I would like to start the story about the Russo-Japanese War with a revolutionary proposal. Or maybe stop clinging to the dating of events in the old style? In the end, isn’t it tired to put “not ours” behind the “true” date in parentheses. The whole world knows that the battle in the Yellow Sea took place on August 10, 1904, and only in Russia they claim that the battle at Shantung took place on July 28 of the same year. But such a change would avoid much confusion, because nowhere else is the Julian style used. Of course, Patriarch Alexy II declared the Gregorian calendar "a diabolical invention invented to the detriment of true Christians," but we still live according to it. So, we will most likely be forgiven for a small sin in dating the events of the distant past.

Well, okay, back to the subject of conversation. The first big war, in which not only the ideas of the theorists of naval warfare, but also the ideas of shipbuilding engineers, were tested, was the Russo-Japanese War. For all interesting facts and the conclusions of the Japanese-Chinese and Spanish-American wars, they were still small local conflicts, although the second was formally fought on two oceans. But remember: Admiral Dewey's squadron at first stood peacefully in Chinese ports, then reached Manila, defeated the Spanish squadron and again anchored until the end of the war. Attempts by the Spaniards to send a squadron of Admiral Camarra to the Philippines and launch a cruising war in the Atlantic ended in nothing. And only the Russo-Japanese War forced the admirals and engineers to think seriously about a lot of things. In particular, about the role of cruisers.

The fact is that in this war all aspects of the combat activity of this class of ships were tested, but not always the cruisers successfully coped with the assigned tasks. By the beginning of the war, both opponents had a large number cruisers of a wide variety of types and sizes - from small scouts like the Novik to ocean raiders like the Thunderbolt. Fast cruisers were supposed to serve as scouts for armored squadrons; the Japanese were forced to use their armored cruisers as "battleships for the poor"; the Russians tried to wage a cruising war; Japanese cruisers monitored and blocked Port Arthur; both opponents used cruisers to support their light forces and fight enemy destroyers. Interestingly, the Japanese did not even try to use their cruisers to protect communications and fight Russian raiders. Let's consider everything in order.

The odyssey of the Novik cruiser deserves a separate story. After the battle on August 10, the cruiser, together with the Askold, broke through the Japanese fleet, but at night the ships separated. The commander of the Novik, Captain 2nd Rank von Schultz, decided to go to Qingdao to take on an additional supply of coal. The loading took place in a hurry, the full supply could not be accepted, but the cruiser managed to slip out of the port before dark and did not meet the Japanese detachment sent by Admiral Togo to block the port.

Von Schultz decided to try to break through to Vladivostok, bypassing Japan from the ocean. Given the far from the best state of the cruiser's machines, this was the best solution. Arguments that it was necessary to break through the Tsushima Strait are not serious. The cruiser had long lost its record speed, and such an attempt bordered on suicide. Even during a calm passage, the mechanics had to constantly fight so that the cruiser's machines would not fail. Fuel consumption jumped to 54 tons per day instead of the norm of 30 tons, so von Schultz decided to go to Sakhalin at the Korsakov post to receive coal, although at first he intended to break through the Sangar Strait. But it was there that the Novik was guarded by the Japanese cruisers Chitose and Tsushima, stationed in Hakodate.

However, on August 19, the commander of the Chitose, Captain 1st Rank Takagi, received a telegram stating that the Novik had been seen from the Atoya lighthouse, and immediately led his ships north to the La Perouse Strait. However, the Japanese did not find a Russian cruiser there, which caused them serious concern - the Novik could already slip into Vladivostok. Takagi remained to cruise in the strait, but sent the Tsushima to inspect the Korsakov post. The Japanese hoped that the Russians would mistake the three-pipe cruiser for the Bogatyr and be able to take them by surprise. It was naive, because the Arthurian sailors more than once encountered the same type of cruiser "Niytaka", so the enemy was identified immediately.

At 16.25, smoke was noticed on the Novik, the cruiser weighed anchor and tried to jump out of the bay, which became a mousetrap, but the Tsushima went to the intersection. At 17.10, when the distance was reduced to 40 cables, Novik opened fire, the Japanese immediately responded. For Tsushima, this was a combat debut, but the Russian ship participated in many clashes, and its gunners had great experience, so the inequality of forces was smoothed out to a certain extent. However, the superiority of the Japanese, who had 6 152 mm and 10 76 mm guns against 6 120 mm Russian guns, was too much great. The skirmish lasted 45 minutes, after which von Schultz turned back to the Korsakov post. "Novik" received 3 underwater holes and began to land astern. "Tsushima" also got a leak, but the Japanese managed to cope with it, although they had no desire to continue the battle.

The next morning, the Chitose approached the Korsakov post, but found that the Novik was at the bottom. All attempts by the team to close the holes were unsuccessful, and the captain of the 2nd rank von Schultz ordered the cruiser to be flooded. It was not possible to blow it up, as the explosive cartridges remained in the flooded steering compartment. The city looked abandoned, so the Japanese began to calmly shoot the sunken cruiser. Then the Chitose came closer and made sure that the Novik was on the ground with a list of 30 degrees to starboard. The service of the brave cruiser has ended.

The Vladivostok detachment of cruisers stood out throughout the war for its activity. Yes, his actions were far from always successful, and he lost his only battle, but one cannot but agree with the famous historian V. Semenov, who argued that if Admiral Jessen did not win resounding victories, then he did not drop the honor of the Russian flag. As expected, Russia appreciated this: when after the war the armored cruisers "Gromoboy" and "Russia" returned to their homeland, Jessen received a reprimand based on the results of the inspection review and was dismissed the same year. After all, he didn’t sit out in dugouts like Admiral Grigorovich, but stood on the bridge under shells, and any fool will be able to do this. On the sea lanes of the enemy, the detachment sank 10 transports and 12 schooners, captured 4 transports and 1 schooner.

The first campaign of the detachment in the Sea of ​​Japan began with the replacement of the commander - Captain 1st Rank Reitsenstein was appointed instead of Admiral Stackelberg. The result was the sinking of a small Japanese steamer. The next campaign was already under the command of Admiral Jessen - to Genzan. For this, ocean raiders were clearly not required, but another Japanese transport became the prey of the cruisers. Unfortunately, in May 1904, the detachment lost the Bogatyr cruiser, which landed on the rocks of Cape Bruce and did not go to sea until the end of the war. The Japanese could well have destroyed it, but the mythical system of total espionage failed. For some reason, the Japanese assured themselves that the Russian cruiser would remain on the rocks forever.

A new campaign to the Tsushima Strait was carried out under the command of Admiral Bezobrazov. He was appointed head of the battleship detachment, but never got to Port Arthur. Japanese official history briefly reports that on June 15, the Hitachi Maru and Izumi Maru transports were sunk, and the Sado Maru transport was also damaged. But this is a forced brevity, because otherwise one would have to admit that due to the frivolity of their own admirals, 18 280-mm howitzers, which were sent to Port Arthur, and about 1000 soldiers of the reserve guards regiment went to the bottom. The passivity of the Russian fleet led the Japanese to neglect elementary security measures and paid the price. At the time of the attack, only the small cruiser Tsushima was next to the transports, which, of course, could not do anything. Admiral Kamimura and his armored cruisers were too far away to help the transports. However, the Russians also showed frivolity, they did not make sure that the Sado Maru sank, although the losses of the Japanese turned out to be great without that. They could only console themselves with the manifestation of the unbending samurai spirit - Colonel Suti, who commanded the battalion, solemnly burned the banner and committed hara-kiri. Some consolation...

On the Russian cruisers they listened to the radio communications of the Japanese, and Admiral Bezobrazov correctly decided that Kamimura was not too far away. Since the "Rurik" could not develop high speed, he decided to deceive the Japanese and went to Vladivostok not directly, but leaned towards the shores of Japan. Meanwhile, the weather worsened, and this helped the Russians. Kamimura reached the island of Okinoshima, did not find anyone or anything, and stopped the pursuit.

This raid can be considered very successful in the sense that it delayed the fall of Port Arthur, terrible howitzers appeared there only in the fall. By the way, the Japanese also removed them from the coastal fortifications of Tokyo Bay, not only the Russians did strange things. The next raid on Genzan almost led to a collision with Kamimura, but the meeting took place in the evening, and the Russian cruisers safely avoided an unequal battle.

The next raid was made by Russian cruisers to the Pacific Ocean, and again under the flag of Jessen. Admiral Bezobrazov doubted the success of the campaign too much, and he had to be replaced by Jessen, who was temporarily removed from business after the accident of the Bogatyr. On July 17, the cruisers went to sea, and on the 19th they passed through the Sangar Strait. The Japanese could not prevent them - the entire defense of the strait at that moment consisted of 2 ancient gunboats and 3 tiny destroyers with a displacement of 50 tons. Having broken into the ocean, the Russians began operations in the coastal waters of Japan. They sank several transports, not only Japanese, but also English, the ships "Arabia" and "Calhas" were taken as prizes. It seems to be a success, but, on the other hand, the destroyed cargo was not of exceptional value, most often it was railway rails. By the way, this confirms that the cruising war at that time simply could not be particularly effective, the list of strategic cargoes was too short, and in addition, none of them were vital, like, say, aluminum during the Second World War.

Still, this raid gave the impression of an exploding bomb. Sums of insurance jumped sharply, shipping decreased. At the same time, one should not take seriously the tale of how outraged Japanese shipowners burned the house of Admiral Kamimura. I personally read a story about this, and in a book that few people pay attention to - the memoirs of the Belgian envoy to Tokyo, Baron d'Anetan, and still I don't believe it. Well, do with me what you want - I do not believe! By the way, where was he, Kamimura, at that time? The actions of the admiral, or rather inaction, during this period are rather difficult to explain. He hung around the southern entrance to the Tsushima Strait and seemed to expect Jessen to attempt to break into Port Arthur, although such an act would have been completely pointless.

On the way back, the Russian cruisers ran into an unexpected problem. The weather worsened, everything was covered in thick fog, and the squadron simply could not find the entrance to the Sangar Strait. After chatting for some time in the ocean, the cruisers managed to see the mountains around the strait and squeezed into it. The campaign lasted 16 days, and the ships practically used up the entire supply of coal. Somehow, quite unexpectedly for the admirals, it turned out that the raiders could no longer act as before. It was earlier famous sailing ships like the Alabama, which used a steam engine only as an auxiliary engine, could not think about coal. Now the organization of cruising should have been approached more thoroughly, and the Germans, preparing for a new war, took this into account when creating their famous system of stages.

No happiness lasts forever, and soon the Vladivostok detachment had to be convinced of this. When the Arthurian squadron went on a breakthrough, on the evening of August 11, the cruiser detachment received an order to meet it. An order is an order, Admiral Jessen led sailors who had barely had time to rest south to the Tsushima Strait. But when the cruisers were already at sea, it turned out that the campaign was useless, the Arthurian squadron was defeated, partially dispersed to neutral ports, and partially returned. That's when you should have contacted Jessen by radio and brought him back, that's where those same "200 miles of radio communication" would come in handy, if they weren't pure linden.

At dawn on August 14, the cruisers reached the Fuzan parallel, where they had already been, but this time the Japanese were much better prepared. At 04.50, the detachments of Kamimura and Jessen noticed each other, and the corresponding radiogram of Kamimura was received by all nearby patrol cruisers - 5 units. So, even if Jessen had missed the Japanese armored cruisers, he would probably have run into one of the sentinels, but if he was not lucky, then he was not lucky right away and thoroughly, because the Japanese were to the north of the Russian squadron and blocked her way to Vladivostok. However, in fact, the Japanese tried to watch for the Novik and Askold cruisers they had lost.

But then things began to happen that were not entirely clear, and Russian and Japanese descriptions differ sharply. The Russians claim that the battle began at 05.18, the Japanese - that at 05.23, this is not too significant. But the discrepancy in distances is already more serious, the Russians claim that it exceeded 60 cables, but according to Japanese data, it barely reached 46 cables, which looks much more realistic.

The battle developed according to the classical canons - an artillery duel on parallel courses, in this regard, the battle near Ulsan looks like the most "classic" of all naval battles this war. The Japanese had some superiority in speed and gradually overtook the Russian squadron. And this is where one of the many incomprehensible moments arises. Looking at paper specifications, the Japanese had a noticeable advantage in speed, but it is also well known that their cruisers could only reach the nominal 20 knots in the most ideal conditions. On the other hand, the cars of the Russian cruisers were far from being in perfect condition, Rurik especially suffered from this, and here in the morning due to an accident on Rossiya 4 boilers failed, so in any case, Kamimura should have had superiority 2 or more node. But every time he needed to catch up with the Russian squadron, it happened painfully slowly.

And yet, by 05.52, the Japanese were exactly on the beam of the Russians, reducing the distance to 27 cables. Their superiority in artillery was beginning to show, and now the Japanese were directly in front of the rising sun, which prevented the Russians from aiming. Admiral Jessen first turned to the southeast, as if intending to pass the Tsushima Strait, but at 0600 sharply turned to the right, described a loop and went to the northwest, hoping to slip under the stern of the Japanese. Kamimura reacted to this turn late and turned left. The squadrons were on diverging courses, the distance increased to 50 cables, and the Japanese temporarily ceased fire. But it was at this moment that the trailing Iwate, which was walking, received a hit that could have been fatal. A 203-mm projectile exploded in the forward casemate of the upper deck, simultaneously detonating a projectile in the gun. The casemate was completely destroyed, part of the armor flew overboard. The casemate a deck below was out of order, and the 12-pounder gun standing above simply disappeared along with the crew. Another 152-mm gun failed, 32 people died, 43 were injured.

At 06.23 the battle resumed, and almost immediately the Rurik received a fatal hit that damaged the steering, from that moment the cruiser kept losing control. In addition, he began to gradually lag behind the lead cruisers. Shooting from both sides was chaotic and uncontrollable, no matter what historians try to write. Even in official Japanese works, it is recognized that Izumo is the flagship! - fired simultaneously at all three Russian cruisers. The fact that all the ships received hits from the Japanese indicates the lack of organization of fire in the Russian squadron.

Further events are not of particular interest. The Russian squadron tried twice to return to Rurik, apparently, Admiral Jessen hoped that he would be able to cope with his difficulties, but it was in vain. "Rurik" received more and more new hits and soon completely lost its combat capability. But still, he diverted the attention of Admiral Kamimura. The Japanese commander, apparently, decided to destroy at least one of the Russian cruisers for sure and at times almost stopped firing at Jessen's ships. For example, around 08.00, he generally ordered all fire to be concentrated on the damaged cruiser, and only the return of Rossiya and Gromoboy forced the Japanese to fire on them again.

At 0820, Admiral Jessen realized the futility of his attempts, besides, two other cruisers received noticeable damage, so he finally turned north towards Vladivostok. The Japanese, carried away by finishing off Rurik, were on his right shell and could not prevent a breakthrough. Kamimura followed him, but he couldn't - or didn't he want to? - shorten the distance. As we can see, this Japanese admiral showed the same caution as Admiral Togo in the battle in the Yellow Sea, although in this segment of the battle he had a double superiority in ships and almost a quadruple in artillery. By 09.45, the Japanese managed to reduce the distance to 27 cables, but then, as if frightened by their own courage, they dropped the course, and at 10.00 the distance again increased to 37 cables.

“The battle was protracted (about 5 hours). During the chase, all crews were ordered to fire slowly and carefully aim their guns. But at 1000, Admiral Kamimura was informed that the Izumo was running out of ammunition. Seeing that the enemy’s speed was not decreasing at all, although his fire had noticeably weakened, the admiral decided to use the remaining ammunition to sink the Rurik in order to definitely prevent his rescue, ”reports the Japanese Confidential History. In fact, by this time, Izumo had used up only half of its ammunition: 2255 203-mm shells, 1085 152-mm shells and 910 12-lb shells. Another factor that influenced the decision of the Japanese admiral was that he did not know about the results of the battle of the Togo squadron and could well expect a collision with the Arthurian squadron, and in the very near future

All this time, "Rurik" tried to finish off the approaching cruisers "Naniva" and "Takatiho", which prudently kept at a distance of 35 cables. But this did not save them from a couple of accidental hits, although Rurik, of course, had much worse. Both of these cruisers fired a total of over 650 152mm shells. At about 10.20 "Rurik" sank, calm weather allowed the Japanese to save almost all the surviving sailors.

Another proof of the inadequacy of the older commanders of the Russian fleet was the ratio of losses on the "Russia" and "Gromoboy". The newer and much better armored Gromoboy lost twice as many people simply because Captain 1st Rank Dabich ordered the crews of small-caliber guns, obviously useless under the prevailing conditions, to be at combat posts. Moreover, he ordered the dead to be replaced by new sailors, which entailed new losses.

And one more strange nuance. For a hundred years now, a story has been circulating on the pages of books that on Russian ships, when firing at long distances, deck guns failed - the teeth of lifting arcs and gears were bent and broken. But no one bothered to compare the real distances of the battle with the limit. The battle near Ulsan took place mainly at distances of 30-35 cable, a couple of times the distance was briefly reduced to 25 cable, a couple of times it increased to 45. These values ​​are far from the maximum range of the 152-mm Kane guns, what are the maximum elevation angles? But it seems that the assumption that the famous Obukhov plant supplied a frank marriage to the fleet does not suit anyone.

“After the death of Rurik, the active combat service of the Vladivostok detachment practically ceased,” one of the historians sadly writes. But attempts to conduct a cruising war did not stop, although now it was entrusted to auxiliary cruisers. The result was disgusting - without achieving anything serious, these ships, by their actions, managed to spoil Russia's relations with many European powers. By the way, if you look at the reference books, it suddenly turns out that the Japanese, not trying to officially start a cruising war, nevertheless caught more transports with smuggling than the Russians. The region of Vladivostok was especially fruitful for them.

In preparing for the cruising war, the Russian military-political leadership made several gross mistakes. First of all, the Russian command, without knowing it, let the genie out of the bottle, introducing a fundamentally new interpretation of the concept of "military smuggling" in Order No. 42 of the Maritime Department. Previously, only military goods were considered such: weapons, ammunition, uniforms, vehicles (read - horses). The Russians implicitly introduced the notion of “dual-use goods”, which is so fashionable today, that is, goods that may be used for military purposes though may and not be. Moreover, the Russian admirals immediately realized that anything could be dragged under such a definition. For example, cotton, which accounted for almost a third of Japan's imports, immediately turned out to be a forbidden product, because it could be used to produce nitrocellulose gunpowder and make uniforms.

Moreover, it was decided to start a cruising war in European waters, which obviously could bring nothing but scandals and exacerbation of tensions with Great Britain, which in 1905 owned half of the world's merchant fleet. This is not “the breadth and boldness of the strategic plan”, but outright stupidity. Along the way, it turned out that the preparation of Russia for a cruising war turned out to be zilch. The ships of the Voluntary Fleet, specially built for this, turned out to be unsuitable for this, only Petersburg and Moskva were converted into auxiliary cruisers, and the Maritime Department managed to turn even this quite ordinary business into an international scandal. These two ships were in Sevastopol, where gun platforms were installed and a trial installation of guns was made. After that, the guns were lowered into the hold and camouflaged. It was supposed to lead them through the Black Sea straits under the guise of merchant ships, and already at sea to install guns and raise the St. Andrew's flag. According to the international treaties in force at that time, Russia could not lead warships through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, but the Russian admirals hoped in this way to deceive everyone and everything. It would seem that it would be easier to prepare everything in the same Sevastopol, since the ports of the Baltic Sea were overloaded with work with the ships of the Second Pacific Squadron, bring them to Libau and officially turn them into auxiliary cruisers there. The loss of a couple of weeks meant absolutely nothing. But no, the main thing is to create problems for yourself.

These ships were intended for cruising in the Indian Ocean and left Sevastopol in June 1904. Only in the Red Sea, after the passage of the Suez Canal, they changed the commercial flag to a war flag and began operations in the Red Sea. "Petersburg" examined several ships and detained the English steamer "Malacca" with contraband cargo for Japan. In mid-July, the ships headed for the Indian Ocean. At Cape Gvardafuy, the cruisers split up: Petersburg headed north of the island of Madagascar, Smolensk went south. Having received an order to stop cruising on August 24, both ships arrived in Libau at the end of September. During this time, they examined 19 ships, of which they detained four and gave rise to the infamous case of the Malacca steamer.

Russian and English historians describe these events from directly opposite points of view, and the Russian one looks much less solid, and it is precisely the cited "evidence" that undermines it. Russia at that time considered it completely natural for itself to violate any international obligations and therefore shouted the loudest about the violation of the rules by others. To begin with, the Russo-Japanese War itself broke out due to the fact that Russia violated every single one multilateral and bilateral treaties concerning China, Manchuria and Korea. Therefore, the “war for Korean firewood” became inevitable.

So, on June 30, 1904, the auxiliary cruiser Petersburg stopped and detained the British steamship Malacca of the Peninsular and Oriental company. under the pretext the presence of military contraband on it. The English newspapers of that time describe the colorful details of the search: the captain of the Malacca nailed the British merchant flag to the flagpole, and the Russian officer, threatening him with a revolver, tore off the flag. Captain 2nd rank Skalsky decided to send him to Libau with a prize team, without spending inspection of the cargo on the basis of mere "suspicions that the matter is unclean." Information about the allegedly smuggled nature of the cargo "came" from a variety of places that had nothing to do with the voyage of this steamer, for example, from Russian consuls in Malta and Alexandria, where "Malacca" did not enter.

Already on July 7, a note from the British ambassador followed, of course, completely unfounded, as all Russian authors have been writing in unison for a hundred years in a row. Yes, there were military supplies on the Malacca destined for Hong Kong, which the Russians stubbornly did not notice and do not notice today. There were proper documents, the cargoes were marked “Property of the EB government”, but if you really want to, you can not notice this, but say that “from the survey of the team” it turned out the presence of military contraband. Indeed, stokers and deckhands know better than anyone what, where and to whom the ship is carrying.

On June 10, a meeting was held on Malacca, at which opinions were sharply divided. Diplomats demanded the release of the ship, citing violations international law, admitted by the sailors, the naval faction, headed by "Prince Tsushima" Alexei Alexandrovich, defended the point of view "what I want, then I turn back." The Grand Duke argued that England was so sharp in defense of Malacca on the grounds that the English king was among the shareholders of P&O. Imagine, as the French say! There are two different explanations for this delusion. Either the Admiral General was a complete fool and broadcast the rotten Russian experience to other countries, because in the famous scam with Korean firewood, the Romanov family was smeared up to their ears. One of the leaders of the concession was Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich, and the largest stake belonged to the "EB cabinet", that is, simply the king. It can be assumed that Aleksey Aleksandrovich bought into the title of "P&O" - "royal privileged" (Royal Charter), but this only means that the king granted certain privileges to the company, but by no means that he receives money for this. And again, such an interpretation means that the Admiral General was remarkably stupid. The second explanation is much shorter - the Grand Duke deliberately lied.

And the explanation for the sharp reaction of the British may be quite simple. Since 1841, P & O has been the official carrier of the British Admiralty mail, and a little later became the official carrier of the Royal Mail. In fact, in England, for an attack on the Royal Mail, they simply hung up without much ranting, because this was considered an attempt on the guarantees given by the EB.

After some squabbling, already on July 14 the ship was released and continued the transition. In order to get rid of them completely, the Russians are launching a campaign of lies, in which Russian consuls in Shanghai and Hong Kong began to play the first fiddle. Now the Malacca is going to Singapore not for repairs, but to cover its tracks, then the French journalists have “reliably established” that the ship is going to Yokohama, but for some reason ends up in Sasebo. It suddenly turns out that the Iwate cruiser was equipped with 152-mm guns brought by the Malacca, although such guns did not exist in nature. In general, as Dr. Goebbels advised, in order for a lie to be believed, it must be monstrous.

The reliability of the work of these "sources of information" is well illustrated by the fable about the German transport "Sambia". The Russian agent in Berlin, Colonel Schebeck, reported that this transport was leaving Hamburg for Japan with 329 guns on board. The Russian admirals, without hesitation, immediately sent the auxiliary cruiser Ural to catch the smuggler. No one even bothered to think whether it is possible to believe these nonsense. After all, this is the artillery park of an entire army, the real deal of the century. It would be simply impossible to keep such a secret, but there were no other confirmations, except for the colonel's tales, then, and have not appeared now. But earlier, and especially today, most historians for some reason consider these tales to be true facts.

Smolensk also made a scandal when it detained the German steamship Prince Heinrich. Russian historians shyly write that they checked the mail on it and seized two letters containing documents about the departure of military contraband from Germany to Japan. In fact, everything was much more stupid and vile. The ship was confiscated all mail, after which it all perused and seized the two mentioned letters. All other letters were “sealed and set aside for transfer to the first postal steamer they met,” which was done two days later, when the English steamer Persia met. Is it any wonder after this that the Russian auxiliary cruisers were treated like pirates of the 18th century who had fallen out in our time?

In general, the actions of the Russian auxiliary cruisers brought nothing but trouble to Russia. Admiral Rozhdestvensky dragged the Kuban, Terek, Dnepr, Rion and Ural around the world, but they did nothing significant, except that the Ural ingloriously died in the Battle of Tsushima. The only auxiliary cruiser of the Vladivostok detachment "Lena" distinguished itself only by the fact that "due to a breakdown of the machines that prevented the continuation of cruising", it reached San Francisco!

Purely for reference, we give data on merchant ships captured by the Japanese fleet. The total number is 64, including 16 Russian, 22 English, 10 German and 5 American. And what will you say after that, who was helped by the British and Americans?

Probably the easiest way to deal with the reconnaissance and patrol activities of the cruisers. With what words the famous “dogs” of the Japanese fleet were not honored by the Arthurians! But, what is most interesting, the obviously stronger "Askold" never tried to drive away the observers who settled on the outer raid. Even in the most tense moments, when the Japanese squadron fired across Liaoteshan, bombarding the harbor of Port Arthur, no one tried to interfere with the Japanese cruisers that were correcting the fire. These episodes, by the way, prove that the radio communication among the Japanese was two orders of magnitude better, and stories about pre-war experiments in communication at a distance of 200 miles are not convincing. Why did no one try to repeat them during the war?!

Another example of a well-established intelligence service is the organization of patrols in front of the Tsushima Strait. Both amateur and professional historians like to speculate about whether Rozhdestvensky's squadron could have slipped through the strait undetected by the Japanese. The answer is simple - it couldn't. Just to get this answer, I had to wait a very long time until the Japanese maps, considered secret for almost 100 years, finally appear. It turned out that four lines of patrols were organized, advanced almost to the island of Quelpart. Rozhdestvensky was lucky to slip through them at night, but what could happen if he passed this area during the day, hoping to be in the Tsushima Strait at night? It would have resulted in a total attack by Japanese destroyers and in the morning finishing off a battered squadron with the main forces of Admiral Togo. But what happened happened, in square 203, the auxiliary cruiser Shinano Maru discovered the Russians ...

As for the 18 Japanese heavy cruisers that became the subject of this monograph, the first of them appeared as 7100-ton long-range reconnaissance fleets that went to the ocean, and their projects were approved even before the signing of the Washington Treaty. However, they were created with an eye on the British cruiser-defenders of trade of the end of the First World War of the type "Hawkins" ("Hawkins"), which are considered the immediate predecessors of all "Washingtonians". Having built 4 ships with weapons that were noticeably inferior to the first "10,000-tons" of probable opponents, the Japanese more than compensated for their lag in the next two series, due to all sorts of tricks (and they did not disdain violating agreements) giving them 1-2 guns more, than others, as well as the most powerful torpedo and aircraft weapons. As a result, 8 cruisers of the Myoko and Takao types, not without reason, began to be considered the strongest in the world. Japanese admirals pinned great hopes on these ships in a night battle against the numerically strongest battle fleet of the United States - a battle that, according to their plans, was supposed to precede a pitched battle. The functions of reconnaissance in the interests of the battle fleet faded into the background, especially with the development of carrier-based aviation.

The appearance of the last 6 heavy cruisers in the Japanese fleet has no analogues in the practice of world shipbuilding: they were built as light ones (class “b”) with an unprecedentedly powerful armament of 15 155-mm guns, but with the possibility of re-equipping with 203-mm caliber, they were quickly rebuilt into heavy ones as soon as the Japanese refused to comply with all treaties. As a result, by the beginning of the war on pacific ocean the number of ships of this class among the main rivals - Japan and the United States - turned out to be equal.

The publication was released in a format similar to the "Warships of the World" series.

1.2. General doctrine of the development of the Japanese fleet after the Russo-Japanese war. The first projects of reconnaissance cruisers.

The war with Russia, which ended in the complete defeat of the enemy at sea, which culminated in the Battle of Tsushima, fully confirmed the correctness of the organization and tactics chosen by the Imperial Navy. However, the change in the foreign policy situation, the experience gained in the course of hostilities and the significant progress in military shipbuilding caused by the war required a corresponding reorganization of the fleet. In October 1906, Emperor Mutsuhito demanded that Marshal Arimoto Yamagata formulate a policy for the defense of the Empire, taking into account the lessons of the past war and the strengthening of US interests in the Pacific and Far East. Fulfilling the instructions of the emperor, Prime Minister Kinmochi Saioniji held a series of meetings in January-April of the following year with the Chief of the Naval General Staff (MGSH) Admiral Heihachiro Togo, the new Naval Minister Vice Admiral Minoru Saito, the Minister of War General Masatake Terauchi and the chiefs of staff. Issues relating to the fleet were discussed at these meetings on the basis of a new treatise written by a captain of the 2nd rank. Sato, who spent the entire war at the headquarters of the commander of the Second Squadron, and after it became a college teacher at the Moscow State School. Adopted on April 7, 1907, the new "Imperial Defense Policy" set out the main directions for Japan's defense planning for the next 11 years. In the list of potential adversaries, in the first place, most likely due to inertia or because of dissatisfaction with territorial acquisitions after the victory, was Russia, followed by the United States and France, which owned large colonies in Southeast Asia. Regarding the ship composition, T. Sago argued the need to have by 1920 "a battle fleet (Kaizen Kantai) of three squadrons of 8 new battleships each, a sin of squadrons of 4 armored cruisers and three squadrons of 4 cruisers of the 2nd class, not counting" auxiliary fleet "of the ships of the shore line. But the adopted" Policy "indicated a more modest composition of the linear fleet of eight battleships, supported by a squadron of eight armored cruisers of the latest project and with an age of no more than 8 years. March 31, 1912 in accordance with the new standards instead of armored ships were supposed to have the same number of battlecruisers.This ambitious project, which became known in history under the name "Fleet 8-8" (Hachi-hachi Kantai), Japan could not implement due to political and financial difficulties, but for several years it was used as a weapon of politics.When, finally, it seemed that all difficulties could be overcome, the signing of the Washington Naval Treaty I in 1922 finally buried this project of building a powerful fleet.

Based on the experience of the Russo-Japanese war, the MGSH also put forward a requirement to have cruisers with powerful weapons and protection, high speed and a long range in the naval forces, which could perform the functions of scouts in the battle fleet. The main characteristics of the new reconnaissance cruisers were detailed in the “Program for the Creation of a New Fleet”, presented to the Cabinet of Ministers by the Minister of Marine M. Saito on May 15, 1910. And here the Japanese were helped by the Russian trophies, in particular, long-range scouts - the armored cruiser "Bayan" (renamed "Azo") and the armored "Varyag" ("Soya"), the short-range reconnaissance armored "Novik" ("Suzuya") and an auxiliary cruiser “ ” (“Anegawa”). The latter, sunk in shallow water in Port Arthur, the Japanese introduced into their fleet as early as March 1906, using a messenger ship (tsuhokan) as a messenger. It was the experience of operating the Anegava, which amazed its new owners with its cruising range and ability to maintain 19-knot speed even in heavy seas, that showed what an ocean reconnaissance aircraft should be like. In total, the 1910 program requested the construction over the next eight financial years (1911-1918) of 51 single ships: 7 battleships, 3 1st class cruisers, 4 2nd class cruisers, 1 cruiser " special purpose” (for ocean reconnaissance), 26 destroyers and 10 submarines. With ships already planned for construction, a fleet of 8 new battleships (dreadnought Fuso plus 7), 8 cruisers of the 1st class (armored Kurama with 305-mm and 203-mm guns + 4 future battleships Kongo + 3 ) and 8 cruisers of the 2nd class (“Tone” and 3 types of “Tikum” under construction, plus 3 and 1 “special”) no older than 8 years could be ready by April 1, 1919. Moreover, all battleships and battlecruisers of this program (except Kurama) were supposed to carry 356-mm guns, and ships already built after the Russo-Japanese War and under construction with 305-mm main caliber (“pre-dreadnoughts” “Kashima”, “ Katori "Aki" and "Satsuma", dreadnoughts "Kawachi" and "Settsu", large armored cruisers "Tsukuba" "Ikoma" and the same type "Kurame" "Ibuki") were taken out of the scope of "Fleet 8-8".

But the cabinet rejected the submitted program and in September 1911 the fleet proposed another one, which provided for the readiness by April 1, 1920 of 8 battleships, 6 cruisers of the 1st and 8 cruisers of the 2nd class. According to it, 7 battleships should have been built, two cruisers of the 1st class (in addition to 4 of the Congo type), five of the 2nd class, two “special” ones (one of them was supposed to replace the “Aiegawa” delisted in August 1911 year to return as a gift to the Russian Tsar). The number of destroyers and submarines remained unchanged. However, the construction of none of these ships was not approved, and the political confusion in the country led to the rejection of the new shipbuilding program at two regular sessions of parliament.

In 1914, the new Minister of the Navy, Vice Admiral Mutsuro Yashiro, presented proposals to bring the fleet to the composition of "8-8" in the shortest possible time, and the defense department of the ruling cabinet in anticipation of big war in Europe approved them on 22 June. A month later, on Yashiro's advice, the cabinet presented an abridged version of this plan to Parliament as part of a routine naval replenishment. The new program, which provided for bringing the fleet up to the “8-4” composition, also included three reconnaissance cruisers of 6000 tons each, armed with four 20-cm guns. It is interesting that the Russian fleet was equipped with long-range scouts of just such a displacement before the war with Japan (“Varyag”, “Askold” and the type “Bogatyr”). The Russian Naval Ministry soon considered them suboptimal, given their size, cost and armament (of course, they could not compete with Asama-class armored cruisers, which simply did not exist in the Russian fleet), but the Japanese, apparently, turned out to have a higher opinion of them . Such ships could fill an empty niche in the Japanese fleet between armored and small armored cruisers.

The outbreak of World War II prevented the adoption of this program. On September 10, 1915, the next Minister of the Navy, Tomosaburo Kato, presented his plan to bring the fleet to the “8-4” composition, approved in principle by the Defense Department of the Cabinet of Ministers, but only partially approved. This partial plan (the battleship Nagato, the 2nd class cruisers Tenryu and Tatsuta, 1 destroyer, 3 submarines and a tanker) was adopted at the 37th session of Parliament in February 1916, but the reconnaissance cruisers were deleted from there. No technical data has been found regarding the reconnaissance cruisers of the pre-war programs. This program itself was interesting in that it marked the transition to the construction of capital ships with 410-mm guns. The MGSH was no longer satisfied with the 4 battleships under construction (“Fuso”, “Yamashiro”, “Ise” and “Hyuga”) and 4 battlecruisers (“Kongo”, “Haruna”, “Hii”, “Kirishima”) from 356- mm main caliber and he hatched plans for the construction of the “8-8 Fleet” with guns that far exceeded those of other powers.

The Tenryu and Tatsuta were the fast leaders of the destroyer fleets that rolled off the stocks in large numbers. The construction of just such 2nd class cruisers was then considered more urgent, but a few months later the Marine Technical Council (1) (MTS) received the task of developing a preliminary design for a reconnaissance cruiser (“scout”, as the British called it). At the same time, the arsenal at the base of the fleet in Kure, the development of a new 20-cm gun was entrusted, which was supposed to replace the 20-cm 45-caliber type 41 years (2) (41st year of the reign of Meiji - Emperor Mutsuhito, i.e. 1908), created on the basis of an earlier model of the English company Vickers.Already on September 22, 1916, MTS submitted for consideration to the Moscow State School a draft scout project with the following characteristics: normal displacement 7200 tons, maximum speed 36 knots, range 6000-8000 miles at 14 knots, artillery weapons - at least 12 new (adopted into service just before the World War) 14-cm / 50 guns (two twin installations in the bow and stern and 4 single on the sides) or a smaller number of developed 20-cm guns, torpe bottom - 4 twin-tube fixed on-board vehicles for new 61-cm torpedoes, protection - 76-mm belt made of HT-steel (high tension steel - High Tensile Steel) and an armored deck over vital parts. The 14 cm (140 mm) caliber was new to the Japanese Navy, which had previously made do with 152 mm and 120 mm English-style rapid-firing guns. But 152-mm shells weighing 45.4 kg were too heavy for manual loading by a Japanese sailor of normal conditions, and a 120-mm gun was already considered too small for the main caliber of cruisers.

In general, they liked the project and the “8-4 Fleet Construction Program”, prepared in July-September 1916, included three such “scouts” (estimated cost of building 6,915,078 yen each), and in total it requested funds for the construction of three battleships (“ Mutsu”, “Kata”, “Tosa”), two battlecruisers (“Amachi”, “Akagi”), 9 cruisers (three 7200-ton “scouts” and six 3500-ton leaders of torpedo fleets of the “improved Tenryu” type) , 27 destroyers, 18 submarines and 3 auxiliary vessels, which should have been allocated within 7 years, starting from 1917. Parliament was unable to adopt this program at the 38th session, as it was dissolved on January 25th. But when the Japanese learned about the 3-year shipbuilding program adopted by the United States on August 29, 1916, certain political circles managed to convene an extraordinary 39th session of parliament, which on July 14, 1917 made the necessary decision.

The Americans, in particular, planned to build 10 “scout” cruisers of 7100 tons each, with a speed of 35 knots and armament of 8 152-mm / 53 guns, 2 twin-tube rotary torpedo tubes (TA) and 2-4 seaplanes with two catapults (future type "Omeha"). Having suppressed these data, the Japanese MGSH decided to redo the project of the 7200-ton “scout”, but for now, change the composition of the light cruisers of the latest program. At the end of 1917, the 9 cruisers envisaged by the program were replaced by eight 5500-ton cruisers, which could serve as scouts and destroyer leaders, and one experimental “small” project. Three more cruisers of 5500 tons each (3) were included in the “8-6 Fleet Construction Program” (battlecruisers Takao and Atago, 3 light cruisers, 27 destroyers, 48 ​​submarines and 6 auxiliary ships), adopted by the 40th session of Parliament on March 12, 1918.

The project of a 5500-ton cruiser, the so-called "medium model" was developed by the 4th - shipbuilding - department of the MTD (Marine Technical Department) (4) based on the Tenryu. A significant increase in size made it possible to strengthen the armament (from 4 to 7 14-cm guns with a side salvo of 6 trunks) and increase the cruising range by one and a half times (from 6000 to 9000 miles at 10 knots). In parallel, the MTD began to improve the design of the 7200-ton cruiser and at the beginning of 1918 presented the following characteristics to the MGSH:

Four ships under the new project, officially called “large model cruisers”, were included in the first post-war “8-8 Fleet Construction Program”, which also included 4 giant battleships (Nos. 9-12) and battlecruisers (Nos. 13-16) ), 8 cruisers of the “medium model” of 5500 tons each, 32 destroyers, 28 submarines, 5 gunboats and 18 auxiliary vessels. The results of the last world war strengthened the financial position of the Land of the Rising Sun, which gave hope to its admirals to finally realize their plans without restrictions from the government and parliament. The Council of Ministers approved this last phase of the Fleet 8-8 (5) program on June 2, 1919, but Parliament was only able to adopt it a year later at its 43rd Extraordinary Session (the previous session had been dissolved in February). Published on August 1, 1920, it planned to place an order for one 8,000 ton cruiser and one 5,500 ton cruiser annually over 4 years (fiscal years 1920/21-1923/24), and then during fiscal 1924/25 and 1925/26. years to order 2 5500-ton. The last ship of the Fleet 8-8 program should have been completed by April 1, 1928 (that is, by the beginning of the next financial year). The cruiser's cost of 8,000 tons was estimated in 1919 as 8,039,200 yen, but by June 1920 this figure already exceeded 11 million.

At the time of its entry into serviceKongowas the most advanced battlecruiser in the world, which caused a heated debate in the British Parliament: “Why should a foreign power, even a friendly one, receive from English industry a more powerful ship than its domestic prototype?”

The late 19th and early 20th centuries were a turning point for Japan. Heading towards the creation of a "Great Eastern Empire", the Japanese ruling elite developed the country's armed forces, based on the belief that only a powerful fleet can protect the island state from direct invasion and guarantee its regular supply of the necessary raw materials. To defend the islands, the Japanese needed a fleet of battleship armored ships, and to protect sea lanes, a fleet of cruisers. Thus, the doctrine of the Japanese navy provided for the presence in its composition of an equal number of battleships and large armored cruisers. Forced to embark on a large-scale naval renewal program (after the advent of dreadnought-type battleships) and with limited financial resources, the Japanese acted with their characteristic pragmatism and decided to build battlecruisers. This decision was based on a sober assessment of the strength of potential adversaries: the British and American battle fleets were incomparably stronger, and the Russian was incomparably weaker than the Japanese naval forces. Battlecruisers allowed Japan both to protect its own communications from Russian cruisers and to inflict serious damage on the communications of the British and Americans when they tried to block the Japanese coast (due to the small number of British and American ground forces, as well as the remoteness of Japan, the threat of landing could be neglected).

Initially, the Japanese tried to develop the project on their own, but quickly realized that due to their lack of experience in creating such ships, they were doing it more slowly than the British were building new ships. The first Japanese project became obsolete after the British built the battlecruiser Invincible, the second - the cruiser Lion:

Realizing this, the Japanese turned for help to the British - the leading experts in this industry. The designs of the Vickers and Armstrong firms were proposed for consideration by the Japanese admirals. Despite the fact that Armstrong already had experience in building ships for the Imperial Navy, the Vickers project, developed by Sir George Thurston (later the creator of the British battlecruiser Tiger), won the competition. Thurston's project was an improved version of the British cruiser Lion (translated from English - "lion").

Tactical and technical characteristics

The contract with Vickers was signed on October 17, 1910 (some authors erroneously list the year 1912). In accordance with the agreement, the lead ship was built in England, and the rest - in Japan. A total of four battlecruisers were built.

Naval literature mentions two somewhat dubious stories related to the construction of Kongo-class cruisers. According to one of them, there was a long time interval between the signing of the contract with Vickers and the start of construction, caused by disputes over the range of weapons. In fact, the lead ship was laid down three months after the signing of the contract, and it is possible that January 17, 1911 was only the official laying date, and the work itself began even earlier. According to another story, two ships were originally planned, but "the huge superdreadnought cruiser made such a strong impression on the miniature Japanese admirals that it was decided to build two more ships of the same type". Most likely, the Japanese initially planned to build four cruisers, based on a rational calculation (one cruiser under repair, another one making the transition, two in the patrol zone), and the delay in laying the ships was caused preparatory work on the localization of production at Japanese shipyards (according to available data, up to 30% of imported components were used in the construction of Hiei, and Haruna and Kirishima were almost completely assembled from Japanese materials). The Kongo-class battlecruisers were emblematic of Japanese shipbuilding, as the project's lead ship was the last major warship built outside of Japan, while the Haruna and Kirishima were the first ships built by private domestic contractors.

Hull design

In accordance with the requirements of the Marine Technical Department of Japan, the Kongo's hull has been significantly modified. In particular, the ship received a larger camber and a clipper-type stem than on the prototype, which had a positive effect on its seaworthiness. As a result of the alterations, the geometric dimensions of the Kongo were somewhat different from those of the cruiser Lion.

The cruiser retained the tripod foremast and mainmast, as well as three chimneys of different diameters, but changed their location. The chimneys on the Kongo were arranged more compactly, and the smaller diameter pipe, which was the bow on the Lion cruiser, became medium on the Japanese ship. The foremast and mainmast, located between the bow and middle pipes and behind the stern pipe, were placed, respectively, in front of the bow and between the middle and stern pipes (this somewhat weakened the smoke of the ship's bridge). It should be noted that, unlike the Kongo with pipes of the same height, on the other cruisers of the same type, the bow pipe was initially about two meters higher than the others, which solved the problem of smoke (on the Kongo, the bow pipe was extended only in 1920).

Power plant

The increase in the width of the ship compared to the prototype and the movement of the pipes was the result of a significant reconstruction of the power plant.

Despite an almost ten percent reduction in the power of the installation, the Kongo, due to its better seaworthiness, even somewhat surpassed the Lion in maximum speed. The high speed of the cruisers was achieved not least due to the use of mixed fuels (oil was used to achieve maximum speed, and coal was used to sail at an economical speed). At the same time, it is impossible to compare the efficiency of the installations of the two ships: most reference books indicate the range of the Japanese cruiser at 8,000 miles at an economical speed of 14 knots, and the English cruiser at 2,420 miles at a speed of 24 knots. The location of the engine and boiler rooms inside the ships was also different. On the Lion cruiser, the midship (medium) tower of the main caliber divided the power plant into the bow of two boiler rooms and the aft one from the boiler room and the engine room, and on Kongo, due to the shift of the tower behind the stern pipe, the bow of the plant consisted of three boiler rooms, and stern - only from the machine. The statement about the greater efficiency of the Japanese installation is rather controversial, but the refusal to place the main caliber tower between the chimneys, of course, increased its angle of fire and protected the superstructure from the effects of powder gases.

Battlecruiser Kongo, June 1914
Source: tsushima.su

Armament

The Japanese thoroughly revised the artillery armament of the cruiser Lion (eight 343-mm guns in four twin-gun turrets and sixteen 102-mm guns in armored bow and stern superstructures), increasing the caliber of the main and medium caliber guns and adding anti-mine caliber guns. According to a common version, initially it was supposed to use 305-mm guns as main caliber artillery on Kongo. However, having received confidential information from the British that "305-mm guns had a lower survivability and rate of fire than 343-mm installations", The Japanese decided to equip their cruiser with the latest English 356-mm guns with a barrel length of 45 calibers (a prototype was made and tested at the British training ground in Sheerness in March 1911). As a result, the Japanese ship received main caliber guns, "the firing range of which was limited only by the horizon line". Usually, for cruisers of the Kongo type of the early period, a firing range of 25,000 m is indicated at an elevation angle of 20 degrees, forgetting that the lead ship built in England exactly had an elevation angle of up to 25 degrees (according to some sources, the elevation angle of cruisers built in Japan was 20 degrees, others - 25).

Installation of 356-mm guns of the battlecruiser Kongo
Source: milay.ru

The main caliber guns were located in four twin-gun turrets (on Kongo and Hiei they were made multifaceted, on Haruna and Kirishima - rounded), placed in the diametrical plane of the ship (two - in the bow with an elevation, one (middle) - behind the third chimney, one more - in the stern). The aforementioned transfer of the midship tower by the pipes made it possible to increase from two to four the number of main battery guns firing into the stern. In addition to the numerical advantage, the transfer also gave a qualitative one, since at least four guns were required to quickly adjust the fire. For reasons unknown, Japanese cruisers Until 1917, there was no command and rangefinder post, which negatively affected their combat capabilities.

The medium-caliber artillery of the Kongo-class cruisers consisted of sixteen 152-mm guns with a barrel length of 50 calibers placed in single-gun casemates. Eight guns were installed on each side with a horizontal sector of fire of 130 degrees and a maximum elevation of 15 degrees (mass of a high-explosive projectile - 45.36 kg, firing range - 21,000 m, combat rate of fire - 4-6 rounds per minute). Most authors explain the increase in caliber by the experience gained by the Japanese fleet during the naval battles of the Russo-Japanese War. At the same time, the question why the Japanese armed their cruisers with absolutely useless 76-mm guns remains unanswered. The Kongo anti-mine artillery consisted of sixteen 76-mm guns with a barrel length of 40 calibers (eight guns were installed on each main battery turret (two), eight more onboard in the middle part of the ship on the open deck on top of the battery), as well as seven machine guns. Probably, the Japanese themselves initially had doubts about the need for such guns (on the three subsequent ships they limited themselves to installing eight guns on the open deck), but the 76-mm guns and machine guns were finally dismantled only in 1918. The Japanese were in no hurry to install anti-aircraft weapons: four 80-mm anti-aircraft guns were installed on cruisers only in 1923. Another mystery of the Kongo-class cruisers, which does not have a clear answer, is the installation of eight 533-mm underwater torpedo tubes on them (there were only two on the British cruiser Lion).

Booking

The cruiser Kongo retained the concept of booking its British prototype.

The main element of the cruiser's vertical protection was the main armor belt (thickness in the middle part - 229 mm). The main belt was closed in the bow by a traverse (thickness - 127-152 mm), and in the aft part - by bulkheads that closed behind the aft barbette (thickness - 152-203 mm). Above the main one was the upper armor belt, which covered the middle part of the hull and reached the upper deck (thickness in the middle part - 203 mm). The upper belt was closed by traverses near the barbette of the main tower (thickness - 152-254 mm) and behind the barbette of the third (middle) tower (thickness - 152 mm). The armor thickness of casemates was 152 mm, barbettes - 254 mm, main battery towers - 229 mm. The thickness of the armor of the bow conning tower was 254 mm, the aft cabin - 152 mm. It is easy to see that the cruisers received more protection from longitudinal fire from the bow than from the stern, which indicates plans to use the ships for attacking operations. The vertical protection of the battlecruisers Kongo and Lion was weaker than that of the battleships, but left them with a chance to survive even in battle with enemy dreadnoughts. So, during the Battle of Jutland, Lion retained its buoyancy after being hit by thirteen 305-mm shells and an explosion in the middle tower, and losses on the Princess Royal of the same type after being hit by thirteen "heavy projectiles" 22 killed and 81 wounded.

Significantly more criticism is caused by horizontal booking, which the English sailors with bitter irony called "cardboard". On Kongo, the thickness of the armored deck was only 38-51 mm, which was significantly less than, for example, the German armored cruiser Blucher. The lack of horizontal protection cost the British dearly during the Battle of Jutland: the battlecruiser Queen Mary (Lion type) sank as a result of a shell hitting the cellar of the bow towers through the deck (as a result of an explosion of ammunition, it broke into two parts and sank almost instantly).

There is no exact data on the mine protection of the cruisers, but it is known that the cruiser Haruna, which was blown up by a German mine, was seriously damaged, although it remained afloat and did not even lose its course. In general, the armor of Kongo-class cruisers was typical for battlecruisers - excessive for combat with enemy cruisers and insufficient for combating battleships.

At the time of its entry into service, Kongo was the most advanced battlecruiser in the world, which caused heated debate in the British Parliament:

“Why should a foreign power, even a friendly one, receive from British industry a more powerful ship than its domestic prototype?”

The Russo-Japanese War is one of the blackest pages in the Russian fleet. Probably because until now it attracts the attention of military historians and just people interested in military history Russia. Yes, it included not only victories and the almost complete defeat of the Russian Pacific and Baltic fleets by the Japanese Imperial Navy is a clear confirmation of this. This topic is interesting because never before has the Russian Imperial Navy been so modern, huge, strong and powerful. On the paper. After the events of that war, the Russian navy revived such ocean power only once - in the 70-80s of the XX century. So why did it happen? Why did the very modest Japanese fleet manage to utterly defeat its superior Russian fleet without significant losses. Although “on paper” it should have turned out exactly the opposite? These questions will be considered in this article. The reader is waiting for a lot of bare figures and facts. Without any fairy tales about "obsolete and weak armadillos", "short range", " large area Booking Japanese ships” and other, other, other beautiful fairy tales. That allegedly did not allow such "geniuses of naval thought" as Z.P. Rozhestvensky and V.K. Vitgeft to defeat the Japanese fleet under the command of Admiral Togo. Who was to blame for this - the technique or the people who were entrusted with this technique? The military in their failures always primarily blame the useless, in their opinion, military equipment. The people who created this technique, on the contrary, indicate the unprofessionalism and unsuitability of the military. So it has always been, and so it will continue to be. Let's analyze all this with dispassionate mathematical precision.

Fleet compositions

Before moving on to listing the military equipment that was at the disposal of the Russian and Japanese admirals, I consider it necessary to explain to the reader the general quality level of the fleets and classes of warships of that period. In an era when artillery was the god of war, all types of naval weapons systems could be counted on the fingers:

- Classic artillery pieces various calibers and purposes. At that time, they had already reached a completely mature level of development and, in their design, did not differ much from modern artillery systems, although they had less power.

- torpedoes. At that time, this type of weapon was just beginning to develop. Torpedoes of that period were much inferior to modern ones in terms of launch range and damaging effect.

- Mines. At that time, this type of sea was already a fully developed and effective means of combating enemy ships.

- Aviation. It was in its infancy at that time. Actually, aviation, then it can be called a stretch, because. it was just balloons, which were used only for reconnaissance and artillery fire adjustment at long distances.

In accordance with this, the classes of warships were distributed:

1. Home strike force fleet of that period were battleships. In the course of their evolution, battleships had many different subclasses: battery battleship, barbette battleship, tower battleship, I-class battleship, II-class battleship, coastal defense battleship, squadron battleship (aka predreadnought), dreadnought, superdreadnought and finally, battleship. All of them were the most armed and protected ships of their time. During the described period, squadron battleships, II-class battleships and coastal defense battleships were in service. These ships had a displacement of 4,000 tons to 16,000 tons, carried heavy armor and powerful universal artillery and mine-torpedo armament. At the same time, they could develop a speed of 14-18 knots. The more modern ships of this class were in the fleet, the more formidable the fleet was.

2. Same to the main striking force of the fleet can be attributed armored cruisers. Ships with a displacement of about 8000-10000 tons, also having good protection, albeit not as powerful as those of battleships. Artillery armament was also weaker, but such ships could reach speeds of 18-22 knots. The presence of armored cruisers in the squadron expanded its operational capabilities. It was on battleships and armored cruisers that the main task of fighting enemy warships and supporting troops in coastal operations lay down.

3. Auxiliary tasks for reconnaissance, patrol, interception, and the fight against small enemy ships and its amphibious transport fleet fell on armored cruisers of the 1st and 2nd ranks. These ships with a displacement of 4000-6000 tons had light armor and artillery armament from medium and small caliber guns. But they could develop a speed of 20-25 knots and had a long cruising range. For example, the famous 1st rank cruiser Aurora gives a good idea of ​​this type of warship.

4. For night torpedo attacks, the final finishing off of damaged enemy ships and the feasible performance of part of the functions of armored cruisers, the fleets had destroyers, Further destroyers, basic destroyers(destroyers), further torpedo boats And submarines. Destroyers are small ships that did not carry even a shadow of armor. They were armed with one or two torpedo tubes and several small cannons. They reached speeds of 25-30 knots and could operate together with squadrons in the near sea zone. Torpedo boats and submarines of that period, due to their imperfection, were the weapons of the near coastal zone.

The cruiser of the 1st rank "Aurora" took a direct part in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. The ship, 123 meters long, is still in good technical condition, although it is no longer on the move.

5. Also in the fleets of that time could be balloon carriers, minelayers And transport ships. Aerostat carriers - the predecessors of aircraft carriers - were designed to house reconnaissance balloons on them and were equipped with hangars for their storage. Minelayers were used for setting mines. The artillery armament of these ships consisted of several small cannons. Transport ships were used to transport troops, weapons, or other supplies. They could have several small guns or not have any weapons at all. Their sizes could vary widely.

After a brief digression into the characteristics of warships during the Russo-Japanese War, let's move on to comparing the forces of both sides.

Russian Imperial Navy (RIF). Despite all the vacillation and bureaucracy, by the beginning of the war with Japan, he was a formidable force. Since there is no way to list the entire combat strength with all auxiliary ships and support vessels in the format of this article, we will dwell in detail only on the main striking force of the fleet:

Table 1

The main strike power of the Russian fleet consisted precisely in these 38 ships. In total they had 88 guns caliber 305mm, 26 guns caliber 254mm, 8 - 229mm and 28 caliber 203mm. Smaller caliber guns already then belonged to medium-caliber artillery, although they retained important combat significance at that stage in the development of science and technology. In addition to these ships, the fleet included a large number of powerful cruisers of the 1st and 2nd ranks, both the latest and the oldest, many destroyers, minelayers, gunboats, transports, four multi-purpose submarines "Dolphin", "Trout", "Sturgeon" and "Catfish" and other ships. Subsequently, submarines (submarines) became one of the main classes of warships in the fleet.

The squadron battleship "Tsesarevich" is one of the most powerful battleships of its time. Its power is felt literally in its appearance - even today it looks quite modern. The ship was built according to the latest technology and had all the features of a modern battleship of the 2nd World War: a high board of an optimal, seaworthy form, advanced tower-like superstructures for placing observation posts and FCS elements at the maximum possible height. Modern artillery in twin turret gun mounts was located high, was fully mechanized and had large pointing angles. Very complex, multi-row differential armor was very powerful. The ship saw far along the horizon and could operate effectively and conduct aimed fire in any weather. Displacement of this floating tank: 13105 tons. The enemy was waiting for 68 guns of various calibers, 4 torpedo tubes, 20 mines of obstacles and 4 7.62mm machine guns "Maxim". All the weapons that were then in the Russian fleet - everything was installed on it. The OMS of this ship was also first-class.

The total total number of warships of all classes and ages in service with the Russian fleet by the time the war with Japan began is difficult to estimate, but according to rough estimates, it was about ~ 300 ships of various classes. To destroy such a large armored force, even today, it would require the involvement of very serious naval missile-carrying and aviation forces. Any of those battleships is not a cardboard-plastic Sheffield for you, and it will not burn and sink after being hit by a single Exocet anti-ship missile. It would also not be a strong exaggeration to say that that fleet was more powerful than, say, the Patriotic Navy of the USSR on the eve of the Great Patriotic War10. For a predominantly agricultural country, which was royal Russia, to create such a large ocean-going fleet was a real achievement. The flagship of the Russian Pacific Fleet was the newest squadron battleship Tsesarevich. The strike core of the Baltic Fleet were battleships of the Borodino type in the amount of four units. Already during the war, the fleet was replenished with the fifth battleship of this type, Glory.

Oryol is one of the ships of the Borodino series. It was an improved model of the "Tsesarevich". The outlines of its hull are somewhat reminiscent of the hulls of today's URO frigates built using the Stealth technology. It differed from the prototype in a new hull 121 meters long, improved armor, an improved design of a number of components and assemblies, and a slightly modified composition of auxiliary weapons. Displacement: 13516 tons. Like the prototype at the time of construction, it was considered one of the most powerful and advanced warships of its time.

Japanese Imperial Navy(IJN). After the defeat of the Chinese fleet at the Battle of Yalu, the Japanese fleet began to rapidly build up its combat potential. In building its fleet, Japan relied on British assistance. The resources of the Japanese economy were enough to create a grouping of six squadron battleships and six armored cruisers with similar characteristics. In addition, they had two more old battleships of the 1st class: Chin-Yen and Fuso, of which Chin-Yen was captured from the Chinese. Since the number of attack warships was small, some of the large-caliber guns were placed on light ones that were poorly suited for this purpose. armored cruisers type "Matsushima" and "Takasago". List of warships Japanese fleet, which carried more or less large calibers on board, it turns out like this:

table 2

Thus, the power of the Russian fleet, the Japanese fleet, together with light cruisers, absolutely unsuitable for confronting battleships, could oppose: 3 guns caliber 320mm, 28 guns caliber 305mm, 4 - 240mm guns and 30 - 203mm guns. A simple mathematical calculation shows that in terms of heavy weapons, the potential of the Japanese fleet was at least three times inferior to the Russian one. Of the 20 ships, no more than 12, that is, 60%, could be considered modern and truly suitable for a general battle. The characteristics of the rest did not leave them any decent chances of surviving under fire even from the old Russian squadron battleships. Of the 38 Russian attack ships, 35, that is, 92%, could be considered to one degree or another suitable for a general battle. The flagship of the Imperial Japanese Navy was the battleship Mikasa.

Squadron battleship "Mikasa". Its design was traditional for ships of this class of that period. Structurally, he repeated the British models: low side, low superstructures, mostly citadel armor, tower gun mounts only of the main caliber. Relatively low-power medium-caliber guns were located in side casemates low above the water. The ship has been more optimized for flat water combat rather than movement. At the same time, the large size of its body made all its characteristics very decent. Its displacement is 15352 tons. The closest analogue to this ship in the Russian Navy is the squadron battleship Retvizan.

The entire Japanese fleet consisted of about 100 warships of various classes, but unlike the Russian fleet, all these 100 ships were focused like a fist on one theater of operations. Of the ~ 300 warships of the Russian fleet, about 100 took a direct part in the war with Japan, that is, about 30%. Already during the war, the Japanese fleet was replenished with two Italian-built armored cruisers: Nissin and Kassuga.

Results: Without delving at this stage into all the nuances of manning ships, their maintenance and repair, combat training of personnel, the choice of commanders and assessing their professional suitability, but simply noting succinctly that "at some stage something went wrong" , we can say that all this gigantic armored power of the Russian fleet was lost in the most mediocre way. Moreover, without any serious damage to the enemy. Data on the losses of the Japanese fleet are given in table 3. They cause only a bitter smile.

Table 3

Total 24 combat and support ships. Of these, 13 ships (54%) were sunk by mines, 6 ships (25%) by artillery, 0 ships (0%) by torpedoes, 1 ship by the combined action of artillery and torpedoes (<1%) и от навигационных происшествий потери составили 4 корабля (17%). Затоплено и брошено экипажами в результате полученных повреждений 0 кораблей (0%). Сдано в плен так же 0 кораблей (0%). Тот факт, что более половины всех безвозвратно потерянных Японией кораблей флота было уничтожено минами – оружием по своему характеру пассивно - оборонительно типа, говорит о крайней пассивности и бездействии ударного Российского флота в период БД на море. Все боевые действия на море свелись к двум крупным сражениям, нескольким приличным боям и локальным боестолкновениям отдельных крупных кораблей и легких сил. Такое ощущение, что даже в бою, наши корабли воевали как будто из под палки, нехотя, без инициативно и всячески стараясь уклониться от сражения. В дальнейшем этому будет приведено не одно подтверждение, как будут и рассмотрены все случае отдельных «вспышек» прояснения сознания и боевого духа. Такая тактика наших высших адмиралов привела к потерям, с которыми можно ознакомиться в таблице 4.

Table 4

The total losses of the Russian Imperial Navy exceeded the losses of the US Navy during the four years of the Pacific War of 1941-1945. sad list of 64 lost ships distributed as follows: 20 ships (31%) were sunk by artillery fire, the Japanese failed to sink a single Russian ship with torpedoes alone - 0 (0%), 3 ships (5%) were destroyed by the joint action of artillery and torpedoes, 6 were killed by mines ships (9%). Abandoned / sunk / blown up by their crews as a result of damage from artillery fire / torpedoes / mines / simply hopelessness and not knowing what to do: 27 ships (42%!), Surrendered to the enemy 5 ships (8%), lost as a result of navigational damage 3 ships (5%). The most direct and most important responsibility for these gigantic losses, in addition to the tsarist regime itself, is borne by very specific people. These are admirals: Z.P. Rozhestvensky, V.K. Vitgeft, O.V. Stark. It was in their hands that all the fullness of power and the right to make all the fateful decisions that were made by them, taken or not taken, were concentrated. As for Admiral N.I. Nebogatov, he can be reproached for a lack of courage / will / spirit, but one cannot be reproached for being unprofessional or not knowing his business. Admiral S.O. Makarov generally showed himself to be a competent and active leader, who knew his job perfectly and was confident in his weapon. Admiral OA Enquist may have been a good specialist in his field, but for one reason or another he could not prove himself. We will consider the contribution to increasing the combat capability of the fleet of some of these people below.

Admiral Stepan Osipovich Makarov is one of the outstanding Russian admirals. Born in 1848. He died in 1904 aboard the battleship Petropavlovsk (was the flagship of the 1st Pacific Squadron during the repair of the Tsesarevich). The cause of death from a single mine was a fatal accident and shortcomings in the protection of Petropavlovsk. It was booked mainly as a citadel of the British and Japanese EDB type. When a mine was blown up in the bow of the ship, there was a sequential detonation of the torpedo ammunition, then the mines of the obstacle stored in the bow, and finally, the entire ammunition of the 1st gun mount of the main caliber. The 56-year-old admiral had little chance of escaping in such a situation (his place was not far from the epicenter of the last explosion). Under the command of this man, the Russian fleet had every chance of successfully defeating the enemy. A fatal combination of circumstances put an end to this scenario.

However, many modern post-Soviet researchers of that war very often turn that situation on its head. His "holiness", "adjutant general" Z.P. Rozhdestvensky simply cannot be to blame for anything. The outdated and useless, in their opinion, equipment, as well as the illiterate and ignorant crews of these "floating galoshes" who do not understand anything in the war, are to blame for everything. To justify such a position, many myths were invented, designed to “direct the blame” for the shameful defeat on civilian specialists, factories, MTK, anyone, but not officers. We will try to consider these myths below. So:

Semi-myth #1: Overloading of Russian battleships. Because of this, they, they say, died "so quickly." Here it is necessary to understand the difference. Civilian specialists create military equipment and carry out its current / medium / major repairs, and military specialists operate it, fight on it and carry out various maintenance. It is necessary to distinguish between construction and operational overload of ships. Construction overload - the fault of civilians. Operational overload is the fault of the military. With regards to construction overload. At that time, this phenomenon was massive and therefore it can even be called “normal”. Indeed, battleships of the Borodino type were calculated for a displacement of 13,516 tons, but in reality they contained 14,150 tons of iron. Construction overload amounted to 634 tons. But the level of engineering calculations of that period simply did not allow to calculate all the loads absolutely accurately. The construction overload of the Japanese battleship Mikasa was even greater - 785 tons, and at the same time, none of the Japanese military somehow complained about the deterioration in stability or other performance characteristics of the Mikasa. Operational overload - exceeding the carrying capacity of the ship. During the campaign of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, all battleships were filled to such an extent with coal, water, provisions and other supplies that the displacement of Borodino-class battleships, according to engineer V.P. Kostenko, reached 17,000 tons! What kind of fighting qualities are there with such a “weight”! No measures were taken to correct the situation even before the battle, as a result of which the displacement of attack ships of the Borodino type before the Battle of Tsushima was unacceptably large - 15275 tons. The offer of the Orel officers to prepare the ships for battle before the general battle, coupled with their radical unloading, was rejected on idiotic grounds: "The Eagle officers are too fond of playing war." This is the fault of the military, namely Z.P. Rozhdestvensky.

Myth #2: Low speed of Russian ships. This myth is explained simply. Speed ​​is needed for action. Those who do not take any active action do not need speed. The Japanese used the speed of their ships, which is called "to the fullest." The Russians used it only when their ships, for one reason or another (usually damage), were deprived of the "guardianship" of the commander (and it was already too late) and just to escape, and not overtake. In addition, the maximum speed of the ship depends not only on its passport data, but also on the specific technical condition, and on the combat damage that it received. The maximum squadron speed of the Japanese squadron was 15 knots, at most 15.5 knots and was limited by the speed of its slowest ship, the EBRB 1 Fuji (for technical reasons, it could not develop more than 15.5 knots). The squadron course of the 1st Pacific squadron was 14.5-15 knots. The EDB "Sevastopol" did not give out more than 15 knots due to a bent propeller blade. The squadron move of the 2nd Pacific squadron was not tested in practice, but theoretically it could be about 15-15. there was no ship in the squadron slower than 15.5 knots ("Nikolai-I" - 15.5 knots, "Navarin" - 15.8 knots, "Sisoy the Great" - 15.6 knots, BRBO type 2 "Ushakov" all gave out 16 knots each). During the night attempt to break away from the enemy, the old battleship Nikolai-I under the flag of N.I. Nebogatov, the heavily damaged Eagle, the Sevyanin and Apraksin BRBOs, as well as the II-rank cruiser Izumrud, easily supported speed 13-14 knots. Conclusion: The squadron course of the Russian attack ships, if it was lower than the Japanese one, then not by much. The fact that Z.P. Rozhdestvensky trudged in battle at a speed of 9 knots (only 17 km / h - slower than a river pleasure boat rolls), dragging transports behind him, is his fault, and not the low speed capabilities of his warships.

Myth #3. Russian ships were inferior in range to the Japanese. There were figures about the firing range of the Japanese at 82 cables and even at 100 (!) Cables. The myth is explained by the same thing as speed. The Japanese fought actively and used the capabilities of their artillery at 100%. Of course, some kind of aimed shooting at such gigantic distances for that time was out of the question. But the Japanese did sometimes shoot at long distances. Domestic ships almost always fired only in response and ceased fire as soon as the enemy stopped it. All without initiative and sluggish (more detailed descriptions of this will be given below). In order to shoot at long distances, three conditions must be met:

1. Artillery must have the technical ability to fire at such distances, in other words, be long-range enough. This is the responsibility of civilians.
2. The fire control system of warships must provide a sufficiently high probability of hitting a target at long distances. This is also the responsibility of civilians.
3. Artillerymen of all levels must have proper training and practice in organizing and conducting firing at such distances. It is good to own the military equipment entrusted to them and be able to handle it correctly. The military is responsible for this.

Unfortunately, the “weak link” here turned out to be the military. Regarding technical issues. At 100kbt, one single Japanese ship could shoot - the armored cruiser "Kassuga" of Italian construction. And only from a single 254mm gun. His 203mm guns, like his twin brother Nissin, fired at 87kbt. As for the new Japanese battleships, their main battery artillery was of two types. 305mm / L42.5 EDB guns "Fuji" and "Yashima" at a maximum angle of + 13.5 ° could fire at maximum 77kbt. Slightly more powerful 305mm / L42.5 guns "Mikasa", "Asahi", "Hatsuse" and "Sikishima" had a lower maximum elevation angle - + 12.5 ° and fired at 74 kbt. The maximum firing range of 203mm main battery guns of Japanese armored cruisers such as Asama, Yakumo, etc. was only 60-65kbt, which was approximately at the level of modern 152mm medium-caliber gun mounts of Russian ships. The issue of ensuring at least the technical possibility of firing at the maximum possible distances Russian specialists paid, perhaps, the greatest attention after the German fleet. The elevation angle of the main caliber guns of Russian battleships was +15°, +25° and even +35°. The squadron battleship Pobeda was considered the most long-range in the entire Russian fleet. It was equipped with more modern 254mm / L45 guns, which differed from the previous "10-inch guns" in increased weight, strength and rigidity of the barrel. As a result, its 225-kilogram shells of the main caliber flew at 113kbt at an initial speed increased to 777m / s. The 254mm guns of the other two ships of this series, Oslyaba and Peresvet, as well as the Admiral Apraksin BRBO, fired at 91kbt. All "12" battleships with 305mm/L40 guns fired at 80kbt at +15°. BRBO "Ushakov" and "Sevyanin" fired at 63kbt. The range of fire of the old squadron battleships was less: for the Navarin - 54kbt, for the Nikolai-I - 51kbt for 229mm / L35 and 49kbt for 305mm / L30 guns.

As for the FCS, its 4x optics and rangefinders with a base of 1200 mm even then made it possible to conduct more or less effective fire at a distance of up to ~ 60kbt (10-12km). Russian battleships of new and latest types received the latest fire control system "mod.1899". Its structure can be judged from the description of the Oryol squadron battleship:

SUAO mod.1899. A set of instruments was first presented at an exhibition in Paris in 1899 and was installed on many RIF battleships. It was the prototype of modern central aiming systems. The basis of the system was two sighting posts (VP) - one on board.

Pancratic, optical, monocular devices of these posts - central aiming sights (VCN) had a variable magnification - 3x-4x. The search for a target and aiming a weapon at it was carried out by the VP operator. When aiming at the target, the VCN was used to determine the elevation angle of the target relative to the diametrical plane of the ship, and the tracking system associated with it automatically set this angle with an arrow in the receiving instruments of the main 8-turret guns and batteries of 75 mm guns of the ship. After that, the gunners-operators (commanders) carried out horizontal aiming of their installations until the angle of rotation of the AU was combined with the elevation angle of the target (the so-called principle of “combining the arrows”) and the target fell into the field of view of the gun optical sights. Optical, pancratic, monocular sights of the Perepelkin system had a variable magnification - 3x-4x and a field of view angle of 6 - 8 degrees changing in accordance with it. To illuminate the target at night, six combat searchlights with a mirror diameter of 750 mm were used. The next step was to determine the distance to the target. To do this, in the conning tower there were two rangefinder stations - one on board. They were equipped with Barr and Studd horizontal base rangefinders with a base of 1200 mm.

The rangefinder measured the distance and, using the rangefinder key, the data was automatically entered into the receiving devices of the conning tower, central post, 8 main turret guns and batteries of 75 mm guns. To control the correctness of data transmission, there was a feedback system with a control rangefinder dial, the readings of which were compared with those entered into the receiving devices. The sighting posts and rangefinder stations were located inside the conning tower on the right and left sides (a pair on each side), which is why the Eagle's conning tower had an oval shape in the transverse direction from the center plane of the ship. A set of instruments and a magnetic compass in the conning tower showed the senior artillery officer his own course and speed, direction and strength of the wind. He determined the course and speed of the target approximately “by eye”. Having data on his own speed and course, direction and strength of the wind, deviation, type of target, elevation angle of the target and distance to it, estimating the approximate speed and course of the target, the senior artillery officer, using firing tables, manually (on paper) made the necessary calculations and calculated the necessary amendments to the lead on VN and GN. I also chose the type of AU and the type of projectiles necessary to hit this target. After that, the senior artillery officer transmitted data for guidance to the AU, from which he intended to hit the target. For this purpose, in the conning tower and the central post there was a set of master pointers, which, through 47 cable cores, transmitted data to the receiving devices in the AC and 75 mm batteries. The whole system worked at voltage Ur=23V through a 105/23V transformer. In the case of centralized fire control, they transmitted data on the angles of vertical and horizontal guidance, the type of projectiles used. After receiving the necessary data, the gunners-operators of the selected AU installed the guns at the given angles (corrected the initial installation according to the VCN) and loaded them with the selected type of ammunition. After performing this operation, the senior artillery officer, who was in the conning tower, at the moment when the inclinometer showed "0", set the handle of the firing indicator device to the sector corresponding to the selected fire mode "Fraction", "Attack" or "Short alarm", in accordance with which AU opened fire. This mode of centralized fire control was the most effective. In the event of a failure of a senior artillery officer or the impossibility for any other reason to carry out centralized fire control, all 305 mm, 152 mm guns and a battery of 75 mm guns switched to group (plutong) or single fire. In this case, the instruments transmitted data about their course, their speed, direction and strength of the wind, the elevation angle of the target, the distance to it, but all calculations were made by the commander of the AU or battery. This mode of fire was less effective. In the event of a complete defeat of fire control devices, personnel of the conning tower and data transmission circuits, all AUs switched to independent fire. In this case, the choice of target, and aiming at it, was carried out by calculating a specific AU using only a gun optical sight, which sharply limited its effectiveness and range. Guidance of torpedo tubes was carried out using ring sights with the same tracking system as that of the VP for onboard 381mm TA or by turning the entire hull of the ship for the bow and stern 381mm TA. This fire control system ensured the high efficiency of the use of naval artillery and torpedoes against various targets and made it possible to "lead" two targets at the same time - one from each side. However, it should be noted that the officers and commanders of the Russian squadron battleships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron did not master this system well. For external communications, the ship had a radio station "Slyabi-Arko". It was located in the radio room on the first tier of the bow superstructure and provided communication at a distance of 180-200 km.

There is a third point left. Teachings and combat training. In this aspect, the Russian fleet, of course, lagged behind the Japanese. The Japanese regularly conducted exercises and trained in shooting. Since the new fire control devices were then too complicated to understand their operation (and even more so to combine them into a system) by ordinary sailors, they developed, if not the most ideal, but the most effective from the point of view of those specific conditions, fire control and fire control methods. shooting. One of them is the so-called. "the art of massive fire". Its essence is that without any use of the SLA (having only once measured the distance), they begin to shoot extremely actively with medium and small caliber artillery. After that, they wait for the target to be covered. All adjustments to fire are carried out not by changing the input data and adjusting the fire of the guns themselves, but by directly changing the position of a group of ships (closer - further to the target). Despite the gigantic consumption of medium-caliber shells, such tactics at that time bore fruit. Moreover, the Japanese goals (that is, our ships) contributed to its success in the best possible way. At the same time, this method of "massive fire" was never used by anyone else. Perhaps due to the fact that the enemies were no longer so stupid. As for our gunners, they worked according to instructions. And they tried to master the work of the SLA. It didn't work out for everyone. If the lower ranks of the artillery were somehow still able to master their subject, then almost no effort was made by the higher ranks. As for the firing range, the command of the 1st Pacific Squadron, albeit belatedly, but realized the role of new, powerful and long-range guns, as well as modern SLA. And the beginning seems to be developing measures adequate to the current situation. But time was already hopelessly lost. The command of the 2nd Pacific Squadron was still in happy ignorance of the combat capabilities of enemy and own ships. All those criminally rare firing exercises were carried out at a distance of no further than 20kbt. Thus, the gunners of the 2nd Pacific Squadron entered the battle with the Japanese, having no practice of firing at long distances at all. The exception is the 3rd Pacific squadron of Admiral N.I. Nebogatov (merged into the 2nd Pacific squadron). Admiral Nebogatov showed himself to be a good specialist in artillery. He trained his gunners well to shoot from the most extreme possible distances. As luck would have it, the squadron of Rear Admiral N.I. Nebogatov consisted only of obsolete or small ships. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the Nikolai-I battleship was in fact the oldest and weakest battleship of the Russian Pacific Fleet, its fire turned out to be almost the most effective! The old ship, still firing with charges of black powder, achieved hits at distances up to 50 cables, i.e. at the maximum possible range for their artillery! In all likelihood, it was his 305mm and 229mm shells that inflicted heavy damage on the Japanese armored cruiser Asama, which had to withdraw from the battle. Thus, the cruiser "Varyag" was to some extent avenged. Unfortunately, this combat training did not affect the crews of the latest attack ships, otherwise, even with such a “brilliant” commander as Z.P. Rozhdestvensky, the Japanese could probably be crushed by the power of the Borodino.

Half myth #4. Bad shells on Russian ships. They, they say, did not penetrate armor well and practically did not explode. Russian "12-inch" battleships used 305mm armor-piercing and fragmentation shells of the 1887 model, weighing 331.7kg. "10-inch" ships had 254mm armor-piercing shells of the 1892 model weighing 225.2kg. Japanese battleships fired 305mm armor-piercing and high-explosive shells weighing 386kg. Let's start with armor-piercing. Their comparative characteristics are shown in Table 5.

Table 5

As can be seen from Table 5, all shells are quite worthy of each other. What is surprising is that the 254mm shells of Russian ships, with almost half the kinetic energy compared to 305mm shells, nevertheless, were almost not inferior to them in armor penetration. As for the armor penetration itself, Table 5 shows that the characteristics of both Russian and Japanese armor-piercing shells made them ineffective against the powerful armor of battleships at long distances. Their effective use against heavily armored targets was limited by distance.<20-30 кабельтовых. На больших расстояниях шансов пробить защиту ЖВЧ любого броненосца практически не было. Эти данные подтвердила и реальная практика. Несмотря на все усилия русских и японских артиллеристов за время сражений так ни разу и не удалось пробить Крупповскую броневую плиту толще чем 152мм. Так же стоит отметить, что для 305мм/L35 орудий «Наварина» существовали и более тяжелые 305мм снаряды массой 455кг. Но они почему то не были включены в боекомплект этого корабля. Использование таких «чемоданов» в современных артустановках с орудиями 305мм/L40 у новых кораблей – вопрос требующий дальнейших исследований, так как доподлинно не известно, были ли приспособлены лотки МЗ 9 у новейших «Бородинцев» и «Цесаревича» к приему таких более длинных снарядов. Потому на расстояниях свыше 30 кабельтовых имело смысл переходить на осколочные и фугасные снаряды. Их сравнительные характеристики приведены в таблице 6.

Table 6

At first glance, it seems that Japanese high-explosive shells are completely superior to Russian ones3. In part, this is true. Especially if we add pyroxylin humidity increased from 10% to 30% to our shells. But not everything is so great. First, the fuses on Japanese high-explosive shells were set to act instantly at the slightest touch. This led to a series of explosions of these shells right in the barrels of Japanese guns, which naturally led to the failure of these guns. Secondly, for any armored object, it is the explosion inside its armored body that is terrible. Even a powerful high-explosive explosion outside is not capable of causing serious damage, but will only spoil the “cosmetics”. Therefore, armor-piercing and semi-armor-piercing shells with delayed action fuses are primarily good for combating armored objects. Japanese non-shells were very effective against light cruisers, but it turned out to be extremely difficult to destroy the Borodinos, which were booked from head to toe, albeit overloaded. The Japanese themselves were well aware of this, which is why, along with land mines, they actively used armor-piercing shells against Russian battleships. Conclusion - the myth about the bad shells of Russian ships, of course, is not a myth in the full sense of the word - this is partly a fact. And the blame for this lies with civilian specialists, but it is also not worth exaggerating its significance beyond measure. The shells of the opponents were not so ideal either.

Myth #5. Small area of ​​​​booking Russian ships. At that time, there were two main armor schemes for heavy ships in the world: English, also known as the “all or nothing” scheme, and French - common. According to the first one, the ship's HP is covered with the thickest possible armor, and all other parts of it either have weak protection or are completely devoid of it. It was according to this scheme that the Japanese and many of our battleships were booked. However, in the design of the newest ships "Tsesarevich" and the series "Borodino", domestic designers, taking the best of both schemes as a basis, brought the booking of these ships to perfection. The protection of the Tsesarevich and the Borodino series turned out to be so powerful, so modern that, in principle, it corresponded to the battleships and large heavy cruisers of the Second World War. This provided reliable protection for these ships even from dreadnought "suitcases". The battle of "Glory" with the powerful German dreadnoughts "Koenig" and "Kronprinz-Wilhelm" in 1917 clearly proved this. Despite the received seven 305mm shells (each weighing 405.5kg), three of which hit below the waist in the underwater part of the hull, the Slava battleship did not receive serious damage. And if it weren’t for the watertight door that was not closed because of someone’s carelessness (and if it weren’t for the revolution), then it would have been possible to continue to fight. The armor scheme of the battleship "Eagle" is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1 8

The most heavily protected area in the center of the ship at the waterline approximately 60m long and approximately 0.8m high has protection: 194mm/0° + 40mm/30° + 40mm/0° = equivalent to 314mm Krupp armor4. This was more than enough to withstand any armor-piercing projectiles of the time. At the same time, all HVCH, artillery, torpedo tubes, as well as areas near the surface of the water were also protected by sufficiently powerful armor. And the total thickness of the armor of all armored decks ranged from 72mm, 91mm, 99mm, 127mm, 142mm, 145mm - the figures are not bad for the huge battleships of the Second World War. The protection of Japanese ships was much simpler and approximately corresponded to our battleships of the Poltava, Retvizan, Sisoy Veliky, etc. projects. In addition, all Japanese battleships, with the exception of Mikasa, were clad in Harvey's armor. The anti-projectile resistance of the Harvey armor correlates with the Krupp one as 0.8 to 1, that is, the Harveyev armor was inferior in the anti-projectile resistance of the Krupp armor (on new Russian ships) by 20%. Only the flagship Japanese battleship Mikasa had really powerful armor. In addition, one should not forget that half of the Japanese attack ships were armored cruisers, the level of protection of which, in comparison with squadron battleships, was even lower.

Semi-myth #6: Large sizes of sighting slots and embrasures in Russian ships. The width of the sighting slots on the battleship "Tsesarevich" and the series "Borodino" was huge 380mm. It was a forced measure. the designers placed in the conning tower all the elements of the SLA of these ships, incl. DS, VP and ring sights of onboard torpedo tubes. To ensure normal visibility of all this optics, it was necessary to make slots of such a width. The desire of the designers to place the entire FCS under the armor of the conning tower can be explained. Firstly, the SLA has not yet developed so strongly and the weight and size characteristics of its elements still made it possible to arrange them in a BR - the most protected place in the upper part of the ship.

Secondly, the typical battle distances of that time: 30-60kbt meant that in addition to rare single hits by large-caliber shells, the ship was simultaneously under a hail of small and medium-caliber shells: 75mm, 76mm, 152mm. It is obvious that the bulky and poorly protected KDP, sighting posts and other elements of the SLA, if they were openly located, would be destroyed by these seemingly harmless shells in the very first minutes of the battle. However, with regard to protection against shells, the conning towers of domestic ships were well designed.

They had a mushroom-shaped roof protruding beyond the side armor of the cabin and anti-fragmentation visors. As a result, the penetration of shells into the conning tower was practically excluded, which was confirmed in real combat practice. Despite the huge number of hits that fell on Russian battleships, there were practically no cases of penetration of shells into the BR. However, the command staff, nevertheless, was badly damaged by fragments, while being inside the conning tower. But this is primarily due to the gigantic number of hits and the high performance of Japanese high-explosive fragmentation shells. But, as you know, everything is known in comparison. The famous Soviet writer A.S. Novikov wrote in his novel “Tsushima”: “The viewing slots in Japanese ships were made in such a way that even a small fragment could not penetrate through them into the conning tower ...” With all due respect to Alexei Silych, you need to understand that he was not a specialist in the field of shipbuilding and could only assess the perfection of the design of the conning towers of Japanese ships only visually. A photograph will help to estimate the size of the sighting slots of Japanese armadillos. In addition, the Japanese would not have been Japanese if they had not decided on a step that was very original from the point of view of straightforward European logic - the commanders of the Japanese attack ships, Vice Admiral Togo and Rear Admiral Kamimura, preferred not to "climb" into the conning towers of their ships at all! Admiral Togo spent the entire battle, exposing his chest hung with epaulettes and medals to all the winds (and shells) on the upper navigation bridge of the Mikasa. That is, quite openly ... By an evil coincidence, a Russian 305mm fragmentation projectile that exploded right above the bridge killed and wounded everyone on it. Except…. EXCEPT…. Of course, Vice Admiral Heihachiro Togo. Admiral Kamimura spent the same entire battle on the combat mars of the mainmast and the same remained alive. The fact that both Japanese admirals remained alive and did not even receive serious injuries only testifies to the extreme luck of their accompanying and evil fate pursuing Russian ships throughout this war. In addition, the very low characteristics of domestic fragmentation and high-explosive shells also affected.

The conning tower of the Japanese battleship Mikasa. View from the stern of the ship. It can be seen that the size of the sighting slots is also very decent, although smaller than that of our ships. In addition, this felling does not have “eyebrows” in the form of an overhanging mushroom-shaped roof, so penetration into its shells falling at an angle is, in principle, possible. Admiral Togo spent the entire battle two floors above ...

As for the size of the embrasures... The dimensions of the embrasures in the turrets of the Japanese main gun mounts were smaller than those of the Russians, but the vertical pumping angle of their guns was also smaller, we should not forget about this. In addition, the turrets of the AU GK of Russian battleships were streamlined and protected by Krupp armor 254 mm thick, which made them invulnerable to any shells of that time at typical battle distances. The rotating parts of the Japanese AU GC EBR "Fuji" and "Yashima" were armored much more modestly - only 152mm and were potentially vulnerable to AP shells from Russian ships. The Japanese battleship "Fuji", which ours really pierced through 152mm armor of a 12" gun mount (thus confirming my logical conclusions) almost exploded. after that, a fire started and the charges in the tower and the supply pipe had already ignited. The fire miraculously “extinguished itself” with water from a torn pipeline, which we again attribute to the “conscience” of evil fate. But all this applies only to artillery of large (main) caliber. The level of any type of protection for the 152mm turret gun mounts of the latest Russian battleships was two orders of magnitude higher than the protection of medium-caliber guns and their crews on Japanese ships. This photo doesn't really need comments, but still:

The battery deck of the Japanese battleship Mikasa. You don't need to have a wild imagination to imagine what will happen to the calculations of all these guns, if at least one more or less decent shell explodes here ... Just meat. This design is no different from the technical solutions used in wooden battleships of the sailing era. The size of their “embrasures” also seems to hint ... Good gates. On Russian battleships of the Borodino type, 75mm anti-mine guns were located in separate casemates with 76mm armor on their walls in a circle. There are many historians who are happy to criticize the 152mm twin turret guns of the latest Russian battleships. They somehow forgot that all the medium-caliber artillery of the battleship Oslyabya, which was located in the same casemate installations as on the Mikas, was completely destroyed after some 20 minutes after the start of the battle.

The conclusion clearly suggests itself that the Japanese ships simply had good high-explosive fragmentation shells (for all their shortcomings), and not super invulnerable felling, ultra-small loopholes or something else. And most importantly, the Japanese samurai fought, and did not sluggishly fight back like ours. There is a good phrase from the film "Antikiller". In this case, of course, exaggerated, but the essence reflects quite accurately: “Because they are at war, and we are at work ...” Comparative characteristics of the most basic types of attack ships of the Russian and Japanese fleets are given in table 7.

Table 7

After analyzing all the myths and facts listed above, one gradually comes to the conclusion that the most shameful defeat in the entire history of the Russian Navy does not lie in the plane of the quality of military equipment or the incompetence of civilian specialists. Of course, they also had sins. The main one is the frail OFS 5 and weak torpedo armament. Powerful, long-range 457mm torpedoes were carried on board only by battleships of the Poltava type.

The rest were more modest, caliber 381mm. But there is a difference - whether to approach the "wounded animal" at 2-3 km, or at 900 meters. However, torpedoes are generally the forte of the Japanese. They scared the Americans quite a bit with their huge Long Lances (which didn’t help the Japanese in other ways). But torpedoes are not the main thing! So why did this happen? And who is to blame for this? The main responsibility for such a defeat lies with:

1. Admirals Z.P. Rozhestvensky, V.K. Vitgeft, O.V. Stark.
2. Evil fate, pursuing our fleet throughout this war.

Let's look at these two main reasons for the defeat. Point one. Could it be that these three people were clinical idiots who with their own hands strangled all the foundations of combat training, operation and maintenance of the ships and vessels entrusted to them? They really strangled all the basics, but they were not idiots. These were people of a kind of ability that were in demand in the then tsarist fleet. In the fleet, whose leadership seriously believed that victory could be achieved only by demonstrating the latest weapons to the enemy, warriors were not needed. And business executives were needed. So that the ships would clearly keep the formation, not “pull back”, always shine with new paint, the curbs on the shore were also painted and all the leaves on the ground were turned bright side up for the visit of “His Majesty”. All three were the best suited to the implementation of such activities. Well, it’s worth recognizing that they could also solve the problem of logistics (moving over long distances). Logistics, to some extent, became one of the reasons for the defeat of the 2nd Pacific squadron. The Japanese fleet entered the battle fresh, rested and prepared. The Russian squadron, after six months of the hardest voyage, immediately entered the battle. And the fact that the combat potential of the fleet decreases by N% for every 1000 km away from the home base has been known for quite some time.

As for the second point, we come to one of the most interesting questions of that war - what could we do then? The author of these lines had to read many "alternative" versions of the Tsushima battle. They all started with the same thing: “But if - (Makarov commanded / the battleships were not overloaded / the shells exploded well / your version), thenOOOO ... ... ... "Then followed, maybe quite logical, but completely delusional with historical point of view of reasoning. Historical processes have great inertia and changing just one fact of history to radically change the entire subsequent chain of events is simply unrealistic. To do this, it is necessary to change all previous events and fateful decisions in a historical retrospective for many years BEFORE a significant date in order to change the very logical chain that preceded it. This simply does not make any sense, which is clear to any student. The most "delicious" alternative is obvious - Admiral Makarov did not die, but continued to command the 1st Pacific Squadron. But it is almost impossible to calculate what would be reliable in this case. Therefore, without going into details regarding the 1st Pacific Squadron, which is inactive and operating in cooperation with the ground forces, we will dwell in detail on the 2nd squadron of Z.P. Rozhdestvensky. What could she count on exhaustively drawn into the Tsushima Strait on the evening of May 13, 1905, when ship radio stations had already detected the presence of an enemy fleet over the horizon? So let's try to calculate what the 2nd Pacific Squadron could do if ... No, no - don't be scared. If only she was simply lucky in battle this time. And two. Rozhdestvensky, no - he didn’t change to another equally gifted figure, but he would simply become seriously ill and spend the entire battle in the ship’s first-aid post, without interfering with anyone to fight. Calculations show that in this case it would not have been possible to win anyway. The maximum that the 2nd Pacific Squadron could count on in this case was to bring the game to a draw.

So. The virtual reality. Morning May 14th. Admiral Völkersam is dead. Admiral Rozhdestvensky in a cabin in serious condition. Admirals Nebogatov and Enquist do not know about this and therefore do not worry in the slightest. The squadron is commanded by someone on the battleship "Prince Suvorov". And so:

“At the beginning of the sixth, our signalmen and midshipman Shcherbachev, armed with binoculars and spyglasses, noticed a steamer on the right, quickly approaching us. Approaching forty cables, he lay down on a course parallel to us. But he walked like this for only a few minutes and, turning to the right, disappeared into the morning mist. He had a course of at least sixteen knots. They could not identify his flag, but his behavior immediately led to suspicion - undoubtedly, it was a Japanese intelligence officer. It would be necessary to immediately send two fast cruisers after him. Would they have sunk it or not, but at least they would have clarified an extremely important question: are we open to the enemy or are we still in obscurity? And in accordance with this, the line of conduct for the squadron should have been determined. But Admiral Rozhdestvensky took no action against the mysterious vessel.

"Vladimir Monomakh" remained intact. Enemy shells made undershoots or overshoots, and only one of them hit him. Commander Popov rejoiced. When the senior artilleryman Nozikov approached him, he, trying to shout over the hubbub of the chickens that had not yet calmed down, solemnly spoke:
- But we deftly butchered it! As the strekacha asked! It rushed away from us at full speed. ”

In place of the previously sunk cruiser Izumi, there was another similar cruiser. After it turned to the right and began to move away, already having a trim on the nose and serious damage, the Vladimir Monomakh cruiser, squeezing out all 16-17 knots from its old worn-out vehicles, caught up with the damaged Japanese cruiser and finally finished it off. The forces are simply not equal, the Japanese had no chance and there was nothing to stand stupidly watching him run away. 32nd place. The destroyers were also lucky:

“About eleven o’clock, a second destroyer appeared on the right ahead, which intended to cross the course of the Loud. Kern ordered to develop the fullest speed. The rear destroyer began to lag behind, and the one on the right approached and opened fire. There was a fight with unequal forces. It was necessary to decide on something daring to get out of a difficult situation. And Commander Kern went for it. The specialty of a miner suggested to the commander the idea that the time had come to defuse the two surviving mine vehicles at the enemy. They were located on the upper deck. By his order, both mines were prepared for firing. "Loud" made a sharp turn and rushed at the enemy walking behind. As they later learned, it was a Shiranui fighter. Kern decided to blow it up, and then to conduct an artillery duel with another destroyer. The distance between the Shiranui and the Loud was shrinking fast. The team knew that the decisive moment had come. The commanders stepped up the fire. But at these moments the main role was assigned to the miners, who stood ready at their devices. Suddenly, around them, flashing with a short lightning, smoke curled up like a whirlwind on a dusty road. From the fire and smoke, something heavy separated and flew overboard. Chief Officer Paskin was pushed back against the casing by the rear funnel. After recovering, he rushed to the site of the explosion. Miners Abramov and Telegin were lying dead near the apparatus, and only a cap remained from the mine conductor Bezdenezhnykh, thrown to the rack of the side rail. Lieutenant Paskin put miners Tsepelev, Bogoryadtsev and Ryadzievsky to the apparatus. The enemy was already approaching the traverse. The distance to it did not exceed two cables. From the bridge, the commander ordered to release a mine from apparatus No. 1. But it barely moved out and, hitting the side with its tail, fell into the water like a log.

- Drowned, you bastard! - the sharp-sighted signalman Skorodumov shouted on the bridge and cursed strongly. The commander, who was closely following the actions of the miners, clenched his fists and, either in response to him, or to clarify to himself what had happened, he muttered through his teeth: “The gunpowder did not ignite well - it got damp. The second mine, fired after the enemy, went right to the target. They were already waiting for an explosion, but having reached the surface of the sea almost to the very stern, she suddenly turned to the side, thrown by the seething streams from the propellers. In this attack, all the advantages were on the side of the “Loud.”
"Loud" was lucky and the torpedo was serviceable. The Japanese destroyer Shiranui quickly set off for Yasukuni Shrine.

“The enemy, obviously, shot his mines last night, and his devices were fixed in a marching way.”

The destroyer Loud fired a second torpedo at the second Japanese destroyer, but it managed to dodge and an artillery duel began. The excellent training of Kern's crew left him no chance. The Japanese destroyer was fatally damaged, lost speed and sank after some time. The destroyer "Gromky" showed the highest class, destroying two Japanese destroyers at once in a duel and safely reached Vladivostok. The 32nd and 33rd places are occupied by Japanese destroyers. Days earlier, the duel of armored giants continued. The Oslyabya, the Suvorov and the Alexander III had already been lost (the last two were still afloat and were still firing). Later, the crew of the destroyer "Buyny" staged lynching, throwing Vice Admiral Z.P. Rozhestvensky overboard with the wording "Missing." The destroyer commander N.N. Kolomeytsev did not support the idea, but treated the situation with understanding. Admiral Heihachiro Togo stood on the upper navigation bridge along with his entire staff. A Russian 305mm fragmentation projectile hit the foremast at the level of people's heads and exploded. From all those who were on the upper navigation bridge, incl. and Admiral Heihachiro Togo, only shapeless stumps remained. So in one second the Japanese squadron was completely decapitated. And although the command quickly passed into the hands of Rear Admiral Kamimura, the actions of the Japanese began to give off a slight hysteria, which usually happened to them, as soon as something started to go against their plan.

The effectiveness of the fire of the Japanese squadron immediately fell so much that the battleship "Borodino" had enough power and survivability to "drag" the battle before dusk. Admiral Kamimura gave the order to stop the pursuit. After the onset of silence, the Borodino battleship, controlled only by sailors and having vehicles in perfect working order, without unnecessary complexes, increased its speed to the maximum possible 17-18 knots (there was no sense from it in battle anyway), keeping the course N / O-23 °. The Eagle, who received the same amount, tried to keep up with him, but due to the armor plate turned “against the wool” on the bow at the waterline, the speed did not rise above 16.5 knots. The rest of the ships with the flagship "Nikolai-I" trailed behind at a speed of about 14 knots. The cruiser "Emerald" went with them in complete darkness without searchlights. The news of the death of Admiral Togo with his entire staff had a depressing effect on the Japanese sailors. The activity of the Japanese fleet dropped sharply, while in Tokyo they decided what actions to take next. This hitch was enough for the battleships "Borodino", "Orel", "Nikolai-I" and the BRBO "Apraksin" and "Sevyanin" to reach Vladivostok, where they were taken under the protection of the powerful armored cruisers "Russia" and "Gromoboy ". As a result, under the most favorable set of circumstances and maximum luck, the Russian 2nd Pacific Squadron could additionally destroy the Japanese battleships Fuji, Chin-Yen, six assorted cruisers and two destroyers. At the same time, part of the same break through to Vladivostok, retaining such ships as Borodino, Eagle, Nicholas-I, Apraksin, Sevyanin, Emerald and Loud. Purely in terms of the number of sunk and destroyed ships, this is of course still a loss, but not so shameful, which promised peace on more favorable terms with the preservation of the Kuril Islands for Russia. Both admirals, both Russian and Japanese, die in this virtual reality. Only a person who does not understand the essence of those deep crisis processes that at that time already covered all of tsarist Russia can count on something more, for example, on the complete defeat of the Japanese fleet at Tsushima. So you can get lucky - once in 1000 years. The absurd death of S.O. Makarov showed that the war "didn't work out" from the very beginning.

Lessons of war

Lesson #1. It is impossible to defeat the enemy with only one presence, even the most modern weapons. It is necessary to be able to use the entrusted military equipment and to master all the methods of its use to perfection. How are things going with combat training in our fleet today? I would like to think that it is better than in 1904. Probably better.

Lesson #2. Military equipment is a complex mechanism, even one broken screw of which can deprive or, in any case, limit its functionality. In the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, such “broken screws” were overmoistened pyroxylin in shells, the low power of the OFS and overloading ships beyond the norm with all sorts of nonsense. And what is the technical condition of the ships and submarines of the modern Russian fleet? And how many “broken screws” they have, despite the fact that they are immeasurably more complicated than even the most modern ships of the Borodino type and there are significantly more “cogs” in them.

Lesson #3. The ships of that period (meaning battleships), unlike modern ones, had phenomenal strength and survivability with a relatively compact size and forgave admirals and commanders for such mistakes that no modern ship will ever forgive. In other words, with the same "style of command" today, the defeat of the fleet will be an order of magnitude even more terrible and fleeting than it took place in the Tsushima battle. In order not to be unfounded, you can see photos that explain everything.

Battleship "Eagle" (13516t, 121.2m) after the battle of Tsushima. According to V.P. Kostenko, during the battle he received at least 300 hits. However, during the inspection of the ship in the Japanese dock, it turned out that the Eagle received 76 hits. Of these, 5 are 305mm shells (386kg), 2 are 254mm shells (226.5kg), 9 are 203mm shells (113.4kg), 39 are 152mm shells (45.4kg) and 21 are 76mm shells (~6kg). The total mass of steel that got into the ship is a hefty 5.3 tons. From it explosives from half a ton to a ton. The ship survived and retained about 10-15% of its original combat potential.

The British destroyer Sheffield (4350t, 125m) after a single hit by the AM-39 Exocet anti-ship missiles weighing 655kg. The rocket did not explode. However, this cardboard-plastic boat completely burned down and sank. If the reader thinks that our project 956E is much stronger, then he is deeply mistaken.

How can one explain the construction of such ships that do not carry even the shadow of a reservation, it is difficult to say. They even have aluminum and magnesium hull steel, which burns very well. Maybe speed? But speed in modern naval warfare is no longer the determining factor.

Battleship "Eagle" in a creatively redesigned version, with armor closed dynamic protection "Relikt", with six AK-130 mounts instead of 152mm, with added anti-ship missiles launched through 305mm main gun barrels, with AK-630 instead of 47mm guns, with radar, with a TVP, with a gas turbine power plant (speed from 25 to 35 knots), with operational-tactical missiles RK-55 "Granat" with nuclear warheads in new TA, with universal air defense systems and anti-aircraft defense systems, it would be a terrible and universal weapon. Moreover, this very compact and powerful ship is not the giant Yamato battleship. You can build such "Eagles" in large quantities and a lot. At the same time, such a marine tank will be able to withstand the hit of 2-5 missiles of the P-700 complex, after which it will be restored at the plant. Expensive? And how many Sheffields need to be built so that they can withstand 76 hits? No less than 77. Armor, of course, will not save you from powerful modern anti-ship ammunition, but it gives the ship's hull the strength of the tank and prevents it from falling apart after being hit by just one missile. These are perhaps the main lessons for civilian shipbuilders and military sailors from that old war.

Notes:
1. EBR - squadron battleship.
2. BRBO - coastal defense battleship. It had the same architecture as the "big brothers", but less than them in terms of displacement by 3-4 times.
3. The given performance characteristics of Japanese high-explosive fragmentation shells of a new generation, which were first used in the Tsushima battle. High-explosive fragmentation shells of the previous types, which were used by the Japanese in battles with the 1st Pacific squadron and the Vladivostok cruiser detachment, had a very mediocre power, at the level of Russian fragmentation shells. This became clear after an ineffective artillery strike by Japanese armored cruisers on Vladivostok on March 6, 1904. 200 shells were fired. Result: one killed and three wounded on our side.
4. Data are given for Suvorov, Orel and Slava. "Borodino" and "Alexander-III" had 203mm/0° + 40mm/30° + 40mm/0° = equivalent to 323mm normal Krupp armor.
5. OFS - high-explosive fragmentation projectile.
6. The novel "Tsushima" by A.S. Novikov-Priboy. Memoirs of Russian sailors about the Battle of Tsushima.
7. Only one old Chinese Chin-Yen was an armadillo among them. The remaining three were light armored cruisers of the Matsushima type. Each of them carried one heavy and low rate of fire 320mm cannon. Of course, these ships could not even withstand the Russian cruisers of the 1st rank, not to mention the battleships. However, on the battleship lack of fish of the Japanese fleet, these were quite “lobsters” for themselves, and therefore the Japanese were in no hurry to send them for scrapping. During the Battle of Tsushima, they were ordered to shoot at the shock Russian battleships from behind the backs of the Japanese armored detachments, which they did, but they never hit anyone.
8. The diagram shows only the physical dimensions of the Orel armor without taking into account the angles of inclination of the armor plates.
9. MZ - loading mechanisms.
10. Taking into account the "semi-heavy" cruisers of the project 26 and 26-bis from heavy artillery, the Soviet Navy on June 22, 1941 had only 36 305mm caliber guns (on the modernized royal battleships of the "Marat" type) and 40 B-1-P guns of 180mm caliber (on cruisers of projects 26, 26-bis and the modernized "Red Caucasus"). At the same time, the inclusion in the list of formally light cruisers of project 26 and 26 bis is an obvious stretch “for the number”, as is the case with the list of the Japanese fleet. No matter how embarrassing it was. As of June 22, 1941, the USSR Navy did not have aircraft carriers.

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Japanese shipbuilders had rather original views on the class of cruisers. Unlike American "classmates", almost every ship of the branch was equipped with torpedo tubes in addition to artillery pieces. Although most often they played the role of auxiliary weapons, in fights at close range, torpedoes can become a strong trump card.

One of the most vulnerable points of the hull of Japanese cruisers of higher levels is the gun turrets of the main caliber. Unable to provide the installations with reliable protection against large-caliber artillery, shipbuilders decided to limit themselves to light anti-fragmentation armor. As a result, players should be careful: at close range, the turrets of the main caliber of Japanese cruisers can penetrate even medium-powered guns.

Another common drawback of almost all ships of the branch is relatively weak air defense. Only in the later stages of World War II did Japanese engineers manage to copy Bofors anti-aircraft guns and begin industrial production of their counterpart.

Thanks to this, cruisers of higher tiers can already boast relatively good anti-aircraft weapons, although they are still far from the level of American cruisers and battleships.

Cruiser evolution

The Japanese fleet cruiser development branch starts from the second level:

II level -Chikuma

Chikuma is the first Japanese cruiser equipped with a steam turbine and an armor belt. The only representative of the branch that does not carry torpedo tubes on board. This is partly compensated for by its impressive firepower for its tier: eight 152-mm guns are mounted on it, and the maximum broadside was five of them.

IIILevel - Tatsuta

According to the initial plans, Tatsuta was designed as destroyer leaders, and therefore boasts good speed and excellent torpedo armament for its level - two triple-tube tubes of 533 mm caliber. At the same time, compared to its predecessor, Tatsuta lost in firepower: only four 140-mm guns were installed on its board.

IV level -Kuma

Compared to her predecessor, the cruiser Tatsuta, the number of artillery pieces on the ship has increased to seven. Thanks to its high rate of fire and good maneuverability, Kuma will become an excellent destroyer hunter, and the increased number of torpedo tubes to four will allow it to repulse enemy heavy ships as well.

Tier V - Furutaka

Thanks to the armament of six 203 mm artillery guns, Furutaka can successfully resist not only enemy destroyers, but also most of its classmates. The layout of the cruiser's guns is interesting: the half-towers are installed in the form of two pyramids on board and at the stern of the ship. Such an arrangement of installations made it possible to save deck space, but reduced the number of guns capable of firing from the bow or stern to two.

VI level -Aoba

The Aoba cruiser was the first ship in the branch to receive two-gun turret mounts for the main battery during construction. Two of them were located in the bow of the ship, and one was at the stern. Although the maximum broadside salvo remained at the same level, Aoba can fire four guns at once from the bow, which significantly helps in destroying retreating destroyers. In addition, the cruiser is equipped with two four-tube torpedo tubes. The installations are located in the stern of the ship, which makes it a little difficult to aim during a torpedo attack.

Tier VII - Mogami

The Mogami cruiser boasts quite powerful torpedo armament: four triple-tube 610 mm torpedo tubes mounted side by side pose a serious threat to enemy heavy ships. Artillery is not far behind. The ship carries 15 rapid-firing 155 mm guns, which allow the cruiser to successfully destroy even the most maneuverable and fast destroyers.

During the upgrade, the player will be able to further strengthen the ship's armament by replacing the initial settings of the main caliber with ten 203-mm guns. At the same time, the cruiser will lose in the rate of fire, but in return, the damage from each volley will seriously increase.

Level VIII -Myōkō

The project of a heavy cruiser, the displacement of which came close to the limits of the Washington Treaty - 10 thousand tons. Compared to its predecessors, the cruiser is quite well protected.

The reserved area of ​​the hull increased noticeably, and the thickness of the main armor belt of the ship reached 100 mm. The ship's artillery is located in five twin-gun turrets and consists of ten 203 mm guns.

IX level -Ibuki

The cruiser Ibuki has become a logical continuation of its predecessors in the Faster, Higher, Stronger branch. Its armament consists of four on-board torpedo tubes equipped with the famous Long Lance oxygen torpedoes, as well as ten 203 mm caliber guns, which confidently hit destroyers and most of their classmates.

X level -Senjo (Working title)

An unrealized heavy cruiser project of 1941, whose armament had already increased to 12 guns. Four installations of the main caliber, three barrels each, are installed equally on the bow and stern of the ship.

In addition, the cruiser has relatively good air defense. Twelve 100-mm anti-aircraft guns reliably protect against attack squadrons and allow you to actively operate against enemy aircraft carriers. Unlike artillery, torpedo armament was not strengthened compared to its predecessors, since it was already at a very high level.