The attitude of the boyars in its new composition to their sovereign. - The attitude of the Moscow boyars to the Grand Duke in specific centuries... - A change in this relationship with Ivan III. - Collisions. - Unclear reasons for the disorder. - Conversations between Bersen and Maxim the Greek. - Boyar rule. - Correspondence between Tsar Ivan and Prince Kurbsky. The judgments of Prince Kurbsky. - Objections of the king. - The nature of the correspondence. - The dynastic origin of the discord.

We saw how, as a result of the political unification of Great Russia, the composition and mood of the Moscow boyars changed. This change inevitably had to change the good relations that existed between the Moscow sovereign and his boyars in specific centuries.

THE BOYAR'S RELATIONSHIP TO THE GREAT DUKE IN SPECIFIC CENTURIES... This change in attitudes was an inevitable consequence of the same process that created the power of the Moscow sovereign and his new boyars. In specific centuries, the boyar went to serve in Moscow, looking for service benefits here. These benefits grew for the serviceman along with the success of his master. This established a unity of interest between both parties. That is why the Moscow boyars throughout the XIV century. together they helped their sovereign in his external affairs and zealously helped him in internal government. The close connection, sincerity of relations between both sides is a striking feature of the Moscow monuments of that century. Grand Duke Semyon the Gordy writes, addressing in the spiritual to his younger brothers with dying instructions: "You should have listened in everything to our Vladyka Alexei's father and the old boyars who wanted good for our father and for us." These relations are even more sincere in the biography of Grand Duke Dimitri Donskoy, written by a contemporary, who owed his boyars the grand-ducal table. Addressing his children, the Grand Duke said: "Love your boyars, give them worthy honor in their service, do nothing without their will." Turning then to the boyars themselves, the Grand Duke reminded them in sympathetic words of how he worked with them in internal and external matters, how they strengthened the reign, how they became terrible to the enemies of the Russian land. By the way, Demetrius told his employees: "I loved you all and held you in honor, I had fun with you, with you and grieved, and you were called by me not boyars, but princes of my land."

CHANGE IN RELATIONS... These good relations began to be upset from the end of the 15th century. New, titled boyars went to Moscow not for new service benefits, but mostly with a bitter feeling of regret for the lost benefits of specific independence. Now only need and bondage tied the new Moscow boyars to Moscow, and they could not love this new place of their service. Having parted in interests, both sides diverged even more in political feelings, although these feelings came from the same source. The same circumstances, on the one hand, put the Grand Duke of Moscow at the height of a national sovereign with broad power, on the other, they imposed on him a government class with pretentious political tastes and aspirations and with an estate organization that was embarrassing for the supreme power. Feeling like gathering around Moscow Kremlin, titled boyars began to look at themselves, just as the Moscow boyars of specific time did not dare to look. Feeling himself the sovereign of the united Great Russia, the Grand Duke of Moscow could hardly endure his former relations with the boyars as free servants under the contract and could not at all get along with their new claims to the division of power. One and the same reason - the unification of Great Russia - made the Moscow supreme power less patient and compliant, and the Moscow boyars more pretentious and arrogant. Thus, the same historical circumstances destroyed the unity of interests between both political forces, and the separation of interests upset the harmony of their mutual relations. From here came a series of clashes between the Moscow sovereign and his boyars. These clashes bring dramatic animation to the monotonous and ceremonial life of the Moscow court of that time and give the impression of a political struggle between the Moscow sovereign and his rebellious boyars. However, it was a rather peculiar struggle both according to the techniques of the fighters and according to the motives that guided it. Defending their claims, the boyars did not openly rise up against their sovereign, did not take up arms, and did not even lead a friendly political opposition against him. Collisions were usually resolved by court intrigues and disgraces, disfavors, the origin of which is sometimes difficult to make out. It is more of a court enmity, sometimes rather taciturn than an open political struggle, more a pantomime than a drama.

COLLISION ... These clashes were revealed with particular force twice, and each time for the same reason - on the issue of succession to the throne. Ivan III, as we know, first appointed his grandson Demetrius as his heir and crowned him to the great reign, and then debunked him, appointing his son from his second wife Vasily as his successor. In this family clash, the boyars became for the grandson and opposed the son out of dislike for his mother and for the Byzantine concepts and suggestions she brought, while all the small, thin service people turned out to be on the side of Vasily. The clash reached the point of strong irritation on both sides, caused noisy quarrels at court, harsh antics on the part of the boyars, it seems even something similar to sedition. At least Basil's son, Tsar Ivan, complained afterwards that the boyars, along with the latter's nephew Dimitri, "had planned many fatal deaths," even to the sovereign-grandfather himself, "they spoke many revolting and reproachful words." But how things went, what exactly the boyars were trying to achieve, in detail it remains not entirely clear; Only a year after the wedding of Demetrius (1499), the most notable Moscow boyars suffered for their opposition to Vasily: Prince Semyon Ryapolovsky-Starodubsky was beheaded, and his supporters, Prince I. Yu. ... The same dull court enmity, accompanied by disgrace, went into the reign of Vasily. This grand duke treated the boyars with understandable distrust, like a sovereign whom they did not want to see on the throne and with difficulty endured on it. By the way, for some reason they put in prison the paramount boyar, Prince V.D. mother. But especially strongly enmity flared up at Grozny, and again on the same occasion, on the issue of succession to the throne. Soon after the conquest of the Kazan kingdom, at the end of 1552 or at the beginning of 1553, Tsar Ivan became dangerously ill and ordered the boyars to swear allegiance to their newborn son, Tsarevich Dimitri. Many foremost boyars refused the oath or took it reluctantly, saying that they did not want to serve "the little one past the old", that is, they want to serve the cousin of the tsar, the appanage prince Vladimir Andreevich staritsky, whom they intended to put on the throne in case of death king. The tsar's anger against the boyars, aroused by this clash, in a few years led to a complete rupture between both sides, accompanied by cruel disgraces and executions to which the boyars were subjected.

UNCLOSURE OF THE CAUSE OF DISORDER... In all these clashes, which broke through in the course of three generations, one can discern the reasons that caused them, but the motives that guided the quarreling parties, nourished mutual hostility, are not expressed clearly enough by either side. Ivan III dully complained about the intransigence and obstinacy of his boyars. Sending ambassadors to Poland shortly after the case of the heir, Ivan, by the way, gave them the following instruction: "See that everything is smooth between you, they would drink carefully, not drunk, and take care of themselves in everything, and would not act like that. how Prince Semyon Ryapolovsky was highly intelligent with Prince Vasily, the son of Ivan Yuryevich (Patrikeev). " The feelings and aspirations of the opposition boyar nobility for the reign of Vasily are somewhat more pronounced. A monument that reveals the political mood of the boyar side has come down to us from that time - this is an excerpt from an investigative case about the now-mentioned Duma man Ivan Nikitich Bersen-Beklemishev (1525). Bersen, far from belonging to the primary nobility, was a stubborn, uncompromising person. At that time, the learned monk Maxim the Greek, who was an experienced, educated person, familiar with the Catholic West and its science, who had studied in Paris, Florence and Venice, who had been summoned from Athos to translate the Explanatory Psalter from Greek, was living in Moscow at that time. He attracted inquisitive people from the Moscow nobility, who came to him to talk and argue "about books and Tsaregrad customs", so that Maxim's cell in the Simonov monastery near Moscow became like a learned club. It is curious that the most common guests of Maxim were all people from the opposition nobility: between them we meet Prince Andr. Kholmsky, a cousin of the aforementioned disgraced boyar, and V.M. Tuchkov, the son of boyar Tuchkov, who was the most rude Ivan III, according to Grozny. But Maxim's closest guest and interlocutor was Ivan Nikitich Bersen, with whom he often sat face to face for a long time. Bersen was at that time in disfavor and removed from the yard, justifying his prickly nickname (bersen - gooseberry). Ivan Nikitich once in the Duma sharply objected to the sovereign when discussing the question of Smolensk. The Grand Duke got angry and drove him out of the council, saying: "Come on, smerd, get out, I don't need you." In conversations with Maxim, Bersen poured out his grieved feelings, in which one can see the reflection of the political thoughts of the then boyars. I will pass on their conversations as they were recorded during interrogations. This is a very rare case when we can overhear an intimate political conversation in Moscow in the 16th century.

TALKS BEERS WITH MAXIM GREC... The disgraced councilor is, of course, very annoyed. He is not satisfied with anything in the Moscow state: neither people nor order. "About the local people, I said that nowadays there is no truth in people." He is most dissatisfied with his sovereign and does not want to hide his dissatisfaction in front of a foreigner.

"Here," Bersen said to elder Maxim, "you have now Basurman kings in Constantinople, persecutors; evil times have come for you, and somehow you interrupt with them?"

"True," Maxim answered, "our kings are wicked, but they do not intervene in church affairs with us."

"Well," objected Bersen, "even though your kings are wicked, if they do so, then you still have a god."

And as if to justify the swallowed thought that there was no longer God in Moscow, the disgraced counselor complained to Maxim about the Moscow metropolitan, who, for the sake of the sovereign, did not intercede on the duty of dignity for the disgraced, and suddenly, giving free rein to his excited pessimism, Bersen fell upon his interlocutor :

"Yes, here you are, Mr. Maxim, we took from the Holy Mountain, and what benefit did we get from you?"

"I am an orphan," Maxim answered offensively, "what is the use of me and being?"

"No," objected Bersen, "you are a reasonable man and could be of use to us, and it was more appropriate for us to ask you how to arrange our land for the sovereign, how to reward people and how to behave for the Metropolitan."

"You have books and rules, - said Maxim, - you can get settled yourself."

Bersen wanted to say that the sovereign did not ask and did not listen to reasonable advice in organizing his land, and therefore built it unsatisfactorily. This "lack of advice", "arrogance", it seems, most of all upset Bersen in the manner of actions of the Grand Duke Vasily. He was still condescending to Vasiliev's father: Ivan III, according to him, was kind and kind to people, and therefore God helped him in everything; he loved "meeting," objection to himself. "But the present sovereign," complained Bersen, "is not like that: he favors few people, is stubborn, does not like meetings against himself and gets annoyed at those who tell him to meet him."

So Bersen is very dissatisfied with the sovereign; but this dissatisfaction is of a completely conservative nature; recently, the old Moscow order began to shake, and the emperor himself began to shake them - this is what Bersen especially complained about. At the same time, he expounded the whole philosophy of political conservatism.

“You yourself know,” he said to Maxim, “and we also heard from reasonable people that which land is changing its customs, that land does not last long, but here we have the old customs of the present Grand Duke changed: so what kind of good is to expect from us ? "

Maxim objected that God punishes the peoples for violating his commandments, but that the customs of the tsar and the zemstvo are changed by the sovereigns for reasons of circumstances and state interests.

"That's how it is," objected Bersen, "but it's still better than the old customs to stick around, to favor people and honor the elderly; but now our sovereign, shutting himself up to the third by the bed, does all sorts of things."

By this change in customs, Bersen explains the external difficulties and internal troubles that the Russian land was going through at that time. Bersen considers the mother of the Grand Duke to be the first culprit of this apostasy from the old customs, the sower of this betrayal of his native antiquity.

“As the Greeks came here,” he said to Maxim, “so our land got mixed up, and until then our Russian land lived in peace and silence. As the mother of the Grand Duke, the Grand Duchess Sophia, came here with your Greeks, so there was disorder great, like you in Tsaregorod under your kings. "

Maxim the Greek considered it his duty to intercede for his countrywoman and objected:

"The Grand Duchess Sophia on both sides was a great clan - on the father of the tsarist clan of the Tsaregorodsky, and on the mother of the great Duxus of the Ferrarian Italian country."

“Sir, whatever it may be, but it has come to our disorder,” Bersen concluded his conversation.

So, if Bersen accurately expressed the views of the opposition boyars of his day, they were dissatisfied with the violation of the established custom of government orders, the sovereign's distrust of his boyars and the fact that next to the boyar duma he opened a special intimate office of the few confidants with whom he had previously discussed and even predetermined government issues, subject to ascent to the Boyar Duma. Bersen does not demand any new rights for the boyars, but only defends the old customs violated by the sovereign; he is an opposition conservative, an enemy of the sovereign, because he is against the changes introduced by the sovereign.

BOYARS BOARD... After Vasily's death, in the early childhood of his son, which required long-term care, power fell into the hands of the boyars for a long time. Now they could dispose of the state in their own way, implement their political ideals and rebuild the state order in accordance with them. But they did not try to build any new state order. Divided into the parties of the princes Shuisky and Belsky, the boyars led fierce strife with each other out of personal or family accounts, and not for any state order. In the course of ten years since the death of the ruler Elena (1538), they waged these strife, and this decade has passed not only fruitless for political situation boyars, but also dropped his political authority in the eyes of Russian society. Everyone saw what anarchic strength this boyars are, if they are not restrained by a strong hand; but the reason for his disagreement with the sovereign was not found out this time either.

CORRESPONDENCE OF THE KING WITH KURBSK... During the reign of Terrible, when the clash resumed, both quarreling parties had an opportunity to express their Political Views and explain the reasons for mutual dislike. In 1564, the boyar prince A.M. Kurbsky, a peer and favorite of Tsar Ivan, a hero of the Kazan and Livonian wars, commanding Moscow regiments in Livonia, lost one battle there and, fearing the tsar's wrath for this failure or for communication with the fallen Sylvester and Adashev, fled to the Polish king, leaving his wife with a young son in Dorpat, where he was a voivode. He took an active part in the Polish war against his tsar and fatherland. But the fugitive boyar did not want to silently part with his abandoned sovereign: from a foreign land, from Lithuania, he wrote a sharp, reproachful, "annoying" message to Ivan, reproaching him for his cruel treatment of the boyars. Tsar Ivan, himself a "verbal wisdom rhetorician," as his contemporaries called him, did not want to remain in debt to the fugitive and answered him with a long exculpatory message, "broadcast and noisy," as Prince Kurbsky called him, to which the latter objected. Correspondence with long interruptions went on in 1564-1579. Prince Kurbsky wrote only four letters, Tsar Ivan - two; but his first letter is more than half of all correspondence in volume (62 out of 100 pages according to Ustryalov's edition). In addition, Kurbsky wrote in Lithuania the accusatory History of the Great Prince of Moscow, that is, Tsar Ivan, where he also expressed the political views of his boyar brethren. So both sides, as it were, confessed to each other, and one would expect that they fully and frankly expressed their political views, that is, revealed the reasons for mutual hostility. But even in this polemic, waged by both sides with great fervor and talent, we do not find a direct and clear answer to the question of these reasons, and it does not lead the reader out of bewilderment. The letters of Prince Kurbsky are predominantly filled with personal or class reproaches and political complaints; in History, he also expresses several general political and historical judgments.

THE JUDGMENT OF THE KURBAN... He begins his story of Tsar Ivan with mournful meditation: "Many times they bothered me with the question: how did all this happen from such a good and wonderful tsar, who neglected his health for the fatherland, who suffered hard work and troubles in the struggle with the enemies of the cross of Christ and from everyone who used good And many times, with a sigh and tears, I was silent to this question - I did not want to answer; at last I was forced to say at least something about these incidents and so answered the frequent questions: if I had to tell first and in order, I would have to to write about how the devil sowed evil morals in the kindred Russian princes, especially by their evil wives-sorceresses, as was the case with the Israeli tsars, most of all by those who were taken from foreigners. " This means that in looking at the nearest Moscow past, Prince Kurbsky takes the point of view of Bersen, sees the root of evil in Princess Sophia, followed by the same foreigner Elena Glinskaya, the mother of the tsar. However, the already kind once-kind Russian princes clan degenerated into a Moscow clan, "this blood-sucking clan of yours," as Kurbsky put it in a letter to the tsar. "It has long been a custom among the Moscow princes," he writes in History, "to desire their brothers for their blood and to destroy their wretched for the sake of and accursed patrimonies, their unfulfillment for their own sake." Kurbsky also comes across political judgments similar to principles, to theory. He considers normal only such a state order, which is based not on the personal discretion of autocracy, but on the participation of the "synclite", the boyar council, in management; in order to conduct state affairs successfully and with decency, the sovereign must consult with the boyars. It is fitting for the tsar to be the head, and to love his wise advisers, "like his own ouds," - this is how Kurbsky expresses the tsar's correct, deanery attitude to the boyars. His whole history is built on one thought - about the beneficial action of the boyar council: the tsar ruled wisely and gloriously, while he was surrounded by kind and truthful advisers. However, the sovereign should share his tsarist thoughts with not only noble and truthful advisers - Prince Kurbsky also allows popular participation in government, stands for the benefit and necessity of the Zemsky Sobor. In his History, he expresses the following political thesis: "If a king is honored by the kingdom, but has not received any gifts from God, he must seek good and useful advice not only from his advisers, but also from people of the whole people, because the gift of the spirit is given not according to external wealth and not according to the power of power, but according to the righteousness of the soul. " , from all over the world: private conferences with individuals were hardly desirable for him. That is almost all of Kurbsky's political views. The prince stands for the governmental significance of the boyar council and for the participation of the Zemsky Sobor in management. But he dreams of yesterday, he is late with his dreams. . Neither the governmental significance of the Boyar Council, nor the participation of the Zemsky Sobor in management were already ideals at that time, could not be political dreams. political facts, the first is a very old fact, and the second is a still recent phenomenon, and both are facts well known to our publicist. From time immemorial, Russian and Moscow sovereigns thought about all sorts of things, legislated with their boyars. In 1550, the first Zemsky Sobor was convened, and Prince Kurbsky should have well remembered this event, when the Tsar turned for advice to the "people of the whole people", to ordinary Zemstvo people. So, Prince Kurbsky stands for the existing facts; his political program does not go beyond the limits of the current state order: he does not demand either new rights for the boyars, or new guarantees for their old rights, does not require the restructuring of the existing state at all. In this respect, he perhaps only goes a little further than his predecessor I. N. Bersen-Beklemishev and, sharply condemning the Moscow past, he cannot think of anything better than this past.

OBJECTIONS OF THE KING... Now let's listen to the other side. Tsar Ivan writes less calmly and smoothly. Irritation crowds his thought with a multitude of feelings, images and thoughts, which he does not know how to fit into the framework of a consistent and calm presentation. New phrase, by the way, makes him turn his speech the other way, forgetting main idea without finishing the started. Therefore, it is not easy to grasp his main thoughts and tendencies in this foam of nervous dialectics. Flaring up, his speech becomes burning. “Your letter has been accepted,” the king writes, “and read carefully. The poison of an asp is under your tongue, and your letter is filled with the honey of words, but it contains the bitterness of wormwood. understood the one who is acquired contrary to Orthodoxy and has a leper conscience. Like demons, from my youth you have shaken piety and have stolen the sovereign power given to me by God. " This objection is the main motive in the letters of the king. The idea of ​​the kidnapping of the royal power by the boyars most of all and outrages Ivan. He objects not to the individual expressions of Prince Kurbsky, but to the entire political way of thinking of the boyars, which was defended by Kurbsky. "After all," the tsar writes to him, "you repeat the same thing in your compositionless letter, overturning" different words, "and so, and so, your dear idea, so that slaves besides masters have power," - although in Kurbsky's letter none of this has been written. “Is it,” continues the king, “a leper’s conscience, so that you can hold your kingdom in your hand, and not let your slaves rule? All slaves and slaves, and no one else but slaves. Kurbsky talks to the tsar about wise advisers, about synclite, but the tsar does not recognize any wise advisers, for him there is no synclite, but there are only people serving at his court, courtyard slaves. He knows one thing, that "the earth is ruled by God's mercy and our parents' blessing, and then by us, our sovereigns, and not judges and governors, not Ipat and stratigs." All political thoughts of the tsar are reduced to one idea - to the idea of ​​autocratic power. Autocracy for Ivan is not only a normal state order established from above, but also a primordial fact of our history, coming from the depths of centuries. "Our autocracy originated from Saint Vladimir; we were born and raised in a kingdom, we possess our own, and not someone else's kidnapped; the Russian autocrats from the beginning themselves own their kingdoms, and not boyars and nobles." Tsar Ivan was the first to express in Russia such a view of autocracy: Ancient Russia did not know such a view, did not combine internal and political relations with the idea of ​​autocracy, considering only a ruler independent of external forces to be an autocrat. Tsar Ivan drew first attention to this inner side of the supreme power and was deeply imbued with his new look: through all his long, very long first message, he carries this idea, wrapping one word, by his own admission, "semo and ovamo", then there, then here. All his political ideas are reduced to this one ideal, to the image of an autocratic tsar, ruled by neither "priests" nor "slaves." "What kind of autocrat will be called, if he does not build himself?" Plurality is madness. Ivan gives this autocratic power a divine origin and indicates to it not only a political, but also a high religious and moral purpose: "I strive with the zeal of people to teach the truth and to instruct them, so they will know the one true God, glorified in the Trinity, and from the God given to them by the sovereign and let them be left behind from internecine strife and obstinate life, by which the kingdoms are destroyed; for if the king does not obey the subjects, then the internecine strife will never stop. " To such a lofty purpose, the authorities must correspond to the many different qualities required of the autocrat. He must be circumspect, have neither brutal rage, nor wordless humility, must punish tateys and robbers, be merciful and cruel, merciful to the good and cruel to the wicked: otherwise he is not a king. "The king is a thunderstorm not for good, but for evil deeds; if you want not to be afraid of power, do good, and if you do evil, be afraid, for the king does not carry a sword in vain, but for the punishment of the evil and for the encouragement of the good." Never before in our country before Peter the Great did the supreme power in abstract self-consciousness rise to such a distinct, at least to such an energetic expression of its tasks. But when it came to practical self-determination, this flight political thought ended in a wreck. Tsar Ivan's entire philosophy of autocracy boiled down to one simple conclusion: "We are free to grant our servants and we are free to execute them." Such a formula did not require such a strain of thought. The specific princes came to the same conclusion without the help of lofty theories of autocracy and even expressed themselves in almost the same words: "I, prince such and such, am free, whom I favor, whom I will execute." Here and in Tsar Ivan, as once in his grandfather, the patrimonial man triumphed over the sovereign.

CHARACTER OF THE CORRESPONDENCE ... This is the political program of Tsar Ivan. Such a sharply and peculiarly expressed idea of ​​autocratic power, however, does not develop in him into a certain elaborated political order; no practical consequences are derived from it. The tsar does not say anywhere whether his political ideal agrees with the existing state structure or requires a new one, whether, for example, his autocratic power can act in hand with the present boyars, only changing his political mores and habits, or must create completely different instruments of government. One can only feel that the tsar is burdened by his boyars. But against the autocracy, as it was then understood in Moscow, the autocracy coming from St. Vladimir, the boyars did not rebel directly. The boyars recognized the autocratic power of the Moscow sovereign, as history had created it. They only insisted on the necessity and benefits of participation in the management of another political force created by the same history - the boyars, and even called for help to both of these forces a third - the zemstvo representation. It was unfair on the part of the tsar to accuse the boyars of the self-will of the "ignorant priest" Sylvester and the "dog" Adashev: Ivan could only blame himself for this, because he himself gave inappropriate power to these people, to the boyars and did not belong, made them temporary workers. What was the reason for the dispute? Both sides defended the existing one. It is felt that they did not seem to fully understand each other, that some kind of misunderstanding separated both disputants. This misunderstanding consisted in the fact that in their correspondence, not two political ways of thinking, but two political moods clashed; they are not so much polemicizing with each other as confessing to one another. Kurbsky so bluntly called the tsar's epistle confession, mockingly remarking that, not being a presbyter, he did not consider himself worthy to listen to the tsar's confession out of the blue. Each of them repeats his own and does not listen well to the enemy. "Why are you beating us, your faithful servants?" - asks Prince Kurbsky. "No," Tsar Ivan replies to him, "the Russian autocrats, from the outset, own their own kingdoms, and not boyars or nobles." In this simplest form, you can express the essence of the famous correspondence. But, poorly understanding each other and their present position, both opponents argued to foresee the future, to prophecy and - predicted each other's mutual destruction. In the message of 1579, reminding the king of the death of Saul with his royal house, Kurbsky continues: “... do not destroy yourself and your house. ... those drenched in Christian blood will soon disappear with the whole house. "Kurbsky represented his noble brethren as some chosen tribe, on which he would repose a special blessing, and pricked the king's eyes with the difficulty he created for himself, having interrupted and dispersed the" strong in Israel ", his God-given governors, and staying with the artless "voevodishki" who are frightened not only by the appearance of the enemy, but also by the rustle of leaves shaken by the wind. but God may even raise up a child of Abraham from stones. ”These words were written in 1564, at the very time when the tsar was planning a bold task - the preparation of a new ruling class, which was to replace the hated boyars.

DYNASTIC ORIGIN OF DISORDER... So, both disputing parties were dissatisfied with each other and the state order in which they acted, which they even led. But neither side could come up with another order that would correspond to their wishes, because everything that they wanted had already been practiced or had been tried. If, however, they argued and feuded with each other, this was due to the fact that the real reason the contention was not a matter of state order. Political judgments and reproaches were expressed only to justify mutual discontent that came from another source. We already know that discord with particular force was revealed twice and on the same occasion - on the issue of the heir to the throne: the sovereign appointed one, the boyars wanted another. So the discord on both sides had actually not a political, but a dynastic source. It was not a question of how to rule the state, but who would rule it. And here, on both sides, the habits of specific time, refracted by the course of affairs, manifested themselves. Then the boyar chose a prince for himself, moving from one princely court to another. Now, when there was nowhere to leave Moscow or it was inconvenient, the boyars wanted to choose between the heirs to the throne when the opportunity presented itself. They could justify their claim by the absence of a law on succession to the throne. Here the Moscow sovereign himself helped them. Recognizing himself as the national sovereign of all Russia, half of his self-awareness remained a specific patrimony and did not want to give up to anyone his right to dispose of the patrimony before his death, nor to limit his personal will by law: "To whom I want, to that I will give the principality." External interference in this personal will of the sovereign touched him more painfully than any general question of state order could touch. Hence the mutual mistrust and irritation. But when it was necessary to express these feelings orally or in writing, general issues were also touched upon, and then it was discovered that the existing state order suffered from contradictions, partially responded to opposite interests, completely satisfying no one. These contradictions were revealed in the oprichnina, in which Tsar Ivan was looking for a way out of an unpleasant situation.

The first reason feudal fragmentation there was an increase in boyar estates, the number of dependent smerds in them. XII - early XIII centuries were characterized by further development boyar land tenure in various principalities of Russia. The boyars expanded their possession by seizing the lands of free smerds-communes, enslaved them, and bought land. In an effort to get a larger surplus product, they increased the natural quitrent and labor work, which the dependent smerds performed. The increase due to this received by the boyars of the surplus product made them economically powerful and independent. In various lands of Russia, economically powerful boyar corporations began to take shape, striving to become sovereign masters on the lands where their estates were located. They wanted to judge their peasants themselves, to receive fines from them, vira. Many boyars enjoyed feudal immunity (the right of non-interference in the affairs of the patrimony), "Russkaya Pravda" determined the rights of the boyars. However, the Grand Duke (and such is the nature of princely power) strove to keep in his hands all the power. He intervened in the affairs of the boyar estates, strove to retain the right of trial over the peasants and to receive from them males in all lands of Rus.

The Grand Duke, being considered the supreme owner of all the lands of Rus, and their supreme ruler, continued to regard all the princes and boyars as his servants, and therefore forced them to participate in the numerous campaigns he organized. These campaigns often did not coincide with the interests of the boyars, tore them away from their estates. The boyars began to feel weary about serving the Grand Duke, they tried to evade it, which led to numerous conflicts. The contradictions between the local boyars and the great Kiev prince led to the strengthening of the former's striving for political independence. The boyars were also pushed to this by the need for their own, close princely power, which could quickly implement the norms of "Russian Truth", since the power of the grand prince's virniks, voivods, vigilantes could not provide quick real help to the boyars of the lands remote from Kiev. The strong power of the local prince was also necessary for the boyars in connection with the growing resistance of the townspeople, smerds, the seizure of their lands, enslavement, and an increase in extortions. The consequence of this was the growth of clashes between smerds and townspeople with the boyars.

The need for princely power on the ground, the creation of a state apparatus forced the local boyars to invite the prince and his retinue to their lands. But when inviting the prince, the boyars were inclined to see in him only a policeman and military force, not interfering in boyar affairs. This invitation was also beneficial for the princes and retinue. The prince received a permanent reign, his land fiefdom, ceased to rush from one princely table to another. The squad was also pleased, which was also tired of following from table to table with the prince. Princes and vigilantes had the opportunity to receive a stable rent-tax. At the same time, the prince, having settled in a particular land, as a rule, was not satisfied with the role assigned to him by the boyars, but sought to concentrate in his hands all the power, limiting the rights and privileges of the boyars. This inevitably led to a struggle between the prince and the boyars.

Growth and strengthening of cities as new political and cultural centers

During the period of feudal fragmentation, the number of cities in the Russian lands reached 224. Their economic and political role as centers of a particular land increased. It was on the cities that the local boyars and the prince relied on in the struggle against the great Kiev prince. The growing role of the boyars and local princes led to the revitalization of city veche meetings. Veche, a peculiar form of feudal democracy, was a political organ. In fact, it was in the hands of the boyars, which excluded real decisive participation in the management of ordinary townspeople. The boyars, controlling the veche, tried to use the political activity of the townspeople in their own interests. Very often the veche was used as an instrument of pressure not only on the great, but also on the local prince, forcing him to act in the interests of the local nobility. Thus, cities, as local political and economic centers, gravitating towards their lands, were the stronghold of the decentralizing aspirations of local princes and nobility.

The first strife.

After the death of Vladimir Svyatoslavovich in 1015, a long war began between his numerous sons, who ruled separate parts of Russia. The instigator of the strife was Svyatopolk the Damned, who killed his brothers Boris and Gleb. In internecine wars, the princes-brothers brought to Russia either the Pechenegs, or the Poles, or the mercenary detachments of the Varangians. In the end, the winner was Yaroslav the Wise, who divided Russia (along the Dnieper) with his brother Mstislav Tmutarakansky from 1024 to 1036, and then, after the death of Mstislav, became an "autocrat".

After the death of Yaroslav the Wise in 1054, a significant number of sons, relatives and cousins ​​of the Grand Duke turned out to be in Russia.

Each of them had this or that "fatherland", their own domain, and each, to the best of his ability, sought to increase the domain or exchange it for a richer one. This created a tense situation in all the princely centers and in Kiev itself. Researchers sometimes call the time after Yaroslav's death the time of feudal fragmentation, but this cannot be considered correct, since real feudal fragmentation occurs when individual lands crystallize, grow big cities, leading these lands, when each sovereign principality has its own princely dynasty. All this appeared in Russia only after 1132, and in the second half of the 11th century. everything was changeable, fragile and unstable. The princely strife ruined the people and the squad, shattered the Russian state, but did not introduce any new political form.

In the last quarter of the XI century. in difficult conditions of internal crisis and the constant threat of external danger from the Polovtsian khans, the princely strife acquired the character of a national disaster. The object of contention was the grand throne: Svyatoslav Yaroslavich expelled his elder brother Izyaslav from Kiev, "laying the foundation for the expulsion of the brothers."

The strife became especially terrible after the son of Svyatoslav Oleg entered into an alliance with the Polovtsians and repeatedly led the Polovtsian hordes to Russia for a selfish decision between the princes' wars.

Oleg's enemy was the young Vladimir Vsevolodovich Monomakh, who reigned in the border Pereyaslavl. Monomakh managed to convene a princely congress in Lyubech in 1097, the task of which was to secure the "fatherland" to the princes, to condemn the instigator of strife Oleg and, if possible, eliminate future strife in order to resist the Polovtsy with united forces.

However, the princes were powerless to establish order not only in the entire Russian land, but even within their princely circle of relatives and cousins ​​and nephews. Immediately after the congress, a new strife broke out in Lyubech, which lasted for several years. The only force that, under those conditions, could really stop the spinning of princes and princely quarrels, was the boyars - the main body of the young and progressive then feudal class. Boyar program at the end of the XI and the beginning of the XII century. consisted in limiting princely tyranny and outrages of princely officials, in the elimination of strife and in the general defense of Russia from the Polovtsy. Coinciding in these points with the aspirations of the townspeople, this program reflected the interests of the whole people and was undoubtedly progressive.

In 1093, after the death of Vsevolod Yaroslavich, the Kievites invited the insignificant Turov prince Svyatopolk to the throne, but they miscalculated significantly, since he turned out to be a bad commander and a greedy ruler.

Svyatopolk died in 1113; his death was the signal for a widespread uprising in Kiev. The people fell upon the courts of the princely rulers and usurers. The Kiev boyars, bypassing the princely seniority, chose the Grand Duke Vladimir Monomakh, who reigned successfully until his death in 1125. After him, the unity of Rus was still held under his son Mstislav (1125-1132), and then, in the words of the chronicler, " Russian land "into separate independent reigns.

The essence

The loss of the state unity of Russia weakened and divided its forces in the face of the growing threat of foreign aggression and, above all, of the steppe nomads. All this predetermined the gradual decline of the Kiev land from the 13th century. For some time, under the Monamakh and Mstislav, Kiev rose again. These princes were able to rebuff the Polovtsian nomads.

Russia split into 14 principalities, and a republican form of government was established in Novgorod. In each principality, the princes, together with the boyars, "thought about the land system and military service." The princes declared war, made peace and various alliances. The Grand Duke was the first (senior) among equal princes. The princely congresses have survived, where questions of all-Russian politics were discussed. The princes were bound by a system of vassal relations. It should be noted that for all the progressiveness of feudal fragmentation, it had one significant negative aspect. Constant, then subsided, then flared up with renewed vigor, strife between the princes depleted the strength of the Russian lands, weakened their defenses in the face of external danger. The disintegration of Rus, however, did not lead to the disintegration of the Old Russian nationality, a historically formed linguistic, territorial, economic and cultural community. In the Russian lands, a single concept of Rus, the Russian land continued to exist. "Oh, Russian land, you are already over the hill!" - proclaimed the author of “The Lay of Igor's Regiment.” During the period of feudal fragmentation, three centers emerged in the Russian lands: the Vladimir-Suzdal, Galicia-Volyn principality and the Novgorod feudal republic.

The power of the prince

Princely power.

V political order Russian lands and principalities were local peculiarities caused by differences in the level and rates of development of productive forces, feudal land ownership, maturity of feudal production relations. In some lands, the princely power, as a result of a stubborn struggle that continued with varying success, was able to subjugate the local nobility and strengthen itself. In the Novgorod land, on the contrary, a feudal republic was established, in which the princely power lost the role of head of state and began to play a subordinate, mainly military-service role.

With the triumph of feudal fragmentation, the general Russian significance of the power of the Kiev Grand Dukes was gradually reduced to a nominal "eldership" among other princes. Linked to each other by a complex system of suzerainty and vassalage (due to the complex hierarchical structure of land ownership), the rulers and the feudal nobility of the principalities, with all their local independence, were forced to recognize the eldership of the strongest of their midst, who united their efforts to resolve issues that could not be decided by the forces of one principality or affected the interests of a number of principalities.

Already from the second half of the XII century, the strongest principalities stand out, the rulers of which become "great", "the oldest" in their lands, representing in them the top of the entire feudal hierarchy, the supreme head, without which the vassals could not do and in relation to which they were at the same time in a state of continuous rebellion.

Political centers.

Until the middle of the 12th century, such a head in the feudal hierarchy on a scale of all of Russia was the Kiev prince. From the second half of the XII century. his role passed to the local grand dukes, who, in the eyes of their contemporaries, as the "oldest" princes, were responsible for the historical fate of Rus (the idea of ​​the ethnic-state unity of which continued to be preserved).

At the end of the XII - beginning of the XIII century. in Russia, three main political centers were determined, each of which had a decisive influence on political life in the neighboring lands and principalities: for North-Eastern and Western (and also, to a large extent, for North-Western and Southern) Russia - Vladimir-Suzdal principality ; for South and South-West Russia - Galicia-Volyn principality; for North-Western Russia - the Novgorod feudal republic.

In conditions of feudal fragmentation, the role of all-Russian and land congresses (seims) of princes and vassals sharply increased, at which questions of inter-princely relations were considered and appropriate agreements were concluded, questions of organizing the struggle against the Polovtsy and conducting other joint activities... But the attempts of the princes by convening such congresses to smooth out the most negative consequences of the loss of the state unity of Russia, to link their local interests with the problems facing them on an all-Russian (or common land) scale ultimately failed because of the incessant strife between them.

Vassals and overlords

The main activity and subject of efforts of the first Kiev princes were: 1. the unification of all East Slavic tribes under the rule of the Grand Duke of Kiev, 2. the acquisition of overseas markets for Russian trade and the protection of trade routes that led to these markets, 3. the protection of the borders of the Russian land from the attacks of the steppe nomads.

The main goal and task of the princely administration was to collect tribute from the subordinate population. The ways of collecting tribute were "Polyudye" and "Carriage"."Polyudy" was called a detour by the prince (usually in winter) of his region and the collection of tribute, which was collected either in money, or more often in kind. Especially furs. During the "polyudya", the prince or his governor repaired the judgment and reprisals. In those areas to which the prince could not or did not want to go, the population had to lead a "cart", that is. carry tribute to Kiev.

In the spring, a large number of goods accumulated in the hands of the prince, his warriors, merchants, these were mainly traditional Russian goods: honey, furs, wax, slaves (captured during the war or resold), the goods were loaded on boats and moved down the Dnieper under the protection of the prince squads. The guards protected the caravan from the attacks of the steppe nomads. except military guard, the Kiev princes had to take care of the diplomatic protection of Russian trade. To do this, they entered into trade agreements with the Byzantine government, which should ensure the correct and unhindered course of Russian trade, as well as the interests and rights of Russian merchants.

The constant concern of the Kiev princes was the defense of the Russian borders from the attack of the steppe nomads. Kiev lay almost on the border of the steppe strip and was repeatedly attacked. The Kiev princes had to strengthen not only their capital, but also create a whole system of border fortifications.

Veche. Chronicler in the XII century. says that the population of the older cities "from the beginning" came together at the veche and made decisions, which were then subject to the younger cities (or suburbs). It should be noted that the people's assembly in Russia at this time, as an organ of primitive democracy, plays a very important, often decisive, role in the life of all Russian lands from Kiev to Novgorod and from Volyn to Rostov-Suzdal. Only on the western outskirts of Galicia, the aristocratic element (boyars) plays an important political role. In all cases when the population acted independently of the prince, there must be a preliminary council or conference, i.e. veche. When, after the death of Yaroslav (in 1054), the Russian land was divided into several principalities, the veche of the main volost cities often acts as the bearer of the supreme power in the state. When the prince was strong enough and popular (like Vladimir Monomakh), the veche was inactive and left the prince with government affairs. Only in Novgorod and Pskov did the Veche become a permanent operating organ. government controlled, in other areas, it usually did not interfere with the government activities of the prince during normal times. V emergency situations, like a change in the princely throne or the resolution of issues of war and peace, the voice of the popular assembly in these matters was decisive.

The power of the veche and its composition were not determined by any legal norms. The veche was an open meeting, a nationwide gathering, and all who were free could take part in it. In fact, the veche was a meeting of the townspeople of the main city. The decision of the older city was considered mandatory for the residents of the suburbs and for the entire parish. No law defined or limited the competence of the veche. Veche could discuss and resolve any issue that interested him. Sometimes even the people's militia. While on a campaign, he arranged a veche meeting and decided on the continuation of the campaign or on the upcoming hostilities. The most important and ordinary subject of the veche meetings' competence was the vocation, or acceptance, of princes and the expulsion of princes who were not pleasing to the people. At the same time, both sides sometimes concluded additional conditions. The calling and change of princes were not only political facts arising from the real balance of power, but were the generally recognized right of the population. This right was recognized by the princes themselves and their squads.

Another circle of questions to be resolved by the veche were questions about war and peace in general, as well as about the continuation or cessation of hostilities. Sometimes the people themselves took the initiative to declare war, sometimes they refused to participate in the war that the prince started or started, sometimes they demanded more energetic actions or, on the contrary, their termination.

The decisions of the veche must be "unanimous" and unanimous. In reality, this "unity for all" meant the agreement of such an overwhelming majority, which silenced dissenting opinions.

Prince and princely administration in Kievan Rus.

The prince in relation to other sovereign princes was an independent sovereign. Within his volost, the prince was the head of the administration, the highest military leader and judge. The princely power was a necessary element in the composition of the state power of all Russian lands. However, the state system of the ancient Russian lands-reigns cannot be called monarchical. The state system of the ancient Russian principalities of the X-XII centuries. represents a kind of "unstable balance" between two elements of state power: monarchical, in the person of the prince, and democratic, in the person of the national assembly or veche senior township towns. The prince's power was not absolute; it was everywhere limited by the power of the veche. But the power of the veche and its interference in affairs manifested itself only in cases of emergency, while the power of the prince was a constantly and daily operating body of government.

The prince was primarily responsible for maintaining external security and protecting the land from attacks by an external enemy. The prince led foreign policy, was in charge of relations with other princes and states, concluded alliances and treaties, declared war and made peace (however, in those cases when the war required the convocation of the people's militia, the prince had to secure the consent of the veche). The prince was a military organizer and leader; he appointed the chief of the people's militia ("tysyatsky") and during the hostilities commanded both his own squad and the people's militia.

The prince was a legislator, administrator and supreme judge. He had to "the truth of the deed in this world." The prince often entrusted the court to his deputies, "posadniks" and "tiuns," but the people always preferred the prince's personal judgment.

The prince was the head of government and appointed all officials. Regional governors appointed by the prince were called posadniks. Administrative and judicial power was in the hands of the posadniks. Under the prince and under the mayor there were minor officials, partly from free, partly from their slaves, for all kinds of judicial and police enforcement actions - these were "virniks", "metalniks", "children", "youths". The local free population, urban and rural, made up their communities, or worlds, had their elected representatives, elders and “ kind people”That defended his interests before the princely administration. At the prince's court was the management of an extensive princely economy - "courtyard tiuns".

The prince's income consisted of tribute from the population, fines for crimes and trade duties and income from princely estates.

In their government activities, the princes usually enjoyed the advice and help of their senior warriors, the "prince's husbands." On important occasions, especially before the start of military expeditions, the princes gathered the entire squad for a council. The guards were personally free and connected with the prince only by the bonds of personal agreement and trust. But the thought was not with the boyars and vigilantes compulsory for the prince, as well as did not impose any formal obligations on him. There was also no obligatory composition of the princely council. Sometimes the prince consulted with the entire squad, sometimes only with its upper class "princely men", sometimes with two or three close boyars. Therefore, the “aristocratic element of power” that some historians see in the Russian princely duma was only an advisory and auxiliary body under the prince.

But in this druzhina or boyar duma were also the "elders of the city", that is, the elective military authorities of the city of Kiev, perhaps of other cities, "tysyatskie" and "sotskie". So the very question of the adoption of Christianity was decided by the prince on the advice of the boyars and "elders of the city". These elders, or city elders, are hand in hand with the prince, together with the boyars, in matters of government, as in all court celebrations, forming a kind of zemstvo aristocracy alongside the princely service. On the prince's feast on the occasion of the consecration of the church in Vasilev in 996, they were invited together with the boyars and mayors and "elders throughout the city." In the same way, by order of Vladimir, boyars, “greedy”, “sotsky”, “ten's” and all “deliberate men” were supposed to come to his Sunday feasts in Kiev. But constituting the military-government class, the princely squad at the same time remained at the head of the Russian merchant class, from which it separated, taking an active part in overseas trade. This Russian merchant class is about half of the 10th century. it was still far from being Slavic-Russian.

Organization of military forces in Kievan Rus.

The main components of the armed forces of the principalities in the X-XII centuries. there were, firstly, the princely squad, and secondly, the people's militia.

The princely retinue was not numerous; even among the older princes, she made up a detachment of 700-800 people. But they were strong, brave, trained professional warriors. The squad was divided into the younger (lower, “juveniles”), which were called “gridi” or “gridboy” (Scandinavian grid - yard servant), “adolescents”, “children's”, and the older (higher), which were called princely men or boyars. The most ancient collective name of the junior squad “grid” was later replaced by the word “yard” or “servant”. This squad, together with its prince, emerged from among the armed merchants of large cities. In the XI century. it did not yet differ from this merchant class in sharp features, either political or economic. The squadron of the principality was, in fact, a military class.

Initially, the squad was kept and fed in the prince's court and, as an additional reward, received its share from the tribute collected from the population and from the spoils of war after a successful campaign. Subsequently, the warriors, especially their upper stratum, the boyars, began to acquire land and acquire an economy, and then they went to war with their "youths" - servants.

The princely squad was the strongest core and the main core of the army. In the event of upcoming large-scale military operations, the people's militia, made up of the free urban population, was called to arms, and in cases of emergency they were called up to military service and the villagers are "smerds".

Large trading cities were organized in a military fashion, each integral organized regiment was formed, called a thousand, which was subdivided into hundreds and tens (battalions and companies). A thousand (people's militia) was commanded by a city that got out, and then appointed by the prince, a "tysyatsky", hundreds and dozens were also elective "sotsky" and "ten". These elected commanders made up the military administration of the city and the region belonging to it, the military-government foreman, which is called in the chronicles "the elders of the city." The city regiments, more precisely, the armed cities, constantly took part in the campaigns of the prince along with his retinue. But the prince could call on the people's militia only with the consent of the veche.

In addition to the princely squad and the people's militia, auxiliary detachments from foreigners took part in the wars. Initially, these were mainly Varangian squads, which the Russian princes hired for their service, and from the end of the 11th century they were horse detachments of “their own filthy” or “black hoods” (Torks, Berendeys, Pechenegs), which Russian princes settled on the southern outskirts of Kiev land.

Veche.

The news of the chronicles about the veche life in Russia is numerous and varied, although we rarely find detailed descriptions of veche meetings. Of course, in all cases when the population of the city acted independently and independently of the prince, we must assume a preliminary meeting or council, that is, a veche.

In the era of tribal life. Before the formation and strengthening of the Grand Duchy of Kiev, individual tribes, glades, Drevlyans, etc., gather, if necessary, at their tribal meetings and consult with their tribal princelings about common affairs. In the X and at the beginning of the XI century. with the strengthening of the central power in the person of the Grand Duke of Kiev (Vladimir the Holy and Yaroslav the Wise), these tribal gatherings lose their political significance, and from the middle of the 11th century they were replaced by an active and influential veche of older regional cities.

However, in exceptional cases (especially in the absence of the prince), the urban population shows its activity and initiative in the early period of the Kiev state. For example, in 997 we see a veche in Belgorod besieged by the Pechenegs.

After the death of Yaroslav (in 1054), when the Russian land was divided into several principalities, the veche of the main volost cities acts as the bearer of the supreme power in the state. When the prince was strong enough and popular, the veche was inactive and left the prince with government affairs. On the other hand, emergencies, such as a change in the throne or the resolution of issues of war and peace, caused the imperious intervention of the veche, and the voice of the popular assembly in these matters was decisive.

The power of the veche, its composition and competence were not determined by any legal norms. The veche was an open meeting, a nationwide gathering, and all who were free could take part in it. It was only required that the participants did not stand under paternal authority (the fathers of the veche decided for the children) or in any kind of private dependence. In fact, the veche was a meeting of the townspeople of the main city; residents of small towns or “suburbs” had the right to attend the veche, but rarely had the actual opportunity to do so. The decision of the veche meeting of the older city was considered obligatory for the residents of the suburbs and for the entire volost. No law defined or limited the competence of the veche. Veche could discuss and resolve any issue that interested him.

The most important and ordinary subject of the veche meetings' competence was the vocation, or acceptance, of princes and the expulsion of princes who were not pleasing to the people. The calling and change of princes were not only political facts arising from the real balance of forces, but were generally recognized right population. This right was recognized by the princes themselves and their squads.

The second - extremely important - range of issues to be resolved by the veche was questions of war and peace in general, as well as the continuation or cessation of hostilities. For a war by his own means, with the help of his squad and hunters from the people, the prince did not need the consent of the veche, but for the war by means of the volost, when the convocation of the people's militia was required, the consent of the veche was needed.