On August 14 (August 1, O.S. style), 1904, a fierce battle took place Vladivostok detachment cruisers with the Japanese squadron, as a result of which the cruiser "Rurik" was heroically killed. The feat of the crew of this ship is akin to the feat of the Varyag, and even surpasses it in the intensity of the battle and the tragedy of the situation. However, by chance and fate, it so happened that the name "Varyag" is still on hearing, and today very few people remember and know about "Rurik". However, as well as about the legendary Vladivostok detachment ...

Vladivostok squad "invisible"

After in the very first days of the Russian-Japanese war of 1904-1905. our squadron was blocked in Port Arthur by the enemy fleet, in the Pacific Ocean there was only one formation of Russian ships capable of conducting cruising operations on the communications of the Japanese - the Vladivostok detachment of the cruisers "Russia", "Rurik", "Thunderbolt", "Bogatyr" and several attached to him "dogs" - destroyers.

Eighty years later, the famous writer Valentin Pikul dedicated his novel "The Cruisers" to the Vladivostok cruisers, and the local prose writer Anatoly Ilyin wrote a story called the Vladivostok detachment. It is clear that no one devotes stories and novels to ships just like that. The Vladivostok detachment forever entered the annals of history with its daring raids to the shores of Japan, which panicked the enemy. At the same time, the cruisers themselves for a long time remained elusive for the Japanese fleet, in connection with which the foreign press called them "ghost ships".

Cruiser Raids

Already in the first days of the war, our cruisers managed to sink several Japanese transports carrying soldiers and fuel. After this sortie of Russian cruisers, the commander of the Japanese fleet, Admiral Togo, was forced to weaken his forces at Port Arthur in order to strengthen the Kamimura squadron - to fight our cruisers. This is what our naval commanders wanted: to divert some of the enemy ships that were besieging Port Arthur.

And soon the cruiser "Bogatyr" (commander 1st rank captain A. Stemman) was unlucky: on May 15 (2), 1904, in Posiet Bay, during the fog, he sat tightly on the stones at Cape Bruce. With great difficulty and not immediately, the cruiser was removed from the stones and escorted to Vladivostok for repairs, where she remained until the end of the war. Having lost their brother so absurdly, "Russia", "Rurik" and "Thunderbolt" remained three of them. To the entire Sea of ​​Japan and its surroundings ...

At the end of May, the cruisers embarked on another raid. In the Korea Strait, they intercepted the Izumo-Maru military transport. Realizing that it would not be possible to escape, the Japanese captain, having landed the crew on the boats, sank the ship. Then the "Thunderbolt" overtook another transport "Hitatsi-Maru", which had on board 1100 soldiers, 320 horses and 18 siege 280-mm guns of the Krupp company to crush the fortifications of Port Arthur. The captain of the Japanese ship, the Englishman J. Campbell, tried to ram our cruiser. Dodging, "Thunderbolt" shot "Hitatsi-Maru" from guns. Meanwhile, "Russia" and "Rurik" caught up with another large military transport "Sado-Maru", where there were about 15 thousand builders, a railway battalion of soldiers, pontoons, a telegraph fleet, machines for siege weapons (which sank along with the "Hitatsi-Maru »), Boxes with gold and silver. "Rurik" stabbed one by one a torpedo into the starboard and port sides of the ship. The cruisers went further, believing that the transport sinking under the water would be on seabed... But, alas, he did not drown. Haste did not allow our sailors to finish the job ...

Hostile ships scoured the entire Sea of ​​Japan, looking for Vladivostok invisibles, but they burned coal in the furnaces in vain. "We're just out of luck!" - the Japanese admirals lamented. Meanwhile, the whole of Japan was alarmed by the raids of our cruisers, and the newspapers published offensive cartoons on Admiral Kamimura. The foreign press also responded to these events. Thus, one of the British newspapers was forced to note: “The cruising of the Vladivostok detachment is the most daring undertaking of all the Russians have done. The fact that their ships managed to escape from Kamimura's squadron sparked public opinion in Japan. "

Eventually, it got to the point that on June 19, 1904, embittered representatives of Japanese business, suffering millions in losses because of the unpunished raids of the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers on trade communications, destroyed and set fire to the apartment of Admiral Kamimura. If he were at home at that moment, the brutal crowd would obviously have torn him to pieces, especially since the police chose not to interfere in what was happening. Japanese newspapers in those days added fuel to the fire, demanding "on behalf of the Japanese people that the government make the most serious remark to Kamimura's squadron."

And our cruisers, meanwhile, continued to smash the enemy's transport communications, now in the Pacific Ocean, where the Japanese were forced to move the paths of their ships with cargo and troops, hoping thereby to protect them from Russian ghost ships. In the July raid, they sank several Japanese transports and schooners. The German steamship Arabia was seized with a cargo of locomotive boilers and rails for Japan. Detained and blew up the British steamer "Night Commander" with cargo for the Japanese railroad... Then the German steamer "Tea" was unlucky with a cargo of fish in the holds, en route from America to Yokohama. He was stopped, the team removed, and then blown up. And the English steamer "Calchas" with contraband was taken as a prize.

The world press began to clamor about the audacious forays of our cruisers. Business circles not only in Japan, but also in England, Germany and America were worried. Still would! Freight rates and insurance rates rose sharply, contracts for the supply of goods to Japan were disrupted. Panic reigned in ports and stock exchanges ...

Skirmish with the Japanese squadron. The death of "Rurik"

At dawn on August 11, 1904, the cruisers "Russia" (commander 1st rank captain A. Andreev), "Rurik" (commander 1st rank captain E. Trusov) and "Thunderbolt" (commander 1st rank captain N. Dabich), under the leadership of the detachment commander Rear Admiral K. Jessen, went to sea in order, in accordance with the order received, to support the breakthrough of the ships of the Port Arthur squadron to Vladivostok. However, the order was late - the squadron, badly battered in battle, had already returned to Port Arthur, never having managed to break through. And "Russia", "Rurik" and "Thunderstorm" went to Tsushima, not knowing that they had no one to meet ...

Early in the morning of August 14, the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers in the Korean Strait, 40 miles from the port of Fuzan (Busan), intercepted the Japanese squadron and with all its might fell on the Russian ships, cutting off the escape route. "Russia", "Rurik" and "Thunderstorm" were trapped. The Japanese were superior in numbers, artillery, speed, and armor strength. In a fierce battle, the "Rurik", which was on the way, had the hardest part. It was on it that the Japanese concentrated their main fire. "Russia" and "Thunderbolt", themselves injured, tried to alleviate his fate, covering themselves, and then began to retreat to the north, hoping to distract the Japanese from the "Rurik". But the enemy clung to him with a stranglehold.

Reference. "Rurik" is the lead ship of a series of ocean-going armored cruisers-raiders. It was built at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg and entered service in 1895. to improve seaworthiness, it had incomplete armor protection of the hull and almost did not have it in deck guns to protect against shrapnel from the gunners. Displacement 11 690 tons, speed 18 knots. Cruising range 6,700 miles. Armament: 4 guns - 203-mm, 16 - 152-mm, 6 - 120-mm, 6 - 47-mm, 10 - 37-mm guns and 6 torpedo tubes. Crew 763 people.

Tortured in the course of an unequal battle, sinking into the sea astern, enveloped in steam from broken boilers, "Rurik" seemed to the Japanese easy prey. They hoped to capture him. However, after the death of the commander and senior officers, the junior artillery officer Lieutenant Konstantin Ivanov, who led the cruiser, and the surviving officers and sailors, did not intend to lower the flag. They fought to the death. When the Rurik's guns were out of action, the Japanese moved closer. But the crew of the Russian cruiser suddenly made a desperate attempt to ram their nearest ship, and a torpedo went into the cruiser Izumo ...

Recoiling back, the Japanese ships opened fire again. By the end of the fight, there were 14 against one. By 10 o'clock. in the morning, after a five-hour (!) battle ("Varyag", we note, only took part in the battle for an hour and had no fatal injuries) "Rurik" was turned into a pile of twisted iron and only miraculously kept afloat. The Japanese again began to approach the stationary cruiser. To prevent the enemy from getting the Rurik, Lieutenant Ivanov ordered the Kingstones to be opened. Admiral Kamimura, realizing that there would be no surrender on the part of the Russians, flew into a rage and ordered a storm of fire to be unleashed on the cruiser. Before the sinking of the ship, Lieutenant K. Ivanov ordered everyone to leave the agonizing Rurik and throw the wounded overboard. This was a dire necessity.

At 10 o'clock. 42 minutes On August 14, 1904, the armored cruiser of the Russian fleet "Rurik" with the raised Andreevsky flag and the signal "I die, but I do not surrender!" disappeared under water ... On the "Rurik" 204 people died and 305 sailors were wounded (on the "Varyag" 22 sailors were killed in the battle, 12 died of wounds). The fallen Rurik men remained forever where they took their last battle - at the bottom of the Korean Strait. "Russia" and "Thunderbolt" lost 129 lower ranks and officers in that battle. Historians then wrote: "You need to be iron creatures to withstand such a hellish battle."

With the death of "Rurik" the legendary raids of the Vladivostok cruiser detachment practically ceased. Until autumn "Russia" and "Gromoboy" were under repair. Then an order came from the main naval headquarters: “The ships of the Vladivostok cruising squadron should be kept for the second squadron. Cruising operations with the risk of new damage should be avoided. " And only our destroyers sometimes raided enemy communications, sinking several more Japanese schooners. On April 25, 1905, "Russia" and "Thunderstorm" made their last joint raid, reaching the Sangar Strait, where they sank several Japanese schooners. On April 28, they returned to base. And on May 2, "Thunderbolt", having gone out to sea to test a radiotelegraph, was blown up by a mine and was repaired until the end of the war. "Russia" is orphaned.

An interesting detail. After the war of 1904-1905. a ship named "Rurik II" entered the Baltic Fleet. The name "Varyag" was not assigned to a single warship either under the tsar or during the Stalinist era ...

I would like to start the story about the Russo-Japanese War with a revolutionary proposal. Or maybe stop clinging to the old-style dating of events? After all, isn't it tired of putting “not ours” in brackets behind the “true” date. The whole world knows that the battle in the Yellow Sea took place on August 10, 1904, and only in Russia they claim that the battle at Shantung took place on July 28 of the same year. But such a change would avoid a lot of confusion, because the Julian style is not used anywhere else. Of course, Patriarch Alexy II declared the Gregorian calendar "a devilish invention, invented to destroy true Christians," but we still live according to it. So the minor sin of dating the events of the distant past will most likely be forgiven for us.

Well, okay, let's get back to the subject of the conversation. The first big war, in which not only the ideas of the theorists of naval warfare were tested, but also the ideas of shipbuilding engineers, was the Russo-Japanese War. With all interesting facts and the conclusions of the Sino-Japanese and Spanish-American wars, they were still minor local conflicts, although the second was formally fought on two oceans. But remember: the squadron of Admiral Dewey at first peacefully stood in the Chinese ports, then reached Manila, defeated the Spanish squadron and again anchored until the end of the war. Attempts by the Spaniards to send a squadron of Admiral Camarra to the Philippines and launch a cruising war in the Atlantic ended in nothing. And only the Russo-Japanese War made the admirals and engineers think seriously about many things. In particular, about the role of cruisers.

The fact is that in this war all aspects of the combat activities of this class of ships were tested, but by no means always the cruisers successfully coped with the assigned tasks. By the beginning of the war, both opponents had a large number cruisers of a wide variety of types and sizes - from small scouts like Novik to ocean raiders like Thunderbolt. The fast cruisers were supposed to serve as scouts for armored squadrons; the Japanese were forced to use their armored cruisers as "battleships for the poor"; the Russians tried to wage a cruising war; Japanese cruisers were watching and blockading Port Arthur; both opponents used the cruisers to support their light forces and fight enemy destroyers. Interestingly, the Japanese did not even try to use their cruisers to protect communications and fight Russian raiders. Let's consider everything in order.

The odyssey of the cruiser "Novik" deserves a separate story. After the battle on August 10, the cruiser, together with Askold, broke through the Japanese fleet, but at night the ships separated. The Novik commander, 2nd-Class Captain von Schultz, decided to go to Qingdao to receive an additional supply of coal. The loading took place in a hurry, it was not possible to receive the full supply, but the cruiser managed to slip out of the port before dark and did not meet the Japanese detachment sent by the admiral of Togo to block the port.

Von Schultz decided to try to break through to Vladivostok, bypassing Japan from the ocean side. Considering the far from the best condition of the cruiser's vehicles, this was the best solution. Arguments that one should have burst through the Tsushima Strait are not serious. The cruiser had long since lost its record speed, and such an attempt bordered on suicide. Even during a calm transition, the mechanics had to constantly fight so that the cruiser's cars did not fail. Fuel consumption jumped to 54 tons per day instead of the norm of 30 tons, so von Schultz decided to go to Sakhalin at the Korsakov post to receive coal, although at first he intended to break through the Sangar Strait. But it was there that the "Novik" was guarded by the Japanese cruisers "Chitose" and "Tsushima", which were stationed in Hakodate.

However, on August 19, the commander of the Chitose, Captain 1st Rank Takagi, received a telegram stating that the Novik had been spotted from the Atoya lighthouse, and immediately led his ships north to the La Perouse Strait. However, the Japanese did not find the Russian cruiser there, which caused them serious concern - the Novik could have already slipped into Vladivostok. Takagi remained to cruise in the strait, but sent the Tsushima to inspect the Korsakov post. The Japanese hoped that the Russians would mistake the three-pipe cruiser for the Bogatyr and be able to take them by surprise. It was naive, because the Arthurian sailors had encountered the same type of cruiser Niitaka more than once, so the enemy was immediately identified.

At 16.25, smoke was noticed on the Novik, the cruiser weighed anchor and tried to jump out of the bay, which became a mousetrap, but Tsushima went to cross it. At 17.10, when the distance was reduced to 40 cables, "Novik" opened fire, the Japanese immediately responded. For "Tsushima" it was a combat debut, but the Russian ship participated in many collisions, and its gunners had great experience, therefore, the inequality of forces was smoothed out to a certain extent. However, the superiority of the Japanese, who had 6 152-mm and 10 76-mm guns against 6 120-mm guns of the Russians was too much great. The firefight lasted 45 minutes, after which von Schultz turned back to the Korsakov post. "Novik" received 3 underwater holes and began to land astern. "Tsushima" also got a leak, but the Japanese managed to cope with it, although they had no desire to continue the battle.

The next morning "Chitose" approached the Korsakov post, but found that the "Novik" was lying at the bottom. All the team's attempts to patch up the holes were unsuccessful, and Captain 2nd Rank von Schultz ordered the cruiser to be sunk. It was not possible to blow it up, since the explosive cartridges remained in the flooded steering compartment. The city looked abandoned, so the Japanese began to calmly shoot the sunken cruiser. Then "Chitose" came closer and made sure that the "Novik" was on the ground with a roll of 30 degrees to starboard. The brave cruiser's service is over.

The Vladivostok cruiser detachment stood out throughout the war for its activity. Yes, his actions were far from always successful, and he lost his only battle, but one cannot but agree with the famous historian V. Semenov, who argued that if Admiral Jessen did not win big victories, then he did not drop the honor of the Russian flag. As expected, Russia appreciated this: when after the war the armored cruisers Thunderbolt and Russia returned to their homeland, Jessen was reprimanded as a result of the inspection and was dismissed the same year. After all, he did not sit in the dugouts like Admiral Grigorovich, but stood on the bridge under the shells, and any fool can do that. On the enemy's sea lanes, the detachment sank 10 transports and 12 schooners, captured 4 transports and 1 schooner.

The first campaign of the detachment in the Sea of ​​Japan began with the replacement of the commander - instead of Admiral Stackelberg, the captain of the 1st rank Reitenstein was appointed. The result was the sinking of a small Japanese steamer. The next campaign was made already under the command of Admiral Jessen - to Genzan. For this, ocean raiders were clearly not required, but another Japanese transport became the prey of the cruisers. Unfortunately, in May 1904, the detachment lost the cruiser Bogatyr, which sat on the stones of Cape Bruce and did not go out to sea until the end of the war. The Japanese could well have destroyed it, but the mythical system of total espionage failed. For some reason, the Japanese assured themselves that the Russian cruiser would remain on the rocks forever.

A new campaign to the Tsushima Strait was carried out under the command of Admiral Bezobrazov. He was appointed chief of the battleship detachment, but never got to Port Arthur. Japanese official history briefly reports that the Hitachi Maru and Izumi Maru transports were sunk on June 15 and the Sado Maru transports damaged. But this is a forced brevity, because otherwise one would have to admit that, due to the frivolity of their own admirals, 18 280-mm howitzers, which were sent to Port Arthur, and about 1000 soldiers of the reserve guards regiment, went to the bottom. The passivity of the Russian fleet led to the fact that the Japanese began to neglect basic security measures and paid for it. At the time of the attack, only the small cruiser Tsushima was next to the transports, which, of course, could not do anything. Admiral Kamimura with his armored cruisers was too far away and could not help the transports. However, the Russians also showed frivolity, they did not make sure that the Sado Maru sank, although the losses of the Japanese were already great. They could only console themselves with the manifestation of the unyielding samurai spirit - Colonel Suti, who commanded the battalion, solemnly burned the banner and performed hara-kiri. At least some consolation ...

On the Russian cruisers, they listened to the radio communications of the Japanese, and Admiral Bezobrazov correctly decided that Kamimura was not too far away. Since "Rurik" could not develop high speed, he decided to deceive the Japanese and went to Vladivostok not directly, but inclined to the shores of Japan. In the meantime, the weather got worse, and this helped the Russians. Kamimura reached the island of Okinoshima, did not find anyone or anything, and stopped the pursuit.

This raid can be considered very successful in the sense that it delayed the fall of Port Arthur, the terrible howitzers appeared there only in the fall. By the way, the Japanese also removed them from the coastal fortifications of Tokyo Bay, not only the Russians did strange things. The next raid to Genzan almost led to a clash with Kamimura, but the meeting took place in the evening, and the Russian cruisers safely avoided an unequal battle.

The next raid Russian cruisers made in Pacific Ocean, and again under the flag of Jessen. Admiral Bezobrazov too strongly doubted the success of the campaign, and he had to be replaced by Jessen, who was temporarily suspended after the accident of the "Bogatyr". On July 17, the cruisers went to sea, and on the 19th passed through the Sangar Strait. The Japanese could not prevent them - the entire defense of the strait at that moment consisted of 2 ancient gunboats and 3 tiny destroyers with a displacement of 50 tons. Breaking into the ocean, the Russians began operations in the coastal waters of Japan. They sunk several transports, and not only Japanese, but also British, the steamships Arabia and Calhas were taken as prizes. It seemed to be a success, but, on the other hand, the destroyed cargo was not of exceptional value, most often it was railroad tracks. By the way, this confirms that a cruising war at that time simply could not be particularly effective, the list of strategic cargoes was too short, and in addition, none of them was vital, like, say, aluminum during the Second World War.

And yet this raid gave the impression of an exploding bomb. The amount of insurance has jumped sharply, shipping has decreased. At the same time, one should not take seriously the tale of how outraged Japanese shipowners burned down the house of Admiral Kamimura. I personally read a story about this, and in a book that few people pay attention to - the memoirs of the Belgian envoy to Tokyo, Baron d'Anetan, and I still don’t believe it. Well, do with me what you want - I do not believe! By the way, where was he, Kamimura at that time? The actions of the admiral, or rather inaction, during this period are difficult to explain. He dangled near the southern entrance to the Tsushima Strait and, it seems, expected Jessen to try to break through to Port Arthur, although such an act would be completely meaningless.

On the way back, the Russian cruisers encountered an unexpected problem. The weather worsened, thick fog covered everything, and the squadron simply could not find the entrance to the Sangar Strait. After hanging out in the ocean for some time, the cruisers managed to see the mountains around the strait and squeezed into it. The cruise lasted 16 days, and the ships practically used up the entire supply of coal. Somehow, quite unexpectedly for the admirals, it was discovered that the raiders were no longer able to act as before. Previously, famous sailboats like the Alabama, which used a steam engine only as an auxiliary engine, did not have to think about coal. Now the organization of cruising should be approached more thoroughly, and the Germans, preparing for a new war, took this into account, creating their famous stage system.

No happiness lasts forever, and soon the Vladivostok detachment had to be convinced of this. When the Arthurian squadron went to the breakthrough, on the evening of August 11, the cruising squadron received an order to go out to meet her. An order is an order, Admiral Jessen led the sailors who barely had time to rest to the south to the Tsushima Strait. But when the cruisers were already at sea, it turned out that the campaign was useless, the Arthurian squadron was defeated, partially dispersed to neutral ports, and partially returned. That’s when you should have contacted Jessen by radio and brought him back, that’s where those 200 miles of radio communications would have come in handy if they hadn’t been pure phony.

At dawn on August 14, the cruisers reached the Fusan parallel, where they had already been, but this time the Japanese were much better prepared. At 04.50, Kamimura's and Jessen's detachments noticed each other, and the corresponding Kamimura's radiogram was received by all the nearby patrol cruisers - 5 units. So, even if Jessen had missed the Japanese armored cruisers, he probably would have run into one of the sentinels, but if he had no luck, he had no luck right away and thoroughly, because the Japanese were to the north of the Russian squadron and blocked its way to Vladivostok. However, in fact, the Japanese tried to watch for the cruisers Novik and Askold they had lost.

But then not quite clear things began to happen, and Russian and Japanese descriptions differ sharply. The Russians claim that the battle began at 05.18, the Japanese - that at 05.23, this is not too significant. But the discrepancy in the distances is already more serious, the Russians claim that it exceeded 60 cables, but according to Japanese data, it barely reached 46 cables, which looks much more realistic.

The battle developed according to the classical canons - an artillery duel on parallel courses, in this regard, the battle near Ulsan looks the most "classic" of all naval battles this war. The Japanese had some superiority in speed and gradually overtook the Russian squadron. And this is where one of the many incomprehensible moments arises. On paper, the Japanese had a noticeable speed advantage, but it is also well known that their cruisers could only reach the nominal 20 knots under the most ideal conditions. On the other hand, the cars of the Russian cruisers were far from being in perfect condition, especially the "Rurik" suffered from this, and then in the morning because of the accident on the "Russia" 4 boilers were out of order, so in any case Kamimura should have had superiority 2 or more node. But every time he needed to catch up with the Russian squadron, it happened painfully slowly.

And yet, by 05.52 the Japanese were exactly on the abeam of the Russians, having reduced the distance to 27 cables. Their superiority in artillery began to show, besides, now the Japanese were directly in front of the rising sun, which prevented the Russians from aiming. Admiral Jessen first turned southeast, as if intending to pass the Tsushima Strait, but at 0600 he turned sharply to the right, described a loop and went northwest, hoping to slip under the stern of the Japanese. Kamimura reacted late to this turn and turned left. The squadrons found themselves on diverging courses, the distance increased to 50 cables, and the Japanese temporarily ceased fire. But it was at this moment that the Iwate, who was going by the end, received a hit that could become fatal. A 203-mm projectile exploded in the bow casemate of the upper deck, simultaneously detonating the projectile in the gun. The casemate was completely destroyed, part of the armor flew overboard. The casemate on the deck below went out of order, and the 12-fn gun standing above simply disappeared along with the crew. Another 152-mm gun failed, 32 people died, 43 were wounded.

At 06.23 the battle resumed, and almost immediately "Rurik" received a fatal hit, which damaged the steering, from that moment on the cruiser now and then lost control. In addition, she began to gradually lag behind the head cruisers. The shooting from both sides was chaotic and uncontrollable, no matter what historians tried to write. Even in official Japanese works it is admitted that the Izumo is the flagship! - fired simultaneously at all three Russian cruisers. The fact that all the ships received hits from the Japanese indicates the lack of organization of fire from the Russian squadron.

Further events are of little interest. The Russian squadron twice tried to return to "Rurik", apparently, Admiral Jessen hoped that he would be able to cope with his difficulties, but it was in vain. "Rurik" received more and more new hits and soon completely lost its combat capability. But he still distracted Admiral Kamimura's attention. The Japanese commander, apparently, decided for sure to destroy at least one of the Russian cruisers and at times almost stopped firing at Jessen's ships. For example, at about 08.00, he generally ordered to concentrate all the fire on the damaged cruiser, and only the return of "Russia" and "Thunderbolt" forced the Japanese to fire at them again.

At 08.20, Admiral Jessen realized the futility of his attempts, besides, two other cruisers received noticeable damage, so he finally turned north towards Vladivostok. The Japanese, carried away by finishing off "Rurik", were on his right shell and could not prevent the breakthrough. Kamimura followed after him, but he couldn't - or didn't he want to? - to reduce the distance. As we can see, this Japanese admiral showed the same caution as Admiral Togo in the battle in the Yellow Sea, although in this segment of the battle he had a double superiority in ships and almost fourfold in artillery. By 09.45 the Japanese managed to reduce the distance to 27 cables, but immediately, as if frightened by their own courage, dropped the speed, and at 10.00 the distance again increased to 37 cables.

“The fight was protracted (about 5 hours). During the chase, all crews were ordered to fire slowly and carefully aim their guns. But at 10:00 am, Admiral Kamimura was informed that the Izumo was running out of ammunition. Seeing that the enemy's speed did not decrease at all, although his fire had noticeably weakened, the admiral decided to use the remaining ammunition to sink the "Rurik" in order to definitely prevent his rescue, "the Japanese Confidential History reports. In fact, by this time, the Izumo had used up only half of its ammunition: 2255 203-mm shells, 1,085 152-mm shells, and 910 12-lb shells. Another factor that influenced the decision of the Japanese admiral was that he did not know about the results of the battle of the Togo squadron and could well expect a collision with the Arthur squadron, and in the very near future

All this time "Rurik" tried to finish off the approaching cruisers "Naniwa" and "Takatiho", which prudently kept at a distance of 35 cables. But this did not save them from a couple of accidental hits, although "Rurik", of course, had much worse. Both of these cruisers fired over 650 152 mm shells in total. At about 10.20 am "Rurik" sank, calm weather allowed the Japanese to save almost all the surviving sailors.

Another proof of the inadequacy of the elder command staff Russian fleet was the ratio of losses on "Russia" and "Gromoboi". The newer and much better armored "Thunderbolt" lost twice as many people simply because Captain 1st Rank Dabich ordered the crews of small-caliber guns, obviously useless under the current conditions, to be in combat posts. Moreover, he ordered the killed to be replaced by new sailors, which entailed new losses.

And one more strange nuance. For a hundred years, a story has been circulating through the pages of books that on Russian ships, when firing at long distances, deck guns failed - the teeth of the lifting arches and gears bent and broke. But no one bothered to compare the real combat distances with the extreme ones. The battle near Ulsan took place mainly at distances of 30-35 cables, a couple of times the distance was briefly reduced to 25 cables, a couple of times increased to 45. These values ​​are far from the maximum range of Kane's 152-mm guns, what are the maximum elevation angles that can be discussed at all? But it seems that the assumption that the famous Obukhovsky plant supplied an open marriage to the fleet does not suit anyone.

“After the death of Rurik, the active military service of the Vladivostok detachment practically ceased,” one of the historians writes sadly. But attempts to wage a cruising war did not stop, although now it was assigned to auxiliary cruisers. The result was disgusting - without achieving anything serious, these ships by their actions managed to spoil Russia's relations with many European powers. By the way, if you look at the reference books, it suddenly turns out that the Japanese, not trying to officially start a cruising war, nevertheless caught more smuggled transports than the Russians. The Vladivostok region was especially fruitful for them.

In preparation for the cruising war, the Russian military-political leadership made several gross mistakes. First of all, the Russian command, without suspecting it, released the genie from the bottle, introducing a fundamentally new interpretation of the concept of "military smuggling" in Order No. 42 for the Naval Department. Previously, only cargo with a military purpose was considered as such: weapons, ammunition, uniforms, vehicles (read - horses). The Russians implicitly introduced the concept of "dual-use goods" so fashionable today, that is, goods that may be used for military purposes, although may and not to be. Moreover, the Russian admirals immediately realized that anything could be dragged under such a definition. For example, cotton, which accounted for almost a third of Japan's imports, immediately turned out to be a forbidden commodity, because it could be used for the production of nitrocellulose gunpowder and for the manufacture of uniforms.

Moreover, it was decided to start a cruising war in European waters, which obviously could not bring anything except scandals and aggravation of tensions in relations with Great Britain, which in 1905 owned half of the entire world merchant fleet. This is not "the breadth and boldness of a strategic plan," but sheer stupidity. Along the way, it turned out that Russia's preparation for a cruising war turned out to be nothing. The ships of the Volunteer Fleet specially built for this turned out to be unsuitable for this, only "Petersburg" and "Moscow" were converted into auxiliary cruisers, and the Naval Department even managed to turn this quite ordinary business into an international scandal. These two steamships were stationed in Sevastopol, where the gun platforms were installed and a trial installation of the guns was carried out. After that, the guns were lowered into the hold and camouflaged. It was supposed to lead them through the Black Sea straits under the guise of merchant ships, and already in the sea to install guns and raise the St. Andrew's flag. According to the international treaties in force at that time, Russia could not conduct warships through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, but the Russian admirals hoped in this way to deceive everyone and everything. It would seem that it is easier - to prepare everything in the same Sevastopol, since the ports of the Baltic Sea were overloaded with work with the ships of the Second Pacific Squadron, to bring them to Libava and there officially turn them into auxiliary cruisers. The loss of a couple of weeks meant absolutely nothing. But no, the main thing is to create problems for yourself.

These ships were intended for cruising in the Indian Ocean and left Sevastopol in June 1904. Only in the Red Sea, after the passage of the Suez Canal, they changed the trade flag to a military one and began operations in the Red Sea. "Petersburg" examined several ships and detained the English steamer "Malacca" with contraband cargo for Japan. In mid-July, the ships headed for the Indian Ocean. At Cape Guardafui, the cruisers split up: "Petersburg" headed north of the island of Madagascar, "Smolensk" - to the south. Having received the order to stop cruising on 24 August, both ships arrived at Libau at the end of September. During this time, they examined 19 steamers, of which they detained four and gave rise to the notorious case of the steamer "Malacca".

Russian and English historians describe these events from directly opposite points of view, and the Russian one looks much less solid, and it is precisely the "evidence" cited that undermines it. Russia at that time considered it completely natural for itself to violate any international obligations and therefore shouted loudest about the violation of the rules by others. To begin with, the Russo-Japanese War itself broke out due to the fact that Russia violated every single one multilateral and bilateral treaties concerning China, Manchuria and Korea. Therefore, the "war for Korean firewood" became inevitable.

So, on June 30, 1904, the auxiliary cruiser Petersburg stopped and detained the British steamship Malacca of the Peninsular & Oriental company. under the pretext the presence of military contraband on it. English newspapers of that time describe the colorful details of the search: the captain of the "Malacca" nailed the British trade flag to the flagpole, and the Russian officer, threatening him with a revolver, tore off the flag. The captain of the 2nd rank Skalsky decided to send him to Libau with a prize team, without spending inspection of cargo on the basis of only "suspicion that the matter is unclean." Information about the allegedly smuggling nature of the cargo "came" from various places that had nothing to do with the voyage of this steamer, for example, from the Russian consuls in Malta and Alexandria, where the Malacca did not go.

On July 7, a note from the British Ambassador followed, which, of course, was completely unfounded, as all Russian authors have been amicably writing for a hundred years in a row. Yes, there were military cargoes on the "Malacca", addressed to Hong Kong, which the Russians stubbornly did not notice and do not notice today. There were proper documents, the goods were labeled "Property of the EB government", but if you really want to, you might not notice this, but declare that "from the survey of the team" it became clear that there was military contraband. Indeed, stokers and deck sailors know better than anyone what, where and to whom the steamer is taking.

On June 10, a meeting was held on "Malacca", at which opinions were sharply divided. Diplomats demanded the release of the ship, citing violations international law admitted by the sailors, the naval faction headed by "Prince Tsushima" Alexei Alexandrovich defended the point of view "I can do whatever I want." The Grand Duke argued that England was so harshly in defense of Malacca on the grounds that the English king was among the shareholders of P&O. Imazhine, as the French say! There are two different explanations for this delirium. Either the admiral general was a complete fool and broadcast the rotten Russian experience to other countries, because in the famous Korean firewood scam the Romanov family was covered up to their ears. One of the leaders of the concession was Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich, and the largest shareholding belonged to the "EB cabinet", that is, simply to the tsar. It can be assumed that Aleksey Aleksandrovich bought the title "P&O" - "Royal Charter", but this only means that the king granted the company certain privileges, but by no means that he receives money for it. And again, this interpretation means that the admiral general was remarkably stupid. The second explanation is much shorter - the Grand Duke deliberately lied.

And the explanation for the harsh reaction of the British can be quite simple. As early as 1841, P&O was the official carrier of the British Admiralty's mail, and a little later became the official carrier of the Royal Mail. In fact, in England, for the attack on the Royal Mail, they simply hung up without much ranting, because this was considered an attempt on the guarantees given by the EB.

After a short bickering, already on July 14, the steamer was released and continued the passage. To finally excuse themselves, the Russians are unleashing a campaign of lies, in which the Russian consuls in Shanghai and Hong Kong began to play the first violin. Either "Malacca" goes to Singapore not for repairs, but to cover up her tracks, then French journalists "reliably established" that the steamer goes to Yokohama, but somehow ends up in Sasebo. Then it suddenly turns out that the Iwate cruiser has 152-mm guns brought by the Malacca, although such guns did not exist in nature. In general, as Dr. Goebbels advised, for a lie to be believed, it must be monstrous.

The reliability of the work of these "sources of information" is well illustrated by the fable about the German transport "Sambia". Colonel Shebek, a Russian agent in Berlin, reported that this transport was leaving Hamburg for Japan with 329 guns on board. The Russian admirals, without hesitation, immediately sent the auxiliary cruiser Ural to capture the smuggler. Nobody even bothered to think whether it is possible to believe these nonsense. After all, this is the artillery park of an entire army, a real deal of the century. It would be simply impossible to keep such a secret, but there was no other confirmation, except for the Colonel's tales, then, and has not appeared now. But earlier, and especially today, most historians for some reason consider these tales to be true facts.

Smolensk also made a scandal when it detained the German ship Prince Heinrich. Russian historians bashfully write that they checked the mail on it and seized two letters, which included documents on the dispatch of military contraband from Germany to Japan. In fact, everything was much more stupid and disgusting. Was confiscated from the steamer all mail followed by her the whole revised and removed the two letters mentioned. All other letters were "sealed up and set aside for transfer to the first oncoming mail steamer," which was done two days later, when the British steamer Persia met. Is it any wonder after that that the Russian auxiliary cruisers were treated like the pirates of the 18th century that have fallen out in our time?

In general, the actions of the Russian auxiliary cruisers of Russia brought nothing but trouble. Admiral Rozhestvensky dragged the Kuban, Terek, Dnepr, Rion and Ural along with him around the world, but they did not do anything significant, except that the Ural died ingloriously in the Tsushima battle. The only auxiliary cruiser of the Vladivostok detachment "Lena" distinguished itself only by the fact that "due to a breakdown of the machines, which prevented the continuation of cruising", it reached San Francisco!

Purely for reference, we present data on merchant ships captured by the Japanese fleet. The total number is 64, including 16 Russians, 22 English, 10 German and 5 American. And what do you say after that, who did the British and Americans help?

Probably the easiest way to deal with the reconnaissance and patrol activities of cruisers. With what words did the Arthurians not honor the famous "dogs" of the Japanese fleet! But, what is most interesting, the obviously stronger "Askold" never tried to drive away the observers who settled in the outer roadstead. Even in the most tense moments, when the Japanese squadron was carrying out transfer fire across Liaoteshan, shelling the harbor of Port Arthur, no one tried to interfere with the Japanese cruisers, who were adjusting the fire. These episodes, by the way, prove that the Japanese had two orders of magnitude better radio communications, and the stories about pre-war communications experiments at a distance of 200 miles are not convincing. Why did no one try to repeat them during the war ?!

Another example of an established intelligence service is the organization of patrols in front of the Tsushima Strait. Both amateurs and professional historians like to speculate about whether Rozhdestvensky's squadron could have slipped through the strait unnoticed by the Japanese. The answer is simple - I couldn't. Just to get this answer, we had to wait a very long time until the Japanese maps, considered secret for almost 100 years, finally appear. It turned out that four lines of patrol were organized, pushed forward almost to the island of Kvelpart. Rozhestvensky was lucky to slip through them at night, but what could have happened if he had passed this area during the day, hoping to find himself in the Tsushima Strait at night? The result would be a total attack by Japanese destroyers and in the morning finishing off the battered squadron with the main forces of Admiral Togo. But what happened happened, in square 203 the auxiliary cruiser Shinano Maru found the Russians ...

The Russo-Japanese War is one of the blackest pages in the Russian Navy. Perhaps this is why it still attracts the attention of military historians and just people interested in military history Russia. Yes, it was not only victories and the almost complete defeat of the Russian Pacific and Baltic fleets by the Japanese imperial fleet is a clear confirmation of this. This topic is interesting because the Russian Imperial Navy had never before been so modern, huge, strong and powerful. On the paper. After the events of that war, the Russian navy revived such ocean power only once - in the 70s and 80s of the XX century. So why did it happen? Why the rather modest Japanese fleet managed to crush its superior Russian without significant losses. Although “on paper” it should have turned out exactly the opposite? These questions will be discussed in this article. A lot of naked numbers and facts await the reader. Without any tales about "outdated and weak battleships", "short firing range", " large area armoring of Japanese ships "and other, other, other beautiful fairy tales. That they allegedly did not allow such "geniuses of naval thought" as ZP Rozhestvensky and VK Witgeft to defeat the Japanese fleet under the command of Admiral Togo. Who was to blame for this - the technician or the people who were entrusted with this technique? The military in their failures always first of all blame the unusable, in their opinion, military equipment. People who created this technique, on the contrary, indicate the unprofessionalism and unsuitability of the military. It has always been this way, and it will continue to be so. We will analyze all this with dispassionate mathematical precision.

Fleet compositions

Before proceeding to the enumeration of the military equipment that was at the disposal of the Russian and Japanese admirals, I consider it necessary to explain to the reader the general quality level of the fleets and the classes of warships of that period. In the era when artillery was the god of war, all types of naval weapons systems could be counted on one hand:

- Classic artillery pieces various calibers and purposes. At that time, they had already reached a completely mature level of development and in their design differed little from modern artillery systems, although they had less power.

- Torpedoes... At that time, this type of weapon was just beginning to develop. Torpedoes of that period were much inferior to modern ones in terms of launch range and destructive effect.

- Mines... At that time, this type of sea was already a fully developed and effective means of dealing with enemy ships.

- Aviation... It was at that time in its infancy. Actually, and aviation, then it can be called with a big stretch, tk. it was just balloons, which were used only for reconnaissance and artillery fire adjustment at long distances.

In accordance with this, the classes of warships were distributed:

1. The main striking force of the fleet that period were battleships... In the course of their evolution, battleships had many different subclasses: battery battleship, barbet battleship, tower battleship, I-class battleship, II-class battleship, coastal defense battleship, squadron battleship (aka dreadnought), dreadnought, superdreadnought, and finally, battleship. All of them were the most armed and protected ships of their time. During the period under review, there were squadron battleships, II-class battleships and coastal defense battleships in service. These ships had a displacement of 4000 to 16000 tons, carried heavy armor and powerful universal artillery and mine-torpedo weapons. At the same time, they could reach a speed of 14-18 knots. The more modern ships of this class were in the fleet, the more formidable force the fleet was.

2. Also to the main impact force fleet can be attributed armored cruisers... Ships with a displacement of about 8000-10000 tons, also having good protection, albeit not as powerful as that of battleships. Artillery weapons were also weaker, but such ships could reach speeds of 18-22 knots. The presence of armored cruisers in the squadron expanded its operational capabilities. It was on battleships and armored cruisers that the main task of fighting enemy warships and supporting troops in coastal operations with fire fell.

3. Auxiliary missions for reconnaissance, patrol, interception, fighting against small enemy ships and its transport and landing fleet fell on armored cruisers of the 1st and 2nd rank... These ships with a displacement of 4000-6000 tons, had light armor and artillery armament from medium and small caliber guns. But they could reach speeds of 20-25 knots and had a long cruising range. For example, the famous rank I cruiser Aurora gives a good idea of ​​this type of warship.

4. For night torpedo attacks, the final finishing off of damaged enemy ships and the feasible performance of some of the functions of armored cruisers, the fleets had destroyers, Further destroyers, basic destroyers(minoski), then torpedo boats and submarines... Destroyers are small ships that did not carry even a shadow of armor. They were armed with one or two torpedo tubes and several small cannons. They reached speeds of 25-30 knots and could operate together with squadrons in the near sea zone. Torpedo boats and submarines of that period, due to their imperfections, were weapons of the near coastal zone.

The I-rank cruiser "Aurora" was directly involved in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. The ship, 123 meters long, is still in good technical condition, although it is no longer on the move.

5. Also in the fleets of that time could be balloon carriers, minelayers and transport ships... Aerostat carriers - the predecessors of aircraft carriers were intended for basing reconnaissance balloons on them and were equipped with hangars for their storage. Minelayers were used for laying mines. The artillery armament of these ships consisted of several small cannons. Transport ships were used to transport troops, weapons, or other cargo. They could have several small cannons or not have any weapons at all. Their sizes could vary widely.

After a short excursion into the characteristics of warships during the Russo-Japanese War, let's move on to comparing the forces of both sides.

Russian Imperial Navy (RIF)... Despite all the vacillation and bureaucracy, by the beginning of the war with Japan, he was a formidable force. Since there is no way to list the entire combat strength with all auxiliary ships and support vessels in the format of this article, we will dwell in detail only on the main strike force of the fleet:

Table 1

The main striking power of the Russian fleet was precisely in these 38 ships... In total they had 88 guns of 305mm caliber, 26 guns of 254mm caliber, 8 - 229mm and 28 guns of 203mm caliber... Even then, guns of a smaller caliber belonged to medium-caliber artillery, although they retained an important combat significance at that stage of the development of science and technology. In addition to these ships, the fleet included a large number of powerful cruisers of the 1st and 2nd ranks, both new and ancient, many destroyers, minelayers, gunboats, transports, four multipurpose submarines "Dolphin", "Trout", "Sturgeon" and "Catfish" and other ships. Subsequently, submarines (submarines) became one of the main classes of warships in the fleet.

The battleship Tsesarevich is one of the most powerful battleships of its time. Its power is felt literally in its appearance - it looks quite modern even today. The ship was built according to the latest technology and had all the features of a modern battleship of World War II: a high side of an optimal, seaworthy shape, developed tower-like superstructures for placing observation posts and elements of the control system at the maximum possible height. Modern artillery in twin turret gun mounts was located high, was fully mechanized and had large guidance angles. Very complex, multi-row differentiated booking was very powerful. The ship could see far over the horizon and could operate effectively and conduct aimed fire in any weather. Displacement of this floating tank: 13105 tons. The enemy was waiting for 68 guns of various calibers, 4 torpedo tubes, 20 mines of obstacles and 4 7.62mm heavy machine guns "Maxim". All the weapons that were then in the Russian fleet - everything was installed on it. The ship's OMS was also top-notch.

It is difficult to estimate the total total number of warships of all classes and ages in service with the Russian fleet at the time of the outbreak of the war with Japan, but according to rough estimates it was about ~ 300 ships of various classes. To destroy such a numerous armored power, even today, would require the involvement of very serious naval missile and aviation forces. Any of those battleships is not a cardboard-plastic Sheffield and it will not burn or sink after being hit by a single Exocet anti-ship missile. It would also not be a strong exaggeration to say that that fleet was more powerful than, say, the Patriotic Navy of the USSR on the eve of the Great Patriotic War10. For a predominantly agrarian country, which was royal Russia It was a real achievement to create such a large ocean-going fleet. The flagship of the Russian Pacific Fleet was the newest battleship Tsesarevich. The striking core of the Baltic Fleet was the Borodino-class battleships in the amount of four units. Already in the course of the war, the fleet was replenished with the fifth battleship of this type, "Glory".

The Eagle is one of the ships of the Borodino series. Was an improved model of the "Tsarevich". The outlines of its hull are somewhat reminiscent of the hulls of today's URO frigates built using the "Stealth" technology. It differed from the prototype with a new hull 121 meters long, improved armor, improved design of a number of components and assemblies, and a slightly modified composition of auxiliary weapons. Displacement: 13516 tons. Like the prototype at the time of construction, it was considered one of the most powerful and perfect warships of its time.

Imperial Japanese Navy(IJN). After the defeat of the Chinese fleet at the Battle of Yalu, the Japanese fleet began to rapidly build up its combat potential. In building its fleet, Japan relied on British assistance. The resources of the Japanese economy were enough to create a grouping of six squadron battleships with similar characteristics and six armored cruisers. In addition, they had two more old battleships of the 1st class: "Chin-Yen" and "Fuso" of which "Chin-Yen" was captured from the Chinese. Since the number of attack warships was small, some of the large-caliber guns were placed on lightweight, which was poorly suited for this purpose. armored cruisers like Matsushima and Takasago. List of warships Japanese fleet, which carried more or less large calibers on board, it turns out like this:

table 2

Thus, the power of the Russian fleet, the Japanese fleet, together with light cruisers absolutely unsuitable for opposing battleships, could oppose: 3 guns caliber 320mm, 28 caliber 305mm, 4 - 240mm guns and 30 - 203mm guns... A simple mathematical calculation shows that in terms of heavy weapons, the potential of the Japanese fleet was at least three times inferior to the Russian one. Of the 20 ships, no more than 12, that is, 60%, could be considered modern and truly suitable for a general battle. The characteristics of the rest did not leave them any decent chances of survival under fire even from the old Russian squadron battleships. Of the 38 Russian strike ships, 35, that is, 92%, could be considered suitable for a general battle to one degree or another. The flagship of the Imperial Japanese Navy was the battleship Mikasa.

Squadron battleship Mikasa. Its design was traditional for ships of this class of that period. Structurally, he repeated the British models: low side, low superstructures, to a greater extent citadel armor, turret gun mounts only for the main caliber. Relatively low-power medium-caliber guns were located in on-board casemate installations low above the water. The ship was more optimized for combat on flat water rather than for movement. At the same time, the large size of its body made all its characteristics very decent. Its displacement is 15352 tons. The closest analogue to this ship in the Russian Navy is the battleship Retvizan.

The entire Japanese fleet consisted of about 100 warships of various classes, but unlike the Russian fleet, all these 100 ships were like a fist concentrated on one theater of operations. Of the ~ 300 warships of the Russian fleet, about 100 took a direct part in the war with Japan, that is, about 30%. Already during the war, the Japanese fleet was replenished with two Italian-built armored cruisers: "Nissin" and "Kassuga".

Results: Without delving into all the nuances at this stage, manning ships, their maintenance and repair, combat training of personnel, the choice of commanders and assessing their professional suitability, but simply succinctly noting that "at some stage something went wrong" , we can say that all this gigantic armored power of the Russian fleet was lost in the most mediocre way. Moreover, without any serious damage to the enemy. The data on the losses of the Japanese fleet are given in Table 3. They cause only a bitter smile.

Table 3

Total 24 combat and support ships... Of these, 13 ships (54%) were sunk by mines, 6 ships (25%) by artillery, 0 ships by torpedoes (0%), by the joint action of artillery and torpedoes 1 ship (<1%) и от навигационных происшествий потери составили 4 корабля (17%). Затоплено и брошено экипажами в результате полученных повреждений 0 кораблей (0%). Сдано в плен так же 0 кораблей (0%). Тот факт, что более половины всех безвозвратно потерянных Японией кораблей флота было уничтожено минами – оружием по своему характеру пассивно - оборонительно типа, говорит о крайней пассивности и бездействии ударного Российского флота в период БД на море. Все боевые действия на море свелись к двум крупным сражениям, нескольким приличным боям и локальным боестолкновениям отдельных крупных кораблей и легких сил. Такое ощущение, что даже в бою, наши корабли воевали как будто из под палки, нехотя, без инициативно и всячески стараясь уклониться от сражения. В дальнейшем этому будет приведено не одно подтверждение, как будут и рассмотрены все случае отдельных «вспышек» прояснения сознания и боевого духа. Такая тактика наших высших адмиралов привела к потерям, с которыми можно ознакомиться в таблице 4.

Table 4

The total losses of the Russian Imperial Navy surpassed the losses of the US Navy in the four years of the 1941-1945 Pacific War. A sad list of 64 lost ships distributed as follows: 20 ships (31%) were sunk by artillery fire, Torpedoes alone did not manage to sink a single Russian ship - 0 (0%), the joint action of artillery and torpedoes destroyed 3 ships (5%), 6 were killed by mines ships (9%). Thrown / flooded / blown up by their crews as a result of damage from artillery fire / torpedoes / mines / simply hopelessness and not knowing what to do: 27 ships (42%!), 5 ships were taken prisoner to the enemy (8%), as a result of navigational damage lost 3 ships (5%). The most direct and most important responsibility for these gigantic losses, in addition to the tsarist regime itself, is borne by very specific people. These are admirals: Z.P. Rozhdestvensky, V.K. Witgeft, O.V.Stark. It was in their hands that all the fullness of power and the right to make all the fateful decisions that were made by them, taken or not taken, were concentrated. As for Admiral N.I. Nebogatov, he can be blamed for a lack of courage / will / spirit, but cannot be blamed for unprofessionalism or lack of knowledge of his business. Admiral S.O. Makarov generally showed himself as a competent and active leader, who perfectly knows his job and is confident in his weapon. Admiral O.A. Enquist may have been a good specialist in his field, but for one reason or another he could not prove himself. We will consider the contribution of some of these people to increasing the combat effectiveness of the fleet below.

Admiral Stepan Osipovich Makarov is one of the outstanding Russian admirals. Was born in 1848. Died in 1904 on board the battleship Petropavlovsk (he was the flagship of the 1st Pacific Squadron during the repair of the Tsarevich). The cause of death from one single mine was a fatal accident and shortcomings in the defense of "Petropavlovsk". It was booked predominantly citadelly, like the British and Japanese EBRs. When a mine was detonated in the bow of the ship, there was a sequential detonation of the ammunition load of the torpedoes, then the barrage mines stored in the bow of the bow, and finally, the entire ammunition load of the 1st artillery mount of the main caliber. The 56-year-old admiral had few chances to escape in such a situation (his place was not far from the epicenter of the last explosion). Under the command of this man, the Russian fleet had every chance to successfully defeat the enemy. A fatal coincidence of circumstances put an end to this scenario.

However, many modern post-Soviet researchers of that war very often turn that situation upside down. His "Holiness", "Adjutant General" ZP Rozhdestvensky simply cannot be guilty of something. It is all the fault of the obsolete and useless, in their opinion, equipment, as well as the illiterate crews of these "floating galoshes" who do not understand anything in war. To justify this position, many myths have been invented, designed to "shift the arrow" of blame for the shameful defeat to civilian specialists, factories, ITCs, anyone else, but not officers. We will try to consider these myths below. So:

Semi-myth No. 1: Overloading of Russian battleships. Because of this, they say, they died "so quickly." Here you need to understand the difference. Civilian specialists create military equipment and carry out its current / average / overhaul repairs, and they operate it, fight on it and carry out various maintenance operations by the military. It is necessary to distinguish between construction and operational overloading of ships. Construction overload is the fault of civilians. Operational overload is the fault of the military. With regard to construction overload. At that time this phenomenon was massive and from that it can even be called "normal". Indeed, the battleships of the "Borodino" type were calculated for a displacement of 13,516 tons, but in reality they contained 14,150 tons of iron. Construction overload amounted to 634 tons. But the level of engineering calculations of that period simply did not allow to calculate all the loads absolutely accurately. The construction overload of the Japanese battleship Mikasa was even greater - 785 tons, and at the same time none of the Japanese military somehow complained about the deterioration of stability or other performance characteristics of the Mikasa. Operational overload - excess of the ship's carrying capacity. During the campaign of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, all the battleships were so full of coal, water, provisions and other supplies that the displacement of the Borodino-class battleships, according to engineer V.P. Kostenko, reached 17,000 tons! What are the fighting qualities with such a "weight"! No measures were taken to rectify the situation even before the battle, as a result of which the displacement of the Borodino-class attack ships before the Battle of Tsushima was unacceptably large - 15275 tons. The proposal of the officers of the "Eagle" to prepare the ships for battle before the general engagement, coupled with their radical unloading, was rejected with idiotic grounds: "The officers of the" Eagle "love to play war too much." The blame for this is the military, namely ZP Rozhdestvensky.

Myth number 2: Low speed of Russian ships. This myth is simply explained. Speed ​​is needed for action. Those who do not take any active action do not need speed. The Japanese used the speed of their ships, which is called "to the fullest." The Russians used it only when their ships, for one reason or another (usually damage), were deprived of the "guardianship" of the commander (and it was already too late) and just to run away and not overtake. In addition, the maximum speed of the ship depends not only on its passport data, but also on the specific technical condition, and on the combat damage that it received. The maximum squadron speed of the Japanese squadron was 15uz, at most 15.5uz and was limited by the speed of its slowest ship - EBRB 1 "Fuji" (for technical reasons, it could not develop more than 15.5uz). The squadron move of the 1st Pacific squadron was 14.5-15uz. EBR "Sevastopol" because of the bent propeller blade, more than 15uz did not give out. The squadron move of the 2nd Pacific Squadron has not been tested in practice, but theoretically it could be of the order of 15-15.5. in the squadron there was no ship slower than 15.5uz (Nikolay-I - 15.5uz, Navarin - 15.8uz, Sisoy Velikiy - 15.6uz, BRBO type 2 "Ushakov" all issued 16uz). During the night attempt to break away from the enemy, the old battleship "Nikolai-I" under the flag of N.I. Nebogatov, the heavily damaged "Oryol", BRBO "Sevyanin" and "Apraksin", as well as the II-rank cruiser "Emerald" were easily supported speed 13-14uz. Conclusion: The squadron movement of the Russian strike ships, if it was lower than the Japanese one, was not at all much. The fact that Z.P. Rozhdestvensky trudged in battle at a speed of 9uz (only 17 km / h - slower than a river pleasure motor ship), dragging transports along with him - is his fault, and not the low speed capabilities of his warships.

Myth number 3. Russian ships were inferior in range to Japanese. There were figures about the firing range of the Japanese for 82 cables and even for 100 (!) Cables. The myth is explained by the same, than the speed. The Japanese fought actively and used the capabilities of their artillery 100%. Of course, there could be no question of some kind of targeted shooting at such gigantic distances for that time. But the Japanese did sometimes shoot at long distances. Domestic ships almost always fired only in response and ceased fire as soon as the enemy stopped it. All without initiative and sluggish (more detailed descriptions of this will be given below). In order to shoot at long distances, three conditions must be met:

1. Artillery must be technically capable of shooting at such distances, in other words, be sufficiently long-range. Civilian specialists are responsible for this.
2. The fire control system of warships must ensure a sufficiently high probability of hitting a target at long distances. Civilian specialists are also responsible for this.
3. Gunners of all levels must have proper training and practice in organizing and conducting firing at such distances. It is good to own the military equipment entrusted to them and be able to handle it correctly. The military is already responsible for this.

Unfortunately, the "weak link" here turned out to be the military. With regard to technical issues. A single Japanese ship, the Italian-built Kassuga armored cruiser, could fire at 100kbt. And only from one single 254mm cannon. His 203mm cannons, like his twin brother "Nissin", fired at 87kbt. As for the new Japanese battleships, their main caliber artillery was of two types. 305mm / L42.5 guns EBR "Fuji" and "Yashima" at a maximum angle of + 13.5 ° could fire as much as 77kbt. Slightly more powerful 305mm / L42.5 guns "Mikasa", "Asahi", "Hattsuse" and "Shikishima" had a lower limiting elevation angle - + 12.5 ° and fired as much as 74kbt. The maximum firing range of 203mm guns of the main caliber of Japanese armored cruisers such as "Asama", "Yakumo", etc. was only 60-65kbt, which was about the level of modern 152mm gun mounts of medium caliber Russian ships. The issue of ensuring at least the technical capability of firing at the maximum possible distances Russian specialists have paid perhaps the greatest attention after the German fleet. The elevation angle of the main caliber guns of the Russian battleships was + 15 °, + 25 ° and even + 35 °. The long-range battleship Pobeda was considered the most long-range in the entire Russian fleet. It was equipped with more modern 254mm / L45 cannons, which differed from the previous 10-inch guns by increased weight, strength and barrel stiffness. As a result, its 225-kilogram main-caliber projectiles with an initial velocity increased to 777 m / s flew 113kbt. 254mm guns of the other two ships of this series "Oslyabe" and "Peresvete", as well as BRBO "Admiral Apraksin" fired at 91kbt. All "12" battleships with 305mm / L40 guns fired at 80kbt at an angle of + 15 °. BRBO "Ushakov" and "Sevyanin" fired at 63kbt. The firing range of the old battleships was shorter: the Navarin had 54kbt, the Nikolai-I had 51kbt for 229mm / L35 and 49kbt for 305mm / L30 guns.

As for the FCS, its 4-fold optics and rangefinders with a base of 1200 mm even then made it possible to conduct more or less effective fire at a distance of up to ~ 60kbt (10-12 km). Russian battleships of new and newest types received the newest fire control system "mod.1899". Its structure can be judged by the description of the battleship "Eagle":

SUAO mod. 1899. The set of instruments was first presented at an exhibition in Paris in 1899 and was installed on many of the RIF battleships. Was the prototype of modern central guidance systems. The basis of the system was two sighting posts (VP) - one on board.

Pancratic, optical, monocular devices of these posts - sighting devices for central aiming (VTSN) had a variable magnification ratio - 3x-4x. The search for the target and the aiming of the weapon at it was carried out by the VP operator. When aiming at the VTsN target, the scale determined the elevation angle of the target relative to the center plane of the ship, and the tracking system associated with it automatically set this angle with an arrow in the receiving devices of the main 8 tower AU and batteries of 75 mm ship guns. After that, the gunners-operators (gunners) carried out horizontal aiming of their installations until the angle of rotation of the AU coincided with the elevation angle of the target (the so-called principle of "alignment of arrows") and the target fell into the field of view of the gun optical sights. Optical, pancratic, monocular sights of the Perepelkin system had a variable magnification ratio of 3x-4x and a field of view changing in accordance with it 6-8 degrees. To illuminate the target in the dark, six combat searchlights with a mirror diameter of 750 mm were used. The next step was to determine the distance to the target. For this, the conning tower had two ranging stations - one per board. They were equipped with horizontal-base rangefinders "Barr and Studd" with a base of 1200 mm.

The range finder measured the distance and, using the range finder key, the data was automatically entered into the receiving devices of the conning tower, the central post, 8 main turret guns and batteries of 75 mm guns. To control the correctness of data transmission, there was a feedback system with a control rangefinder dial, the readings of which were compared with those entered into the receiving devices. The sighting posts and rangefinder stations were located inside the conning tower on the right and left sides (a pair for each side) due to which the “Eagle” conning tower had an oval shape in the transverse direction from the center plane of the ship. A set of instruments and a magnetic compass in the conning tower showed the senior artillery officer his own course and speed, direction and strength of the wind. He determined the course and speed of the target approximately "by eye". Having data on his own speed and course, wind direction and strength, deviation, target type, target elevation angle and distance to it, having estimated the approximate target speed and course, the senior artillery officer, using firing tables, manually (on paper) made the necessary calculations and calculated the necessary corrections of the lead-in and GNP. I also chose the type of AU and the type of shells necessary to hit this target. After that, the senior artillery officer transmitted data for guidance to the AU, from which he intended to hit the target. For this purpose, in the conning tower and the central post there was a set of master indicators, which transmitted data through 47 cable cores to the receiving devices in the AU and 75 mm batteries. The entire system operated at a voltage of Uр = 23V through a 105 / 23V transformer. In the case of centralized fire control, they transmitted data on the angles of vertical and horizontal guidance, the kind of shells used. After receiving the necessary data, the gunners-operators of the selected AU installed the guns at the given angles (correcting the initial installation according to the VTSN) and loaded them with the selected type of ammunition. After performing this operation, the senior artillery officer who was in the conning tower at the moment when the inclinometer showed "0", set the firing indicator handle to the sector corresponding to the selected fire mode "Shot", "Attack" or "Short alarm", in accordance with which AU opened fire. This mode of centralized fire control was the most effective. In the event of the failure of the senior artillery officer or the impossibility for any other reason to carry out centralized fire control, all 305 mm, 152 mm AU and a battery of 75 mm guns switched to group (plutong) or single fire. In this case, the instruments transmitted data on their course, their speed, direction and strength of the wind, the angle of the target, the distance to it, but all calculations were made by the commander of the AU or the battery. This fire mode was less effective. In the event of a complete defeat of fire control devices, conning tower personnel and data transmission circuits, all AU switched to independent fire. In this case, the choice of the target and aiming at it was carried out by calculating a specific AU using only a gun optical sight, which sharply limited its effectiveness and range. The aiming of torpedo tubes was carried out using ring sights with the same tracking system as the VP for onboard 381mm TA or by turning the entire hull of the ship for the bow and stern 381mm TA. This fire control system ensured a high efficiency of the use of naval artillery and torpedoes against various targets and made it possible to simultaneously "lead" two targets - one from each side. However, it should be noted that the officers and gunners of the Russian squadron battleships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron poorly mastered this system. For external communications, the ship had a Slabi-Arko radio station. It was located in the radio room on the first tier of the bow superstructure and provided communication at a distance of 180-200 km.

The third point remains. Exercises and combat training. In this aspect, the Russian fleet certainly lagged behind the Japanese. The Japanese regularly held exercises and practiced shooting. Since the new fire control devices were then too difficult for ordinary sailors to understand their actions (and even more so to combine them into a system), then, if not the most ideal, but the most effective from the point of view of those specific conditions, methods of fire control and conduct shooting. One of them is the so-called. "The art of massive fire." Its essence is that without any use of the FCS (only once measuring the distance), they begin to shoot extremely actively with medium and small caliber artillery. After that, they wait for the target to be covered. The entire adjustment of fire is carried out not by changing the input data and adjusting the fire of the guns themselves, but by directly changing the position of the group of ships (closer - farther to the target). Despite the enormous consumption of medium-caliber projectiles, such tactics at that time bore fruit. Moreover, the Japanese targets (that is, our ships) contributed to its success in the best way possible. At the same time, this method of "massive fire" was never again used by anyone. Perhaps due to the fact that the enemies were no longer so stupid. As for our gunners, they worked according to instructions. And they tried to master the work of the LMS. Not everyone succeeded. If the lower ranks of the artillery somehow still managed to master their subject, then on the part of the higher ranks almost no efforts were made to this. As for the firing range, the command of the 1st Pacific Squadron, albeit belatedly, realized the role of new, powerful and long-range guns, as well as a modern fire control system. And it seemed to begin to develop measures adequate to the current situation. But the time was already hopelessly lost. The command of the 2nd Pacific Squadron was still happily unaware of the combat capabilities of the enemy and their own ships. All those criminally rare shooting practice were carried out at a distance of no more than 20kbt. Thus, the artillerymen of the 2nd Pacific Squadron entered the battle with the Japanese, having no long-range shooting practice at all. The exception is the 3rd Pacific squadron of Admiral N.I. Nebogatov (joined the 2nd Pacific squadron). Admiral Nebogatov proved himself to be a good artillery specialist. He trained his gunners well to shoot from the most extreme distances possible. As luck would have it, the squadron of Rear Admiral N.I. Nebogatov consisted only of obsolete or small ships. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the battleship Nikolai-I was in fact the oldest and weakest battleship of the Russian Pacific Fleet, its fire turned out to be almost the most effective! The old ship, still firing charges of black powder, achieved hits at distances of up to 50 cables, i.e. at the maximum possible range for your artillery! In all likelihood, it was his 305mm and 229mm shells that inflicted heavy damage on the Japanese armored cruiser Asama, which had to withdraw from the battle. Thus, the cruiser "Varyag" was to some extent avenged. Unfortunately, this combat training did not affect the crews of the newest attack ships, otherwise, even with such a "genius" commander as ZP Rozhdestvensky, the Japanese could probably be crushed by the power of the Borodintsy.

Semi myth number 4... Bad shells on Russian ships. They, they say, poorly pierced armor and practically did not explode. Russian "12-inch" battleships used 305mm armor-piercing and fragmentation shells of the 1887 model weighing 331.7kg. "10-inch" ships had 254mm armor-piercing shells, model 1892, weighing 225.2kg. Japanese battleships fired 305mm armor-piercing and high-explosive shells weighing 386kg. Let's start with armor-piercing. Their comparative characteristics are shown in table 5.

Table 5

As you can see from Table 5, all the shells are well worth each other. What is surprising is that the 254mm shells of Russian ships with almost half the kinetic energy compared to 305mm shells, nevertheless, almost did not yield to them in armor penetration. As for the armor penetration itself, it can be seen from Table 5 that the characteristics of both the Russians and the Japanese armor-piercing shells made them ineffective against the powerful armor of battleships at long distances. Their effective use against heavily armored targets was limited by the distance<20-30 кабельтовых. На больших расстояниях шансов пробить защиту ЖВЧ любого броненосца практически не было. Эти данные подтвердила и реальная практика. Несмотря на все усилия русских и японских артиллеристов за время сражений так ни разу и не удалось пробить Крупповскую броневую плиту толще чем 152мм. Так же стоит отметить, что для 305мм/L35 орудий «Наварина» существовали и более тяжелые 305мм снаряды массой 455кг. Но они почему то не были включены в боекомплект этого корабля. Использование таких «чемоданов» в современных артустановках с орудиями 305мм/L40 у новых кораблей – вопрос требующий дальнейших исследований, так как доподлинно не известно, были ли приспособлены лотки МЗ 9 у новейших «Бородинцев» и «Цесаревича» к приему таких более длинных снарядов. Потому на расстояниях свыше 30 кабельтовых имело смысл переходить на осколочные и фугасные снаряды. Их сравнительные характеристики приведены в таблице 6.

Table 6

At first glance, the Japanese high-explosive shells seem to outnumber the Russian ones. This is partly true. Especially if we add to our shells the increased moisture content of pyroxylin from 10% to 30%. But not everything is so great. Firstly, the fuses on Japanese high-explosive shells were set up for instantaneous action from the slightest touch. This led to a series of explosions of these shells directly in the barrels of Japanese guns, which naturally led to the failure of these guns. Secondly, it is the explosion inside its armored body that is terrible for any armored object. Even a powerful high-explosive explosion outside is not capable of causing serious damage, but will only spoil the "cosmetics". Therefore, for the fight against armored objects, armor-piercing and semi-armor-piercing shells with delayed action fuses are first of all good. Japanese non-shells were very effective against light cruisers, but it turned out to be extremely difficult to destroy armored from head to toe, albeit overloaded Borodintsy with them. The Japanese themselves perfectly understood this, which is why, along with land mines, they actively used armor-piercing shells against Russian battleships. Conclusion - the myth about the bad shells of Russian ships, of course, is not a myth in the full sense of the word - this is partly a fact. And the blame for this lies with civilian specialists, but it is also not worth exaggerating its importance beyond measure. The opponents' shells were not so perfect either.

Myth number 5... Small armor area for Russian ships. At that time, there were two main schemes for armoring heavy ships in the world: the English one, also known as the “all or nothing” scheme, and the French one, which was widespread. According to the first, the ship's HHCs are covered with the thickest armor possible, and all other parts of it either have weak protection or are completely deprived of it. It was according to this scheme that Japanese and many of our ships of the line were booked. However, in the design of the newest ships "Tsesarevich" and the "Borodino" series, domestic designers, taking the best of both schemes as a basis, brought the armor of these ships to perfection. The defense of the Tsesarevich and the Borodino series turned out to be so powerful, so modern that, in principle, it corresponded to battleships and large heavy cruisers of the Second World War. This ensured reliable protection of these ships even from dreadnought "suitcases". The battle of "Glory" with the powerful German dreadnoughts "König" and "Kronprinz-Wilhelm" in 1917 clearly proved this. Despite the received seven 305mm shells (each weighing 405.5 kg), three of which hit below the belt in the underwater part of the hull, the battleship "Slava" did not receive serious damage. And if it were not for the waterproof door that was not closed because of someone's carelessness (and if it were not for the revolution), then we could continue to fight. The armoring scheme of the battleship Orel is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1-8

The most heavily protected area in the center of the ship at the waterline, approximately 60m long and about 0.8m high, has protection: 194mm / 0 ° + 40mm / 30 ° + 40mm / 0 ° = equivalent to 314mm of Krupp armor4. This was more than enough to withstand any armor-piercing shells of that time. At the same time, all HHVCh, artillery, torpedo tubes, as well as areas near the surface of the water were also protected by sufficiently powerful armor. And the total thickness of the armor of all armored decks ranged from 72mm, 91mm, 99mm, 127mm, 142mm, 145mm - not bad for huge battleships of the Second World War. The defense of the Japanese ships was much simpler and approximately corresponded to our battleships of the Poltava, Retvizan, Sisoy Veliky, etc. projects. In addition, all Japanese battleships with the exception of the Mikasa were clad in Garvey armor. The projectile resistance of the Garvey armor correlates with the Kruppovskaya armor as 0.8 to 1, that is, the Garvey armor was inferior in the anti-projectile resistance of the Kruppovskaya armor (on new Russian ships) by 20%. Really powerful was the booking only of the flagship Japanese battleship Mikasa. In addition, do not forget that half of the Japanese attack ships were armored cruisers, the level of protection of which was even lower in comparison with squadron battleships.

Semi-myth No. 6: Large sizes of sighting slots and embrasures in Russian ships. The width of the sighting slots at the battleship "Tsarevich" and the series "Borodino" was a huge 380mm. This was a forced measure since the designers placed all the elements of the FCS of these ships in the conning tower, incl. DS, VP and ring sights of onboard torpedo tubes. To ensure normal visibility of all these optics, it was necessary to make the slits of such a width. The desire of the designers to place the entire control system under the armor of the conning tower can be explained. Firstly, the FCS had not yet developed so strongly, and the weight and size characteristics of its elements still allowed them to be assembled in a BR - the most protected place in the upper part of the ship.

Secondly, the typical battle distances of that time: 30-60kbt meant that in addition to rare single hits by large-caliber shells, the ship was simultaneously under a hail of small and medium-caliber shells: 75mm, 76mm, 152mm. Obviously, the bulky and poorly protected control tower, sighting posts of guidance and other elements of the control system, if they were openly located, would have been destroyed by these seemingly harmless shells in the very first minutes of the battle. However, with regard to protection against shells, the conning tower of domestic ships was well designed.

They had a mushroom-shaped roof protruding beyond the side armor of the wheelhouse and splinterproof visors. As a result, the penetration of shells into the conning tower was practically excluded, which was confirmed in real combat practice. Despite the huge number of hits that fell on the share of Russian battleships, there were practically no cases of penetration of shells inside the BR. However, the command staff, nevertheless, was badly damaged by shrapnel, while being inside the conning tower. But this is due primarily to the gigantic number of hits and the high performance of Japanese high-explosive fragmentation shells. But, as you know, everything is learned in comparison. The famous Soviet writer A.S. Novikov wrote in his novel "Tsushima": "The viewing slits in Japanese ships were made so that even a small fragment could not penetrate through them into the conning tower ..." With all due respect to Alexei Silych, you need to understand that he was not an expert in the field of shipbuilding and could assess the perfection of the design of the conning tower of Japanese ships only visually. A photograph will help to estimate the size of the sighting slits of Japanese battleships. In addition, the Japanese would not have been Japanese if they had not decided on a very original step from the point of view of straightforward European logic - the commanders of the Japanese attack ships, Vice Admiral Togo and Rear Admiral Kamimura, preferred not to "get into" the conning tower of their ships at all! Admiral Togo spent the entire battle, exposing his chest, hung with epaulets and medals, to all the winds (and shells) on the Mikasa's upper navigation bridge. That is, completely openly ... By an evil coincidence, a Russian 305mm fragmentation shell that exploded right above the bridge killed and wounded everyone who was on it. Besides…. BESIDES…. Vice Admiral Heihachiro Togo, of course. Admiral Kamimura spent the whole battle on the battle marsh of the mainmast and the same remained alive. The fact that both Japanese admirals survived and did not even receive serious injuries only testifies to the extraordinary success of the accompanying and evil fate that haunted the Russian ships throughout this war. In addition, the very low characteristics of domestic fragmentation and high-explosive shells also affected.

The conning tower of the Japanese battleship Mikasa. View from the stern of the ship. It can be seen that the size of the sighting slits is also very decent, although less than that of our ships. In addition, this wheelhouse does not have "eyebrows" in the form of an overhanging mushroom-shaped roof, so that the penetration inside its shells falling at an angle is in principle possible. Admiral Togo stood two floors above the whole battle ...

As for the size of the embrasures ... The dimensions of the embrasures in the towers of the Japanese main gun mounts were smaller than those of the Russians, but the vertical pumping angle of their guns was also smaller, do not forget about that. In addition, the AU GK turrets of the Russian battleships were streamlined and protected by Krupp armor 254 mm thick, which made them invulnerable to any shells of that time at typical combat distances. The rotating parts of the Japanese AC EBR "Fuji" and "Yashima" were armored much more modestly - only 152mm and were potentially vulnerable to BB shells of Russian ships. The Japanese battleship "Fuji" which ours really pierced the 152mm armor of the 12 ”gun mount (thereby confirming my logical conclusions) almost exploded because after that, a fire started and the charges in the tower and the feed pipe had already ignited. The fire was miraculously “extinguished” by water from the torn pipeline, which we again attribute to the “conscience” of evil fate. But all this applies only to large (main) caliber artillery. The level of any type of protection of 152mm gun mountings of the latest Russian battleships was two orders of magnitude higher than the protection of medium-caliber guns and their crews on Japanese ships. This photo does not need the essence and comments, but still:

Battery deck of the Japanese battleship Mikasa. You don't need to have a violent imagination to imagine what will happen to the calculations of all these guns, if at least one more or less decent shell explodes here ... Just meat. This design is no different from the technical solutions used in wooden battleships of the sailing era. The size of their "embrasures" also hints ... Nice gate. On Russian battleships of the Borodino class, 75mm anti-mine guns were located in separate casemates with 76mm armor of their walls in a circle. There are many historians who happily criticize the 152mm twin turret guns of the newest Russian battleships. They somehow forgot that all the medium-caliber artillery of the battleship "Oslyabya", which was located in the same casemate installations as on "Mikas", was completely destroyed in just some 20 minutes after the start of the battle.

The conclusion clearly suggests itself that the Japanese ships simply had good high-explosive fragmentation shells (for all their shortcomings), and not over-invulnerable cuttings, ultra-small embrasures, or something else. And most importantly, the Japanese samurai fought, and did not fought back sluggishly like ours. There is a good phrase from X / F "Antikiller". In this case, of course, exaggerated, but the essence reflects quite accurately: "Because they are at war, and we are at work ..." Comparative characteristics of the most basic types of strike ships of the Russian and Japanese navies are shown in Table 7.

Table 7

After analyzing all the listed myths and facts, he gradually comes to the conclusion that the most shameful defeat in the entire history of the Russian Navy does not lie in the plane of the quality of military equipment or the incompetence of civilian specialists. Of course, there were sins behind them too. The main one is the feeble OFS 5 and weak torpedo armament. Powerful, long-range 457mm torpedoes were carried on board only by battleships of the "Poltava" type.

The rest got along more modest, caliber 381mm. And there is a difference - either to approach the "wounded animal" by 2-3 km, or 900 meters. However, torpedoes are generally the strong point of the Japanese. They frightened the Americans with their huge Long Lances (which, in other respects, did not help the Japanese). But torpedoes are not the main thing! So why did this happen? And who is to blame for this? The main responsibility for such a defeat lies with:

1. Admirals ZP Rozhdestvensky, VK Witgeft, OV Stark.
2. An evil fate that has haunted our fleet throughout this war.

Let us examine these two main reasons for defeat. Point one. Were these three people really clinical idiots who, with their own hands, strangled all the basics of combat training, operation and maintenance of the ships and vessels entrusted to them? They really strangled all the basics, but they weren't idiots. These were people of a kind of ability that were in demand in the then tsarist fleet. In the fleet, the leadership of which seriously believed that victory could be achieved only by demonstrating the latest weapons to the enemy, no warriors were needed. And we needed business executives. So that the ships clearly keep the formation, do not "delay", they always shone with new paint, the borders on the shore were also painted and all the leaves on the ground were turned upside down for the visit of "His Majesty". All three were the best suited to the implementation of such activities. Well, we have to admit that they could also solve the problem of logistics (moving over long distances). Logistics, to some extent, became one of the reasons for the defeat of the 2nd Pacific squadron. The Japanese fleet went out to battle fresh, rested and prepared. The Russian squadron, after six months of the hardest sailing, immediately entered the battle. And the fact that the combat potential of the fleet decreases by N% for every 1000 km distance from the home base has been known for quite a long time.

As for the second point, we come to one of the most interesting questions of that war - what could we have done then? The author of these lines had to read many "alternative" versions of the Tsushima battle. They all began with the same thing: "But if - (Makarov commanded / the battleships were not overloaded / the shells exploded well / your version), thenOOOO ... ... ..." point of view of reasoning. Historical processes have tremendous inertia and the change in just one fact of history is simply unrealistic to radically change the entire subsequent chain of events. To do this, it is necessary to change all previous events and fateful decisions in the historical retrospective for many years BEFORE the significant date in order to change the very logical chain that preceded it. This simply does not make any sense, which is clear to any student. The most "delicious" alternative is obvious - Admiral Makarov did not die, but continued to command the 1st Pacific Squadron. But it is practically impossible to calculate what would be reliable in this case. Therefore, without going into details regarding the 1st Pacific squadron inactive, operating in cooperation with the ground forces, we will dwell in detail on the 2nd squadron of ZP Rozhestvensky. What could she count on, exhaustedly being drawn into the Tsushima Strait on the evening of May 13, 1905, when the ship's radio stations had already detected the presence of the enemy fleet over the horizon? So let's try to figure out what the 2nd Pacific Squadron could do if ... No, no - don't be alarmed. If only she was just lucky in battle this time. And two. Rozhdestvensky, no - he did not change to another, equally gifted figure, but simply would have fallen seriously ill and spent the entire battle in the ship's first-aid post, without interfering with anyone to fight. Calculations show that in this case it would not have been possible to win anyway. The maximum that the 2nd Pacific Squadron could count on in this case was to draw the game.

So. Virtual reality... Morning May 14. Admiral Felkersam died. Admiral Rozhdestvensky in his cabin in serious condition. Admirals Nebogatov and Enquist do not know about this and therefore do not nearly worry. The squadron is commanded by someone on the battleship "Prince Suvorov". And so:

“At the beginning of six, our signalmen and warrant officer Shcherbachev, armed with binoculars and telescopes, noticed a steamer on the right, rapidly approaching us. Approaching forty cables, he lay down on a course parallel to us. But he walked like this for only a few minutes and, turning to the right, disappeared into the morning mist. It had a stroke of at least sixteen knots. They could not identify his flag, but with his behavior he immediately aroused suspicion - undoubtedly, it was a Japanese intelligence officer. Two fast cruisers should have been sent immediately after him. Would they have sunk it or not, but at least they would have clarified an extremely important question: are we open by the enemy or are we still in the unknown? And in accordance with this, the line of behavior of the squadron should have been determined. But Admiral Rozhestvensky did not take any measures against the mysterious vessel.

"Vladimir Monomakh" remained intact. The enemy shells made undershoots or overshoots, and only one of them hit him. Commander Popov was jubilant. When the senior artilleryman Nozikov approached him, he, trying to shout down the hubbub of the chickens still not calm, spoke solemnly:
- But we cleverly butchered him! How he asked the snatch! It rushed away from us at full speed. "

In place of the previously sunk cruiser "Izumi", there was another similar cruiser. After he turned to the right and began to move away with increasing speed, already having a trim on the bow and serious damage, the cruiser Vladimir Monomakh, squeezing all 16-17 knots from her old worn-out vehicles, caught up with the damaged Japanese cruiser and finally finished it off. The forces are simply not equal, the Japanese had no chance and there was nothing to stand stupidly to watch him run away. 32nd place. The destroyers were also lucky:

“About eleven o'clock ahead of us a second destroyer appeared on the right, intending to cross the course of the“ Loud ”. Kern ordered to develop the most complete stroke. The rear destroyer began to lag behind, and the one on the right approached and opened fire. There was a battle with unequal forces. It was necessary to decide on something daring in order to get out of a difficult situation. And Commander Kern went for it. The specialty of the miner prompted the commander to think that the moment had come to defuse the two surviving mine vehicles at the enemy. They were located on the upper deck. By his order, both mines were prepared for firing. "Loud" made a sharp turn and rushed to the enemy, who was walking behind. As we learned later, it was the Shiranui fighter. Kern decided to blow it up, and then conduct an artillery duel with another destroyer. The distance between "Shiranui" and "Loud" was rapidly closing. The team knew it was a decisive moment. The gunners increased the fire. But at these moments the main role was assigned to the minerals, who were at the ready at their apparatus. Suddenly near them, flashing a short lightning, smoke curled like a whirlwind on a dusty road. Something heavy separated from the fire and smoke and flew overboard. Senior Officer Paskin was pushed by the air against the shroud at the rear chimney. Having recovered, he rushed to the scene of the explosion. At the apparatus lay dead miners Abramov and Telegin, and from the mine conductor Bezdenezhnykh there was only a cap thrown to the post of the side rail. Lieutenant Paskin put the miners Tsepelev, Bogoryadtsev and Ryadzievsky to the apparatus. The enemy was already approaching the traverse. The distance to it did not exceed two cables. From the bridge, the commander gave the order to release the mine from vehicle No. 1. But it barely moved forward and, hitting its tail over the side, fell into the water like a log.

- Drowned, mean! The sharp-sighted signalman Skorodumov cried out on the bridge and swore hard. The commander, who was closely following the actions of the miners, clenched his fists and, either in response to him, or to understand to himself what had happened, muttered through his teeth: “The gunpowder ignited badly - it was damp. The second mine, fired after the enemy, went right to the target. They were already expecting an explosion, but, having reached the surface of the sea almost to the very stern, she suddenly turned aside, thrown by the seething streams from the propellers. In this attack, all the advantages were on the side of the "Loud". "
"Loud" was lucky and the torpedo was serviceable. The Japanese destroyer Shiranui quickly set off for the Yasukuni Shrine.

"The enemy, obviously, shot his mines last night, and his devices were fixed in a marching manner."

The destroyer "Loud" launched a second torpedo at the second Japanese destroyer, but the latter managed to dodge and an artillery duel began. The excellent training of Kern's crew left him no chance. The Japanese destroyer was fatally damaged, lost speed and sank after a while. The destroyer "Loud" showed the highest class, destroying two Japanese destroyers in a duel at once and safely reached Vladivostok. 32nd and 33rd places are occupied by Japanese destroyers. A day earlier, the duel of the giants clad in armor continued. Was already lost "Oslyabya", "Suvorov" and "Alexander-III" (the last two are still afloat and were still firing). Later, the crew of the destroyer "Buyny" arranged lynching, throwing overboard Vice Admiral ZP Rozhestvensky with the wording "Missing". The commander of the destroyer N.N. Kolomeitsev did not support the idea, but reacted to the situation with understanding. Admiral Heihachiro Togo stood on the upper navigating bridge along with his entire staff. Russian 305mm fragmentation projectile hitting the foremast at the level of people's heads and exploded. From all who were on the upper navigation bridge, incl. and Admiral Heihachiro Togo, only shapeless stumps remained. So in one second the Japanese squadron was completely beheaded. And although the command quickly passed into the hands of Rear Admiral Kamimura, the actions of the Japanese began to give off a slight hysteria, which usually happened to them, as soon as something began to go not according to their plan.

The effectiveness of the fire of the Japanese squadron immediately fell so much that the battleship Borodino had enough power and survivability to drag the battle until dusk. Admiral Kamimura gave the order to end the pursuit. After the onset of silence, the battleship Borodino, controlled only by sailors and having the vehicles in full working order, without unnecessary complexes increased the speed to the maximum possible 17-18uz (there was no sense in it in battle anyway), keeping the course N / O-23 °. The “Eagle” who received the same amount of time tried to keep up with it, but because of the armor plate turned out against the grain on the bow at the waterline, the speed did not rise above 16.5uz. The rest of the ships with the flagship "Nikolai-I" followed the trail at a speed of about 14uz. The cruiser "Emerald" went with them in complete darkness without searchlights. The news of the death of Admiral Togo and his entire staff had a depressing effect on the Japanese sailors. The activity of the Japanese fleet dropped sharply while Tokyo was deciding what action to take next. This hitch was enough for the battleships Borodino, Oryol, Nikolay-I and BRBO Apraksin and Sevyanin to reach Vladivostok, where they were taken under protection by the powerful armored cruisers Russia and Thunderbolt ". As a result, under the most favorable circumstances and maximum luck, the Russian 2nd Pacific Squadron could additionally destroy the Japanese battleships Fuji, Chin-Yen, six assorted cruisers and two destroyers. At the same time, partly to break through to Vladivostok, keeping such ships as Borodino, Oryol, Nikolai-I, Apraksin, Sevyanin, Izumrud and Loud. Purely in terms of the number of ships sunk and destroyed, this is of course still a loss, but not such a shameful one, which promised peace on more favorable terms with the preservation of the Kuril Islands for Russia. Both admirals, both Russian and Japanese, perish in this virtual reality. Only a person who does not understand the essence of those deep crisis processes that at that time was already engulfed all of Tsarist Russia can count on something more, for example, on the complete defeat of the Japanese fleet at Tsushima. So you can get lucky - once every 1000 years. The absurd death of S.O. Makarov showed that the war "did not work out" from the very beginning.

The lessons of the war

Lesson number 1... It is impossible to defeat the enemy with only one presence, even the most modern weapons. It is necessary to be able to use the entrusted military equipment and to master perfectly all the methods of its use. How are things with combat training in our fleet today? I would like to think that it is better than in 1904. Probably better.

Lesson number 2... Military equipment is a very complex mechanism, even one broken screw of which can deprive or at least limit its functionality. In the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, such "broken cogs" were over-moistened pyroxylin in the shells, the low power of the OFS and the overloading of ships in excess of the norm with all sorts of nonsense. And what is the technical condition of the ships and submarines of the modern Russian fleet? And how many "broken screws" they have, despite the fact that they are immeasurably more complicated than even the most modern ships of the "Borodino" type and there are significantly more "screws" in them.

Lesson number 3... Ships of that period (meaning battleships), unlike modern ones, had phenomenal strength and survivability with a relatively compact size and forgave admirals and commanders such mistakes that no modern ship will ever forgive. In other words, with the same "style of command" today, the defeat of the fleet will be an order of magnitude even more terrible and transient than it was in the Battle of Tsushima. In order not to be unfounded, you can see the photos that explain everything.

Battleship "Eagle" (13516t, 121.2m) after the battle of Tsushima. According to V.P. Kostenko, he received at least 300 hits during the battle. However, during the inspection of the ship in the Japanese dock, it turned out that the "Eagle" received 76 hits. Of these, 5 - 305mm shells (386kg), 2 - 254mm shells (226.5kg), 9 - 203mm shells (113.4kg), 39 - 152mm shells (45.4kg) and 21 - 76mm caliber (~ 6kg). The total mass of steel that got into the ship is not sickly 5.3 tons. From it, explosives from half a tone to a ton. The ship survived and retained about 10-15% of its original combat potential.

British destroyer Sheffield (4350t, 125m) after a single hit by AM-39 Exocet anti-ship missiles weighing 655kg. The rocket did not explode. Nevertheless, this cardboard-plastic boat completely burned up and sank. If the reader thinks that our pr.956E is much stronger, then he is deeply mistaken.

How can one explain the construction of such ships that do not carry even the shadow of booking it is difficult to say. They even have aluminum and magnesium body steel, which burns very well. Maybe speed? But speed in modern naval warfare is no longer the determining factor.

Battleship "Eagle" in a creatively reworked version, with closed reactive armor armor "Relikt", with six AK-130 mounts instead of 152mm, with added anti-ship missiles launched through 305mm main gun barrels, with AK-630 instead of 47mm guns, with radar, with TVP, with a gas turbine power plant (speed from 25 to 35uz), with operational-tactical missiles RK-55 "Granat" with nuclear warheads in new TA, with universal air defense systems and PLO weapons would be a terrible and universal weapon. Moreover, this very compact and powerful ship is not the giant battleship Yamato. You can build such "Eagles" in large quantities and a lot. At the same time, the hit of 2-5 missiles of the P-700 complex such a sea tank will be able to withstand, after which it will be restored at the plant. Expensive? How many Sheffields have to be built to withstand 76 hits? Not less than 77. The armor, of course, will not save you from modern powerful anti-ship ammunition, but it gives the ship's hull the strength of a tank and prevents it from falling apart after being hit by just one missile. These are perhaps the main lessons for civilian shipbuilders and naval sailors from that war long ago.

Notes:
1. EBR - squadron battleship.
2. BRBO - coastal defense battleship. It had the same architecture as the "big brothers", but their displacement is 3-4 times less.
3. The given performance characteristics of Japanese high-explosive fragmentation shells of a new generation, which were first used in the Tsushima battle. High-explosive fragmentation shells of the previous types, which were used by the Japanese in battles with the 1st Pacific Squadron and the Vladivostok cruising detachment, had a very mediocre power, at the level of Russian fragmentation shells. This became clear after an ineffective artillery strike by Japanese armored cruisers on Vladivostok on March 6, 1904. 200 shells were fired. Result: one killed and three wounded from our side.
4. Data are given for "Suvorov", "Eagle" and "Slava". "Borodino" and "Alexander-III" had 203mm / 0 ° + 40mm / 30 ° + 40mm / 0 ° = equivalent to 323mm Kruppov armor along the normal.
5. OFS - high-explosive fragmentation projectile.
6. The novel "Tsushima" by A.S. Novikov-Surf. Memories of Russian sailors about the Battle of Tsushima.
7. Among them was only one old Chinese "Chin-Yen" battleship. The other three were Matsushima-class light armored cruisers. Each of them carried one heavy and low-rate 320mm cannon. Of course, these ships could not in any way resist even the Russian cruisers of the 1st rank, not to mention the battleships. However - on the battleship bezrybe of the Japanese fleet they were quite a "lobster" and therefore the Japanese were in no hurry to send them for scrap. During the Tsushima battle, they were ordered to shoot at the Russian shock battleships from behind the Japanese armored detachments, which they did, but never hit anyone.
8. The diagram shows only the physical dimensions of the Eagle's armor without taking into account the angles of inclination of the armor plates.
9. МЗ - loading mechanisms.
10. Taking into account the "light-heavy" cruisers of the project 26 and 26-bis from the heavy artillery of the USSR Navy, on June 22, 1941, they had only 36 guns of 305mm caliber (on the modernized tsarist battleships of the "Marat" type) and 40 B-1-P guns of 180mm caliber (on cruisers of projects 26, 26-bis and the modernized "Red Caucasus"). At the same time, the inclusion in the list of formally light cruisers of the project 26 and 26-bis is a clear stretch "for the number", as is the case with the list of the Japanese fleet. That would not be quite ashamed. As of June 22, 1941, he did not have any aircraft carriers of the USSR Navy.

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Ships of the Russian fleet - participants in the Russian-Japanese war. Probably in the history of Russia there is no more annoying defeat.

cruiser I rank "Askold"

Founded in 1898 in Kiel (Germany). Shipyard - "Germany" (Deutschland). Launched in 1900. Commissioned in 1902. In 1903 he left for the Far East. One of the most active ships. In July 1904 he took part in an unsuccessful breakthrough to Vladivostok. Together with the cruiser Novik (later sunk in the Korsakov Bay on Sakhalin), he managed to get out of the encirclement. Unlike Novik, Askold went to the nearest port - Shanghai, where he was interned until the end of the war. After the end of the Russo-Japanese War, he entered the Siberian Flotilla and was in Vladivostok. During WWI, he took part in various military operations together with Allied ships against the squadron of Admiral Spee. After that, he went to the Mediterranean Sea, participated in the Dardanelles operation (a joint operation of the land and sea forces of the allies against the Ottoman Empire, the purpose of which was to break through to Constantinople, ended in the failure of the coalition forces despite the numerical advantage over the Ottomans). Then he went to Toulon, where he was being renovated (spring 1916 - summer 1917). From Toulon, the cruiser left for Murmansk, where she entered the fleet of the Arctic Ocean. In 1918, the Kola Bay was captured by the British and entered the British fleet under the name "Glory IV". In 1922 it was bought by Soviet Russia. In view of the unsatisfactory condition of the hull and mechanisms, it was decided to sell the cruiser for scrap. In the same 1922 "Askold" was dismantled for metal in Hamburg.
During the Dardanelles operation "Askold" fought together with the British cruiser HMS Talbot - the same one to which the "Varyag" team switched.

before launching

building "Askold" (left) in the water

at the outfitting wall - installation of a bow tube, 1901

the cruiser has almost taken its final form, winter 1901

docking at Blom & Foss floating dock, Hamburg, 1901

sea ​​trials, 1901

additional installation of the navigation bridge, autumn 1901, Kiel, Germany

acceptance tests. Since the cruiser has not yet been enlisted in the navy, on the flagpole is the state (tricolor), and not the naval (Andreevsky) flag

in the Kiel Canal, 1902

Great Kronstadt raid, 1902

already in the Baltic Fleet, 1902

Dalianwan Bay, 1903

Port Arthur, 1904. The cruiser has already been repainted in the standard military paint of the Pacific formations of those years - dark olive

on a combat course, 1904

during the Dardanelles operation, 1915

in Toulon, 1916

as part of the Arctic Ocean flotilla, 1917

note from the magazine "Niva", 1915

drawing and axonometric projection, "Modelist-Konstruktor" magazine. On a perspective view, mine-action nets are shown in a combat position

"Askold" during service on the Baltic Sea, modern drawing

painting of the cruiser "Askold" during service in the Pacific

painting of the cruiser "Askold" during the hostilities in the Mediterranean

Laid down at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg on September 5, 1899, launched on July 21, 1901, and commissioned on June 20, 1904. Before moving to Libava and further to the Far East, he was manned with a Guards crew.
In the Tsushima battle, he led a column of Russian ships. Having received heavy damage to the bow, it gave way to the lead ship EDR "Borodino". As a result of the loss of speed, it was under fire from the armored cruisers "Nissin" and "Kassuga". A fire broke out on board. The water that got through the holes worsened the situation and on May 18-50 on May 14, 1905, the ship capsized and sank. The entire crew was killed. In the same year, he was formally excluded from the lists of the fleet.
Before leaving for Port Arthur, the captain of the 1st rank, the commander of the crew of the Emperor Alexander III EBR, Nikolai Mikhailovich Bukhvostov, said 2:

You wish us victory. Needless to say, how we want it. But there will be no victory! I am afraid that we will lose half of the squadron on the way, and if this does not happen, then the Japanese will crush us: they have a better fleet and they are real sailors. For one thing I can vouch - we will all die, but we will not surrender.

before launching, 1901

during outfitting work at the Baltic shipyard

transfer from St. Petersburg to Kronstadt

in the dry dock of Kronstadt, 1903

on the Kronstadt roadstead, 1904

August 1904

on the Revel roadstead, September 1904

view of the starboard side, given a crane with a steam boat

at one of the parking lots during the transition to the Far East, from left to right - EBR "Navarin", EBR "Emperor Alexander III", "Borodino"

The armored cruiser "Rurik" is the last ship of this class with full sailing armament in the Russian Fleet

The last Russian cruiser with full sailing armament. Development of the "Memory of Azov" project. Subsequent ships - "Russia" and "Thunderstorm" became the development of this project (it was originally planned to build them according to the same project as the "Rurik"). The main task is to conduct hostilities and raider operations on British and German communications. A special feature of the ship was that when loading an additional supply of coal, it could go from St. Petersburg to the nearest Far Eastern bases for additional loading of coal in a 10-knot course.
Started with construction at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg in September 1889. Officially founded in May 1890. Launched on October 22, 1892. Commissioned in October 1895. Transferred from the Baltic Sea to the Far East to the I Pacific Squadron,
arrived in Nagasaki on April 9, 1896. He was a member of the Vladivostok cruiser detachment. In battle on August 1, 1904, at about. Ulsan was flooded by the crew as a result of the damage received. Of the 796 team members, 139 were killed and 229 injured.

painting the side in preparation for the inspection

on a hike

"Rurik" in black

"Rurik" in Nagasaki, 1896

in the eastern basin of Port Arthur

in the dock of Vladivostok

Port arthur

cruiser on a campaign, Far East

the stem of the cruiser - the decoration of the bow is clearly visible - the legacy of the "bow figures" of sailing ships

battleship "Sevastopol"

Laid down on March 22, 1892. Launched on May 25, 1895. It entered service on July 15, 1900. Participated in the battle in the Yellow Sea. On December 20, 1904, on the eve of the surrender of Port Arthur, it was flooded by the crew. The last ship of the "Poltava" class.

"Sevastopol" and "Petropavlovsk" in Vladivostok, 1901

on the right (at the wall) of the Sevastopol Electronic Development Bank. Crane transports a faulty 12-inch gun from the "Tsarevich", Port Arthur, 1904

EBR "Sevastopol" in the campaign

"Sevastopol", "Poltava" and "Petropavlovsk" at the wall of the eastern basin of Port Arthur, 1901-1903

Projectile-torn ventilation deflector, 1904

in Port Arthur. Ahead - stern to the photographer - "Tsarevich", in the background - "Askold"

in Port Arthur, campaign of 1904, on the right is the stern of the Sokol-class destroyer, on the left is the stern of the Novik

after being hit by a Japanese torpedo in White Wolf Bay, December 1904

sailors leave for the land front. after that the EBR "Sevastopol" will be flooded in the inner roadstead of Port Arthur on the eve of the surrender of the fortress

Squadron battleship "Sevastopol", color card

Armored cruiser of rank II "Boyarin"

Laid down at Burmeister og Vine, Copenhagen, Denmark in early 1900. The official bookmark took place on September 24, 1900. Launched on May 26, 1901.
Commissioned in October 1902. On October 27, 1902, the cruiser left Kronstadt and on May 10, 1903 arrived in Port Arthur.
It was blown up by a Russian mine near the Dalny port on January 29, 1904 (6 people died). The team left the ship, which remained afloat for two more days and only after a second detonation on a minefield sank.

1902 - St. Andrew's flag is already on the flagpole. Before going to Kronstadt.

"Boyarin" in the Far East, 1903

in the Danish Strait, 1903

in Toulon

Port Arthur, 1904

Armored cruiser of the II rank "Boyarin", photo postcard

1 - these are stanzas from the poem "In Memory of Admiral Makarov". Its author is S. LOBANOVSKY, cadet of the Vladimir Kiev cadet corps, graduation in 1910. It is completely embossed on the pedestal of the monument to Admiral Stepan Osipovich Makarov in Kronstadt. But these drains are the memory of all those who until the last remained with their crew, with their ship. Such as N.M.Bukhvostov, S.O. Makarov and many others ...

Sleep, northern knight, sleep honest Father,
Untimely taken by death, -
Not laurels of victory - a crown of thorns
You received with a fearless retinue.
Your coffin is an armadillo, your grave
Cold deep ocean
And faithful sailors a native family
Your age-old guard.
Sharing laurels, henceforth with you
They also share eternal peace.
The jealous sea will not betray the land
A hero who loved the sea -
In a deep grave, in a mysterious darkness
Cherishing him and peace.
And the wind will sing a dirge over him,
Hurricanes will cry like rain
And spread the shroud with a thick cover
Thick fogs over the sea;
And the clouds, frowning, the last fireworks
They will give him a thunderclap.

As for the 18 Japanese heavy cruisers, which became the subject of this monograph, the first of them appeared as 7100-ton long-range reconnaissance ships that went out to the ocean, and their projects were approved even before the signing of the Washington Treaty. Nevertheless, they were created with an eye to the British cruisers-defenders of trade at the end of the First World War, such as Hawkins, who are considered the immediate predecessors of all Washingtonians. Having built 4 ships with weapons that were noticeably inferior to the first "10,000-ton ships" of potential opponents, the Japanese more than compensated for their lag in the next two series, due to all sorts of tricks (and they did not disdain to violate contracts) by giving them 1-2 more guns, than others, as well as the most powerful torpedo and aircraft weapons. As a result, 8 cruisers of the "Mioko" and "Takao" types, not without reason, began to be considered the strongest in the world. The Japanese admirals pinned great hopes on these ships in the night battle against the numerically strongest battleship of the United States - a battle that, according to their plans, was to precede a general engagement. The functions of reconnaissance in the interests of the line fleet faded into the background, especially with the development of carrier-based aviation.

The appearance of the last 6 heavy cruisers in the Japanese fleet has no analogues in the practice of world shipbuilding: they were built as light (class “b”) with unprecedentedly powerful armament of 15 155-mm guns, but with the possibility of rearming with 203-mm caliber, they were quickly rebuilt into heavy ones as soon as the Japanese refused to comply with all contracts. As a result, by the beginning of the war in the Pacific, the number of ships of this class among the main rivals - Japan and the United States - turned out to be equal.

The edition was released in a format similar to the series "Battle Ships of the World".

1.2. General doctrine of the development of the Japanese fleet after the Russo-Japanese war. The first projects of scout cruisers.

The war with Russia that ended in complete defeat of the enemy at sea, the apogee of which was the Battle of Tsushima, fully confirmed the correctness of the organization and tactics chosen by the Imperial Navy. However, the change in the foreign policy situation, the experience gained in the course of hostilities and the significant progress caused by the war in naval shipbuilding required a corresponding reorganization of the fleet. In October 1906, Emperor Mutsuhito demanded that Marshal Arimoto Yamagata formulate a defense policy for the Empire, taking into account the lessons of the past war and the strengthening of US interests in the Pacific Ocean and the Far East. Following the emperor's instructions, Prime Minister Kinmochi Sayoniji held a series of meetings in January-April of the following year with the Chief of the Naval General Staff (MGS), Admiral Heihachiro Togo, the new Minister of the Navy, Vice Admiral Minoru Saito, Minister of War General Masatake Terauchi and the chiefs of staff. Naval issues were discussed at these meetings on the basis of a new treatise written by Captain 2nd Rank T. Sato, who spent the entire war at the headquarters of the commander of the Second Squadron, and after her became a college teacher at MGSH. Adopted on April 7, 1907, the new Imperial Defense Policy established the guidelines for Japan's defense planning for the next 11 years. In the list of potential adversaries, Russia was in the first place, most likely due to inertia or because of dissatisfaction with territorial gains after victory, followed by the United States and France, which owned large colonies in Southeast Asia. Regarding the naval composition, T. Sago argued the need to have by 1920 "a battleship (Kaizen Kantai) of three squadrons of 8 new battleships in each, squadrons of 4 armored cruisers and three squadrons of 4 cruisers of the 2nd class, not counting" auxiliary fleet "of ships of the short line. But the adopted" Policy "indicated a more modest composition of the battle fleet of eight battleships, supported by a squadron of eight armored cruisers of the latest project and with an age of no more than 8 years. March 31, 1912 in accordance with the new standards instead of armored cruisers were supposed to have the same number of battle cruisers.This ambitious project, which became known in history as "Fleet 8-8" (Hachi-hachi Kantai), Japan was unable to implement due to political and financial difficulties, but for several years it was used as a weapon of politics, and when it finally seemed that all difficulties could be overcome, the signing of the Washington I in 1922 finally buried this project of building a powerful fleet.

Based on the experience of the Russian-Japanese war, MGSH also put forward the requirement to have a cruiser with powerful weapons and protection, high speed and a large radius of action in the naval forces, which could perform the functions of scouts with a linear fleet. The main characteristics of the new reconnaissance cruisers were detailed in the "Program for the Creation of a New Fleet" presented to the Cabinet of Ministers by the Minister of the Navy M. Saito on May 15, 1910. And here the Japanese were helped by the Russian trophies they got, in particular, long-range scouts - the Bayan armored cruiser (renamed Azo) and the Varyag armored deck (Soya), the Novik armored close scout (Suzuya) and the auxiliary cruiser “” (“Anegawa”). The latter, sunk in shallow water in Port Arthur, the Japanese introduced into their fleet in March 1906, using a ship (tsuhokan) as a messenger. It was the experience of operating the Anegava, which amazed the new owners with its cruising range and ability to maintain a 19-knot speed even in significant sea waves, that showed what an ocean reconnaissance should be like. In total, the 1910 program of the year requested the construction of 51 one ship during the next eight financial years (1911-1918): 7 battleships, 3 cruisers of the 1st class, 4 cruisers of the 2nd class, 1 cruiser "special purpose" (for oceanic reconnaissance) , 26 destroyers and 10 submarines. With ships already scheduled for construction, a fleet of 8 new battleships (dreadnought "Fuso" plus 7), 8 cruisers of the 1st class (armored "Kurama" with 305-mm and 203-mm guns + 4 future line-type "Congo" + 3 ) and 8 cruisers of the 2nd class (“Tone” and 3 types of “Tikum” under construction plus 3 and 1 “special”) no older than 8 years could be ready by April 1, 1919. Moreover, all battleships and battle cruisers of this program (except for "Kurama") had to carry 356-mm guns, and ships already built after the Russo-Japanese war and under construction with a 305-mm main caliber ("pre-dreadnoughts" "Kasima", " Katori "Aki" and "Satsuma", dreadnoughts "Kawachi" and "Setsu", large armored cruisers "Tsukuba" "Ikoma" and the same type "Kurame" "Ibuki") were removed from the framework of "Fleet 8-8".

But the cabinet rejected the presented program and in September 1911 the fleet proposed another, which provided for the readiness of 8 battleships, 6 cruisers of the 1st and 8 cruisers of the 2nd class by April 1, 1920. It was necessary to build 7 battleships, two cruisers of the 1st class (in addition to 4 types of "Congo"), five of the 2nd class, two "special" (one of them was to replace the "Aiegawa" excluded from the lists in August 1911 years to return as a gift to the Russian Tsar). The number of destroyers and submarines remained unchanged. However, the construction of none of these ships was not approved, and the political confusion in the country led to the rejection of the new shipbuilding program at two regular sessions of parliament.

In 1914, the new naval minister, Vice Admiral Mutsuro Yashiro, presented proposals to bring the fleet to the "8-8" as soon as possible, and the defense department of the ruling cabinet on the eve of a major war in Europe approved them on June 22. A month later, on Yashiro's advice, the cabinet presented an abridged version of the plan to parliament as part of a normal naval replenishment phase. The new program, which provided for bringing the fleet to the composition of "8-4", also included three reconnaissance cruisers of 6000 tons, armed with four 20-cm guns. Interestingly, the Russian fleet was equipped with long-range reconnaissance personnel of just such a displacement before the war with Japan (“Varyag”, “Askold” and the “Bogatyr” type). The Russian Naval Ministry soon considered them suboptimal, given their size, cost and armament (of course, they could not compete with the Asama-class armored cruisers, which the Russian Navy simply did not have), but the Japanese, apparently, had a higher opinion of them ... Such ships could fill the empty niche in the Japanese navy between armored and small armored cruisers.

The outbreak of World War II prevented the adoption of this program. On September 10, 1915, the next naval minister Tomosaburo Kato presented his plan to bring the fleet to the composition of "8-4", in principle approved by the Defense Department of the Cabinet of Ministers, but only partially approved. This partial plan (battleship Nagato, cruisers of the 2nd class Tenryu and Tatsuta, 1 destroyer, 3 submarines and a tanker) was adopted at the 37th session of parliament in February 1916, but the reconnaissance cruisers were deleted from there. No technical data has been found regarding the reconnaissance cruisers of the pre-war programs. The program itself was interesting in that it marked the transition to the construction of capital ships with 410-mm guns. MGSh no longer satisfied the 4 battleships under construction ("Fuso", "Yamashiro", "Ise" and "Hyuuga") and 4 battle cruisers ("Congo", "Haruna", "Hiei", "Kirishima") from 356- mm with the main caliber, and he hatched plans for the construction of a "Fleet 8-8" with guns far superior to all those available to other powers.

The Tenryu and Tatsuta were the fast leaders of the destroyer flotillas, descending in large numbers from the stocks. The construction of "just such cruisers of the 2nd class was then considered a more urgent matter, but a few months later the Maritime Technical Council (1) (MTS) received the task to develop a preliminary design for a reconnaissance cruiser (" scout ", as the British called him). on the basis of the fleet in Kure, the development of a new 20-cm gun was entrusted, which was to replace the 20-cm 45-caliber type 41 years (2) (41st year of Meiji's reign - Emperor Mutsuhito, i.e. 1908), created On the basis of an earlier model of the British company Vickers Already on September 22, 1916, MTS submitted for consideration to the MGSH a draft "scout" project with the following characteristics: normal displacement 7200 tons, maximum speed 36 knots, range 6000-8000 miles at 14 knots, artillery weapons - at least 12 new (put into service before the world war itself) 14-cm / 50 guns (two paired installations in the bow and stern and 4 single ones on the sides) or a smaller number of developed 20-cm guns, torp the bottom - 4 twin-tube fixed onboard vehicles for the new 61-cm torpedoes, protection - a 76-mm belt made of HT-steel (high tension steel - High Tensile Steel) and an armored deck over vital parts. The 14-cm (140-mm) caliber was new for the Japanese fleet, which previously had to do with 152-mm and 120-mm English-style rapid-fire guns. But 152-mm shells weighing 45.4 kg were too heavy for manual loading by a Japanese sailor of normal conditions, and the 120-mm gun was already considered too small for the main caliber of cruisers.

In general, the project was liked and the "Program for the construction of the 8-4 Fleet", prepared in July-September 1916, included three such "scouts" (the estimated cost of building 6915078 yen for each), and in total, funds were requested for the construction of three battleships (" Mutsu, Kata, Tosa), two battle cruisers (Amati, Akagi), 9 cruisers (three 7200-ton scouts and six 3500-ton leaders of the improved Tenryu torpedo flotillas) , 27 destroyers, 18 submarines and 3 auxiliary vessels, which should have been allocated within 7 years, starting in 1917. Parliament was unable to adopt this program at the 38th session, since it was dissolved on January 25. But when the Japanese learned about the 3-year shipbuilding program adopted by the United States on August 29, 1916, certain political twists achieved the convocation of an extraordinary 39-session of parliament, which made the necessary decision on July 14, 1917.

The Americans, in particular, planned to build 10 cruisers-"scouts" of 7100 tons, with a speed of 35 knots and armament of 8 152-mm / 53 guns, 2 twin-tube rotary torpedo tubes (TA) and 2-4 seaplanes with two catapults (future type "Omeha"). Having inspired these data, the Japanese MGSh decided to remake the project of the 7200-ton "scout", but for now change the composition of the light cruisers of the last program. At the end of 1917, the 9 cruisers envisaged by the program were replaced by eight 5500-ton cruisers, which could perform both the functions of reconnaissance and destroyer leaders, and one experimental "small" project. Three more cruisers of 5500 t each (3) were included in the "8-6 Fleet Construction Program" (battlecruisers "Takao" and "Atago", 3 light cruisers, 27 destroyers, 48 ​​submarines and 6 auxiliary ships), adopted on the 40th session of parliament on March 12, 1918.

The project of a 5500-ton cruiser, the so-called "middle model", was developed by the 4th - shipbuilding - department of the MTD (Marine Technical Department) (4) based on the "Tenryu". A significant increase in size made it possible to strengthen the armament (from 4 to 7 14-cm guns with an onboard salvo of 6 barrels) and increase the cruising range by one and a half times (from 6000 to 9000 miles at 10 knots). In parallel, MTD began to improve the project of the 7200-ton cruiser and at the beginning of 1918 presented the following characteristics to the MGSH:

Four ships under the new design, officially called "large model cruisers", were included in the first post-war Fleet Building Program 8-8, which also included 4 giant battleships (nos. 9-12) and battle cruisers (nos. 13-16 ), 8 cruisers "medium model" of 5500 t each, 32 destroyers, 28 submarines, 5 gunboats and 18 auxiliary ships. The results of the last world war strengthened the financial position of the Land of the Rising Sun, which gave hope to its admirals to finally realize their plans without restrictions from the government and parliament. The Council of Ministers approved this last phase of the Fleet 8-8 program (5) on June 2, 1919, but parliament was able to adopt it only a year later at its 43rd extraordinary session (the previous session was dissolved in February). Published on August 1, 1920, she planned to issue an annual order for one 8000 tonne and one 5500 tonne cruiser for 4 years (fiscal years 1920 / 21-1923 / 24), and then for fiscal years 1924/25 and 1925/26. years to order 2 5500 tons. The last ship of the "Flot 8-8" program should have been completed by April 1, 1928 (that is, by the beginning of the next financial year). The cost of a cruiser of 8,000 tons was estimated in 1919 at 8,039,200 yen, but by June 1920 this figure had already exceeded 11 million.