation refused to return to Russia, remaining in Germany. On the same day, Trotsky gives the Supreme Commander Krylenko an order demanding that the army immediately issue an order to end the state of war with Germany and general demobilization, which was canceled by Lenin after 6 hours. Nevertheless, the order was received by all fronts on 11 February.

On January 31 (February 13), 1918, at a meeting in Homburg with the participation of Wilhelm II, the Imperial Chancellor Gertling, the head of the German Foreign Office von Kühlmann, Hindenburg, Ludendorff, the Chief of the Naval Staff and the Vice Chancellor, it was decided to break the truce and launch an offensive on the Eastern front.
On the morning of February 19, the offensive of the German troops rapidly unfolded on the entire Northern Front. Through Livonia and Estonia to Revel, Pskov and Narva (the ultimate goal is Petrograd), the troops of the 8th German Army (6 divisions), a separate Northern Corps stationed on the Moonsund Islands, as well as a special army formation operating from the south, from Dvinsk . For 5 days, German and Austrian troops advanced 200-300 km deep into Russian territory. “I have never seen such an absurd war,” Hoffmann wrote. - We conducted it practically on trains and cars. You put a handful of infantry with machine guns and one cannon on the train and you go to the next station. You take the station, arrest the Bolsheviks, put more soldiers on the train and go on.” Zinoviev was forced to admit that "there is evidence that in some cases unarmed German soldiers dispersed hundreds of our soldiers." “The army rushed to run, leaving everything, sweeping away in its path,” N.V. Krylenko, the first Soviet commander-in-chief of the Russian front-line army, wrote about these events in the same 1918.

After the decision to accept peace on German terms was made by the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b), and then passed through the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the question arose of the new composition of the delegation. As Richard Pipes notes, none of the Bolshevik leaders was eager to go down in history by putting his signature on a treaty shameful for Russia. Trotsky by this time had already resigned from the post of People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, Sokolnikov G. Ya. proposed the candidacy of Zinoviev G. E. However, Zinoviev refused such an “honor”, ​​proposing in response the candidacy of Sokolnikov himself; Sokolnikov also refuses, promising to leave the Central Committee in the event of such an appointment. Ioffe A. A. also flatly refused. After long negotiations, Sokolnikov nevertheless agreed to head the Soviet delegation, the new composition of which took the following form: Sokolnikov G. Ya., Petrovsky L. M., Chicherin G. V., Karakhan G. I. and a group of 8 consultants (among them, Ioffe A. A., former chairman of the delegation). The delegation arrived in Brest-Litovsk on March 1, and two days later signed the contract without any discussion.
Postcard depicting the signing of the ceasefire agreement by the German representative, Prince Leopold of Bavaria. Russian delegation: A.A. Bitsenko, next to her A. A. Ioffe, as well as L. B. Kamenev. Behind Kamenev in the form of captain A. Lipsky, secretary of the Russian delegation L. Karakhan

The German-Austrian offensive, which began in February 1918, continued even when the Soviet delegation arrived in Brest-Litovsk: on February 28, the Austrians occupied Berdichev, on March 1, the Germans occupied Gomel, Chernigov and Mogilev, and on March 2, Petrograd was bombed. On March 4, after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed, the German troops occupied Narva and stopped only on the Narova River and the western shore of Lake Peipsi, 170 km from Petrograd.
A photocopy of the first two pages of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk between Soviet Russia and Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, March 1918.

In its final version, the agreement consisted of 14 articles, various annexes, 2 final protocols and 4 additional agreements (between Russia and each of the states of the Quadruple Union), according to which Russia was obliged to make many territorial concessions, also demobilizing its army and navy.
The Vistula provinces, Ukraine, provinces with a predominantly Belarusian population, Estland, Courland and Livonia provinces, the Grand Duchy of Finland were torn away from Russia. Most of these territories were to become German protectorates or become part of Germany. Russia also pledged to recognize the independence of Ukraine represented by the UNR government.
In the Caucasus, Russia conceded the Kars region and the Batumi region.
The Soviet government ended the war with the Ukrainian Central Council (Rada) of the Ukrainian People's Republic and made peace with it.
The army and navy were demobilized.
The Baltic Fleet was withdrawn from its bases in Finland and the Baltic.
The Black Sea Fleet with all the infrastructure was transferred to the Central Powers.
Russia paid 6 billion marks in reparations, plus the payment of losses incurred by Germany during the Russian revolution - 500 million gold rubles.
The Soviet government pledged to stop revolutionary propaganda in the Central Powers and allied states formed on the territory of the Russian Empire.
Postcard showing the last page of signatures on the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk

The appendix to the treaty guaranteed a special economic status for Germany in Soviet Russia. Citizens and corporations of the Central Powers were removed from the scope of the Bolshevik decrees on nationalization, and those who had already lost their property were restored to their rights. Thus, German citizens were allowed to engage in private business in Russia against the background of the general nationalization of the economy that was taking place at that time. This state of affairs for some time created an opportunity for Russian owners of enterprises or securities to get away from nationalization by selling their assets to the Germans.
Russian telegraph Brest-Petrograd. In the center is the secretary of the delegation L. Karakhan, next to him is Captain V. Lipsky.

Dzerzhinsky F.E.'s fears that “By signing the conditions, we do not guarantee ourselves from new ultimatums” are partially confirmed: the advance of the German army was not limited to the boundaries of the zone of occupation defined by the peace treaty. German troops captured Simferopol on April 22, 1918, Taganrog on May 1, and Rostov-on-Don on May 8, causing the fall of Soviet power on the Don.
The telegraph operator sends a message from the peace conference in Brest-Litovsk.

In April 1918, diplomatic relations were established between the RSFSR and Germany. On the whole, however, Germany's relations with the Bolsheviks were not ideal from the outset. In the words of Sukhanov N. N., “the German government was quite thoroughly afraid of its“ friends ”and“ agents ”: it knew very well that these people were the same“ friends ”to it, as well as to Russian imperialism, to which the German authorities tried to“ palm off ”them keeping them at a respectful distance from their own loyal subjects." From April 1918, the Soviet ambassador Ioffe A.A. engaged in active revolutionary propaganda already in Germany itself, which ends with the November Revolution. The Germans, for their part, are consistently liquidating Soviet power in the Baltics and Ukraine, providing assistance to the "White Finns" and actively contributing to the formation of a center of the White movement on the Don. In March 1918, the Bolsheviks, fearing a German attack on Petrograd, transferred the capital to Moscow; after the signing of the Brest Peace, they, not trusting the Germans, did not begin to cancel this decision.
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While the German General Staff came to the conclusion that the defeat of the Second Reich was inevitable, Germany managed to impose on the Soviet government, in the context of the growing civil war and the beginning of the intervention of the Entente, additional agreements to the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty. On August 27, 1918, in Berlin, in the strictest secrecy, a Russian-German supplementary treaty to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and a Russian-German financial agreement were signed, which were signed on behalf of the government of the RSFSR by Plenipotentiary A. A. Ioffe, and on behalf of Germany - von P. Ginze and I. Krige. Under this agreement, Soviet Russia was obliged to pay Germany, as compensation for damage and expenses for the maintenance of Russian prisoners of war, a huge indemnity - 6 billion marks - in the form of "pure gold" and credit obligations. In September 1918, two "gold echelons" were sent to Germany, which contained 93.5 tons of "pure gold" worth over 120 million gold rubles. It didn't make it to the next shipment.
Russian delegates buying German newspapers in Brest-Litovsk.

Consequences of the Brest peace: Odessa after the occupation by the Austro-Hungarian troops. Dredging works in Odessa port.

Consequences of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk: Austro-Hungarian soldiers on Nikolaevsky Boulevard. Summer 1918.

Photo taken by a German soldier in Kyiv in 1918

"Trotsky learns to write." German caricature of L.D. Trotsky, who signed the peace treaty in Brest-Litovsk. 1918

Consequences of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk: Austro-Hungarian troops enter the city of Kamenetz-Podolsky after the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

Consequences of the Brest Peace: Germans in Kyiv.

Political cartoon from the American press in 1918.

Consequences of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk: German troops under the command of General Eichhorn occupied Kyiv. March 1918.

Consequences of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk: Austro-Hungarian military musicians perform on the main square of the city of Proskurov in Ukraine.

Brest Peace (Brest peace treaty, Brest-Litovsk peace treaty) is a peace treaty between the participants of the First World War: Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire on the one hand and Soviet Russia on the other, signed on March 3, 1918 in the Brest Fortress. Ratified by the Extraordinary IV All-Russian Congress of Soviets.

The signing of peace at that moment was urgently demanded by the internal and external situation in Soviet Russia. The country was in a state of extreme economic ruin, the old army actually disintegrated, and a new one was not created. But a significant part of the leadership of the Bolshevik Party advocated the continuation of the revolutionary war (a group of "Left Communists" under the leadership. At the peace negotiations, the German delegation, taking advantage of the fact that the offensive of its army was rapidly developing at the front, offered Russia predatory peace conditions, according to which Germany would annex the Baltic states , part of Belarus and Transcaucasia, and also received indemnity.

“To continue this war over how to divide the weak nationalities captured by them between strong and rich nations, the government considers it the greatest crime against humanity and solemnly declares its determination to immediately sign the terms of peace ending this war on the specified nationalities equally fair for all without exception. conditions” - With these words, the Leninist Decree on Peace, adopted on October 26 by the Congress of Soviets, formulated the essence of the Bolshevik foreign policy. Only that peace will be just, which will allow all occupied and oppressed peoples, both in Europe and on other continents, to determine their fate by a free vote, which should take place after the withdrawal of all occupying armies. Having set this bold goal, achievable only after the overthrow of all colonial empires, Lenin cautiously adds that the Soviets are ready to enter into peace negotiations even if their program is not accepted - the Bolshevik government is ready to consider any other conditions for peace. It is determined to conduct all negotiations quite openly before the whole people and declares, unconditionally and immediately, the secret imperialist treaties confirmed or concluded by the former governments of the landowners and capitalists. As Lenin explained to the congress, this message is addressed to the governments, as well as to the peoples of the belligerent countries. Indirectly, it called on the peoples to rise up against existing governments, but directly urged these governments to conclude an immediate truce. This dual appeal was the key dilemma of the foreign policy of the Bolsheviks and the beginnings of the Brest-Litovsk tragedy.

Russia, exhausted by the war, accepted the decree on peace with a sigh of relief. Official and patriotic circles in France and Britain responded with indignant cries. Allied ambassadors and heads of allied military missions in Russia more or less imagined that Russia was incapable of waging war.

Despite the revolutionary calls, the Bolsheviks wanted to establish diplomatic contacts with the allies. Immediately after the defeat of Kerensky's troops, Trotsky proposed to resume normal relations with the British and French. The Bolsheviks, and Trotsky more than others, feared that the Germans, by setting unacceptable peace conditions, might again draw Russia and the Entente into the war. In Russia, Trotsky's proposal was ignored. Allied embassies ignored him.

The Allied ambassadors held a meeting at which they decided to ignore Trotsky's note and recommend that their governments leave it unanswered on the grounds that the Soviet regime was illegal. The governments of the allied countries followed the advice and decided to establish official relations only with the High Command of the Russian army, that is, with General Dukhonin, who was in Mogilev. By this act, they, so to speak, elevated the headquarters of the army to the level of a rival government. In addition, Dukhonin was warned against any negotiations on a ceasefire and hinted in no uncertain terms that if Russia pulled out of the war, they would be retaliated by a Japanese attack on Siberia. Trotsky immediately protested and threatened that he would arrest any Allied diplomat who tried to leave Petrograd to contact anti-Bolshevik circles in the provinces. He appealed to the diplomats of neutral countries with a request to use his influence to conclude peace. On the same day, General Dukhonin, who refused to comply with the order to cease fire, was removed - later, his own soldiers brutally dealt with him, having learned that he did not want to stop the war. Krylenko, a former ensign of the tsarist army and one of the leaders of the military organization of the Bolsheviks, was appointed to the place of the Supreme Commander.

Relations between Russia and Europe immediately hardened, which predetermined the future intervention. It couldn't be otherwise. With the determination of the allied powers to continue the war, their ambassadors could not help but use their influence against the authorities, which threatened to withdraw Russia from the war. This alone inevitably led them to interfere in the internal affairs of Russia. The circumstances from the very beginning pushed the embassies and military missions to get involved in the Civil War.

Trotsky wanted to prevent this and prevent the British, French and Americans from binding themselves with indissoluble obligations. With Lenin's consent, he did his best to impress them: Europe should be interested in Russia not feeling abandoned and forced to sign peace with Germany on any terms.

On November 14, the German High Command agreed to begin negotiations for an armistice. Krylenko ordered a ceasefire and "brotherhood fronts", hoping that through contact with the Russian troops, the German army would be infected with the revolution. On the same day, Trotsky notified the Western powers: “The Supreme Commander of the Armies of the Republic, Ensign Krylenko, proposed postponing the start of armistice negotiations for 5 days until November 18 (December 1), in order to again invite the allied governments to determine their attitude to the matter of peace negotiations ... »

Even as Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Trotsky remained the chief propagandist of the revolution. He staked on the possible or actual antagonism between the authorities and the people and turned to the first so that the second could hear him. But since he did not give up trying to reach an understanding with existing governments, he combined his revolutionary appeals with an extremely flexible and subtle diplomatic game.

On November 19, a meeting of peace delegations took place, and the Germans immediately proposed to conclude a preliminary truce for a month. The Soviet delegation refused and instead asked for an extension of the ceasefire for a week to give the other Western powers time to reflect on the situation. Trotsky again turned to the Allied embassies, and again he was met with icy silence. However, he instructed the Soviet negotiators not to sign a truce until the Central Powers pledged not to transfer troops from the Russian front to the Western and—a rather unusual condition—until they allowed the Soviets to carry out revolutionary agitation among the German and Austrian troops. The German General Hoffmann, commander of the Russian front, rejected both demands. For a moment it seemed that the negotiations were broken and Russia was returning to the war.

Until now, all the important questions arising from the truce have remained open. The Bolsheviks and the Left SRs decided in favor of separate peace negotiations, but not a separate peace. And even those who, like Lenin, were already inclined towards a separate peace, were not yet ready to achieve it at any cost. The main goal of the Soviet government was to buy time, to loudly declare their peaceful aspirations amid a sudden lull on the fronts, to determine the degree of revolutionary ferment in Europe and to probe the positions of allied and enemy governments.

The Bolsheviks had no doubts about the imminence of a social upsurge in Europe. But they began to wonder whether the road to peace goes through the revolution or, conversely, the road to revolution goes through the world. In the first case, the revolution will put an end to the war. In the second Russian revolution, for the time being, we will have to negotiate with the capitalist authorities. Only time could show in which direction events were moving and to what extent the revolutionary impulse from Russia determined or did not determine their direction. There is no doubt that the proletariat of Germany and Austria is restless, but what does this indicate - about the imminent collapse of the enemy or about a crisis in the distant future? The peaceful delegations of the Central Powers showed a strange willingness to make concessions. On the other hand, the hostility of the Entente seemed to weaken for a moment. The allied countries still refused to recognize the Soviets, but in early December they agreed to exchange diplomatic privileges, which are usually granted to recognized governments. Soviet diplomatic couriers were allowed to travel between Russia and Western Europe, the countries mutually recognized diplomatic passports, Chicherin was finally released from prison and returned to Russia, and Trotsky exchanged diplomatic visits with some Western ambassadors.

But at the same time, the Bolsheviks feared that the Entente would conclude a separate peace with Germany and Austria and, together with them, strike a blow at the Russian revolution. Most often, this fear was voiced by Lenin, both in public speeches and in private conversations. When the inside story of the war was revealed, it showed that his fears were well founded. Austria and Germany repeatedly and secretly, together and separately, probed their Western enemies for peace. Fear of revolution was growing in the ruling circles of France and Great Britain, and the possibility of reconciliation between the Entente and the Central Powers, a reconciliation prompted by fear, could not be ruled out. This was not a real, but only a potential threat, but it was enough to convince Lenin that only a separate peace in the East could prevent a separate peace in the West.

The peace conference in Brest-Litovsk began on 9 December. Representatives of the Central Powers let it be known that they "agreed to immediately conclude a common peace without forcible annexations and indemnities." Ioffe, who led the Soviet delegation, proposed "to take a ten-day break so that the peoples whose governments have not yet joined the current negotiations on universal peace" have the opportunity to change their minds. During the adjournment, only the peace conference commissions were in session, and their work proceeded strangely smoothly. The actual negotiations did not begin until December 27, before Trotsky's arrival.

Meanwhile, the Council of People's Commissars took a number of demonstrative steps. He activated propaganda against German imperialism, and Trotsky, with the help of Karl Radek, who had just arrived in Russia, edited the leaflet "Die Fackel" ("Torch"), which was distributed in the German trenches. On December 13, the government allocated 2 million rubles for revolutionary propaganda abroad and published a report on this in the press. On the 19th, the demobilization of the Russian army began. In addition, German and Austrian prisoners of war were released from compulsory work, they were allowed to leave the camps and work at large. The Soviet government canceled the Russian-British treaty of 1907, according to which the two powers divided Persia among themselves, and on December 23 ordered Russian troops to leave Northern Persia. Finally, Trotsky instructed Joffe to demand that the peace negotiations be moved from Brest-Litovsk to Stockholm or any other city in a neutral country.

Exactly two months after the uprising, on December 24 or 25, Trotsky went to Brest-Litovsk. On the way, especially in the front area, he was greeted by delegations from local Soviets and trade unions, who asked him to speed up the negotiations and return with a peace treaty. He saw with amazement that the trenches on the Russian side were practically empty: the soldiers simply dispersed. Trotsky realized that he was going to face the enemy with no military force behind him.

The meeting took place in a deserted and gloomy setting. The city of Brest-Litovsk was burned down and razed to the ground by the retreating Russian troops at the beginning of the war. Only the old military fortress remained intact, and the general headquarters of the eastern German armies were located in it. Peaceful delegations settled in gray houses and huts inside the fenced area of ​​the temporary camp. The Germans insisted that negotiations be conducted there, partly for reasons of their own convenience, partly to humiliate the Soviet envoys. They behaved with diplomatic courtesy. Ioffe, Kamenev, Pokrovsky and Karakhan, intellectuals and hardened revolutionaries, behaved at the negotiating table with the clumsiness that is natural for newcomers to diplomacy.

When Trotsky arrived, he was not satisfied with this state of affairs. At Lenin's urging, he went to the conference to give it a completely different look. The first meeting he attended as head of the Soviet delegation took place on 27 December. Opening it, Kühlmann stated that the Central Powers agreed to the principle of "peace without annexations and indemnities" only in the event of a general peace. Since the Western Powers have refused to negotiate and only a separate peace is on the agenda, Germany and her allies no longer consider themselves bound by this principle. He refused, as the Soviets demanded, to transfer the talks to a neutral country and lashed out at Soviet agitation against German imperialism, which, he said, cast doubt on the sincerity of the Soviets' peaceful disposition. His colleagues turned the Ukrainians against the Soviet delegation, who declared that they represented an independent Ukraine and denied Petrograd the right to speak on behalf of Ukraine and Belarus.

Trotsky got involved in this tangle of interests, characters and ambitions when, on December 28, he spoke for the first time at the conference. He simply dismissed the Ukrainian machinations. The Soviets, he announced, had no objection to Ukraine's participation in the talks because they had proclaimed the right of nations to self-determination and intended to respect it. Nor does he question the credentials of the Ukrainian delegates representing the Rada, a provincial copy or even parody of the Kerensky government. Kuhlmann again tried to provoke an open quarrel between Russians and Ukrainians, which would allow him to benefit from the struggle of the two opponents, but Trotsky again avoided the trap. Remembering the accusations and protests of the previous day, he refused to apologize for the revolutionary propaganda that the Soviets were carrying out among the German troops. He came to negotiate peace terms, Trotsky said, not to restrict his government's freedom of expression. The Soviets do not object to the fact that the Germans are conducting counter-revolutionary agitation among Russian citizens. The revolution is so sure of its rightness and the attractiveness of its ideals that it is ready to welcome an open discussion. Thus, the Germans have no reason to doubt the peaceful mood of Russia. It is the sincerity of Germany that causes doubts, especially when the German delegation announced that it no longer binds itself to the principle of peace without annexations and indemnities.

Two days later, the delegations discussed the preliminary peace treaty presented by the Germans. The treaty's preamble contained the polite cliché that the signatories expressed their intention to live in peace and friendship. This was followed by a dramatic dispute over the principles of self-determination and the fate of the nations located between Russia and Germany. The dispute was mainly between Trotsky and Kuhlmann, occupied more than one meeting and took the form of a conflict between two interpretations of the term "self-determination". Both sides argued in the tone of supposedly dispassionate, academic debates on legal, historical, and sociological topics; but behind them gloomily stood the realities of war and revolution, of conquest and forcible annexation.

In almost every paragraph of the preliminary agreement, some noble principle was first affirmed, and then it was refuted. One of the first reservations provided for the liberation of the occupied territories. This did not prevent Kuhlmann from declaring that Germany intended to occupy the occupied Russian territories until the conclusion of a general peace and for an indefinite period after it. In addition, Kühlmann argued that Poland and other German-occupied countries had already exercised their right to self-determination, as German troops had restored local authority everywhere.

Each stage of the competition became known to the whole world, sometimes in a distorted form. The occupied nations, whose future was at stake, listened with bated breath.

On January 5, Trotsky asked for a break in the conference so that he could acquaint the government with the German demands. The conference had been going on for almost a month. The Soviets had won a lot of time, and now the party and the government had to make a decision. On the way back to Petrograd, Trotsky again saw the Russian trenches, the very abandonment of which seemed to cry out for peace. But now he understood better than ever that peace could be achieved only at the cost of complete submission and disgrace to Russia and the revolution. Reading the newspapers of German and Austrian socialists in Brest, he was shocked by the fact that some of them considered the peace conference a staged spectacle, the outcome of which was clear in advance. Some of the German socialists believed that in fact the Bolsheviks were agents of the Kaiser. One of the main motives driving Trotsky's actions at the negotiating table was the desire to wash away the stigma from the party, and now it seemed that his efforts had borne some fruit. Finally, demonstrations and strikes in support of peace began in enemy countries, and loud protests were heard from Berlin and Vienna against Hoffmann's desire to dictate terms to Russia. Trotsky came to the conclusion that the Soviet government should not accept these conditions. We must play for time and try to establish between Russia and the Central Powers a state that will be neither war nor peace. In this conviction, he appeared at Smolny, where they were waiting for him excitedly and impatiently.

Trotsky's return coincided with a conflict between the Soviet government and the finally convened Constituent Assembly. Against the expectations of the Bolsheviks and sympathizers, the Right SRs received the majority of votes. The Bolsheviks and the Left SRs decided to dissolve the assembly and carried out the intention after it refused to ratify Lenin's decrees on peace, land and the transfer of all power to the Soviets.

On January 8, two days after the dissolution of the assembly, the Central Committee was completely immersed in the debate about war and peace. In order to sound the mood of the party, it was decided to conduct them in the presence of Bolshevik delegates who had arrived at the Third Congress of Soviets from the provinces. Trotsky reported on the Brest-Litovsk mission and presented his formula: "no peace, no war." Lenin urged to accept the conditions of the Germans. Bukharin advocated a "revolutionary war" against the Hohenzollerns and Habsburgs. The vote brought a striking success to the supporters of the revolutionary war - the left communists, as they were called. Lenin's proposal for an immediate peace was supported by only fifteen people. Trotsky's resolution received sixteen votes. Thirty-two votes were cast for the Bukharin call for war. However, since outsiders took part in the voting, it was not binding on the Central Committee.

Soon the entire Bolshevik party was divided into those who advocated peace and those who supported the war. Behind the latter stood a significant but heterogeneous majority, with the powerful support of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, who, as one, were against peace. But the faction of supporters of the war was not sure that they were right. She opposed peace rather than defended the resumption of hostilities.

On January 11, at the next meeting of the Central Committee, the military faction furiously attacked Lenin. Dzerzhinsky reproached him for cowardly abandoning the program of the revolution, just as Zinoviev and Kamenev had abandoned it in October. To agree to the Kaiser's dictate, Bukharin argued, means to stick a knife in the back of the German and Austrian proletariat - a general strike against the war was just going on in Vienna. According to Uritsky, Lenin approached the problem from a narrowly Russian rather than an international point of view, and he made the same mistake in the past. On behalf of the Petrograd party organization, Kosior rejected Lenin's position. The most resolute defenders of peace were Zinoviev, Stalin and Sokolnikov. As in October, so now Zinoviev saw no reason to wait for a revolution in the West. He argued that Trotsky was wasting time in Brest and warned the Central Committee that later Germany would dictate even more painful conditions.

Lenin was skeptical of the Austrian strike, to which Trotsky and the supporters of the war attached such importance. He painted a picturesque picture of Russia's military impotence. He admitted that the world he defends is an "obscene" world, implying a betrayal of Poland. But he was convinced that if his government renounced peace and tried to fight, it would be destroyed and another government would have to accept even worse terms. He did not neglect the revolutionary potential of the West, but believed that the world would accelerate its development.

So far, Trotsky has tried his best to convince the communist left of the impracticability of a revolutionary war. At the suggestion of Lenin, the Central Committee authorized Trotsky to delay the signing of the peace by all means, only Zinoviev voted against. Then Trotsky proposed the following resolution: "We are ending the war, we are not concluding peace, we are demobilizing the army." Nine members of the Central Committee voted in favor, seven against. So the party formally allowed Trotsky to stick to his former course in Brest.

In addition, during the same break, Trotsky delivered a report at the Third Congress of Soviets. The overwhelming majority of the congress was so categorically in favor of the war that Lenin kept a low profile. Even Trotsky spoke more emphatically of his objections to peace than to war. The congress unanimously approved Trotsky's report, but made no decision and left it to the discretion of the government.

Before Trotsky set out on his return trip, he and Lenin entered into a personal agreement that introduced one significant change in the decisions of the Central Committee and the government. The reason for the unauthorized departure of Trotsky and Lenin from the official decision of the Central Committee and the government was the uncertainty of the decision itself: having voted for the formula "no peace, no war", the Bolsheviks did not foresee the probability that haunted Lenin. But the personal agreement of the two leaders, as it turned out later, allowed for a double interpretation. Lenin was under the impression that Trotsky promised to sign a peace at the first threat of an ultimatum or a resumption of the German offensive, Trotsky believed that he undertook to accept the terms of the peace only if the Germans actually launched a new offensive, and that even in this case he undertook to accept only those conditions which the Central Powers have hitherto proposed, and not the more severe ones which they will dictate later.

By mid-January, Trotsky was back at the negotiating table in Brest. In the meantime, strikes and peaceful demonstrations in Austria and Germany were either crushed or deadlocked, and the opponents greeted the head of the Soviet delegation with new self-confidence. At this stage of the discussion, Ukraine and Poland came to the fore. Kuhlman and Chernin were secretly preparing a separate peace with the Ukrainian Rada. At the same time, the Bolsheviks were hard at work promoting the Soviet revolution in Ukraine: the orders of the Rada were still valid in Kyiv, but Kharkov was already under Soviet rule, and a Kharkov representative accompanied Trotsky on his return to Brest. Ukrainian parties strangely changed places. Those who, under the tsar and Kerensky, stood for an alliance or federation with Russia, tended to separate from their big brother. The Bolsheviks, who had previously favored secession, now called for a federation. The separatists turned into federalists and vice versa, but not for reasons of Ukrainian or Russian patriotism, but because they wanted to secede from the established state system in Russia or, on the contrary, to unite with it. The Central Powers hoped to capitalize on this metamorphosis. Disguising themselves as supporters of Ukrainian separatism, they hoped to seize Ukraine's desperately needed food and raw materials and turn the dispute over self-determination against Russia. The weak, insecure Rada, on the verge of falling, tried to lean on the Central Powers, despite the oath of allegiance given to the Entente.

Even now Trotsky did not object to the participation of the Rada in the negotiations, but officially notified the partners that Russia did not recognize separate agreements between the Rada and the Central Powers. Trotsky, of course, understood that his opponents managed to confuse the issue of self-determination to a certain extent. It is unlikely that Trotsky would have been especially tormented by the remorse of Soviet power imposed on Ukraine: you cannot strengthen the revolution in Russia without spreading it to Ukraine, which has cut like a deep wedge between North and South Russia. But here, for the first time, the interests of the revolution clashed with the principle of self-determination, and Trotsky could no longer invoke it with the same clear conscience as before.

He again took an offensive stance on the question of Poland and asked why Poland was not represented in Brest. Kuhlmann pretended that the participation of the Polish delegation depended on Russia, which must first recognize the then Polish government. Recognition of Poland's right to independence does not imply recognition that it enjoys de facto independence under German-Austrian tutelage.

On January 21, in the midst of the discussion, Trotsky received news from Lenin about the fall of the Rada and the proclamation of Soviet power throughout Ukraine. He contacted Kyiv himself, checked the facts, and notified the Central Powers that he no longer recognized the right of the Rada to represent Ukraine at the conference.

These were his last days in Brest-Litovsk. Mutual accusations and reproaches reached such a pitch that the negotiations reached an impasse and could not drag on any longer.

On the last day before the break, the Central Powers confronted Russia with a fait accompli: they signed a separate peace with the Rada. The separate peace with Ukraine served as a pretext for the Central Powers to take Ukraine under their control, and therefore the powers of the Ukrainian partners did not matter in their eyes. It was precisely for this reason that Trotsky could not continue the negotiations, for to do so would be to promote a coup d'état and all its consequences: the overthrow of the Ukrainian Soviets and the separation of Ukraine from Russia.

The next day there was a famous scene at the meeting of the subcommittee, when General Hoffmann unfolded a large map with marked on it the lands that Germany was going to annex. Since Trotsky said that he was "ready to bow before force" but would not help the Germans save face, the general apparently thought that by laying out the German claims directly, he could shorten the road to peace. On the same day, January 28 (February 10), a second meeting of the political commission took place, Trotsky got up and made the last statement:

“We are leaving the war. We inform all peoples and their governments about this. We give the order for the complete demobilization of our armies ... At the same time, we declare that the conditions offered to us by the governments of Germany and Austria-Hungary are fundamentally contrary to the interests of all peoples. These conditions are rejected by the working masses of all countries, including the peoples of Austria-Hungary and Germany. The peoples of Poland, the Ukraine, Lithuania, Courland and Estonia consider these conditions to be violence against their will; for the Russian people, these conditions mean a constant threat ... ".

Before the delegations left, however, something happened that Trotsky had overlooked—something that confirmed Lenin's worst fears. Kuhlman said that in view of what had happened, hostilities would be resumed, because "the fact that one of the parties demobilizes its armies does not change anything, either in fact or in law" - only its refusal to sign peace matters. Kühlmann himself gave Trotsky some reason to ignore the threat when he asked if the Soviet government was even prepared to establish legal and commercial relations with the Central Powers and how they could communicate with Russia. Instead of answering the question, as his own conviction suggested, what could oblige the Central Powers to adhere to the "no peace, no war" formula, Trotsky arrogantly refused to discuss it.

He stayed in Brest for another day. He became aware of a quarrel between Hoffmann, who insisted on the resumption of hostilities, and civilian diplomats, who preferred to agree to a state between war and peace. It seemed that on the spot the diplomats got the better of the military. Therefore, Trotsky returned to Petrograd confident and proud of his success. He gave humanity the first unforgettable lesson in truly open diplomacy. But at the same time he allowed himself to be optimistic. He underestimated the enemy and even refused to heed his warnings. Trotsky had not yet reached Petrograd when General Hoffmann, with the consent of Ludendorff, Hindenburg and the Kaiser, was already ordering the German troops to march.

The offensive began on February 17 and was not met with any resistance. When the news of the offensive reached Smolny, the Central Committee of the party voted eight times, but never came to an unequivocal decision about how to get out of the situation. The committee was equally divided between the supporters of peace and the adherents of war. Trotsky's single voice could break the deadlock. Indeed, in the next two days, February 17 and 18, only he alone could make a fateful decision. But he did not join any of the factions.

He was in a very difficult position. Judging by his speeches and actions, many identified him with the military faction, and indeed he was politically and morally closer to it than to the Leninist faction. But after all, he gave Lenin a personal promise that he would support peace if the Germans resume hostilities. He still refused to believe that this moment had come. On February 17, he, along with the supporters of the war, voted against Lenin's proposal to immediately request new peace negotiations. Then he voted with the peaceful faction against the revolutionary war. Finally, he came up with his own proposal, advising the government to wait with new negotiations until the military-political results of the German offensive were clarified. Since the military faction supported him, the proposal passed by a margin of one vote, his own. Then Lenin raised the question of concluding peace if it turned out that the German offensive was a fact and if no revolutionary opposition came out against it in Germany and Austria. The Central Committee answered the question in the affirmative.

Early the next morning, Trotsky opened the meeting of the Central Committee with a review of recent events. has just informed the world that Germany is protecting all peoples, including her opponents in the East, from the Bolshevik contagion. It was reported about the appearance in Russia of German divisions from the Western Front. German planes were operating over Dvinsk. An attack on Reval was expected. Everything pointed to a full-scale offensive, but the facts have not yet been reliably confirmed. Lenin insistently suggested that we immediately turn to Germany. We must act, he said, there is no time to waste. Either war, revolutionary war, or peace. Trotsky, hoping that the offensive would cause a serious public outburst in Germany, continued to argue that it was too early to ask for peace. Lenin's proposal was again rejected by a one-vote margin.

But on the same day, February 18, before evening came a dramatic change. Opening the evening meeting of the Central Committee, Trotsky announced that the Germans had already captured Dvinsk. Rumors spread widely about a pending offensive into Ukraine. Still hesitating, Trotsky proposed to "probe" the Central Powers for their demands, but not yet ask for peace talks.

Three times Trotsky opposed asking the Germans for peace talks, and three times offered only a preliminary test of the waters. But when Lenin again put his plan to the vote, Trotsky, to everyone's surprise, voted not for his own proposal, but for Lenin's. The peaceful faction won by one vote. The new majority asked Lenin and Trotsky to draft an appeal to the governments of enemy countries. Later that night, a meeting of the central committees of the two ruling parties, the Bolsheviks and the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, took place, and during this meeting the military faction again gained the upper hand. But in the government, the Bolsheviks managed to defeat their partners, and the next day, February 19, the government officially turned to the enemy with a request for peace.

In anxious expectation and fear, four days passed before an answer came to Petrograd from the Germans. In the meantime, no one could say on what terms the Central Powers would agree to reopen negotiations, or if they would agree at all. Their armies were advancing. Petrograd was open to attack. A committee of revolutionary defense was formed in the city, and Trotsky headed it. Even while seeking peace, the Soviets had to prepare for war. Trotsky asked the Allied embassies and military missions whether the Western powers would help the Soviets if Russia entered the war again. However, this time the British and French were more responsive. Three days after the request for peace was sent, Trotsky informed the Central Committee (in Lenin's absence) that the British and French had offered military cooperation. To his bitter disappointment, the Central Committee flatly rejected him and thereby rejected his actions. Both factions turned against him: the defenders of peace because they feared that accepting help from the Allies would reduce the chances of a separate peace, and the advocates of war because considerations of revolutionary morality, which prevented them from entering into an agreement with Germany, prevented them from agreeing to cooperate with " Anglo-French imperialists. Then Trotsky announced that he was leaving the post of Commissar for Foreign Affairs. He cannot remain in office if the party does not understand that the socialist government has the right to accept aid from the capitalist countries, provided that it retains complete independence. In the end, he convinced the Central Committee, and Lenin firmly supported him.

Finally, a response arrived from the Germans, shocking everyone. Germany gave the Soviets forty-eight hours to think about a response and only three days to negotiate. The conditions were much worse than those offered in Brest: Russia must carry out a complete demobilization, abandon Latvia and Estonia and withdraw from Ukraine and Finland. When the Central Committee met on February 23, it had less than a day to make a decision. The outcome again depended on Trotsky's single vote. He yielded to Lenin and agreed to ask for peace, but nothing obliged him to accept new, much more difficult conditions. He did not agree with Lenin that the Soviet Republic was completely incapable of defending itself. On the contrary, he leaned more towards the military faction than before. And yet, despite his fears about peace, despite his confidence in the ability of the Soviets to defend themselves, he again ensured with his voice the victory of the peaceful faction.

His strange behavior cannot be explained without a closer look at the arguments and motives of the factions and the balance of power between them. Lenin sought to obtain a "breathing space" for the Soviet Republic, which would make it possible to restore relative order in the country and create a new army. For a respite, he was ready to pay any price - to leave Ukraine and the Baltic countries, to pay any indemnity. He did not consider this "shameful" world to be final. Lenin hoped that during the respite in Germany, a revolution could mature and reverse the Kaiser's conquests.

To this, the military faction objected that the Central Powers would not allow Lenin to use the respite: they would cut Russia off from Ukrainian grain and coal and Caucasian oil, subdue half of the Russian population, finance and support the counter-revolutionary movement, and stifle the revolution. In addition, the Soviets are unable to form a new army during a short respite. Armed forces will have to be created in the process of struggle, because this is the only possible way. It is true that the Soviets may be forced to evacuate Petrograd and even Moscow, but they will have enough room to retreat where they can muster their strength. Even if it turns out that the people do not want to fight for the revolution, as well as for the old regime - the leaders of the military faction did not at all consider that this would necessarily happen - then every advance of the Germans, accompanied by horrors and robberies, will shake off fatigue and apathy from the people, will force resist him and, finally, arouse truly popular enthusiasm and raise him to a revolutionary war. On the wave of this enthusiasm, a new, formidable army will rise. The revolution, untainted by miserable capitulation, will be revived, it will stir the soul of the foreign proletariat and dispel the nightmare of imperialism.

Each faction was convinced of the disastrous course proposed by the other side, and the discussion took place in an electrified, emotional atmosphere. Apparently, Trotsky alone argued that from a realistic point of view, both lines have their pros and cons, and both are admissible, based on principles and revolutionary morality.

It has long been a hackneyed thought among historians - to which Trotsky himself later had a hand - that the Leninist course had all the virtues of realism, and that the military faction embodied the most quixotic aspect of Bolshevism. Such a view is unfair to the leaders of the supporters of the war. Indeed, Lenin's political originality and courage elevated him in those days to the height of genius, and subsequent events - the fall of the Hohenzollerns and Habsburgs and the abolition of the Brest Treaty before the expiration of the year - confirmed his correctness. It is also true that the military faction often acted under the influence of conflicting feelings and did not propose a coherent course of action. But in their best moments, its leaders proved their case convincingly and realistically, and for the most part their arguments were also justified in practice. The respite that Lenin received was, in fact, half illusory. After the peace was signed, the Kaiser government did everything in its power to crush the Soviets. However, he was placed by the struggle on the Western Front, which took away huge forces. Without a separate peace in the West, Germany would not have been able to achieve more, even if the Soviets had not accepted the Brest-Litovsk Diktat.

The other argument of the military faction, that the Soviets would have to create a new army on the battlefield, in battles, and not in the barracks during a quiet respite, paradoxically, was very realistic. This is how the Red Army was ultimately created. Precisely because Russia is so exhausted by the war, she could not raise a new army in relatively calm times. Only a severe shock and an inevitable danger, forcing to fight, and to fight immediately, could awaken the energy hidden in the Soviet system and force it to act.

The weakness of the military faction was not so much in its wrongness, but in its lack of leadership. Bukharin, Dzerzhinsky, Radek, Ioffe, Uritsky, Kollontai, Lomov-Oppokov, Bubnov, Pyatakov, Smirnov and Ryazanov, all prominent members of the party, were the main spokesmen for its opinion. Some were distinguished by great intelligence and were brilliant orators and publicists, others were brave men, people of action. The position of the leader of the military faction was empty, and she threw inviting glances at Trotsky. At first glance, there was little to prevent Trotsky from meeting their expectations. Although he said that the Leninist strategy, like the opposite, had its merits, he did not hide his internal rejection of this strategy. It is all the more striking that at the most critical moments he supported Lenin with all his authority.

He was in no hurry to become the leader of the military faction, as he understood that this would immediately turn the differences into an irreparable split in the Bolshevik party and, possibly, into a bloody conflict. He and Lenin would have ended up on opposite sides of the barricades; as leaders of warring factions, divided not by the usual differences, but by matters of life and death. Lenin had already warned the Central Committee that if he again did not receive a majority of votes on the question of peace, he would leave the committee and the government and turn against them to the rank and file members of the party. In this case, Trotsky remained the only successor to Lenin as head of government. It was precisely in order to prevent the party from sliding into a civil war in its own ranks that Trotsky voted for Lenin at the decisive moment.

The peaceful faction won, but its conscience was troubled. Immediately after the Central Committee decided on February 23 to accept the terms of the Germans, it unanimously voted to begin immediate preparations for a new war. When it came to appointing a delegation to Brest-Litovsk, a tragicomic episode occurred: all members of the committee shied away from dubious honor; no one, even the most ardent supporter of peace, wanted to put his signature on the treaty. Trotsky asked the Central Committee to consider his resignation from the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, which was actually under the control of Chicherin. The Central Committee asked Trotsky to remain in office until peace was signed. He only agreed not to publicly announce his resignation and said that he would not appear in any government office again. At Lenin's insistence, the Central Committee obliged him to attend at least those government meetings where foreign affairs were not discussed.

After recent tensions, victories and failures, Trotsky was on the verge of a nervous breakdown. It seemed that his efforts in Brest had gone to waste. He was reproached, not without reason, for giving the party a false sense of security, as he repeatedly assured them that the Germans would not dare to attack.

On March 3, Sokolnikov signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, making it more than clear that the Soviets were acting under pressure. In less than two weeks, the Germans captured Kyiv and a significant territory of Ukraine, the Austrians entered Odessa, and the Turks entered Trebizond. In Ukraine, the occupying authorities liquidated the Soviets and restored the Rada, though only in order to disperse the Rada a little later and put Hetman Skoropadsky at the head of the puppet administration in its place. The temporary victors flooded the Leninist government with demands and ultimatums, one more humiliating than the other. The most bitter was the ultimatum, according to which the Soviet Republic was to immediately sign a peace treaty with "independent" Ukraine. The Ukrainian people, especially the peasants, offered desperate resistance to the invaders and their local tools. By signing a separate treaty with Ukraine, the Soviets would unequivocally renounce all Ukrainian resistance. At a meeting of the Central Committee, Trotsky demanded that the German ultimatum be rejected. Lenin, not for a moment forgetting about future revenge, was determined to drink the cup of humiliation to the end. But after each German provocation, both in the party and in the Soviets, opposition to peace grew stronger. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk had not yet been ratified, and ratification was in doubt.

On March 6, an emergency congress of the party was held in the Tauride Palace, which was supposed to decide whether to recommend ratification to the future Congress of Soviets. The meetings were held in strict secrecy, and the minutes were not published until 1925. An atmosphere of deep despondency reigned at the congress. The provincial delegates discovered that in the face of the threat of a German offensive, the evacuation of government offices from Petrograd was being prepared, although even the Kerensky government refused to take this step. The commissars were already "sitting on their suitcases" - only Trotsky was to remain in place to organize the defense. Until recently, the desire for peace was so strong that it overthrew the February regime and brought the Bolsheviks to power. But now that peace has come, reproaches fall primarily on the party that achieved it.

At the congress, the main controversy inevitably flared up around Trotsky's activities. In his sharpest speech, Lenin urged the ratification of peace.

At the party congress, Lenin made the cryptic remark that the situation was changing so rapidly that in two days he himself might oppose ratification. Therefore, Trotsky tried to get the congress to formulate a resolution that was not too harsh. However, in the depths of his soul, Lenin did not expect an encouraging response from the Entente, and again he was right.

At that time, the appointment of Trotsky as Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs was just being discussed or decided in the inner-party soviets. On behalf of the Leninist faction, Zinoviev assured Trotsky that Trotsky's tactics "were by and large the correct tactics, which were aimed at rousing the masses in the West." But Trotsky must understand that the party has changed its position, that it is pointless to argue about the wording "neither peace nor war." When it came to electing the Central Committee, he and Lenin received the most votes. While condemning his line, the party nevertheless placed full confidence in him.

Four hectic months have passed since the Soviets ratified peace. The Council of People's Commissars moved from Petrograd to Moscow and settled in the Kremlin. Allied diplomatic missions also left Petrograd, but in protest against a separate peace they left for provincial Vologda. Trotsky became People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs and began to "arm the revolution." The Japanese invaded Siberia and occupied Vladivostok. German troops crushed the Finnish revolution and forced the Russian fleet to withdraw from the Gulf of Finland. In addition, they occupied the whole of Ukraine, Crimea and the coasts of the Azov and Black Seas. The British and French landed at Murmansk. The Czech Legion rebelled against the Soviets. Encouraged by the foreign interventionists, the Russian counter-revolutionary forces resumed the deadly war against the Bolsheviks, subordinating principles and conscience to it. Many of those who only recently called the Bolsheviks German agents, first of all Milyukov and his comrades, accepted help from Germany to fight the Bolsheviks. Famine began in Moscow and the cities of Northern Russia, cut off from the granaries. Lenin announced the complete nationalization of industry and called on committees of the peasant poor to requisition food from wealthy peasants in order to feed the urban workers. Several real rebellions and several imaginary conspiracies were put down.

Never before has the conclusion of peace brought so much suffering and humiliation as the Brest “peace” brought to Russia. But Lenin, throughout all these troubles and disappointments, cherished his offspring - the revolution. He did not want to denounce the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, although he violated its terms more than once. He did not stop calling the German and Austrian workers to revolt. Despite the stipulated disarmament of Russia, he gave sanction to the creation of the Red Army. But under no circumstances did Lenin allow his supporters to take up arms against Germany. He summoned to Moscow the Bolsheviks, who led the Ukrainian Soviets, who wanted to strike at the occupying authorities from the underground. Throughout Ukraine, the German war machine crushed the partisans. The Red Guard watched their agony from behind the Russian border and languished with the desire to rush to help, but Lenin curbed it with a firm hand.

Trotsky had long ceased to resist the conclusion of peace. He agreed with the party's final decision and its consequences. Solidarity with the people's commissars and party discipline in equal measure obliged him to adhere to the Leninist course. Trotsky faithfully followed this course, although he had to pay for his loyalty with internal struggle and hours of bitter torment. Supporters of the revolutionary war among the Bolsheviks, deprived of a leader, confused, fell silent. All the louder and more impatiently did the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries speak out against peace. In March, immediately after the treaty was ratified, they withdrew from the Council of People's Commissars. They continued to participate in almost all government departments, including the Cheka, as well as in the executive bodies of the Soviets. But, embittered by everything that was happening, they could not be in opposition to the government and at the same time be responsible for its actions.

Such was the situation when, at the beginning of July 1918, the Fifth Congress of Soviets met in Moscow. The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries decided to go through with the matter and disengage from the Bolsheviks. Again there were angry protests against peace. The Ukrainian delegates went up to the podium to talk about the desperate struggle of the partisans and beg for help. The leaders of the Left Social Revolutionaries Kamkov and Spiridonova condemned the "Bolshevik treason" and demanded a war of liberation.

Trotsky on July 4 asked the congress to sanction an emergency order issued by him in his capacity as commissar for military and naval affairs. Severe discipline was introduced into the Russian partisan detachments by order, as they threatened to disrupt the peace with unauthorized skirmishes with German troops. Trotsky said that no one has the right to appropriate the functions of the government and independently decide on the start of hostilities.

On July 6, noisy debates were interrupted by the assassination of the German ambassador, Count Mirbach. The murderers Blyumkin and Andreev, two Left SRs, senior officials of the Cheka, acted on the orders of Spiridonova, hoping to provoke a war between Germany and Russia. Immediately after this, the Left SRs rose in revolt against the Bolsheviks. They managed to arrest Dzerzhinsky and other chiefs of the Cheka, who headed for the headquarters of the rebels without protection. The Social Revolutionaries occupied the post office and the telegraph office and announced the overthrow of the Leninist government. But they did not have a leader and a plan of action, and after two days of skirmishes and skirmishes, they surrendered.

On July 9, the Congress of Soviets met again, and Trotsky reported on the suppression of the uprising. He said the rebels had taken the government by surprise. It sent several reliable detachments from the capital to fight against the Czechoslovak Legion. The government entrusted its security to the same Red Guard, which consisted of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, who staged the uprising. The only thing that Trotsky could put up against the rebels was a regiment of Latvian riflemen under the command of Vatsetis, a former colonel of the General Staff and in the near future commander in chief of the Red Army, and a revolutionary detachment of Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war under the command of Bela Kun, the future founder of the Hungarian Communist Party. But the uprising had an almost farcical character, if not from a political, then from a military point of view. The rebels were a band of bold but unorganized guerrillas. They were unable to coordinate their attack and eventually surrendered not even to force, but to the persuasion of the Bolsheviks. Trotsky, who was just establishing discipline in the ranks of the Red Guards and partisans and reforming their detachments into a centralized Red Army, took advantage of the uprising as an objective lesson that clearly showed the correctness of his military line. The leaders of the uprising were arrested, but amnestied after a few months. Only a few of them, those who abused their high position in the Cheka, were executed.

Thus, while Trotsky fought back the stubborn echo of his own passionate protest against peace, the fateful Brest-Litovsk crisis ended.

In the west, a territory of 1 million square meters was torn away from Russia. km, in the Caucasus, Kars, Ardagan, Batum retreated to Turkey. Russia pledged to demobilize the army and navy. According to an additional Russian-German financial agreement signed in Berlin, she was obliged to pay Germany an indemnity of 6 billion marks. The treaty was ratified on March 15, 1918 by the Extraordinary Fourth All-Russian Congress of Soviets.

On the Soviet side, the agreement was signed by the deputy. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, People's Commissar for Internal Affairs and secretary of the delegation. The Brest Treaty remained in force for 3 months. After the revolution in Germany 1918–1919, the Soviet government on November 13, 1918 unilaterally annulled it.

According to the frankly predatory terms of the treaty, Poland, the Baltic States, part of Belarus, Ardagan, Kars and Batum in Transcaucasia departed from Soviet Russia. Ukraine (actually occupied by the Germans by agreement with the Central Rada) and Finland were recognized as independent. The total losses amounted to 780 thousand square meters. km, 56 million people, up to 40% of the country's industrial proletariat, 70% iron, 90% coal. Russia pledged to demobilize the army and navy and pay a huge indemnity of 6 billion gold marks.

The Russian government pledged to completely demobilize the army, withdraw its troops from Ukraine, the Baltic states and Finland, and conclude peace with the Ukrainian People's Republic.

The Russian fleet was being withdrawn from its bases in Finland and Estonia.

Russia paid 3 billion rubles in reparations

The Soviet government pledged to stop revolutionary propaganda in the Central European countries.

The November Revolution in Germany swept away the Kaiser's empire. This allowed Soviet Russia to unilaterally annul the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on November 13, 1918 and return most of the territories. German troops left the territory of Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Belarus.

Effects

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, as a result of which huge territories were torn away from Russia, which consolidated the loss of a significant part of the country's agricultural and industrial base, aroused opposition to the Bolsheviks from almost all political forces, both from the right and from the left. The treaty almost immediately became known as the "obscene peace". Patriotically minded citizens considered him a consequence of previous agreements between the Germans and Lenin, who back in 1917 was called a German spy. The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, who were in alliance with the Bolsheviks and were part of the “Red” government, as well as the faction of the “Left Communists” within the RCP (b) that had formed, spoke of the “betrayal of the world revolution”, since the conclusion of peace on the Eastern Front objectively strengthened the Kaiser’s regime in Germany, allowed him to continue the war against the allies in France and at the same time eliminated the front in Turkey, allowed Austria-Hungary to concentrate its forces on the war in Greece and Italy. The agreement of the Soviet government to stop propaganda work in the territories occupied by the Germans meant that the Bolsheviks surrendered the Ukraine, the Baltic states and most of Belarus.

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk served as a catalyst for the formation of a "democratic counter-revolution", expressed in the proclamation of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik governments in Siberia and the Volga region, and the uprising of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries in June 1918 in Moscow. The suppression of speeches, in turn, led to the formation of a one-party Bolshevik dictatorship and a full-scale civil war.

Literature

1. Lenin's decree on peace. - M., 1958.

3. “Trotsky. Armed Prophet. years." Part 2. / Per. from English. . - M.:, 2006. S.351-408.

4., Rosenthal. 1917: Package-set of documentary materials on history. - M., 1993

6. Reader on the history of the CPSU: A guide for universities. This year / Comp. and others - M., 1989.

7. Shevotsukov of the history of the civil war: A look through decades: Book. For the teacher. - M., 1992.

In Soviet historiography (A. Chubaryan, K. Gusev, G. Nikolnikov, N. Yakupov, A. Bovin), the “Decree on Peace” was traditionally considered as the first and important stage in the formation and development of the “Leninist peace-loving foreign policy of the Soviet state”, based on the cornerstone principle of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. In reality, Lenin's "Decree on Peace" could in no way lay the foundations for a new foreign policy doctrine of Soviet Russia, because:

He pursued a purely pragmatic goal - the withdrawal of dilapidated and exhausted Russia from the state of war;

The Bolsheviks considered the revolution in Russia not as an end in itself, but as the first and inevitable stage in the beginning of the world proletarian (socialist) revolution.

November 8 People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs L.D. Trotsky sent the text of the "Decree on Peace" to the ambassadors of all the allied powers, inviting the leaders of these states to immediately stop hostilities at the front and sit down at the negotiating table, but this call was completely ignored by the Entente countries. November 9, 1917 to the commander-in-chief N.N. Dukhonin was instructed to immediately turn to the command of the Fourth Bloc countries with a proposal to end hostilities and start peace negotiations with them. General N.N. Dukhonin refused to comply with this order, for which he was immediately declared an "enemy of the people" and removed from his post, which was taken by ensign N.V. Krylenko. A little later, upon the arrival of N.V. Krylenko to Mogilev, General N.N. Dukhonin was first arrested and then killed at the staff car by drunken sailors, and the new Commander-in-Chief immediately followed the instructions of the Central Committee on this issue.

On November 14, 1917, representatives of the German and Austro-Hungarian military leadership informed the Soviet side of their agreement to stop hostilities on the Eastern Front and begin the process of peace negotiations. On November 20, 1917, the first round of negotiations between Russia and the countries of the Quadruple Bloc began in Brest-Litovsk, at which the leadership of the Soviet delegation represented by A.A. Ioffe (chairman of the mission), L.B. Kameneva, G.Ya. Sokolnikov and L.M. Karakhan immediately announced a declaration of principles, in which they again proposed to conclude a democratic peace treaty without annexations and indemnities. Having received no response to their proposal, the Soviet side refused to conclude a formal truce and took a week-long time-out.

On November 27, 1917, the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR approved the "Outline of the peace talks program", compiled by V.I. Lenin, I.V. Stalin and L.B. Kamenev, in which the idea of ​​concluding a general democratic peace was reaffirmed, and three days later the negotiation process resumed in Brest-Litovsk. The result of new negotiations was the signing on December 2, 1917 of an armistice agreement for a period of one month, until January 1, 1918.

On December 9, 1917, a new round of negotiations began, in which the head of the Soviet delegation, A.A. Ioffe announced the declaration "On the principles of universal democratic peace", consisting of six main points. In this declaration, based on the main provisions of the Peace Decree and the Outline of the Peace Negotiation Program, the main components of a democratic peace were once again concretized: "refusal of annexations and indemnities" and "complete self-determination of peoples".

On December 12, 1917, the Austrian Foreign Minister O. Chernin announced a response note to the Soviet side, which stated that the countries of the Quadruple Bloc agreed to immediately conclude a peace treaty with all Entente countries without annexations and indemnities. But for the Soviet delegation, this turn of events was so unexpected that its head, A.A. Ioffe suggested a ten-day break. The opposing side rejected this proposal, and three days later the head of the German delegation, Richard von Kuhlmann, who, by the way, while holding the post of State Secretary (Minister) of Foreign Affairs, was personally involved in the financial support of the Bolshevik Pravda, directly laid claim to the possession of all of Poland, Lithuania , Courland, part of Estonia and Livonia, whose peoples "they themselves expressed a desire to come under the protection of Germany." Naturally, the Soviet delegation categorically refused to discuss this proposal, and a break was announced in the work of the peace conference.

People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs L.D. Trotsky once again tried to give the peace talks a general character and addressed with a repeated note to the governments of the Entente countries to sit down at the negotiating table, but he did not receive an answer to his message. In this situation, fearing that the negotiations in Brest would take on an openly separate character, at the suggestion of V.I. Lenin, the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR decided to move the peace talks to the capital of neutral Sweden, the city of Stockholm. The Austro-German side rejected this trick of the Soviet government, and Brest-Litovsk remained the place to continue negotiations. At the same time, representatives of the countries of the Quadruple Alliance, referring to the fact that the Entente countries remained deaf to the proposal to conclude a "general democratic peace", abandoned their own declaration on December 12, which seriously aggravated the negotiation process itself.

On December 27, 1917, the second round of the peace conference in Brest-Litovsk began, at which the Soviet delegation was already headed by People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs L.D. Trotsky. A new round of negotiations, at the suggestion of the oracle of the revolution, began with an empty theoretical dispute about the state and the right of nations to self-determination. This political chatter, which had become rather annoying for the opposing side, was soon stopped, and on January 5, 1918, the delegation of the countries of the Quadruple Union in an ultimatum presented the Soviet side with new conditions for a separate peace - the rejection from Russia not only of the entire Baltic and Poland, but also of a significant part of Belarus.

On the same day, at the suggestion of the head of the Soviet delegation, a break was announced in the negotiations. L.D. Trotsky, having received a letter from V.I. Lenin and I.V. Stalin, was forced to urgently leave for Petrograd, where he had to give his explanations about his new position regarding the further conduct of negotiations, which he outlined in a letter addressed to V.I. Lenin on January 2, 1918. The essence of the new position of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs was extremely simple: “We stop the war, we demobilize the army, but we don’t sign peace.” In Soviet historical science, the position of L.D. Trotsky has always been interpreted in derogatory tones and expressions as the position of a "political prostitute" and a traitor to the interests of the working class and the working peasantry. In reality, this position, which was initially supported by V.I. Lenin, was absolutely logical and extremely pragmatic:

1) Since the Russian army cannot, and most importantly, does not want to fight, it is necessary to completely disband the old imperial army, and stop fighting at the front.

2) Since the opposing side is categorically in favor of a separate peace treaty, which threatens the Bolsheviks with a loss of reputation in the eyes of the world proletariat, a separate treaty with the enemy should by no means be concluded.

3) It is necessary to drag out the negotiation process as long as possible, in the hope that in Germany and other European powers the fire of the world proletarian revolution will flare up in the near future, which will put everything in its place.

4) Refusal to sign a separate treaty with the countries of the Quadruple Alliance will not formally give the Entente countries a reason to launch military intervention against Soviet Russia, which has violated its allied duty.

5) Finally, the refusal to sign a peace treaty will significantly smooth out the contradictions that have already arisen both within the ruling Bolshevik party and in relations between the Bolsheviks and the Left SRs.

By mid-January 1918, the latter circumstance began to acquire paramount importance. At this time, the “left communists” headed by N.I. Bukharin, F.E. Dzerzhinsky, M.S. Uritsky, K.B. Radek and A.M. Kollontai. This rather noisy and influential faction of the Bolsheviks, which was supported by a number of leaders of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party (B.D. Kamkov, P.P. Proshyan), categorically opposed any agreements with the enemy and declared that only a “revolutionary war” with the German imperialism will save the Bolsheviks from the universal disgrace of the accomplices of world capital and create the necessary conditions for kindling the fire of the world proletarian revolution. Moreover, at this time B.D. Kamkov and P.P. Proshyan turned to K.B. Radek, N.I. Bukharin and G.L. Pyatakov with a proposal to arrest the entire Council of People's Commissars headed by V.I. Lenin and form a new government consisting of Left Social Revolutionaries and Left Communists, which could be headed by Georgy Leonidovich Pyatakov, but this proposal was rejected by them.

In the meantime, another principled approach to solving this problem was outlined in the party leadership, which was expressed by V.I. Lenin. The essence of his new position, which he reached at the end of December 1917, was also extremely simple: to conclude a separate peace with Germany and its allies at any cost.

In historical science, the question of the motives that prompted the leader of the revolution to such a political conclusion, which ran counter to all the postulates of orthodox Marxism, has long been discussed.

Soviet historians (A. Chubaryan, K. Gusev, A. Bovin) claimed that V.I. Lenin came to this conviction under the pressure of harsh objective circumstances, namely the complete disintegration of the old Russian army and the uncertainty about the timing of the proletarian revolution in Europe, primarily in Germany itself.

Their opponents, mainly from the liberal camp (D. Volkogonov, Yu. Felshtinsky, O. Budnitsky), are sure that, while advocating extremely harshly for the conclusion of a separate peace with Germany, V.I. Lenin only fulfilled his obligations to his German sponsors, who generously forked out for the October Revolution.

On January 8, 1918, after discussing the new Leninist theses at an enlarged meeting of the Central Committee, an open vote was held, which clearly showed the alignment of forces in the top party leadership: the position of N.I. Bukharin was supported by 32 participants in this meeting, for L.D. Trotsky was voted by 16 participants, and the position of V.I. Lenin was supported by only 15 members of the Central Committee. On January 11, 1918, the discussion of this issue was submitted to the Plenum of the Central Committee, where the position of L.D. was supported by a small majority. Trotsky. This situation forced V.I. Lenin to make partial adjustments to his previous position: no longer insisting on the immediate conclusion of peace, he proposed to delay the process of negotiations with the Germans in every possible way. The next day, the Trotskyist slogan "no war, no peace" was approved by a majority vote at a joint meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b) and the PLSR, which was immediately formalized as a resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR. Thus, all supporters of peace in both ruling parties, in particular members of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b) V.I. Lenin, G.E. Zinoviev, I.V. Stalin, Ya.M. Sverdlov, G.Ya. Sokolnikov, I.T. Smilga, A.F. Sergeev, M.K. Muranov and E.D. Stasov, and members of the Central Committee of the PLSR M.A. Spiridonova, A.L. Kolegaev, V.E. Trutovsky, B.F. Malkin and A.A. Bidenko again remained in the minority. On January 14, 1918, the III All-Russian Congress of Soviets approved a resolution reflecting the position of L.D. Trotsky, and on the same day the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs left for Brest-Litovsk, where on January 17 the third round of peace negotiations began.

Meanwhile, in Brest itself, negotiations were in full swing between Austro-German representatives and the leadership of the Ukrainian People's Rada (N.A. Lyublinsky), whose government the Bolsheviks recognized back in December 1917. On January 27, 1918, immediately after the signing of a separate treaty with the government of the Ukrainian People's We are glad that the delegation of the Quadruple Alliance in an ultimatum demanded that the Soviet side immediately respond to its terms of the peace treaty.

The next day, L.D. Trotsky, on behalf of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR, announced a declaration in which:

1) it was announced the termination of the state of war between Russia and the countries of the Quadruple Bloc - Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria, as well as the complete demobilization of the old Russian army;

In Soviet historiography (A. Chubaryan, K. Gusev), this ultimatum of the head of the Soviet delegation was always regarded as another act of vile betrayal on the part of the “Jewish Trotsky”, who violated the oral agreement with V.I. Lenin that after the new "German ultimatum we sign a peace treaty."

Modern Russian historians, including outspoken apologists L.D. Trotsky (A. Pantsov), they say that the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs acted in strict accordance with the decision of the Central Committee of both ruling parties and the resolution of the III All-Russian Congress of Soviets, and their oral agreement with V.I. Lenin clearly contradicted them.

February 14, 1918 declaration by L.D. Trotsky received official support at a meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and its chairman Ya.M. Sverdlov, and a day later the German command in the person of Leopold of Bavaria and Max Hoffmann announced the end of the truce and the resumption of hostilities along the entire front from noon on February 18. In this situation, on the evening of February 17, 1918, an emergency meeting of the Central Committee was convened, at which six of the eleven members of the highest party Areopagus, namely L.D. Trotsky, N.I. Bukharin, M.S. Uritsky, G.I. Lomov, N.N. Krestinsky, A.A. Ioffe, spoke out against the resumption of the negotiation process in Brest.

The Germans launched an offensive at the front and by the end of February 19 occupied Polotsk and Dvinsk. In this critical situation, at a new meeting of the Central Committee, with seven votes in favor, it was decided to immediately resume the peace process. In this situation, L.D. Trotsky announced his resignation from the post of People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and the leader of the left communists N.I. Bukharin - about his withdrawal from the Central Committee and the editorial board of Pravda.

On February 23, 1918, the Soviet government was presented with new conditions for a separate peace treaty and a very strict framework for signing and ratifying it. In particular, the German side demanded that all of Poland, Lithuania, Courland, Estonia and part of Belarus be torn away from Russia, as well as the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of Finland and Ukraine, and the signing of a similar peace treaty with the government of the Central Rada.

On the same day, a new meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b) was convened, at which the votes on the German ultimatum were distributed as follows: seven members of the Central Committee voted “for” its adoption - V.I. Lenin, I.V. Stalin, G.E. Zinoviev, Ya.M. Sverdlov, G.Ya. Sokolnikov, I.T. Smilga and E.D. Stasova, "against" - four members of the highest party Areopagus - N.I. Bukharin, A.S. Bubnov, G.I. Lomov and M.S. Uritsky, and "abstained" - also four members of the Central Committee - L.D. Trotsky, F.E. Dzerzhinsky, A.A. Ioffe and N.N. Krestinsky. Thus, at the most critical moment, when the issue of retaining one's own power was being decided, the majority of the members of the Central Committee "trembled" and voted for the conclusion of an "obscene" peace with the Germans.

On February 24, at a meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, after an extremely tense discussion, the Bolshevik resolution on the adoption of new terms of the peace treaty was approved by a small majority. And late in the evening of the same day, a new Soviet delegation consisting of G.Ya. left for Brest-Litovsk to sign a peace treaty with the countries of the Quadruple Bloc. Sokolnikova, L.M. Karakhan, G.V. Chicherin and G.I. Petrovsky.

On March 3, 1918, the leaders of both delegations signed Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, under the terms of which:

A vast territory of more than 1 million square meters was torn away from Soviet Russia. kilometers, on which more than 56 million people lived - the entire territory of Poland, the Baltic States, Ukraine, part of Belarus and Turkish Armenia;

Soviet Russia had to pay the countries of the Quadruple Alliance a huge military indemnity in the amount of six billion gold marks and agree to the complete transfer of all industrial enterprises and mines, where before the war 90% of all coal was mined and more than 70% of iron and steel were smelted.

According to V.I. Lenin, in such humiliating and "obscene" conditions of the Brest peace treaty, which the Soviet government was forced to sign, were to blame, first of all, "our unfortunate leftists Bukharin, Lomov, Uritsky and Co." Moreover, a number of Soviet and Russian historians (Yu. Emelyanov) argue that not a single theoretical or political mistake of N.I. Bukharin did not have such catastrophic consequences for our country and tens of millions of its citizens.

On March 8, 1918, at the emergency VII Congress of the RCP (b), the terms of the Brest Peace Treaty after a sharp controversy between V.I. Lenin and N.I. Bukharin were passed by a significant majority, since the majority of his delegates agreed with Lenin's argument that the international world revolution was for the time being just a beautiful fairy tale and nothing more. On March 15, 1918, after no less heated and heated discussion at the IV Extraordinary Congress of Soviets, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was ratified by roll call and entered into force.

In historical science, there are still diametrically opposed assessments of the Brest peace treaty, which largely depend on the political and ideological views of their authors. In particular, V.I. Lenin, who did not have any sympathy for the patriarchal thousand-year-old Russia, directly called the Brest Treaty "Tilsit" and "obscene" peace, but vital to the salvation of the power of the Bolsheviks. The same assessments were shared by Soviet historians (A. Chubaryan, A. Bovin, Yu. Emelyanov), who were forced to talk about the brilliant insight and political wisdom of the leader, who foresaw the imminent military defeat of Germany and the annulment of this treaty. In addition, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was traditionally regarded as the first victory of the young Soviet diplomacy, which laid the foundations for the peace-loving foreign policy of the USSR.

In modern science, the assessments of the Brest Treaty have changed significantly.

Historians of the liberal persuasion (A. Pantsov, Yu. Felshtinsky) believe that this agreement was not a victory, but the first major defeat of the Bolshevik course to prepare for the world proletarian revolution. At the same time, this peace became a kind of maneuver in the field of tactics and a short-term retreat of the Bolsheviks on the tortuous and difficult path of struggle for the victory of the world socialist revolution.

Historians of a patriotic persuasion (N. Narochnitskaya) are convinced that for V. Lenin and other leaders of Bolshevism, the Russian proletarian revolution was a kind of “bunch of brushwood” capable of igniting the fire of the world proletarian revolution. Therefore, the Brest Treaty was a direct betrayal of the national interests of Russia, which marked the beginning of its collapse and the most difficult Civil War.

2. "Left SR rebellion" and its political consequences

After the ratification of the Brest peace treaty, the "left communists" did not give up hope for its denunciation. In particular, in May 1918, at the Moscow Conference of the RCP(b), N.I. Bukharin, N.V. Osinsky and D.B. Ryazanov (Goldenbach) again called for the denunciation of the Brest Treaty, but the majority of the delegates of this party forum did not support their proposal.

Another attempt to denounce the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was the "Left SR rebellion", which took place in Moscow on July 6-7, 1918. The events associated with this rebellion were as follows: The Cheka, under a plausible pretext, entered the German embassy and, having killed the German ambassador, Count V. Mirbach, hid in the headquarters of the Cheka troops, which was headed by their fellow party member Dmitry Popov.

After the accomplishment of this terrorist act, V.I. Lenin and Ya.M. Sverdlov went to the German embassy, ​​and the chairman of the Cheka, F.E. Dzerzhinsky went to the headquarters of the Cheka troops to arrest Ya. G. Blyumkin and N.A. Andreeva. Upon arrival at the place of F.E. Dzerzhinsky was taken under arrest, and the headquarters of the Cheka troops, on the orders of D.I. Popov was turned into an impregnable fortress, where more than 600 well-armed Chekists dug in.

Upon learning of the arrest of F.E. Dzerzhinsky, V.I. Lenin instructed to arrest the entire faction of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries who took part in the work of the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, and to take their leader Maria Spiridonova as a hostage in exchange for saving the life of F.E. Dzerzhinsky. At the same time, the commander of the division of the Latvian riflemen I.I. Vatsetis was ordered to storm the mansion of the Cheka troops and suppress the "Left SR rebellion". On the night of July 7, 1918, a division of Latvian riflemen, with the support of field artillery, launched an assault on the headquarters of the Cheka troops, which ended in the complete defeat of the rebels and the release of F.E. Dzerzhinsky.

The trial of the rebels was quick and just: several hundred people, including Ya.G. Blyumkin and N.A. Andreev, were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment, and the immediate inspirer and leader of this rebellion, Deputy Chairman of the Cheka V.A. Aleksandrovich was shot. The same result ended with the new “Left SR rebellion”, raised in Simbirsk by the commander of the Eastern Front, the Left SR M.A. Muravyov, who was shot dead on July 10, 1918 upon arrival for negotiations in the building of the provincial executive committee.

In Soviet and Russian historical science (K. Gusev, A. Velidov, A. Kiselev), it was traditionally asserted that the July events in Moscow and Simbirsk were deliberately organized by the leadership of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party (M.A. Spiridonova, P.P. Proshyan), who not only wanted to denounce the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, but also, having provoked a government crisis, to remove from power the Bolshevik Party, which, planting kombeds, began to pursue a disastrous economic course in the countryside.

In foreign historiography (Yu. Felshtinsky), there is a rather exotic version, which says that the so-called “Left SR rebellion” was organized by “left communists”, in particular, the head of the Cheka, F.E. Dzerzhinsky, who also sought to denounce the "obscene" Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and kindle the fire of the world proletarian revolution.

In our opinion, there are much more white spots and unsolved mysteries in the history of this rebellion than it seems at first glance, since researchers have not been able to properly answer even two completely obvious questions:

1) why exactly the chairman of the Cheka F.E. Dzerzhinsky personally went to the headquarters of the Cheka troops to arrest the killers of the German ambassador;

2) if the decision to kill the German ambassador was sanctioned by the Central Committee of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party, then why is its entire faction, including M.A. Spiridonov, calmly waited for her isolation and arrest on the sidelines of the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets.

Speaking essentially, it should be recognized that the July events in Moscow and Simbirsk drew a line under the period of development of Soviet statehood on a two-party basis and became the starting point for the formation of a one-party Bolshevik system in the country. During this period, the activities of all Socialist-Revolutionary, Menshevik and anarchist groups and parties, the existence of which still created the illusion of proletarian-peasant democracy in the country, were banned.

The Brest Treaty itself was denounced by the Soviet government on November 13, 1918, that is, exactly one day after the surrender of Germany and its military allies to the Entente countries, which put a long-awaited end to the First World War.

The direct result of the Brest Peace and the suppression of the "Left SR rebellion" was the adoption of the first Constitution of the RSFSR. According to most authors (O. Chistyakov, S. Leonov, I. Isaev), for the first time the issue of creating the first Soviet Constitution was discussed at a meeting of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on March 30, 1918. On April 1, 1918, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee formed a constitutional commission, in which included representatives of his three party factions (Bolsheviks, Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, Maximalist Socialist-Revolutionaries) and representatives of the six leading people's commissariats - for military and naval affairs, for nationalities, internal affairs, justice, finance and the Supreme Economic Council. Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee Ya.M. Sverdlov.

During the work on the draft Constitution, which lasted more than three months, a number of fundamental disagreements arose on the following issues:

1) the federal structure of the state;

2) the system of local Soviet authorities;

3) the social and economic foundations of Soviet power, etc.

In particular, representatives of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries (V.A. Algasov, A.A. Schreider) and Maximalist Socialist-Revolutionaries (A.I. Berdnikov) very persistently suggested:

1) to base the Soviet federation on the administrative-territorial principle of state structure with the provision of the broadest possible rights to all subjects of the federation to manage their own territories;

2) liquidate the lower levels of the Soviet state system and replace them with traditional rural assemblies, which, having lost their political functions, turned into municipal authorities;

3) carry out total socialization of property and tighten the principles of universal labor service, etc.

During a heated and lengthy debate, in which many prominent Bolsheviks took part, including V.I. Lenin, Ya.M. Sverdlov, I.V. Stalin, N.I. Bukharin, L.M. Reisner, M.F. Latsis and M.N. Pokrovsky, these proposals were rejected. The final draft of the Soviet Constitution was approved by a special commission of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), headed by V.I. Lenin.

On July 4, 1918, this project was submitted for consideration by the V All-Russian Congress of Soviets, and already on July 10, the congress delegates approved the first Constitution of the RSFSR and elected a new composition of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, consisting entirely of Bolsheviks.

The main provisions of the Constitution of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic were enshrined in six separate sections:

2) general provisions of the Constitution of the RSFSR;

3) the construction of Soviet power;

4) active and passive suffrage;

5) budget law;

6) about the emblem and flag of the RSFSR.

The Declaration of the Rights of the Working and Exploited People, which was fully included in the Constitution of the RSFSR, determined the political and social basis of the new Soviet statehood - the power of the Soviets of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies and "the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poorest peasantry in order to completely suppress the bourgeoisie, abolish the exploitation of man by man and establish socialism in the country."

The state structure of the RSFSR was based on the principles of a national federation, the subjects of which were declared national republics, as well as various regional unions, consisting of several national regions. The All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', Peasants' and Cossacks' Deputies became the supreme body of state power in the country, the exclusive competence of which included all issues of state building: approval and amendment of the Constitution of the RSFSR; declaration of war and conclusion of peace; ratification of peace treaties, general management of foreign and domestic policy of the state; establishment of national taxes, duties and fees; the basics of the organization of the armed forces, law enforcement agencies, the judiciary and legal proceedings; federal law, etc.

For everyday and operational work, the congress elected from among its members the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK RSFSR), which formed the Council of People's Commissars (SNK RSFSR), which consisted of people's commissars who headed the sectoral people's commissariats (People's Commissariats). And the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, and the Council of People's Commissars equally had the right to issue legislative acts, which was a direct consequence of the complete denial by the Bolsheviks of the well-known bourgeois principle of separation of powers. Regional, provincial, district and volost congresses of Soviets, as well as city and rural Soviets, which formed their own executive committees (executive committees), became local government bodies.

It should be emphasized that the well-known principle of “democratic centralism” was put at the basis of the organization of Soviet power at all levels, according to which the lower bodies of Soviet power were strictly subordinated to the higher ones, which were charged with the obligation to implement all decisions of the higher Soviets that did not violate their competence.

The Constitution of the RSFSR legislated not only a new type of Soviet statehood, but also a new type of Soviet democracy, since it openly proclaimed the class principle of democratic rights and freedoms. In particular, all "socially alien class elements" were deprived of the right to vote, and the representation from the social groups of working people who were endowed with the right to vote was far from equal. For example, in elections to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, city Soviets had a fivefold advantage over provincial congresses of Soviets, etc.

In addition, the Soviet electoral system retained the principle of indirect elections that existed in Tsarist Russia. Only elections to grassroots city and rural Soviets were direct, and deputies of all subsequent levels were elected at volost, district, provincial and regional congresses of Soviets.

ALL-RUSSIAN CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

ON CANCELLATION OF THE BREST AGREEMENT

To all the peoples of Russia, to the population of all the occupied regions and lands.

The All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets solemnly declares to everyone that the terms of peace with Germany, signed in Brest on March 3, 1918, have lost their force and significance. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (as well as the additional agreement signed in Berlin on August 27 and ratified by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on September 6, 1918) as a whole and in all points is declared annihilated. All obligations included in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, relating to the payment of indemnity or the cession of territory and regions, are declared invalid.

The last act of the government of Wilhelm, which forced this world of violence in order to weaken and gradually worsen the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic and to exploit the peoples surrounding the Republic without any restrictions, was the expulsion of the Soviet embassy from Berlin for its activities aimed at overthrowing the bourgeois-imperial regime in Germany. The first act of the insurgent workers and soldiers in Germany, who overthrew the imperial regime, was to call on the embassy of the Soviet Republic.

The Brest-Litovsk world of violence and plunder thus fell under the combined blow of the German and Russian proletarian revolutionaries.

The working masses of Russia, Livonia, Estland, Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine, Finland, the Crimea and the Caucasus, liberated by the German revolution from the oppression of the predatory treaty dictated by the German military, are now called upon to decide their own fate. The imperialist peace must be replaced by a socialist peace concluded by the working masses of the peoples of Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary who have liberated themselves from the yoke of the imperialists. The Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic invites the fraternal peoples of Germany and the former Austria-Hungary, represented by their Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, to immediately begin settling the issues connected with the destruction of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The true peace of the peoples can be based only on those principles which correspond to fraternal relations among the working people of all countries and nations and which were proclaimed by the October Revolution and defended by the Russian delegation in Brest. All occupied regions of Russia will be cleared. The right to self-determination will be fully recognized for the working nations of all peoples. All losses will be laid on the true culprits of the war, on the bourgeois classes.

The revolutionary soldiers of Germany and Austria, who are now setting up soldiers' Soviets of Deputies in the occupied regions, having entered into contact with the local workers' and peasants' Soviets, will be collaborators and allies of the working people in carrying out these tasks.
Through a fraternal alliance with the peasants and workers of Russia, they will atone for the wounds inflicted on the population of the occupied regions by the German and Austrian generals who guarded the interests of the counter-revolution.

The international relations of Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary built on these foundations will not only be peaceful relations. It will be an alliance of the working masses of all nations in their struggle to create and strengthen the socialist system on the ruins of the system of militarism and economic slavery. This alliance is offered by the working masses of Russia, represented by the Soviet Government, to the peoples of Germany and Austria-Hungary. They hope that the peoples of all other countries that have not yet cast off the yoke of imperialism will join this mighty alliance of the liberated peoples of Russia, Poland, Finland, Ukraine, Lithuania, the Baltic states, the Crimea, the Caucasus, Germany and Austria-Hungary. Until that moment, this alliance of peoples will resist any attempt to impose capitalist oppression on the peoples of the foreign bourgeoisie. The peoples of Russia, liberated by the German revolution from the yoke of German imperialism, will all the less agree to submit to the yoke of Anglo-American or Japanese imperialism.

The government of the Soviet Republic has proposed to all the powers waging war with them a peace agreement. Until the moment when the working masses of these powers force their governments to accept peace with the workers, peasants and soldiers of Russia, the government of the Republic will, relying now on the revolutionary forces of all of Central and Eastern Europe, resist attempts to return Russia again under the yoke of foreign and native slavery. capital. Welcoming the population of all the regions liberated from the yoke of German imperialism, the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic calls on the working masses of these regions to form a fraternal alliance with the workers and peasants of Russia and promises them full support, going to the end, in their struggle to establish the socialist power of the workers and peasants on their lands. peasants.

The violent peace in Brest-Litovsk has been destroyed. Long live true peace and the world union of the working people of all countries and nations.

Chairman
All-Russian Central

Y. SVERDLOV

Secretary
All-Russian Central
Executive Committee of the Soviets
V.AVANESOV

(Dates, unless otherwise specified, are given before February 1, 1918, according to the old style, and after this date, according to the new one.) See also the article Brest Peace.

1917

Night of November 8, 1917 - Council of People's Commissars sends to the Supreme Commander of the Russian Army Dukhonin order: immediately turn to the commanders of the enemy armies with a proposal for the immediate suspension of hostilities and the opening of peace negotiations.

November 8 - in response to Dukhonin's statement that it is not the Commander-in-Chief who is authorized to start peace negotiations, but the government, Lenin removes him from his post, replacing him with an ensign Krylenko. Note of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to all the ambassadors of the allied powers with a proposal to declare a truce and start peace negotiations. Radiogram from Lenin: “To all soldiers and sailors. Choose representatives and enter into negotiations for a truce with the enemy yourself.

Brest Peace

November 10 - the heads of military missions of the allied countries at the headquarters of the Russian Supreme Commander-in-Chief present General Dukhonin with a collective note protesting against the violation of the agreement of September 5, 1914, which prohibited allies conclusion of a separate peace or truce.

November 14 - Germany declares its consent to start peace negotiations with the Soviet government. On the same day, Lenin's note to the allies: “On December 1, we are starting peace negotiations. If the allied peoples do not send their representatives, we will negotiate with the Germans alone.

November 20 - start of negotiations on armistice in Brest. Arrival of the Krylenka at the Mogilev Headquarters. The murder by militants of his detachment Dukhonin.

November 21 - the Soviet delegation in Brest sets out its terms: a truce is concluded on all fronts for 6 months; the Germans are withdrawing troops from Riga and moonzunda; the transfer of German troops from the Eastern Front to the Western is prohibited. The Germans reject these proposals and force the Bolsheviks into another agreement: an armistice for 10 days(from 24.11 to 4.12) and only on the Eastern Front; troops remain in their positions; all transfers of troops are stopped, except for those that have already begun ( and what started - you can't check).

December 2 - conclusion of an armistice agreement in Brest for 28 days from 4.12, with the possibility of further extension (in case of a break, warn the enemy 7 days in advance).

December 5 - Trotsky's appeal "To the oppressed and bloodless peoples of Europe": he tries to convince them that "the truce in Brest-Litovsk is a huge conquest of mankind"; "the reactionary governments of the Central Powers are forced to negotiate with the Soviet power", but complete peace will be ensured only by a proletarian revolution in all countries.

December 9 - the beginning of the 1st stage of negotiations on world. The delegations of the states of the Quadruple Union are headed by: from Germany - Secretary of State of the Foreign Office R. von Kuhlmann; from Austria-Hungary - Minister of Foreign Affairs Count O. Chernin; from Bulgaria - Minister of Justice Popov; from Turkey - Grand Vizier Talaat Bey. Soviet delegation: Ioffe, Kamenev(Rosenfeld), Sokolnikov(Girsh Brilliant), Socialist-Revolutionary terrorist Bitsenko (Kamoristaya) and literary librarian Maslovsky-Mstislavsky + 8 military consultants + 5 delegates "from the people" - sailor Olic, soldier Belyakov, Kaluga peasant Stashkov (he constantly gets drunk at diplomatic dinners), worker Obukhov , ensign of the fleet Zedin. The Soviet delegation puts forward "principles Peace Decree"(peace without annexations and indemnities + self-determination of peoples).

December 11 - Lithuanian Tariba announces the restoration of Lithuania's independence in the "eternal union" with Germany.

December 12 - Kuhlmann's statement that Germany agrees to accept the principles put forward by the Soviets, but only if the Entente countries also accept them. The Soviet delegation proposes a 10-day break in order to again try to involve the Entente in the negotiations during this time. It soon becomes clear that the Germans believe that Poland, Lithuania and Courland have already spoken out by way of “self-determination” in favor of secession from Russia and can, without violating the principle of “non-annexations”, voluntarily enter into negotiations on joining Germany.

December 14 - the proposal of the Soviet delegation: Russia will withdraw its troops from the parts of Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Persia occupied by it, and let the powers of the Quadruple Alliance withdraw from Poland, Lithuania, Courland and other regions belonging to Russia. The Germans reject: Poland and Lithuania "have already expressed their people's will", and now the Soviet government must withdraw Russian troops from Livonia and Courland in order to give the population an opportunity to speak freely there too. This concludes the first stage of the negotiations.

December 15 - The Soviet delegation leaves for Petrograd. The Central Committee of the RSDLP (b) decides to drag out the peace negotiations as long as possible, in the hope of a revolution in Germany - and adopts the formula: "We hold on until the German ultimatum, then we surrender." The People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs again invites the Entente to join the negotiations, but again receives no answer.

December 20 - the Soviet government proposes to the countries of the Quadruple Alliance to transfer negotiations to Stockholm (in the hope of attracting European socialists there) Zimmerwaldists). It deviates.

December 22 - arrival in Brest of the delegation of the Ukrainian Central Rada. She intends to negotiate separately from Russia and demands to transfer the Kholm region, Bukovina and Eastern Galicia to Ukraine (then it is limited to one Kholm region).

December 25 - arrival in Brest of the Soviet delegation of Trotsky - Joffe. Trotsky's main goal is to drag out negotiations as long as possible.

December 27 - the beginning of the 2nd stage of peace negotiations. Kuhlmann's statement: since the Entente did not accept the formula "without annexations and indemnities", Germany will not accept it either.

December 28 - a joint meeting with the participation of the delegation of the Central Rada. Its head, V. Golubovich, announces a declaration that the power of Soviet Russia does not extend to Ukraine, and the Rada will negotiate independently. The Moscow regional bureau of the RSDLP (b), in opposition to the position of the Central Committee, demands a break in negotiations with Germany.

December 30 - Soviet statement that the will to self-determination of national territories is possible only after the withdrawal of foreign troops from them. Rejected by Germany.

1918

January 5 - General Hoffmann presents the conditions of the Central Powers: Poland, Lithuania, part of Belarus and Ukraine, Estonia and Latvia, the Moonsund Islands and the Gulf of Riga should withdraw to Germany and Austria-Hungary. The Soviet delegation asks for a break of ten days to consider these conditions.

January 6 - the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly by the Bolsheviks, which could reject peace with Germany.

January 8 - discussion of Lenin's "Theses" at a meeting of members of the Central Committee with party workers. Outcome: 15 votes for them, for " left communists"(to continue the war, but not for the sake of defending Russia, but in order not to disappoint the international proletariat with capitulation to the Germans) - 32 votes, for Trotsky's slogan "no war, no peace" (do not wage war, but do not formally conclude peace - again with that the goal is not to disappoint the European proletariat) - 16 votes.

January 9 - IV Wagon Central Rada: in view of the beginning Bolshevik offensive on Kyiv it finally proclaims Ukraine an independent state.

January 11 - meeting of the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks on the issue of peace. It was decided by 12 votes against Zinoviev alone to drag out the negotiations with the Germans in every possible way. When voting on what to do in the event of a German ultimatum, the left communists take the side of Trotsky, and his formula "no war, no peace" defeats Lenin's by 9 votes to 7.

January 17 - the beginning of the 3rd stage of the Brest negotiations. Trotsky arrives on them, accompanied by delegates from Soviet Ukraine, but the Germans refuse to recognize them. Trotsky responded by declaring that the Council of People's Commissars "does not recognize separate agreements between the Rada and the Central Powers."

January 27 - the signing of peace between the German coalition and the delegates of the Central Rada. In exchange for military assistance against the Soviet troops, the UNR undertakes to supply Germany and Austria-Hungary by July 31, 1918 with one million tons of grain, 400 million eggs, up to 50 thousand tons of cattle meat, lard, sugar, hemp, manganese ore, etc. The German ultimatum to the Soviets on the acceptance of peace terms with the abandonment of the Baltic regions up to the Narva-Pskov-Dvinsk (Daugavpils) line.

January 28 (February 10, NS) - in response to the German ultimatum, Trotsky officially proclaims the “neither peace nor war” formula at the negotiations: the Soviets stop both hostile actions against the Central Powers and peace negotiations with them. The Soviet delegation leaves the negotiations. Subsequently, Soviet historians falsely present this act as Trotsky's "treacherous arbitrariness", but it is entirely based on the decision of the Central Committee on January 11th.

January 31 - Krylenko's order to the army on the cessation of hostilities and demobilization (later Soviet historians incorrectly claim that it was allegedly issued without the consent of the Council of People's Commissars). The official request of the Rada to the Germans for help against the Soviets. The Germans accept it.

February 16 (February 3, old style) - at half past seven in the evening, the Germans notify that at 12 noon on February 18, the Soviet-German truce ends. (Some historians claim that by doing so the Germans violated the previous condition to notify of the breaking of the truce in 7 days However, the departure of the Soviet delegation from the talks on January 28 is already tantamount to a unilateral announcement of the breaking of all previous conditions.)

February 18 - the beginning of the German offensive on the Eastern Front. Two meetings of the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks on this issue: at the morning Lenin's proposal to immediately send a request for peace to the Germans was rejected by 7 votes to 6, at the evening it won by 7 votes to 5, with one abstention.

February 19 - Lenin's telegram to the Germans: "In view of the situation that has arisen, the Council of People's Commissars sees itself forced to sign the peace conditions proposed in Brest-Litovsk by the delegations of the Quadruple Union ..."

February 21 - Occupation of Minsk by the Germans. Council of People's Commissars adopts a decree " The socialist fatherland is in danger"(Listing not so much defensive measures against the enemy as terrorist threats to opponents of Soviet power: all able-bodied members of the bourgeois class, men and women, are mobilized to dig trenches under the supervision of the Red Guards and under the threat of being shot, "enemy agents, speculators, thugs, hooligans, counter-revolutionary agitators, German spies are shot at the scene of the crime). Formation of the Committee for the Revolutionary Defense of Petrograd.

February 22 - the response of the German government to the request for peace: it sets even more difficult conditions for it (immediately clear Livonia, Estonia, Finland and Ukraine, return the Anatolian provinces to Turkey, immediately demobilize the army, withdraw the fleet in the Black and Baltic Seas and in the Arctic Ocean to Russian ports and disarm it, plus "trade and economic demands"). You have 48 hours to accept the ultimatum. Trotsky's resignation from the post of People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. Since none of the prominent Bolsheviks is eager to sign a shameful peace with the Germans, Ioffe, Zinoviev and Sokolnikov refuse the offer to become a People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs.

February 23 - meeting of the Central Committee on the issue of the German ultimatum: 7 votes for its adoption, 4 against and 4 abstentions.

February 24 - German troops occupy Zhytomyr, and the Turks - Trebizond. Adoption VTsIK German peace conditions after an open, roll-call vote. Radiogram to Berlin about the acceptance of the German conditions. "Left Communists" leave the Council of People's Commissars in protest.

February 25 - the occupation of Revel and Pskov by the Germans. Admiral Shchastny at the last moment takes the Reval squadron of the Baltic Fleet to Helsingfors (later he was shot at the insistence of Trotsky for not handing over the Baltic Fleet to the Germans).

March 1 - the occupation of Kyiv and Gomel by the Germans. The arrival of a new Soviet delegation (Sokolnikov, Petrovsky, Chicherin, Karakhan) to Brest-Litovsk.

March 4 - the occupation of Narva by the Germans (already after the signing of the peace). Appointment of Trotsky as chairman (formed on the same day) of the Supreme Military Council (13.03 - and People's Commissar).

March 6-8 - The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was approved by the 7th Congress of the RCP(b) (30 for ratification, 12 against, 4 abstained).

March 10 - the movement (flight) of the Bolshevik Council of People's Commissars from Petrograd, threatened by the Germans, to Moscow.

March 14-16 – Treaty of Brest approved IV Extraordinary Congress of Soviets(for - 784 votes, against - 261, 115 abstentions).