The remnants of the Black Sea Fleet, based primarily in Sevastopol, were mercilessly plundered. German soldiers food parcels were sent daily from the Crimea to Germany, by order of General Kosh, trains loaded with furnishings from imperial palaces and yachts were sent to Berlin, and various valuable property was exported from the port of Sevastopol. The keys to the shops, warehouses and workshops of the port were kept by German officers, who took away materials and equipment from them without any documents, “and their fence is, so to speak, purely spontaneous, not justified by the need ...”, - reported to the commander of the Black Sea Fleet of Ukraine, Captain II rank Pogozhev, head of the rear of the Black Sea Fleet and chief commander of the Sevastopol port of the Sevastopol post office on May 13, 1918. The statement of the captain of the transport "Emperor Nicholas I" addressed to the Commander of the Black Sea Fleet dated May 15, 1918 is significant: "Aviator"). On May 3, the German aviation detachment settled under the command of Lieutenant Commander Mr. Schiller. On the 13th of May, without warning me, they began to bring property from the steamer to the shore, such as: cabin furnishings, beds, mattresses, sofas, washbasins, mirrors, stools, linen and copper rods for curtains, as well as from a suite cabin, ladies' boudoir, library, music salon, first class smoking room, bar and wardroom, all upholstered furniture and chairs, and dishes and silverware from the buffet, as well as take away all the provisions that were purchased for the crew at their own expense. All of the above continues to be brought together at the present time. About which I bring to your attention. Such comments do not even need. A similar state of affairs was in warehouses and workshops. The Germans and Austrians plundered everything they could, officially calling it "war booty". The head of all ports of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral A.G. Pokrovsky naively asked in one of the documents: what is "military booty" in the present situation, when the troops of friendly states are brought into the country at the invitation of its government?

The new owners behaved unceremoniously in the Crimea, using their power and impunity. The uncertainty of the situation in the sense of belonging to one or another government of the fleet, Sevastopol, the property of the fleet contributed to the fact that robberies from the port territory became everyday affairs. In addition to the German, so to speak, legal, robbers, there were enough of their own, the most national ones, who stole state property, not being afraid of the German guards set up. Such thefts were striking in their "courage and became an ordinary phenomenon," the captain over the port of Sevastopol reported to Rear Admiral Klochkovsky. It got to the point that the inhabitants of the city stole even overall wooden things: ship tables, wooden bulkheads and even a piano were chopped for firewood and carried ashore. Thanks to German and Russian robbers, only old iron boxes remained from the ships, since the Germans removed all the whole mechanisms.

From the moment when it became obvious that Germany had fallen, and soon the Germans would have to leave the Crimea, the looting of Russian property by the latter became even more brazen: the Germans simply began to sell the property of the fleet into private hands, electrical equipment, for example, was successfully sold to Jewish speculators, making a good profit on it. From the first days of November, the Germans were removed from the port of Sevastopol by the cash security forces of the port, artisans and employees, but under the threat of the use of force that came from the commander of the German naval forces in the former Russian region of the Black Sea, Vice Admiral Gopman, they soon returned back there. The Russians retained control only over the Lazarevsky and Dock Admiralties. After the Germans returned to the port, the robbery intensified even more. As for the fate of the Black Sea Fleet, it has remained suspended. The Germans offered Ukraine to pay for the fleet, as for all-Russian property, an amount of about 200 million rubles. The question hung in the air, the fate of the fleet remained unresolved. Whose fleet was in the second half of 1918: Ukrainian, Crimean, Russian or German - it is extremely difficult to answer this question from a legal point of view.

Ukraine made attempts to get the ships of the Black Sea Fleet, located in Romanian ports, but was not going to pay maintenance to the personnel of the cruiser teams. Thus, Rear Admiral Maksimov, Comrade of the Naval Minister, informed Rear Admiral Klochkovsky, an official representative of the Ukrainian State Naval Ministry for communication with the German command in the Crimea: For the previous time, Ukraine is not obliged to pay and, in general, does not have the opportunity to do this due to lack of funds. This fact is more than significant. The great-power status of Ukraine, attempts to acquire Russian property by the Power were not confirmed either by military force, or by economic opportunities, or by political independence.

The hetman's government more than clearly understood the significance of the Crimea for Ukrainian trade. Skoropadsky more than once received reports of a similar nature from his subordinates: “The ambiguity of the position of the Crimea, mainly Sevastopol, makes it extremely difficult to resolve very many significant issues.<...>Apparently, the question of the ownership of the fleet and the Crimea is extremely difficult to resolve on the spot, and therefore would it not be the right decision to send a special mission to Berlin to resolve issues so fundamental to the Ukrainian state as the question of the existence of Maritime trade, which without the possession of Crimea and without the navy will be only a fiction ... ".

Skoropadsky himself had no personal contacts with Sulkevich, they broke off before they began. The two generals could not understand each other. Skoropadsky reasoned as follows: “The plans of the Germans are unknown to me, in any case, with a certain combination, I would not mind there [in the Crimea. - A.P.] to gain a foothold. Turkey with the Tatars is also stretching out its hands to the Crimea, but Ukraine cannot live without owning the Crimea, it will be some kind of torso without legs. [emphasis added by us. - A.P.] Crimea should belong to Ukraine, under what conditions, it does not matter whether it will be a complete merger or broad autonomy, the latter should depend on the desire of the Crimeans themselves, but we need to be fully secured from hostile actions from Crimea. In the economic sense, Crimea actually cannot exist without us. I resolutely insisted to the Germans on the transfer of the Crimea on any conditions, of course, taking into account all the economic, national and religious interests of the population. The Germans hesitated, I insisted in the most resolute way. In turn, General Sulkevich stated in an interview with one of the Yalta newspapers: “My government was neither for Ukraine nor against it, but only sought to establish good neighborly relations, equally useful and necessary for both Ukraine and Crimea. After I informed Kiev of my new appointment, I unexpectedly received a telegram from the Ukrainian government addressed to me as a "provincial headman" in Ukrainian. I replied that I was not a "headman", but the head of the government of an independent region, and that I asked to establish relations between us in a public language - in Russian. This act of mine was announced in Kiev as a "severance of diplomatic relations." We, i.e. The Crimean government sent its plenipotentiary to Kiev to establish an economic agreement, but there it ran into absolutely closed doors.

Indeed, in June 1918, Ukraine launched a real customs war against the Crimea, the strong supporter of which was the hetman himself. By order of the Ukrainian government, all goods sent to Crimea were requisitioned. As a result of the closure of the borders, Crimea lost Ukrainian bread, and Ukraine - Crimean fruits. The food situation in the Crimea has noticeably deteriorated, even in Simferopol and Sevastopol bread cards were introduced. It was obvious to the population of Crimea that the region could not feed itself, but Sulkevich's government stubbornly stood on the position of maintaining the actual independence of their small state and paid great attention to issues related to the external attributes of independence. Crimea in 1918 managed to get, for example, its coat of arms.

The coat of arms of the Tauride province (Byzantine eagle with a golden eight-pointed cross on the shield) was approved as the state emblem, the flag was a blue cloth with the coat of arms in the upper corner of the shaft. Simferopol was declared the capital of the state. Russian was elevated to the rank of the state language, but with the right to use Tatar and German at the official level. Characteristically, not Ukrainian! Independent Crimea planned to start issuing its own banknotes. A law on citizenship of the Crimea was developed. Any person born on the Crimean land could become a citizen of the region, without distinction on the basis of religion and nationality, if he supported himself and his family with his labor. “Citizenship could only be acquired by those assigned to estates and societies, serving in a state or public institution and living in Crimea for at least three years ... Any Crimean Muslim, wherever he lived, with a corresponding application, had the right to citizenship of Crimea. Dual citizenship was also envisaged,” reports this story. modern research.

Sulkevich set the task of creating his own armed forces, which was never implemented in practice. Ukrainization of the Crimea was not carried out, because the region tried in every possible way to emphasize its isolation from Ukraine, which, on the whole, was successfully carried out during the reign of Sulkevich and Skoropadsky. To a much greater extent, independent Crimea associated itself precisely in state relations with Russia, perceiving itself as part of Russian state. For a while, the absence of a recognized national authority in Russia, Crimea found it possible to consider itself an independent state, while, as a prominent public figure and minister of labor in the office of Solomon Krym, P.S. Bobrovsky, the activities of the government in this matter were "almost humorous in nature", and the government itself, according to the memoirist, "did not enjoy any authority among the population ... ".

In September 1918, Ukraine somewhat relaxed the regime of the economic blockade of the Crimea. Officially, the "customs war" is over. As a consequence, Simferopol found it possible to open negotiations with Kiev. So, at the end of the month, the Crimean delegation headed by the Minister of Justice A.M. Akhmatovich (by nationality Akhmatovich, like Sulkevich, was a Lithuanian Tatar) visited Kiev. Akhmatovich behaved quite ambitiously, in particular, declaring that "economically, Crimea is in a brilliant position", and emphasizing that the Crimean delegation arrived in Kiev only because the customs war had stopped: "The abolition of the customs war by Ukraine gave the Crimean government the right to come to Kiev for negotiations, because in the customs war we saw the reception of influence<...>With the extension of the customs war, the Crimean government would not consider it possible to enter into any negotiations. Answering a question about the merger of Crimea with Ukraine, Akhmatovich said: “In Ukraine, obviously, they are not aware of Crimean affairs. We have come here to speak as equals. We stand on the principle of national self-determination, and we believe that the idea of ​​national self-determination will triumph. Now I have no right to say what form of government the delegation considers acceptable and necessary to defend for Crimea. But one thing is certain, that for Crimea we will demand the same rights that Ukraine demands for itself. Before leaving Simferopol, our delegation, with the participation of other members of the Crimean cabinet, had a series of meetings at which the government's principled point of view on Ukrainian-Crimean relations was established, which coincides with the opinion of the vast majority of the Crimean population. We are ready for negotiations. We have thought out every step, and we will speak openly, directly, without hidden thoughts with the Ukrainian government, because our cause is clear and, most importantly, truthful. We know that we express the opinion of the vast majority of the Crimean population.” Negotiations, although they went on for several weeks, did not lead to any definite results. Simferopol offered to focus on economic issues, while political issues were more important for Kiev, namely the conditions for the annexation of Crimea to Ukraine. The Ukrainian delegation headed by Prime Minister F.A. Lyzogubom presented "The main reasons for the connection of the Crimea with Ukraine" of 19 points. Their essence boiled down to the fact that Crimea was to become part of Ukraine as an autonomous region “under the unified Supreme Authority of His Serene Highness the Noble Pan Hetman (the official title of P.P. Skoropadsky)” . To resolve issues related to the Crimea, the Secretary of State for Crimean Affairs, who was appointed by the hetman from among three candidates proposed by the Crimean government, was to be attached to the person of the hetman.

The conditions proposed by Ukraine did not suit the Crimean delegation. The "Main Foundations" were regarded by them not as a "project of union", but as a "project of enslavement". Simferopol, in turn, put forward counterproposals, which boiled down to the establishment of a federal union with the Ukrainian State and the conclusion of a bilateral treaty. The Ukrainian delegation interrupted the negotiations, threatening to resume the customs war. As a result, the parties did not come to any agreement, and soon the general conditions changed: the world war began to come to an end, in which Germany - main source support for both Sulkevich and Skoropadsky - was defeated.

The prosperity of the Germans in the Crimea did not last long. The end of the World War was approaching, which in mid-October 1918 became obvious to many. The fate of the Sulkevich government depended only on the support of the Germans.

During his reign, Sulkevich's cabinet failed to gain any recognition and respect in the eyes of the people. Only the Crimean Tatars were sympathetic to the protege of the Germans. The opposition saw in Sulkevich the culprit of all the troubles of the region. October 17 in Yalta at the apartment of a prominent cadet N.N. Bogdanov, the cadet leadership, having previously enlisted the support of the German command, made a decision on the need to remove Sulkevich's cabinet from power. From the very beginning, the meeting participants formulated the task - the removal of Sulkevich - "as a coup d'état". At a party meeting of the committee of cadets at the Vinavera dacha near Alushta, it was decided that it was necessary to recommend to the congress of provincial councilors of Crimea to elect an experienced political figure, cadet Solomon Samoilovich Krym, as chairman of the government. Vinaver himself made a “pilgrimage” a little earlier, in his words, to Yekaterinodar, where he met the leaders Volunteer army and formed a favorable opinion of them. The ground for the future "petition" to Denikin was prepared.

In mid-October, Bogdanov, who arrived in Ekaterinodar, informed Denikin about the upcoming coup in the Crimea. In addition, Bogdanov asked Denikin to appoint a responsible person to organize in the Crimea "an armed force in the name of the Volunteer Army and to send an airborne detachment there." P.S. Bobrovsky recalled: “The question of the occupation of the Crimea by the Volunteer Army arose in cadet circles as soon as it became clear that the Germans would be forced to evacuate the Crimea. At the same time, although it arose in connection with the question of the formation of a new Crimean government and the need for this government to rely on some kind of armed force, it also had independent significance. Not only the Cadets, but also the broadest circles of the anti-Bolshevik intelligentsia (and there were almost no non-anti-Bolshevik intelligentsia at that time), including right-wing socialists and many Social Revolutionaries, looked at the Volunteer Army as the only effective anti-Bolshevik force. The heroic beginning of the army, its lofty patriotic spirit, its sharply anti-German position, the absence of reactionary encroachments in the activities of its leaders - all this made us see in the army a genuine force for the revival of a united free Russia ... ". And if the intelligentsia and the bourgeoisie were inclined to glorify the Volunteer Army, then the masses looked at it differently. The “fourth estate” played a big role in this, thanks to which information about the Volunteer Army reached the inhabitants of the peninsula in an extremely fragmentary and one-sided way: the local press, predominantly of the Social Democratic direction in its political orientation, sought to present Denikin’s men as dangerous reactionaries. According to P. Novitsky, a publicist for the Social Democratic newspaper Priboy, “The Army [Volunteer. - A.P.], under the leadership of Shulgin, Denikin and Milyukov, is hostile to democracy. It can only save the Protofis, the hetman and the all-Russian reaction. By the time the Whites arrived in Crimea, the local proletariat regarded Denikin's men as their class enemies and was ready to fight them.

Denikin gave Bogdanov his consent to all his proposals. Already in exile, Bogdanov sought to emphasize that “the Crimean government called the Dobrarmia to the Crimea, it did everything possible for it to materially and morally support the Dobroarmiya and from the very first days of its existence connected its fate with the army ...” . The situation in Crimea changed day by day. So on November 3, 1918, the commander of the German group in the Crimea, General Kosh, in a letter addressed to Sulkevich, announced his refusal to further support his government, and already on November 4, the Crimean Prime Minister asked Denikin for "quick help from the allied fleet and volunteers." In anticipation of the landing of the Volunteer Army, the streets of Yalta were decorated with tricolor flags and garlands. The bourgeois inhabitants hoped for the imminent arrival of volunteers. However, it was already too late.

The revolution that began in Germany accelerated the fall of Sulkevich's cabinet. Realizing that without the support of the "public" he could not retain power, Sulkevich suggested that the Cadets form their own cabinet, on the condition that he remain the "chief of the region." However, such compromises could no longer suit the constitutional democrats, and they refused the proposals of the general, whose power was surviving. last days. On November 14-15, Sulkevich's cabinet resigned, the general handed over all affairs to the new cabinet without dispute, and the unlucky leader of Crimea himself left for Azerbaijan to continue there as the Minister of War of Azerbaijan Democratic Republic his own, as Denikin put it, "Russophobic work". Sulkevich was later shot by the Bolsheviks.

The collapse of the Central Powers made Crimea once again completely dependent on Russia, with which the then government associated primarily the Volunteer Army.

The backbone of the Volunteer Army in Crimea was the Crimean Center of the Volunteer Army, led by General Baron de Bode. The activities of the Center for sending officers to the Volunteer Army were not very effective, the Crimea did not give the army a single significant party. In a letter to de Baudet, Alekseev tried to give some explanation for this: “The small influx of officers from the area under your jurisdiction, it must be assumed, is due to some isolation of the city of Yalta, which you have chosen as your residence - there are no railways to Yalta, road communication is wrong and expensive... Now, after the defeat of the Central Powers, the Crimean government entered into an agreement with General de Bode. In turn, Denikin, in a letter to the Crimea, announced the readiness of the Volunteer Army to help the region. By order of Denikin on November 18 / December 1, 1918, the Crimean Center was disbanded, and Bode became known as the "Commander of the Volunteer Army in the Crimea." The general was supposed to "take command of all field troops and garrisons of fortresses with the rights of the Corps Commander." By order of Denikin, a small detachment of volunteers with a gun was sent to Yalta, and another detachment was sent to occupy Kerch. On the basis of these forces, insignificant in number, the “Crimean Division” began to form, under the command of Major General A.V. Korvin-Krukovsky, who received the following instructions from Denikin: “Russian statehood, Russian army, subordination to me. All-round assistance to the Crimean government in the fight against the Bolsheviks. Complete non-interference in the internal affairs of the Crimea and in the struggle around the authorities.

Among other things, the fall of the Germans, the crisis of the hetman's power, and the expected arrival of the allies in the Crimea led to the fact that Denikin openly declared his claims to the Black Sea Fleet, which by the end of 1918 remained virtually ownerless. This accession was, according to Denikin, “nominal, since it was command staff, but there were no warships at his disposal ", which were actually captured by the allies: the allies who entered Sevastopol raised their flags on Russian ships and occupied them with their teams.

On November 13, Denikin gave the order to appoint Admiral V.A. Kanin, who at one time commanded the formidable Baltic Fleet during the war years. Kanin hesitated for some time, knowing perfectly well the dire situation of the remnants of the Black Sea Fleet that survived the Novorossiysk catastrophe, who were also in “captivity”, and diligently dismissed in the press any talk about his future appointment, but then agreed to take up the post of commander, immediately starting to actively bombard the newly formed government of Solomon Crimea with requests for urgent financial assistance to a truly distressed fleet. The situation in the fleet was such that most of the officers did not have not only money, but even firearms and edged weapons (which were consistently confiscated from the officers by all authorities). Revolvers for officers had to be purchased from the English squadron located in Sevastopol. At the same time, the Black Sea Fleet, despite the unparalleled hardships it had endured, still had to serve the White Cause to glory.

In the new government of S.S. Crimea, in accordance with the decision of the zemstvo-city assembly created on a coalition basis, included the socialists S.A. Nikonov (public education) and P.S. Bobrovsky (Ministry of Labor), Cadets S.S. Crimea, M.M. Vinaver (foreign relations), V.D. Nabokov (Justice) and N.N. Bogdanov (Ministry of Internal Affairs). These six men made up the collegium that directed the general policy of the government. Well-known cadet figure, editor of "Rech" I.V. Gessen wrote, perhaps too subjectively, about the Crimean government: “Here [in Crimea. - A.P.] a handful of people appointed themselves government, making it even more ephemeral [than the Northwest government. - A.P.], from the Volunteer Army, which was fighting the Bolsheviks here, was completely cut off and had no influence, had nothing to do with this struggle. The working people immediately called the Regional Government "crooked".

Government meetings were held daily, sometimes twice a day. The President's time limit for meetings (11 p.m.) was seldom respected. Despite the exhausting work that consumed all the time, the ministers managed to work unanimously. “People were different,” Vinaver recalled, “but their personal characteristics successfully complemented each other.” The new chairman of the government, Solomon Krym, undoubtedly, could be the ideal ruler of his small state. The same Vinaver wrote about him: “Seated at the head of the green table, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, S.S. Crimea, happily combined the data of a politician who was already working in the big state arena with a deep knowledge of local Crimean conditions<...>A sharp-sighted man who saw much deeper than it might seem, according to his invariably courteous address, possessing rare common sense and exceptional knowledge of people, he knew how, remaining himself, to find conciliatory formulas in all difficult cases, imbued with a healthy sense of reality.<...>As the head of the government, which, through the prism of local everyday interests, was supposed to carry out a certain national task, he had to apply this conciliatory talent not to clashes between individuals, but to a combination of two lines, the joint pursuit of which required great tact, great attention to the interests of individual parts of a small number of people. , but very variegated in composition of its population. And this tact never betrayed him<...>He did not crush us with his authority - the authority of a person in whom the whole region showed such exceptional trust.<...>In the whole manner of doing business, he tried to look more like a president of the republic of the French type than an active head of the executive branch ... ".

Vladimir Dmitrievich Nabokov, the father of the famous writer, who occupied the chair of the Minister of Justice, was also one of the key figures in Solomon Krym's cabinet. “Always equally smooth, well-mannered, he perfectly adapted to the atmosphere, very closely reminiscent of the atmosphere of the Provisional Government, with which he also had no external friction it was not, despite all the deep hostility that subsequently emerged towards his main figures, ”wrote Vinaver about Nabokov. He also admitted: "Nabokov was, of course, in his posture and manners, to the greatest extent a minister among us." A contrasting description of the Crimean government was left in his memoirs by cadet N.I. Astrov: “The Crimean government was more like a city or zemstvo council. Even such bright figures as V.D. Nabokov and M.M. Vinaver did not change this impression. S.S. Crimea behaved with dignity, but seemed somewhat embarrassed by its position as Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Nabokov, always graceful, always self-confident, here, defending his liberal-Cadet positions, at times had, as it were, a not very confident tone. In a private conversation, far from sharing Vinaver’s enthusiastic attitude towards the successes and achievements of the Crimean government, he said: “The Crimean government has not done any work”<...>Bogdanov was, as always, lively, not stupid, and behaved like a good chairman of the zemstvo council, and did not look much like the Minister of the Interior. Only Vinaver was at ease, cleverly and thoroughly defending the draft agreement he had worked out ... ".

Be that as it may, but, despite the above-mentioned some provincialism, the Crimean government immediately showed itself actively. The published government declaration, addressed to the Volunteer Army and allies, said: “United Russia is conceived by the government not in the form of the former Russia, bureaucratic and centralized, based on the oppression of individual nationalities, but in the form of a free democratic state in which all nationalities will be granted the right of cultural self-determination . At the same time, the government is convinced that ensuring the well-being and prosperity of all the peoples inhabiting Russia can in no way be built on the denial of united Russia, on its weakening and on the desire to reject it. At present, the greatest threat to the restoration of normal life in the Crimea, as in all of Russia, is those corrupting forces of anarchy that have brought our homeland and our region to the present distress. The government calls on the entire population to help it in its struggle against these worst enemies of law and freedom. In this struggle, the government will not stop at the most decisive measures and will use both all the means at its disposal and the military force ready to assist it ... ". However, in fact, few people were afraid of the government of Solomon Crimea, the presence of a “strong hand” was not felt in it. According to the prominent royal dignitary A.N. Kulomzin, who lived at that time in the Crimea, “the main feature of the Crimean Government, a red thread running through all its acts and actions, and this was already entirely the work of its head S.S. Crimea, was his spirit, his gentleness, so to speak. It tried to be impartial and did not take revenge on the population or its individual layers for the old ... ". According to Denikin, the government of Solomon Crimea was "a complete experience of democratic government, albeit on a miniature territorial scale - a government that had sovereignty, a complete state apparatus and titles appropriate to it ...". Meanwhile, Denikin failed to establish conflict-free relations with the government of Solomon Crimea. According to Milyukov, the volunteers accused the regional government of being "leftist" and "of relations with the socialists."

On November 26, 1918, at exactly 12 o'clock, a major and long-awaited event took place: a squadron of 22 Allied ships - English, French, Greek and Italian ships - entered the Sevastopol Bay; Primorsky Boulevard by that time was crowded with a crowd of thousands of people: Sevastopol residents with tension and hidden hope were waiting for the ships to appear. The Crimean regional government in full force was not slow to pay their respects, and was received on the flagship by Admiral S. Colthorp. In their welcoming speeches, Krym and Vinaver emphasized that they had high hopes for help in the fight against Bolshevism and anarchy in the region with the Allies' presence in the Crimean land. In a conversation with a press representative, Vinaver said that "The arrival of an allied power in Sevastopol is the first step towards establishing direct relations with the allies." “The government [of Crimea. - A.P.], - he continued, - considered it a duty to use this first meeting in Russia with the allies in order to bring to the attention of the allied powers about the moods and wishes that excite Russian society through the intermediary of the squadron commander<...>Conversations with the commander of the squadron left me with the impression that in the allied countries, apparently, there is very insufficient information about the true state of affairs in Russia; not only nothing is known about the government of the region where the squadron came, but also, obviously, there is also extremely insufficient information about the events in the Kuban and Ukraine. In the allied countries there are only very vague rumors about the existence of the army of General Denikin, but they know nothing about the hopes placed on it. Our indications of the need for their assistance in the struggle against anarchy and Bolshevism met with general sympathy, but the plan, nature and method of such assistance have either not yet been established or were not known to our interlocutors. Of course, the general procedure for the participation of the Allied Powers in Russia's further struggle against Bolshevism can only be worked out through an agreement between the Allies and the Volunteer Army. The squadron that arrived in the Crimea, of course, could not bring such a plan, and the regional government did not consider itself in the right to discuss such a plan, not being able to act together with the allies outside the Crimea ... ". Vinaver drew the attention of the press to the fact that on the day the allied squadron arrived, a special meeting was held, at which S.S. Crimea and Vinaver itself, from the Volunteer Army - Generals de Bode and Korvin-Krukovsky, as well as representatives of the naval command - Admiral V.E. Klochkovsky and his chief of staff. At the meeting, it was decided to draw up a memorandum addressed to the commander of the squadron, containing the following wishes to the allies from the government and the Volunteer Army: firstly, to leave the landing force in Sevastopol and Feodosia; secondly, to allocate several cruisers to protect the entire coast; thirdly, to expedite the departure of German troops; fourthly, to immediately suspend the export of Russian property by the Germans from the Crimea.

On November 30, the allies arrived at Yalta. The local population greeted them with joy. In Yalta cafes, for example, as an eyewitness recalled, foreign sailors and officers were treated "as friends and liberators", expecting the imminent fall of the Bolsheviks. How much great importance the Crimean government devoted itself to relations with the allies, says the fact that the Ministry of Foreign Relations, headed by Vinaver, moved to Sevastopol, where it was housed in a mansion that used to belong to the mayor. From there, the minister traveled twice a week to Simferopol to attend government meetings. Vinaver wrote the following about the purpose of moving his ministry to Sevastopol: “Moving to Sevastopol was only one of the measures aimed at intensifying the impact on the allies. The impact on people who are so ignorant of our affairs could not be limited to personal conversations with superiors, no matter how numerous they were. It was necessary, Vinaver recalled, “to inform our friends [i.e. allies. - A.P.] about such elementary things, about which it is not even always convenient to raise a question in a conversation; it was also necessary to inform not only admirals and commanders, but a large staff of naval officers, and subsequently land, and even lower military ranks - sea and land. Vinaver feared that the allies in the Crimea might fall under the influence of “gossip and legends not only in matters relating to Russia, but also in the field of events taking place in Europe, about which, in the absence of foreign newspapers, no one knew anything. The only way to eliminate this evil was the creation of a printed organ on foreign language... ". The Bulletin was first published in French and English, and from mid-January 1919, after the departure of the British, only in French and published twice a week. In total, 16 issues of the Bulletin were published, which told about the main events of Russian (in particular, the first issue of the Bulletin told about the Iasi conference, and General Denikin's government declaration was placed) and international life and served, as it seems, as a successful attempt at propaganda in the allied environment.

In May 1919, Vinaver compiled a "Reference" on the activities of the government of S.S. Crimea, which in 1927 was published in the Soviet magazine "Red Archive". Not to trust her, I think, there is no particular reason. In Spravka, Maxim Moiseevich stated that “the Crimean government had the task of strengthening the connection between the gen. Sulkevich of a part of the territory of Russia [i.e. Crimea. - A.P.] with the rest of Russia, based on the principles of Russian statehood in domestic politics and loyalty to the allies in foreign policy» . Vinaver also touched upon the issue of relations with the Volunteer Army: “The Crimean government was deprived of its own military force. Having assumed power during the German occupation, just before the departure of the German troops, the government, in view of the explosion of Bolshevism created from within, turned for military assistance to the only representative of the Russian military force, which was D.A. in the south of Russia. [Volunteer army. - A.P.] General Denikin responded sympathetically to the government's appeal. At the same time, the relationship between the government and D.A., formulated as in the letters of Gen. Denikin, and in appeals to the population coming from the government and from D.A., should have rested on the following two principles: D.A. in the internal affairs of the Crimea and the complete independence of D.A. in matters of military command ... ". Vinaver also touched on relations with the allies in his “Spravka”: “The Crimean government, just like D.A., like all the anti-Bolshevik forces of Russia, counted from the moment of the truce on the help of the allies. The share of the Crimean government, in view of the special position of Sevastopol, fell close and intimate communication with the allies. The government tried to use it both to inform the allies about the situation in Russia and the need for a general intervention, and to influence in order to achieve the participation of the allies in the defense of the Crimea together with D.A.” . At the same time, Vinaver’s “Reference” ended with a disappointing summary of the reasons for the failure that followed in the spring of 1919: “D.A.’s impotence, on the one hand, and the general turn in the camp of the allies in the direction hostile to intervention, on the other, the fate of the Crimea and stopped the efforts of the Crimean government to reunite this outskirts with the rest of anti-Bolshevik Russia.

By the end of 1918, everything seemed to be calm in the Crimea. In the Crimea, perceived by the white High Command exclusively as a rear area and a source of replenishment for the front, there was an external (allies) and internal armed force (volunteers), which, according to Denikin, was to turn into powerful armed formations that served as a guarantor of stability in the region. Relations between allies and volunteers have not yet taken on a conflict character. The main events on the Crimean peninsula had yet to take place. The exhausted Crimean inhabitant still had to see the Bolshevization of the region, the decomposition of the allied troops and their hasty evacuation.

The anti-Bolshevik movement in the Crimea pinned very high hopes on the New Year of 1919. It would seem that all factors contributed to this: The Crimea had its own government, headed by the cadet Solomon Samoylovich Krym; on the territory of the region there were still a few volunteer troops and troops of interventionists. The Bolsheviks, as the Crimean politicians thought, were demoralized and did not pose any serious threat. In addition, the World War, which lasted more than 4 years, has just ended, from which the Allies emerged victorious, sending their contingent to Sevastopol and Odessa. Under the cover of the allied troops, haloed by the victors of the formidable Germans, the anti-Bolshevik forces planned to deploy the formation of a powerful national army, which would launch a decisive offensive against red Moscow.

Meanwhile, rainbow dreams collided with a much more complex reality. Firstly, the formation of the Crimean-Azov Volunteer Army under the command of General Borovsky was extremely unsuccessful, the size of the army did not exceed 5 thousand people (that is, almost 4 times less than the regular division of the Russian imperial army during the First World War; Borovsky, according to some testimonies, reached three thousand people with the convoy) - the inhabitants of Crimea did not want to go and defend the "United and Indivisible Russia" of General Denikin, for the most part, there were few who wanted to enter the ranks of the army of General Borovsky, and General Borovsky himself was a great fan of "laid by the collar", and in general did not show the qualities of a leader in the Crimea. Secondly, the interventionists (the French and Greeks), whose main base was Sevastopol (the total number of over 20 thousand people), took a very peculiar position on the “Russian question”: they avoided participating in battles with the Bolsheviks, fearing the “reddening” of their troops and their Bolshevization and decomposition (soon this will happen in Odessa); Bolshevism was considered an internal affair of Russia and they were more concerned about maintaining general order on the peninsula; at the same time, the allies considered themselves the main stewards of the fate of the Crimea and considered the Volunteer Army as being under their control. It came to oddities: when the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in the South of Russia, General A.I. Denikin decided to move the Headquarters from Ekaterinodar to Sevastopol, the Allies categorically opposed this, pointing out that "General Denikin should be with the Volunteer Army, and not in Sevastopol, where the French troops are stationed, which he does not command." One can, I think, state that the interventionists behaved very cautiously in the Crimea, trying in every possible way to evade participation in the battles, but at the same time jealously monitoring the observance of their prestige and the priority right to resolve all emerging political issues in their favor. They considered Crimea as part of the territory of Russia - a country that concluded a separate peace and lost the war. As a consequence of this, the allies - the victors in the war, believed that they had the right to indicate what both the local authorities and Denikin's people needed to do.

Of great importance in the fate of the peninsula was played by the Regional Government itself, headed by Solomon Krym. The government of S. Crimea (first of all, in this case, we should talk about M.M. Vinaver) did its best to curry favor with the allies, trying by all means to achieve one thing: the interventionists provide direct military support in protecting the Crimea from the Red Army. At the same time, the Regional Government, which at one time asked Denikin for help, jealously followed the non-interference of volunteers in the internal affairs of the Crimean peninsula. At the suggestion of the prime minister of the government (so at least those around Denikin thought), a whole campaign was launched in the Crimean press to discredit the Volunteer Army as "reactionary", "monarchist" and showing no respect for local autonomy. It must be said that a similar point of view on the political image of the Volunteer Army dominated among the officers of the allied contingent of troops. It is clear that at the same time, the Crimean government did not even think of refusing to participate in the defense of the peninsula.

Thus, by the spring of 1919, there were three forces in the Crimea: allies (a powerful French squadron under the command of Admiral Amet, ground troops Colonel Trousson and several thousand Greeks); The Crimean-Azov army under the command of General Borovsky and, finally, the weakest one - which did not have real opportunities to maintain its power - the government of S.S. Crimea. The resultant between these three forces was not drawn. In a civil war, military structures not only dominate civilians, but also do not want to delve into the interests of the latter. It was obvious that if the volunteers and allies refused to participate in the defense of the peninsula from the Bolsheviks, then the government of Solomon Crimea would fall: he did not have his own armed forces.

Meanwhile, the stay of the allies in Sevastopol caused great discontent among the city's lower classes. Even Denikin was forced to admit in his memoirs, although not without a share of sarcasm, that the "working people" demanded Soviet power ... ". He also wrote: "Sevastopol - our base - was a cauldron, every minute ready to explode." Indeed, the presence of interventionists in Sevastopol did not lead to the “calming down” of the city, but quite the opposite - to its revolutionization. The city began to seethe, rallies were constantly going on in it, and in the meantime the Bolsheviks, without actually meeting any resistance, were conducting a well-organized and planned offensive. At the end of March, the evacuation of Simferopol began, and on April 5, the Allies concluded a truce with the Bolsheviks, which was not violated until April 15, when the evacuation of the French and Greek troops from the peninsula ended. In Sevastopol itself, jubilation reigned among the working people: demonstrations with red flags went around the city, in which the sailors of the French squadron also took part. Recall that shortly before this, just the same - without a fight! - the French squadron left Odessa, "blushed" for several months in revolutionary Russia. Soldiers and sailors of the "limited contingent" of French troops who arrived from Western Front, where the world war had just ended, to Russia, they did not want to fight against the Bolsheviks. Lenin and his slogans were at that time very popular among the working masses of Europe, and the campaign "Hands off Soviet Russia!" gave amazing results. In addition, the allies failed to delve into the most complex intricacies of the then Russian politics: they could not understand why they should provide assistance to the Volunteer Army, which considered itself the legal successor of old Russia - after all, Russia had concluded a separate peace with Germany! France, a country with the richest revolutionary traditions, perceived Denikin's army as an army of restoration, and compared the Denikinists with the Bourbons of the 19th century, who, as they said at that time, "forgot nothing and learned nothing."

Be that as it may, but in April 1919 the allies left the Crimea, which was covered by the second wave of Bolshevism: by May 1, the entire peninsula was occupied Soviet troops. The Crimean Soviet Socialist Republic emerged. A government was also created, in which two curious figures stood out. Dmitry Ilyich Ulyanov, the younger brother of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, became the temporary chairman (the permanent one did not appear), People's Commissar for Health and Welfare of the Crimean government, and the famous Pavel Efimovich Dybenko, a unique person in his own way, filled the post of People's Commissar for War for a month. The KSSR was considered an autonomous republic within the RSFSR.

OCCUPATION OF THE CRIMEA BY THE KAISER GERMANS IN 1918. On May 1, 1918, German troops occupied the entire peninsula. Soviet power in the Crimea was temporarily eliminated. The Ukrainian haidamaks, who were part of the German troops, were immediately removed from it after the occupation of the Crimea. The Germans considered the population of the Crimea as "native inhabitants of the German colonies." This was openly published in newspapers and in various kinds ads. General Robert Kosh issued an order for the Crimea on the surrender of all weapons by the population within three days. He threatened that everyone who did not follow his orders and instructions would be punished "with all the severity of German wartime laws." In pursuance of Kosch's order, the local German commandants issued their orders and announcements, which, as a rule, ended in a threat death penalty . These were not simple threats: in the first days of the occupation of the Crimea, seven workers were shot in Feodosia. Soon, two more workers were shot by the Germans: a Ukrainian, Savenko, and a Crimean Tatar, Dzhenaev, for not handing over their weapons. An announcement about their execution was pasted all over the city "for public information." The Germans made executions obsolete in other cities of the Crimea, such as: Simferopol, Sevastopol, Kerch, Yalta, etc. When the Germans occupied the Crimea and approached Sevastopol, V.I. On April 29-30, Lenin transferred the Black Sea Fleet to Novorossiysk. On May 2, 1918, the German ship Goeben and the Turkish Hamidiye entered Sevastopol. On May 3-4, the Germans raised German flags on Russian ships that remained in Sevastopol. The Germans appointed Captain 1st Rank Ostrohradsky as a naval representative of Ukraine. But Ostrogradsky had no power in Sevastopol. The German government and military command did not know how to govern the Crimea, and therefore the Germans decided to create a government in the Crimea. On June 6, the commander of the German troops on the peninsula, German General Robert Kosh, entrusted the formation of the government to Lieutenant General Suleiman Sulkevich. A Lithuanian Tatar, general of the tsarist army, commander of the 1st Muslim Corps, Suleiman (Matvey) Sulkevich turned out to be a suitable compromise figure. Kosh wrote to Sulkevich: "The German command will render you full assistance in maintaining order in the country." On June 21, the newspapers published the composition of the government, which included, in addition to General Sulkevich, the former vice-governor of Taurida, Prince S. Gorchakov, large Crimean landowners: the German P. Rapp, V. Nalbandov; Count Tatishchev, L. Friedman and J. Seydamet. On June 25, 1918, the Crimean regional government was formed. On June 10, S. Sulkevich instructed the staff captain, Baron Schmidt von der Launnz, to go to Kiev as an attaché, together with V.I. Kolensky. This mission, despite the benevolent reaction of some Kiev ministers, turned out to be absolutely fruitless. It came to border conflicts, a customs war and a break in postal and telegraph communications between the two, which considered themselves sovereign entities, occupied by one country. Ukraine has effectively declared an economic blockade of Crimea. Until 1917, up to 25,000 heads of cattle, 90,000 poods of dairy products, 12,000 pigs, 100,000 sheep, 623,000 poods of sugar, 23 million poods of coal, 1 million pounds of oil products. 3 million poods of iron ore, 12 million poods of salt, 6 million poods of grain, 1 million buckets of wine, 230,000 poods of tobacco, 50,000 poods of wool were exported annually through the ports of Crimea. The financial situation of the ordinary population of the Crimean cities was deteriorating. Rising food prices. From April to August 1918, prices increased: for oil - more than twice, for eggs - almost twice, for cereals - three times. The shortage of bread was especially acute, in connection with which, in some cities, norms for bread were introduced. In Yalta, the grain norm was set at 200 grams for an adult and 100 grams for children. The delivery of bread to the markets stopped. Bread could only be bought from speculators at a very high price. Queues lined up at the bakery shops in the evening. Ordinary people, not having the means to buy food at speculative prices, were starving. However, the days of German power in the Crimea were numbered. Having been defeated in the war, in early November, Kaiser Wilhelm fled Germany, and on November 11, 1918, Germany capitulated and the Germans left the Crimea, and the government of S. Sulkevich could no longer exist without the support of the Germans and fell on November 16, 1918. Author - Selim Aliyev

In early April 1918, the Crimean German group of General Kosh (212th, 217th Infantry Divisions and the Bavarian Cavalry Division) was formed, which were supposed to conquer Northern Tavria and Crimea. Austria got the Kherson province ...(Savchenko V. A. Twelve wars for Ukraine)

German (Mennonite) colony Orlowo

Since the summer of 1918, the German population has taken steps to create their own armed self-defense. In almost every colony detachments were formed, consisting of local residents. Significant assistance was provided to them by the command of the German and Austrian troops. In particular, a large number of rifles, several dozen machine guns, as well as ammunition and some other equipment were sent to the colony. In a number of areas, especially in Mennonite settlements, German and Austrian soldiers organized military training for young colonists. In the majority of the colonies, however, the front-line colonists, who had significant combat experience in the First World War, dealt with the creation and training of self-defense detachments.
From the site http://reibert.info German colonists

Melitopol

On May 20, 1918, Melitopol was occupied by the combined Austro-German troops (Mikhail Drozdovsky wrote in his diaries that the first German train arrived at the Melitopol station on April 18).

And of course steam locomotives!

1918. Rail yard in Melitopol

On the evening of April 24, General von Kosch arrived in Simferopol at the head of a German division. He ultimatum demanded the immediate and complete withdrawal of the Bolbochan group from the Crimea. Otherwise, the German troops threatened to start forceful actions against the Cossacks, up to the use of weapons ... (Savchenko V.A.)

Svyatoslav Shramchenko: “April 29, 1918 was a miracle day. Sevastopol raid viliskuvav like a lustro. In year. 16. The flagship ship of the Black Sea Fleet, the line ship "George Pobidonosets" by order of the commander of the fleet sent a signal: "Fleet raise the Ukrainian ensign!". On the large ship, a command was heard: “Get on board!”. On the same team, in the old way, as it was in the battle Black Sea Fleet, not yet broken by the revolution, the sailors stood on board with their faces to the middle of the ship. “On ensign and guis - string! Bring the Ukrainian ensign!”. The sound of surmi and the whistle of the foremen-sailors angered the eel of the sailor's kashkets, the blue-yellow ensigns rose over the entire fleet and zap in the air.

On the night of April 29-30, 14 destroyers and destroyers, an auxiliary cruiser, 10 fighter boats, and 8 transports with Red Army soldiers leave the Sevastopol raid. They are led by the commander of the destroyer "Kaliakria", one of the heroes of the defense of Port Arthur, Captain 2nd Rank E.S. Gernet. All ships of the detachment arrive in Novorossiysk on the morning of May 1. In Sevastopol, only 4 destroyers remained near the battleships.
At 12 o'clock in the morning on April 30, already under the fire of German field guns mounted on the North side, the ships, without opening return fire, left the bay. Only the destroyer "Angry" jumped ashore and, after unsuccessful attempts to withdraw, was blown up by the crew. That night, the destroyer Zavetny, which was under repair, was also blown up. 7 old battleships, 3 cruisers, 11 destroyers, 16 submarines and 4 mother ships remained in Sevastopol. These ships and port facilities were not blown up, as the subversive party formed the day before fled. On these ships, by order of Rear Admiral M.M. Ostrogradsky, the Ukrainian flag was raised, but in fact the German command immediately began to control them.
The Germans who entered Sevastopol (including Ukrainian ones), which remained on the abandoned ships, began to lower and gradually raise their own, German flags instead of them. Although, as eyewitnesses recalled, the UNR flags remained on some ships for some time. In the spring of 1918, the German command was not going to transfer warships to Ukraine.
(Alexander Danilov)

On April 30, 1918, 600 ships of the fleet with 3,500 sailors on board left Sevastopol, heading for Novorossiysk, intending to go under the Red command there. Part of the Black Sea Fleet (7 battleships, 3 cruisers, 5 destroyers) remained in the Sevastopol harbor, led by Rear Admiral M. Ostrogradsky. On the same day, German detachments began to enter Sevastopol, abandoned by its defenders.(Savchenko V.A.)

Sevastopol 1918. Monument to the Scuttled Ships. In the roadstead - the German battlecruiser "Goeben" (in October 1914 bombarded the city).

On May 2, 1918, the Goeben, together with the light cruiser Hamidiye, entered the harbor of Sevastopol occupied by German troops, where almost all Russian ships were abandoned by their crews. They were taken under guard by the Germans

Sevastopol 1918. Southern bay with ships

On the South Coast:

March 25, 1917- The Provisional Crimean Tatar Muslim Executive Committee was created. Secretary A. Bodaninsky explained the goal of the executive committee - "a steady desire ... to organize the democratic Tatar masses, the desire to introduce among them a conscious and devoted attitude towards the ideas of the all-Russian and, in particular, the Crimean Tatar revolution, the desire to become in all manifestations of Tatar life the center that does not command, does not commanding, but regulating and controlling”. Ideological and political core national movement becomes Milliy-Firka (July 1917)

June 18, 1917- the beginning of the creation of national military units, which received the name of squadrons in the fall. The Muslim Military Committee decides to assign Tatar soldiers to one unit.

1917 October 1-2- The Crimean Tatar Muslim Congress was held in Simferopol. Violent discussions unfolded between the left wing and national figures. A commission has been set up to convene the Kurultai.

At the conference, a Bolshevik provincial committee headed by Zh. A. Miller was created, and the Crimean Bolsheviks also united.

November 6, 1917- All-Black Sea Congress of Sailors. Resolutions were adopted: on the dissolution of the Central Fleet, which did not recognize Soviet power; on the recognition of the power of the Soviets; about the creation of armed groups.

November 20, 1917- Provincial congress of representatives of city and zemstvo self-governments. The Taurida Council of People's Representatives (SNP) was created as the highest authority in the Crimea.

November 24, 1917- consideration of the issue of the autonomy of the Crimea at the II Conference of the RSDLP (b) of the Taurida province. The text of the resolution adopted by the conference reads: “3. ... Stating that the population of Crimea consists of various nationalities, of which the Tatars are not the numerically predominant element (only 18% of the total population), the congress considers in force local features the only correct solution to the issue of Crimean autonomy is a referendum among the entire population of Crimea…” However, the referendum was not held.

He proclaimed the Crimean People's Republic, elected its government (Directorate), adopted the Constitution, where Article 16 recognized the equality of all inhabitants of Crimea, regardless of nationality, and at the same time postponed the final decision on the fate of the peninsula until the All-Crimean Constituent Assembly. The slogan of the national movement was the appeal put forward on November 4 by Chelebidzhikhan: “Crimea for Crimeans” (by “Crimeans” was meant the entire population of Crimea). Article 17 of the Constitution abolished titles and class ranks, and Article 18 legitimized the equality of men and women.

This happened at an emergency meeting of representatives of 51 ship crews and fortress batteries. The Socialist-Revolutionary Menshevik Soviet was dissolved.

December 20, 1917- Start civil war in Crimea. The first armed clashes between the Bolsheviks and squadrons, commanded by the Joint Headquarters of the Crimean troops of the SNP.

January 4, 1918- the resignation of Chelebidzhikhan from the post of chairman of the Directory. From January 4 to January 12, Jafer Seydamet takes the chair.

January 12, 1918- A military revolutionary headquarters was created in Sevastopol, it was decided to proceed to direct actions to seize power.

January 23, 1918- in the city of Sevastopol, Noman Chelebidzhikhan was arrested by the Bolsheviks. On February 23 of the same year, he was brutally killed and thrown into the Black Sea.

1918 January 28-30 Election of the Taurida Central Committee of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies. It happened in Sevastopol at the Extraordinary Congress of Representatives of the Soviets and Military Revolutionary Committees.

The Tauride Provincial Congress of Soviets, Land and Revolutionary Committees elects the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars.

March 29, 1918- an agreement between Germany and Austria-Hungary on the occupation of Ukraine. According to this agreement, Crimea was included in the sphere of “German interests”.

May 1, 1918- German troops in Sevastopol. By this time they had already occupied Dzhankoy, Evpatoria, Feodosia. The German command demanded the transfer of the Black Sea Fleet, the return of ships that had gone to Novorossiysk.

June 25, 1918- the creation of the Crimean regional government of General M.A. Sulkevich. The declaration “To the population of Crimea” proclaimed the independence of the peninsula, introduced citizenship of the Crimea and state symbols (coat of arms, flag), and set the task of creating its own armed forces and monetary unit. In fact, three state languages ​​were introduced: Russian, Crimean Tatar and German.

1918 August 30– office of M.A. Sulkevich decided "On the establishment of the Tauride University".

1918 August 30- decision by the Cabinet of M. A. Sulkevich national question. The regional government recognized the cultural and national autonomy of the Crimean Tatars. It was supposed to provide all possible assistance to the Directory.

September 26, 1918- October 16 - Crimean-Ukrainian negotiations in Kiev. The Ukrainian delegation proposed that Crimea become part of Ukraine on the basis of an extremely wide autonomy. The Crimean delegation made a counterproposal: the creation of a federal union. It was not possible to reach an agreement. Nevertheless, the Crimean diplomats recorded in the minutes: “…During the negotiations…with the Delegation of the Ukrainian Government, it became clear…Ukraine does not at all consider Crimea as its own, but, on the contrary, takes into account the factual situation, by virtue of which Crimea is a separate, independent from Ukraine as an independent region”.

November 15, 1918– M.A. Sulkevich handed over the administration of Crimea to the Regional Government headed by S.S. Crimea. An order was issued on the creation of the National Reserve. German forces are withdrawn from the Crimea in November. In their place come the troops of France, England and Greece.

February 23, 1919. - by order of the Crimean regional government of Solomon Krym, the editorial office of the Millet newspaper was destroyed. Massive searches, arrests and executions without trial and investigation of Crimean Tatars suspected of “nationalism” began.

April 11, 1919 The Red Army occupied Simferopol. The government of Solomon Crimea left the region and went into exile.

April 23, 1919- Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) with the participation of V.I. Lenin decided to form the Crimean SSR. It said: “To recognize as desirable the creation of the Crimean Soviet Republic". The implementation of the decision was entrusted to the member of the Politburo L.B., who was in Ukraine. Kamenev and member of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) Kh.G. Rakovsky, as well as Yu.P. Gaven. At a meeting of the Muslim Bureau at the Crimean Regional Party Committee on the report of Yu.P. Gaven, his proposals on the creation of the Crimean Council of People's Commissars of 9 people, including 4 Tatars, were accepted.

June 25, 1919- restoration of the pre-revolutionary borders of the Tauride province. Order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in the South of Russia A. I. Denikin “On the inclusion of Berdyansk, Melitopol and Dnieper County in the Taurida Governorate”.

July 1, 1919- Crimea is completely occupied by the Volunteer Army. The command defined the goal of its policy in Crimea in this way: it was to remain Russian without any autonomy, and "there can be no place for an independent regional government."

July 23, 1919- Direct control of the Crimea by the Volunteer Army was established. Lieutenant-General N. N. Schilling was appointed commander-in-chief. 1919 August 9 - the commander-in-chief issues an order to close the Crimean Tatar Directory. Crimean Tatar protests against the closure of the Directory prompted searches and arrests. The Tauride Mohammedan spiritual rule that existed in pre-revolutionary Russia is being restored.

March 22, 1920- Lieutenant General Baron Wrangel is appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in the South of Russia ... "

May 27, 1920- The congress of Tatar representatives began its work. Its goal was to develop the principles of self-government of the region, solving the problems of waqfs and national enlightenment. The work of the congress ended with the formation of the Muslim Council for elections to the apparatus of the future self-government, as well as resolutions on the development of national culture. Wrangel spoke at the congress, declaring that the Tatars could not count on autonomy.

November 12, 1920- the last day of fighting in the Crimea. The evacuation of the defeated is coming to an end. “145,693 people were taken out on 126 ships, not counting ship crews. With the exception of the destroyer Zhivoi, who died from the storm, all the ships arrived safely in Tsargrad ”(P.N. Wrangel).

November 14, 1920- The revolutionary military council of the Southern Front adopted a resolution on the formation of the Krymrevkom. The Revolutionary Committee organized the mass extermination of the White Guards who remained in the Crimea, as well as yesterday's allies - the Makhnovists.

January 8, 1921- By the Decree of the Krymrevkom, the territory of Crimea was divided into 7 counties, counties - into 20 districts. In the future, the administrative-territorial division of the Crimea was changed. In October 1923, the counties were liquidated and 15 districts were created.

May 5, 1921- on the initiative of Y. Gaven, it was decided to send a telegram to Moscow, to the People's Commissariat of Nationalities, with the following content: city ​​of Genichesk.

October 8, 1921- The All-Russian Central Executive Committee approved the regulation “On the Crimean Soviet Socialist Republic”. On October 18, a decree was issued on the formation of the Crimean ASSR.

November 10, 1921– The First All-Crimean Constituent Congress of Soviets adopts the Constitution of the Crimean ASSR. State languages Russian and Tatar were announced.

Prepared by Selim Ali