Chronicle of military Fryazino: 1943. Formation of the 3rd Guards Airborne Brigade. Dnieper landing. 3rd GVDB behind enemy lines.

History of Fryazino

Research and memories

Georgy Rovensky,

candidate of technical sciences

Chronicle

military Fryazino:

1943

Formation of the 3rd Guards

airborne brigade.

Dnieper landing.

3rd GVDB behind enemy lines.

Press service of the city administration

Fryazino

1998.

Veterans of the 3rd and 5th Guards. airborne brigades;

Tamara Makarovna Antsiferova, history teacher of school No. 1 (Fryazino),

enthusiast-organizer of the Poisk group,

Museum of Military Glory and meetings of veteran paratroopers;

eternal memory of the paratroopers of the 3rd and 5th guards. GVDbr.,

killed in the Dnieper landing in 1943

and in subsequent battles in Ukraine,

in Hungary, Austria and Czechoslovakia

dedicated.

HEART CANNOT FORGET!

Dedicated to studentsschool N 1, Fryazino

Fryazino - 35 years later

These moving poems about the tears of a soldier, given on the previous page, were written by veteran paratrooper V. Mikhalev in hot pursuit of the first meetings of paratroopers in Fryazino.

And the meetings began in May 1978, when School No. 1, which was then located in its 4-storey pre-war building, hosted the Council of Veterans of the 3rd Guards Airborne Brigade. This was the first meeting with the paratroopers, who 35 years ago, in March-September 1943, were undergoing combat training in Fryazino. From here they went to heroic assault for the Dnieper.

At that meeting, it was decided to gather a large collection of paratroopers for the next year. Fryazino also prepared for this meeting. History teacher Tamara Makarovna Antsiferova, a wonderful enthusiast and organizer of the Poisk group of schoolchildren, collected a lot of documents. A large exhibition of photographs of paratroopers was made in the assembly hall of the school, several stands told about the landing area, about combat way 317 rifle regiment, which absorbed the surviving soldiers of the 3rd and 5th GVDB. The opening of the exhibition was reported in the newspapers.

I don't know why, but I came very early to this exhibition, long before the arrival of the guests. The hall was still empty. But I was struck by how many Fryazino women of about fifty also came early, waiting for the opening of the hall, and slowly passing from stand to stand peered for a long time at the faces of the living and dead paratroopers. And only then, after a few minutes, I realized what it was.

It was LOVE.

Yes, they were probably the girlfriends of those who did not return from the war. Among these photographs they were looking for their loved ones or their comrades. A bitter notch on a girl's heart. She kept reminding and made me cry.

I will always remember this meeting with the past, And, in fact, in addition to the memory of the paratroopers, this short essay was written in gratitude to the heartfelt memory of their girlfriends.

P.S. Danielyan, a reconnaissance paratrooper from distant Armenia, arrived in Fryazino with the last train. It was a warm night. Where to go? Unknown city. There are no souls on the street. He wandered around the unknown stone city built after the war until his sixth sense led him to the familiar school building where his landing brigade was formed in 1943. He sat on the steps of this school until the morning, remembering his fighting friends, and as he later told at a meeting, he burst into tears on the steps, realizing how many years had passed, how many of his friends had died, and what happiness that fate had brought him back to this warm midsummer night in his youth.

Fryazino. Spring 1943

With the beginning of the war, the construction of the socialist city "Radio Lamp", as the future city of electronics was to be called, ceased. But a huge five-story house with an arch and two houses transverse to it (around the future Alley of Heroes) had already been built, the street running from the Radiolamp plant to Schelkovskoye Highway and further to Moscow was already called Moscow, and two five-story houses were set on it. her appearance. Two quarters of two-story cinder-block houses formed the future Lenin Street with the outlined boulevard and squares. Two dozen two-story houses made of wood-chip panels have become along Institutskaya and Tsentralnaya streets. Since 1938, a four-story brick school building was built in a birch grove, and it accepted the first students. (In September 1998 School No. 1 will celebrate its 60th anniversary).

Since May, two battalions of the 3rd Guards Airborne Brigade and the commander, Colonel V.K. Goncharov, have settled in the school building. The other buildings of the village housed the services of the brigade. Two more battalions were placed further away, 12 km north of Fryazino along the highway - in the village of Kablukovo near the fast river Vorya.

The 5th Airborne Brigade (commander - Colonel P.A. Sidorchuk) was formed in the city of Kirzhach (Vladimir Region), 70 km north of Fryazino. They were expected by a common cross combat path with the 3rd brigade in the Dnieper landing. And then for a long time fate will unite the few surviving paratroopers in the 317th Guards Airborne Regiment.

In total, around Moscow during these months, the main operational reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was formed - 20 guards airborne divisions. After Battle of Stalingrad and the launched counter-offensive for Soviet troops what mattered was the uninterrupted pace of advance. Indeed, on the “shoulders of the retreating enemy”, the defense lines prepared by the Germans were overcome with fewer losses. The airborne brigades were the most mobile reserve of the Stavka. Moreover, their combat effectiveness was confirmed in the street battles for Stalingrad (the basis of the army of General Rodimtsev was the airborne divisions).

“The first to arrive in Fryazino was our separate anti-aircraft machine-gun company from the graduates of the Omsk School,” T.M. Antsiferova wrote in his letter. Galaktionov A.A., crew commander. - The anti-aircraft gunners were housed in a two-story red-brick house. The company took under the protection of the bombers working village. It was at the end of April. Then the brigade commander arrived with his staff. Thus began the formation of an airborne brigade with four paratrooper battalions, a separate tank battalion, a communications company, an artillery company and other services of the brigade, the total number of which was to be 5,000 experienced and trained fighters. As A.A. Galaktionov recalls, the 3rd brigade was formed on the basis of the 3rd

airborne division, of which, after the Stalingrad battles, almost nothing remained.

... A training balloon was raised in a field between a forest and old village Fryazino, and the village boys ran to look at unusual training.

After three obligatory jumps from balloons, when the paratrooper must remember the method of landing, learn to trust the parachute, stop being afraid of heights, jumps from the plane began. Trucks took everyone to the Chkalovsky airfield, where, on a vast field, from a height of 1-2 km, paratroopers were trained in landing. Here it was necessary to comprehend the science of parachute control, the skill of accurate and heap landing of the group. In July, the brigade also made a general landing in the bend of the Moskva River near Ramensk. And of course, in the meantime, there was fire training and knowledge of the basics of hand-to-hand combat. Training, training, every day, sometimes at night.

All new fighters arrive in part. They must be trained and infused into the ranks of the paratroopers, where the success of the operation depends on mutual assistance to a greater extent than in the infantry.

There were no rest days. A friendship was struck up between quick and energetic guys with village girls and girls from neighboring villages. It was here that amateur art was formed. The May holidays were fun.

The high authorities came, checked the training of the fighters. They were probably pleased to see how an excellent combat unit worthy of the title of Guards was being formed from diverse recruits and old soldiers. After 40 years, Grigory Chukhrai will remember in a conversation with a Krasnaya Zvezda correspondent that he was awarded a gold watch by the commander of the Airborne Forces for excellent combat training of the company.

“Here, in Fryazino, we were preparing for new battles,” this famous film director told the townspeople at a meeting in the Istok Palace of Culture in 1979. - I was an experienced fighter with fire training near Kharkov and Stalingrad, a junior lieutenant. We trained new paratroopers, taught them to jump with a parachute, hand-to-hand combat.

In the meantime, I was instructed to prepare amateur performances as well. good program we prepared, showed in Moscow. She turned out to be one of the best.

And then one day the order comes: Junior Lieutenant Grigory Chukhrai to appear in Nakhabino. "The brigade commander read and ordered to go on the road. In Nakhabino there was a school of the Airborne Forces.

I come to the school, I walk along the corridors. Some people hover around the foreman. I come up and try to find out why they called. It turned out that a concert brigade was being formed.

"No," I thought. "That's not for me, I must return to my comrades."

Colonel Monin came up: "What's the noise?" I explained to him that I had been preparing a platoon for so long, the guys would go to the rear, and I would sing songs, but for nothing.

The colonel became furious: "What do you think I sing songs for?" And he ordered me to be enlisted in the concert brigade. But at night I threw my greatcoat over the barbed wire, silently crossed over and returned to Fryazino.

And the loading has already begun. I reported to the battalion commander that I had violated the order. The battalion commander also approved my decision. So I ended up taking part in the Dnieper operation.”

22-24.09.43. Voronezh Front: Bukrinsky bridgehead.

By the second half of September 1943, Soviet troops defeated the Nazi troops in the Left-bank Ukraine and in the Donbass, reached the Dnieper on a 700-kilometer front from Loev to Zaporozhye.

By mid-September 1943, the troops of the 40th Army of the Voronezh Front, exhausted by stubborn battles with the enemy rearguards, were 150 km from the Dnieper. The situation required an increase in the pace of the offensive in order to force the Dnieper before the retreating German troops took up defensive positions on its right bank. To this end, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command subordinated to the front from its reserve the 3rd Guards Tank Army under the command of Lieutenant General P.S. Rybalko.

On September 19, 1943, the command of the 9th mech. corps received an order from the commander of the 3rd Guards. TA go to the Dnieper and force it in the bend at the Monastyrek, Zarubintsy section, further seize the Great Bukrin, Dudari, Ivankovo ​​line.

Dnieper shaft. The Germans considered it their impregnable fortress - the "Eastern Wall". The right "German" bank of this mighty river rose 10-30 meters above the left bank, which was a natural fortress.

... On the night of September 22 reconnaissance detachment of the 6th tank corps, consisting of a motorized rifle platoon, landed on two tanks, and a machine-gun platoon on a truck, broke through to the Dnieper.

On two small boats found, the crossing of the first reconnaissance group began. Thus, in the area of ​​the 10-km bend, within which the villages of Veliky and Maly Bukrin, Zarubintsy and others were located, a bridgehead began its way of the cross, which later received the name of Bukrinsky.

After reconnaissance, the landing party reported that there were no Germans in Zarubintsy, their units were stationed 10 km away, in Grigorovka.

In the meantime, an intensive crossing began on a German half-pontoon raised from the water and another large boat discovered.

By the morning of September 22 the entire 1st battalion of the 69th mechanized brigade was in Zarubintsy and took up defensive positions.

The first group dug in at the height of "Calm" in the direction of Grigorovka. Here, between two deep ravines, lay the road to the banks of the Dnieper occupied by our soldiers. At 14 o'clock. a German convoy appeared. A fight ensued. However, having established that the defense of the height was carried out by small forces, the enemy went over to the attack. His tanks opened fire and immediately knocked out a heavy machine gun. With the support of the fire of our tanks from the left bank and machine-gun fire from the outskirts of Zarubintsy, two German attacks on the hill were repulsed. The fight lasted until the evening. With the onset of darkness, the enemy retreated.

In the middle of the day, enemy aircraft began to actively operate in the area of ​​​​the crossing. The crossing was stopped, the boats were camouflaged.

On the night of September 2369th fur. br. resumed the crossing on boats and makeshift rafts. In the morning the motorized infantry was already on the right bank, and at 7 o'clock. 30 minutes. launched an offensive to expand the bridgehead.

At 6 o'clock. on the morning of September 23 the crossing of the approaching units of the 161st division of the 40th army began. Having unloaded on the shore, occupied by the 69th mech. brigade, they launched an attack on Traktomirov.

On the night of September 24 the approaching units of the 6TK pontoon brigade put the ferry into operation. The crossing of parts of the 71st mech began. br. Over the next two days, significant forces were expected to enter the bridgehead - the rest of the 71 mbr and parts of the 70 mbr.

Under these conditions, the command of Voronezh. front gave the order to land the 3rd and 5th airborne brigades (about 10,000 people).

Operation plan

The decision to drop an airborne assault during the crossing of the Dnieper was taken by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command even during the advance of troops to the river.

The forces of the 1st, 3rd and 5th GVDB were supposed to seize the territory 20 km from the Dnieper bend after landing (30 km along the front and 10-20 km in depth) and prevent the transfer of enemy units to the crossing points of the advancing troops. In the future, it was assumed that advancing units would come to the aid of the paratroopers.

The landing was planned to be carried out within two nights. For this purpose, 180 Li-2 aircraft and 35 gliders were allocated. The initial area for landing on planes included three airfields - Lebedin, Smorodino, Bogodukhov - at a distance of 175-220 km from the drop area, which made it possible to carry out two or three aircraft sorties in one night.

On the first night, it was planned to land the 1st and 5th Guards GVDB. The landing of gliders with 45-mm guns was planned in the intervals between the dropping of parachute echelons. The concentration of the GVDB, as well as aviation, was planned to be completed by September 22, that is, two days before the start of the drop, which was planned for September 24, 1943.

For the delivery of combat cargo to the airborne assault during the battle and the evacuation of the wounded, 35 aircraft were allocated, of which 25 Li-2 and 10 Po-2.

Each paratrooper took with him food for two days and 2-3 sets of ammunition.

On September 19, the plan for the airborne operation was approved by General of the Army G.K. Zhukov, representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters. At the same time, G.K. Zhukov pointed out that the commander of the troops of the Voronezh Front should clarify the task of the airborne assault on the eve of the drop, taking into account the situation that had developed by that time.

By the time of the landing, the 1st GVDB failed to prepare for the landing, and the 3rd and 5th brigades received the order to land. It was decided to leave the 1st GVDB instead of the 3rd brigade in reserve, ready to be thrown out on the second or third night.

Leap into the night

«

As a result, 2017 people were not thrown out on the first night, which accounted for 30 percent of the total landing force and 590 packages with combat cargo.

The paratroopers jumped into the night, into the unknown. In compact groups, they were supposed to occupy part of the territory to receive loads of ammunition and 45-mm cannons and capture the foreground of the Bukrinsky bridgehead.

But the reality turned out to be different.

The pilots, having hit the shelling of anti-aircraft guns, left the fire, gaining altitude and dodging the calculated course. As a result, part of the paratroopers was thrown into the Dnieper and died, the rest were scattered over a territory 10 times larger than the specified one, and could not form a fighting fist.

At the same time, the command of the Voronezh Front, which ordered the landing, did not take into account that over the past day, trying to delay the development of the offensive on the bridgehead, the German command had already pulled several divisions and tank units into this region. Most of paratroopers, therefore, was dropped directly on the battle formations of the Germans and was met with dense fire already in the air.

On September 24, the enemy withdrew troops to the area of ​​the Bukrinsky bend, which had crossed from the left bank of the Dnieper River near Kanev. By the end of September 24, the 112th and 255th German infantry divisions appeared here.

Consequently, over the past three days before the landing, the enemy concentrated large forces in the Bukrinsky bend of the Dnieper, which were located in settlements, forming around them strongholds and defense centers just in those areas where the landing of the 3rd and 5th GVDB was planned. This abrupt change in the situation in the airborne landing area was not timely established by reconnaissance of the troops of the front.

On the night of September 25, 1943, 298 sorties were made from all airfields instead of 500 planned and 4575 people and 660 packages of ammunition were dropped, including 3050 people and 432 packages from the 3rd GVDB and 1525 people and 228 packages from the 5th GVDB.

From the Smorodino airfield, from which 45-mm guns were supposed to land, not a single plane could take off that night due to unpreparedness.

Due to the lack of fuel for aircraft, the landing of the 5th GVDB from the Bogodukhov airfield was suspended by one in the morning on September 25.

The landing of the 3rd GVDB from the Lebedin airfield was completely completed by dawn on September 25 (except for 45-mm guns).

As a result, 2017 people were not thrown out on the first night, which accounted for 30 percent of the total landing force and 590 packages with combat cargo. Radio contact with the discarded units could not be established.

On the night of September 28, three groups of paratroopers with radio stations were thrown out, but the fate of these groups remained unknown. On the afternoon of September 28, a Po-2 plane was sent, but it was shot down while flying over the front line. Other measures taken did not give positive results either.

Further landing of troops was stopped. The remaining unlanded units of the 5th GVDB and 1st GVDB were returned to their permanent locations.

In the battle formations of the Germans

Despite all the difficulties and the complexity of the situation, the paratroopers did not lose heart. They showed the greatest courage, the highest sense of duty to the Motherland. Each of them, barely touching the ground, boldly attacked the enemy, often engaging in hand-to-hand combat with him; stubbornly, to the death stood on the defensive.

Fighting with the pressing enemy, the paratroopers understood that their way to accomplish the assigned task was to unite. And they aspired to it.

By the end of the first day, as it turned out later, more than 40 separate groups of paratroopers were operating in the area from Rzhishchev to Cherkasy. These groups, as communications were established among themselves, united into larger detachments, which made it possible to inflict serious blows on the enemy.

Almost four important days were lost by German troops in battles with landing forces. During this time, not only all units of the 9th Mechanized Corps, but also units of the 40th Army managed to cross over to the Bukrinsky bridgehead.

From 24 to 25 September, the 71st fur crossed the bridgehead. br., and from September 26 to 27 - the 70th fur. br. 9th fur. corps. At the same time, units of the 47th and 23rd Corps of the 40th Army crossed the Dnieper.

General Rybalko decided to build two bridges in the area of ​​Zarubintsy and Grigorovka.

Meanwhile, stubborn battles to expand the bridgehead continued. Our units advanced 4 km and captured a grove southwest of Traktomirov, heights on the northern outskirts of Vel. Bukrin; 69th and 71st fur. br. - heights on the eastern outskirts of Vel. Bukrin and on the northern outskirts of Mal. Bukrin, Kolesishche (see map).

September 26 the Germans, with the support of 16 tanks, launched strong counterattacks on the positions of the 69th and 71st fur. br. These counterattacks were successfully repulsed, but the pressure of the enemy was increasing.

Enemy aircraft in groups of 10 to 50 aircraft bombed our troops on the bridgehead and at the crossing on the left bank. There were no anti-aircraft weapons to reliably cover the crossing yet. Therefore, forcing was carried out only at night.

By September 27 9th fur. Corps of the 3rd Guards TA, having transferred all its motorized infantry, anti-tank artillery, mortars and 11 tanks to the bridgehead, and with battles expanded the bridgehead along the front 11 km and in depth 6 km.

Suffering significant losses, the corps and the 1127th regiment of the 40th Army, which arrived on the evening of September 28, continued to expand the bridgehead.

Pushing the paratroopers into the forests, the Germans began preparations for delivering a decisive blow on the eve of the completion of the construction of bridges.

The morning of September 29 came. About 500 enemy guns and mortars rained down on our forward positions. From Mal. Bukrina and Kolesishche were attacked by German tanks, followed by dense lines of infantry. A fierce battle broke out. Under the onslaught of superior forces, our units retreated to the second line of defense. By evening, the German attack bogged down. The further offensive of the enemy was stopped by the heroism and courage of the soldiers of the 6th Panzer Corps.

So the Bukrinsky bridgehead was captured and held.

The feats of warriors were highly appreciated. Orders and medals were awarded to 2000 fighters, sergeants and officers. Only in the 69th fur. br. title of Hero Soviet Union 41 people were assigned, incl. 32 from the forward battalion, which captured and held the bridgehead until the approach of the main forces.

The heroism of the paratroopers was almost not noted. There is no mention of the landing either in the article "Bukrinsky bridgehead" in the Military Encyclopedia, or in an extensive article by the former commander of the 3rd Guards. mechanized corps of Major General K. Malygin in the "Military History Journal" in 1968.

3rd GVDB behind enemy lines

Groups and detachments of paratroopers of the 3rd and 5th GVDB, operating in the rear areas of enemy formations, boldly attacked the Nazis, smashed their headquarters, disrupted communications, and destroyed manpower and military equipment. Here are some stories from the memoirs of paratroopers.

At the origin of the joint brigade

The commander of the 2nd battalion of the 3rd GVDB, Major V.F.Fofanov, landed west of Rzhishchev. After signaling the collection to the landing site, 22 paratroopers came out to him, mostly those who flew with him in the same plane. By the morning of September 25, 7 more people joined the group. During the day, Major Fofanov took vigorous measures to establish contact with the command and other units of the brigade. At the same time, he sent sentinels to the most important directions, organized the direct defense of the area where the group was located and all-round observation.

Having received information about the presence of an enemy garrison in Medvedovka, he decided to raid it on the night of September 26, capture a prisoner and clarify the situation in the area. During the attack on the garrison, 8 German soldiers but failed to capture the prisoner.

Lost hope to set in this moment communication with the command of the brigade, as well as with other units of the landing force, Major Fofanov decided to withdraw the group to the Veselaia Dubrava area, and then go to the designated defense area of ​​the landing force. Before the start of the movement, he decided to re-raid the enemy garrison in Medvedovka. During the raid, the paratroopers blew up one enemy tank, destroyed three carts and two cars. Having replenished their food stocks at the expense of those captured from the enemy, the group began preparations for moving to another area.

However, on the evening of September 28, the group was attacked by the enemy. Having beaten off the attack, the paratroopers left the occupied area under the cover of night and began to advance in a southerly direction, and by the end of September 29, the group entered the defense area of ​​the 3rd guards brigade. The paratroopers were in the area for two days. Several other small groups joined them, but no additional data on the brigades could be obtained. During these days, the paratroopers attacked enemy garrisons in the settlements of Tulitsy and Shandra, destroying one tank, three vehicles and up to 40 enemy soldiers and officers.

Subsequently, the group moved south and by October 1 entered the forest southeast of Potashni. During the raid, the paratroopers carried out raids on enemy garrisons in the settlements of Yakhny, Potaptsy and Biyevitsy. The paratroopers exterminated in these battles over 80 enemy soldiers and officers, 9 vehicles and a significant amount of military equipment.

In the area of ​​​​Maslovka, the group was attacked by the enemy with a force up to an infantry battalion. By the end of the day, the paratroopers were surrounded. Major Fofanov decided to hold his positions at all costs, and break out of the encirclement at night. Night fell, the Nazis stopped their attacks and, leaving cover, withdrew the main forces of the battalion to the outskirts of the settlement.

The plan for breaking away from the enemy was as follows. Specially assigned paratroopers were to covertly go out to three cars parked at a separate house on the outskirts and blow them up. The main group by this time should have been ready for a quick exit.

It all happened. There were several muffled explosions. The dark night was illuminated by the bright flames of burning cars. Panic arose among the garrison, and indiscriminate shooting began. At this time, the paratroopers quickly left the area they occupied.

The group continued to move into eastbound and only on October 21 arrived in the Taganchansky forest. Major V.F. Fofanov headed the headquarters of the combined airborne brigade.

The heroic death of the detachment of Major Evstropov

The deputy head of the political department of the 3rd GVDB, Major I.Ya. Evstropov, immediately after landing, led a group of 22 people. Soon another 9 paratroopers approached the group.

During the first three days, Major Evstropov failed to obtain information about other units of the brigade and about the airborne assault as a whole. He decided to withdraw the group to the area north of Potashni and begin sabotage operations on enemy communications.

Soon the enemy opened the location of the group. After repulsing the first attack of the enemy, Major Evstropov changed the area. However, the enemy continued to pursue the group and soon blocked it. The paratroopers fought bravely. The first three enemy attacks were repulsed. Attacks by larger forces followed. The encirclement ring around the paratroopers was shrinking. In a critical situation, at the command of Major Evstropov, "Attack follow me! We will not surrender alive!" the guards rushed at the enemy. All paratroopers died the death of heroes. Major Evstropov at the last moment blew himself up with the last grenade. A handful of Soviet paratroopers told about this heroic battle many years later, the inhabitants of Potash.

The fate of the group Lieutenant Tkachev

Senior Lieutenant E.G. Tkachev acted proactively. After landing and orienting, he realized that he was too far from the planned drop area. By the morning of September 25, the senior lieutenant led a group of 23 people. “We will beat the enemy on our own for the time being. At the same time, we will take measures to establish communication with other units of the landing force,” he told the paratroopers.

Moshny. Soon contact was established with partisans operating in the Moshna area. Soon another 21 paratroopers joined the group. The number of the detachment reached more than 400 people.

After uniting with the partisans, Senior Lieutenant Tkachev through the headquarters partisan movement Ukraine reported to the front headquarters the situation in the area of ​​his landing. In response, he received an order to act jointly with the partisans and take measures to establish contact with the airborne assault.

A joint command of partisans and paratroopers operating in the area was created, which included senior lieutenant Tkachev and his deputy lieutenant A.N. Vadyasov from the paratroopers.

From September 26 to October 20, the paratroopers conducted active sabotage and reconnaissance operations in the area of ​​​​Moshna, Sofiyivka, Belozerye. During this period, more than 130 invaders were exterminated, including 11 officers, 9 vehicles with military equipment, 4 cars, 2 motorcycles were destroyed, 5 bridges were blown up.

On October 23, Senior Lieutenant Tkachev received an order from the front headquarters to introduce his detachment into the United Airborne Brigade operating in the Taganchansky Forest.

The actions of the detachments of Major Lev and Lieutenant Chukhrai

In a small area west and southwest of Buchak, a significant number of paratroopers from the 3rd and 5th airborne brigades landed. By the morning of September 25, three groups were formed here: Major N.S. Lev, lieutenants G.N. Chukhrai and S.A. Zdelnik. However, they all acted in isolation, out of touch with each other.

Major Lev, leading a group of 27 paratroopers, led it in a southerly direction, trying to quickly reach the brigade's defense area. The group advanced covertly, with reconnaissance and security measures, avoiding encounters with large enemy forces.

However, there were no paratroopers there. For two days, Major Lev took energetic measures to establish contact with the landing units, and only after that he decided to go to connect with the units advancing from the front.

On September 29, when approaching the village of Glinchik, Major Lev met with groups led by lieutenants Chukhrai and Zdelnik. He united these groups and began active sabotage operations in the rear areas of formations and associations of German troops. At the same time, he took measures to establish communication with other groups.

The group carried out a series of attacks on enemy communications, enemy garrisons, as a result of which they exterminated more than 30 Nazis, destroyed 4 cars, 3 anti-aircraft guns, set fire to a depot of military equipment, captured 18 machine guns and a significant amount of ammunition and food.

On October 4, Major Lev decided to continue reaching the front line and try to establish contact with the advancing troops.

In the Troshchin area, the enemy discovered the paratroopers and attacked them. All day on October 5, the paratroopers repelled enemy attacks. With the onset of darkness, the groups broke away from the enemy and retreated to the grove south of the Bunchak settlement. From here, Lieutenant Chukhrai with two paratroopers penetrated the front line and reported on the situation in this area. He returned back accompanied by a partisan guide. Thus, communication was established with the troops operating from the front.

Odyssey of Captain Krotov's group

Captain N. Krotov did not have time to touch the ground, when he heard the imperative question: "Where did you come from?" It turned out that at the landing site there was a small group of partisans returning to their area after a successful raid on the German garrison in the village of Novaya Gunta.

Captain Krotov clarified the situation with the partisans, sent patrols in order to establish contact with other landing units. Having not achieved positive results, he decided to act together with the partisans. By the end of September 25, he managed to unite about 200 paratroopers, mainly from among the scouts of the 5th GVDB. The location of the detachment was chosen as a small island in a marshy area of ​​the forest, difficult to reach even for pedestrians.

Captain Krotov deployed sabotage operations in a fairly large area. Sudden raids on enemy garrisons, columns of troops and carts, on bases and warehouses of the enemy in six days, 2 tanks were knocked out, 3 cars were destroyed, a bridge was blown up, and up to 30 Nazis were exterminated.

Soon it became known from the partisans that a large airborne assault was operating in the Taganch region. Captain Krotov, continuing active operations, sent reconnaissance to the Taganch region, and then brought his detachment there, which included 225 people, 4 heavy and 7 light machine guns, 3 anti-tank rifles, 100 machine guns, 125 rifles and carbines.

Suren Petrosyan's paratroopers

Skillfully acted group Art. Lieutenant S. Petrosyan. This group won its first victory over the enemy at a height of 180.3. There, surrounded by the Nazis, the soldiers who landed simultaneously with his company were fighting. Petrosyan decided to attack the enemy from the rear. With a shout of "Hurrah" the group quickly rushed to the attack. The Nazis quickly turned around and opened heavy fire. But when our soldiers defending the height went on the attack, the Nazis faltered and rushed to the forest in a panic. Only a few of them managed to escape.

However, the first victory did not bring the usual joyful revival. Too great were the losses suffered by the paratroopers during the landing. After burying their fallen comrades, the paratroopers vowed to avenge their deaths.

On September 28, Petrosyan learned that the German commandant's office, the headquarters of an artillery unit, a police school and a large amount of equipment were stationed in the settlement of Potok. To defeat the garrison, the senior lieutenant created three groups of fifty people. Each of them, in turn, was divided into four subgroups. Three were intended for attack, and one for cover. In addition, the commander singled out two groups of six people to destroy telephone and telegraph communication lines and cover roads, giving them machine guns each.

On September 30, at nightfall, the detachment began to move. The commander made a halt 2 km from the settlement. Here he was met by scouts and reported the latest data on the enemy garrison. In accordance with the data received, it was necessary to slightly change the plan of action. It was decided to take the starting positions at 2 hours 50 minutes, the attack to begin at midnight.

At the headquarters where the first group operated, there were three sentries: one stood at the entrance to the school, the other two patrolled around the premises. The paratroopers, after waiting for the right moment, attacked the sentries, but one of them managed to shoot. In order not to waste time and not give the enemy the opportunity to prepare to repel the attack, the paratroopers went on the attack. Throwing grenades into the windows, they broke into the premises and completed the defeat of the enemy in hand-to-hand combat.

It was easier for the second group. There were only a few soldiers and officers in the police school, who were unable to put up serious resistance. The third group launched the attack a little later, the Nazis had time to prepare and opened heavy fire. The paratroopers lay down. The commander, leaving cover in front of the front, immediately began to bypass the enemy on the right and soon attacked them on the flank, but did not achieve success. The Nazis, illuminating the area with rockets, tightly covered all the approaches to the ammunition depot and equipment with fire. At this time, the second group, having defeated the police school, attacked the enemy from the rear.

As a result of successful actions, the detachment defeated the headquarters of the anti-aircraft artillery division, captured important documents, up to 30 vehicles with ammunition. More than 100 enemy soldiers and officers, 3 anti-aircraft guns, more than 30 vehicles, a large number of communications equipment and other property were destroyed in the battle.

As soon as the paratroopers, exhausted by battle and march, concentrated in the forest south of Maslovka, a report was received from intelligence about the appearance of an enemy artillery column. Senior Lieutenant Petrosyan made a bold decision - to attack the column and crush it on the march in the forest. The paratroopers set up an ambush in the middle of the grove.

The fire was opened simultaneously on the entire column and caused confusion in the ranks of the enemy. Disabled lead cars blocked the way for others, and cars that tried to turn off the road got stuck in ditches. Throwing equipment, the Nazis hurried to hide in the folds of the terrain. At this time, the reserve was brought into battle. By morning the column was destroyed. The detachment destroyed more than 80 soldiers and officers, 6 guns, 2 mortars and 15 vehicles and trailers.

A well-chosen ambush site, simultaneous fire on the entire column ensured the defeat of superior enemy forces.

From the Maslovka area, the detachment fought its way to Kanev, where, according to local residents, large landing forces acted.

Lieutenant Colonel Sidorchuk takes command into his own hands

By October 5, in the forest near Kanev, where the group led by Petrosyan began to advance, several detachments of paratroopers were concentrated. Even during the landing, the commander of the 3rd GVDB, Colonel Goncharenko V.K. was wounded and subsequently taken out through a partisan airfield to the mainland. The 3rd and 5th GVDB brigade, united from the paratrooper detachments, was headed by the commander of the 5th GVDB, Lieutenant Colonel Sidorchuk

On October 6, a group of signalmen with a radio station entered the location of the brigade, with the help of which, for the first time after the release, radio contact was established with the headquarters of the 40th Army.

Soon the headquarters of the Airborne Forces organized the supply of paratroopers with ammunition and food.

Having created a base in the Kanevsky forest, the brigade stepped up operations on enemy communications and defeated several enemy garrisons. The Nazis withdrew from the front and threw field units to fight the landing. They continuously attacked the paratroopers. For three days, the paratroopers courageously and steadfastly held their positions.

With only light weapons, it was difficult to hold back the onslaught of the enemy. And the enemy decided, having strengthened his tank and artillery units, to deliver a decisive blow on the morning of October 12th. But he came to an empty place. Back on the night of October 11, the main forces of the landing force secretly left the forest with the permission of the front commander.

On October 19, the brigade commander received an order from the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, in which Sidorchuk was ordered to unite under his command a detachment of senior lieutenant Tkachev, operating in the forests 5-10 km south of the town of Moshny, and other small groups of paratroopers fighting in this area .

Being in the Taganchansky forest, paratroopers in small groups continued to disrupt the communication of enemy troops. On October 22, they blew up the railway bed in the section Korsun - Tagancha station, as a result of which the echelon with the Nazis was destroyed. In the same area, on October 23, a trainload of ammunition and other military equipment was derailed. On the Korsun - Sakhnovka - Mizhirich highway, paratroopers from ambushes destroyed vehicles and attacked columns. A daring raid on the garrisons in Buda-Vorobievskaya on the night of October 23 destroyed the headquarters of the 157th reserve enemy battalion, killed more than 50 soldiers and officers, destroyed an anti-aircraft gun and 4 vehicles. At the same time, a group of paratroopers destroyed the enemy's warehouses in the village of Potashnya, destroying 34 vehicles and several dozen Nazis.

Since that time, the effectiveness of airborne assault operations has become higher. His attacks on the enemy began to be carefully prepared and carried out according to a single plan. The enemy felt it too.

The Hitlerite command began to intensively transfer field units removed from the front to the Taganchan forest, send special punitive detachments, and make extensive use of aircraft for reconnaissance of the areas where the paratroopers were located and delivering air strikes against them. In the leaflets distributed, the Nazis claimed that the airborne assault would be crushed in the coming days; indicated that for each paratrooper a reward in the amount of 6 thousand occupation marks was appointed.

On the morning of October 23, the enemy launched an offensive. But it was not unexpected for the paratroopers. They prepared carefully to repel the attack of the enemy. The warriors steadfastly held a circular defense. Everyone understood that in these battles not only his personal fate was decided, but also the fate of the landing force as a whole. But every day it got harder and harder. The decisive day was 23 October. A participant in those battles, reserve colonel P.N. Nezhivenko, recalls: “... the day of October 23 was a day of continuous bloody battle. Enemy attacks followed one after another. From the front - a sea of ​​\u200b\u200bfire, from the air - continuous bombing. Enemy aircraft hung over us with impunity "The only salvation from them was constant close contact with the enemy attacking units. In the battalion of Captain V.N. Krotov, almost all the officers were out of order. I led a group of paratroopers. The enemy attacked fiercely all day. At the end of the day, another attack began. The Germans sought to He managed to break through on the left flank of the neighbor. The Nazis began to seep into the rear of our group. The battalion commander jumped into the trench and commanded: "Not a step back! Stand to the death!" And here Major V.F. Fofanov appeared. With a landing knife in one hand, with a grenade in the other, he rushed forward with an exclamation: "Guardsmen! Let's show the fascist bastards how Soviet paratroopers attack!" A hand-to-hand fight ensued. The enemy could not stand it. We opened heavy fire on the fleeing fascists with the last bullets."

At night, the brigade broke out of the ring, carrying the wounded. But not everyone managed to get out of the encirclement. Was also wounded. Sergeant Nezhivenko. He ended up in a partisan hospital. When he received medical treatment, he fought as part of a partisan detachment until the complete liberation of Cherkassy from the Nazis. Like many veterans of the Dnieper landing, Pyotr Nikolaevich proudly wears the medal "To Partizan Patriotic War".

Raid in the Cherkasy forests

The paratroopers also suffered losses in these battles. They also had a difficult situation with ammunition. A break in the fighting became necessary. The brigade commander decided to break away from the enemy and take the brigade to another area. After a thorough reconnaissance, taking advantage of the onset of darkness, the brigade units began to leave the Taganchansky forest in the direction of Sakhnovka and further into the Cherkasy forest.

On the night of October 26, the brigade arrived in Cherkasy Forest, in the area northeast of Bolshoy Staroselye. With the increase in the total number of brigade to 1.2 thousand people in the period from 27 to 30 October, another battalion was formed.

In the Cherkasy forest area, the brigade went on the defensive and continued to fight, violating the German rear and control. In the period from October 28 to November 11, reconnaissance and sabotage groups blew up bridges, destroyed transport columns, destroyed communications, and made daring raids on enemy garrisons. The enemy began to pull up new forces to the Cherkasy Forest in order to first block the landing force and then destroy it.

During this time, the paratroopers reconnoitered in detail the enemy defense system along the Dnieper and in tactical depth, and all information was transmitted to the headquarters of the front, in the zone in which the brigade operated. Due to the fact that the troops of the front were preparing to cross the river, the brigade commander established communication directly with the headquarters of the 52nd Army, which was operating in the Cherkassy direction.

From Fryazino - beyond the Dnieper.

Grigory Chukhrai, film director, laureate of the Lenin Prize, tells(from a speech at the Istok Palace of Culture in May 1979)

... They correctly say that due to the ineptitude of the pilots and the mistakes of the navigators, both brigades were dispersed over a large area.

We flew for a short time. I was the oldest on the plane. Jumped in the support group to prepare the landing of the rest of the groups.

The pilots gave the signal to land. I'm standing at the hatch. I skip half of my own, then I have to jump myself to be on the ground in the middle of the group. Suddenly the paratrooper rested against the edges of the hatch, he did not want to jump. "Dnieper!" - screams. Well, I know all these tricks and subterfuges, fear of jumping, pushed him harder with my knee, he flew down, and then jumped out himself.

But the paratrooper turned out to be right, they really threw us over the Dnieper, and no matter how I controlled the parachute, I managed to land only on the very shore. I gathered my guys only 4 out of 24. Yes, even from a half-platoon of guys from the 5th brigade, who landed with us.

About two platoons of Germans went towards us. But we occupied a small forest not far from the shore and held out until nightfall. At night, the Germans withdrew, probably, the fist was going to fight against the main forces of the landing. And we went to the German rear, cut off communications, killed the Germans, smashed the headquarters. One large headquarters was destroyed, many senior officers were killed, and important documents were seized. The guys fought desperately.

We tried to contact ours. We spent all the batteries, could not establish contact with the command. There were rumors about a large landing in the district, but we could not get through to our comrades: the Germans surrounded them tightly.

Then they decided to send three people, including me, through the Dnieper for communication. Actually, I crossed the front lines many times, but this time the transition was very difficult. The Germans were vigilant, because very close in the rear were large forces of paratroopers. For three days we lay in ambush, set up patrol schedules for the Germans, chose options for crossing ...

And here we are with ours. There they received an order to withdraw their detachment across the front line.

So we returned to Moscow. First we went to the Mausoleum. It was a painting. We are on Red Square: some in German trousers, some in a German uniform, some in something else.

And at the headquarters we were not very kindly met, they accused us that we did not want to join the main forces, sat out in the forests, and returned. We left for Fryazino disappointed.

But I have already said that I was lucky in my life. During the November offensive, a large headquarters was captured beyond the Dnieper, and detailed documents about the actions of our group were found there. Thus, our reports were confirmed. I was awarded the Order of the "Red Star", my comrades received the Order of Glory and the medal "For Courage". We were summoned to headquarters, awarded awards, thanked for our brave and decisive actions, and read excerpts from German documents about our struggle: the Germans numbered 250 of us, and there were about 30 of us. I was proud of my award.

I leave the headquarters and come face to face with Colonel Monin:

Ah, it's you, the fugitive. - Guilty, Comrade Colonel! - 25 days of arrest.

So I ended up on forced rest.

Then I was recalled from the brigade to organize and prepare the landing of Slovaks and Czechs to help the Slovak uprising. It was a very exciting and heroic operation.

Then I ended up in the 104th division, in Romania and Hungary. Here, on the very border with Austria, I was seriously wounded and met Pobeda in the hospital. There I was commissioned.

I returned to Moscow, passed several exams for the directing department, and after graduating from the institute I became an assistant director.

And my military fate turned out happily for me, and in my post-war fate, luck also accompanied me. I am a laureate of the Lenin Prize, People's Artist of the USSR, I have a favorite teaching job, I continue to direct films.

But I don't want young people to think that life is a ceremonial march. Life is not only about victories. The merit of my generation was that in the most difficult conditions we remained true to our ideals, and we won. Nothing in life comes easy. Winning is a lot of work. And the more labor is invested, the more joyful is the victory. ... Do not expect gifts from life.

Capture of the Dnieper bridgehead near the village of Svidovok

On November 11, 1943, the brigade commander received an order from the commander of the 52nd Army, in which he ordered the airborne brigade to go on the offensive on the night of November 13, to seize the Lozovka-Elizavetovka-Sekirna-Svidovok line on the banks of the Dnieper in order to ensure the crossing of the Dnieper River in parts operating from the front.

By one in the morning on November 13, 1943, the units of the brigade went to starting position and, having carried out reconnaissance, at the signal of the brigade commander at 16-00, they simultaneously attacked all enemy strongholds.

The actions of the paratroopers in this swift attack were distinguished by decisiveness and courage. Assault groups of paratroopers used hand grenades and burst into the strongholds with a swift throw. The Germans, stunned by the suddenness of the blow, could not offer organized resistance and began to scatter in a panic. Following the assault groups, the main forces of the 4th and 5th companies began to advance. The 4th company was followed by a reserve. At this time, the 6th company attacked the enemy in the area of ​​the 73.8 mark, but advanced slowly, meeting enemy fire resistance.

The enemy soon recovered from the unexpected blow, but the 4th and 5th companies of Major Bluvshtein's battalion had already managed to capture the nearest strongholds. However, before reaching the center, they were stopped by heavy machine-gun fire and tank fire. The 6th company also did not overcome the enemy resistance at the 73.8 mark. She tried to break into the settlement south of the bend in the road, but had no success and lay down, continuing the firefight with the enemy.

At this time, the neighbor on the left, met by heavy fire, covered himself from the enemy with one platoon, and sent the main forces around the strong point.

The battalion commander Major Bluvshtein also took measures (for this battle he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, he was repeatedly in Fryazino at meetings of paratroopers). He ordered the battalion reserve to bypass the enemy from the east and attack the center of his resistance. A platoon of machine gunners, hiding behind houses, quickly went to the center of the enemy's fortified position.

The battalion under the command of A. Mikhailov fought his way to Svidovka, here the commander was wounded, Suren Petrosyan took command. (he was also awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union). The battalion attacked the center of enemy resistance. Following them, the 4th and 5th rifle companies of the neighbors went on the attack. The resistance of the enemy in the center of the settlement was broken. He, having lost two more tanks, retreated into the bushes northeast of Svidovka. The remnants of the Nazi unit, driven out by the forces of the 6th and 5th rifle companies from the area of ​​​​mark 73.8, also retreated there.

However, the situation with the release of the battalion to the north-eastern outskirts of Svidovka changed dramatically. Before the infantry battalion and seven enemy tanks, advancing from Dakhnovka, they shot down the cover sent from the 2nd paratrooper battalion, quickly approached Svidovka and turned around to strike at the flank and rear of the battalion.

Here, near Svidovk, the armor-piercer I. Kondratiev showed special courage and skill. With well-aimed shots from an anti-tank rifle, he knocked out 5 tanks and 2 self-propelled guns in this battle. For this fight he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

By 5 o'clock after a stubborn battle, the task assigned to the brigade was successfully completed.

Again in the ring of the enemy

However, the troops of the front during the night of November 13 failed to force the Dnieper. This allowed the enemy to withdraw part of the forces from the coast and direct them against the paratroopers. Attacking from the south and east, the Germans began to push the 2nd and 4th airborne battalions and created a threat to encircle the main forces of the brigade. The brigade commander ordered the battalions to withdraw to the forest south of Svidovka and go on the defensive.

In these last battles in the rear of the fascist troops, the paratroopers, as in all previous ones, showed swiftness in attacks and the highest stamina in defense. The female paratroopers also showed courage and selflessness in battle.

As a very young girl, Nadya Gagarina voluntarily went to the front. And in your first fight with fascist invaders she joined the airborne assault in the rear of the German troops. For sixty-five days and nights, paramedic Nadezhda Gagarina fought courageously behind enemy lines. In only one battle, she took out from the battlefield and saved the life of 21 paratroopers. Already in the post-war years, students of secondary school N 8 of the city of Cherkasy wrote in a letter to the brave paratrooper: "... Thank you for your great feat in the name of peace. We swear to be true to the high traditions of the heroes of the Great Patriotic War, to grow up as true patriots of our great Motherland ... "

Just as courageously fought V.I.

Among the paratroopers and partisans, striking towards the troops advancing through the Dnieper in the Svidovka area, there were also French patriots who were brought by the Nazis for construction narrow gauge railway. They established contact with the Cherkasy underground, gave them a radio and important information about the deployment of German troops, and in May 1943. made an escape and arrived at the partisans, taking with them four carts with rifles, a machine gun and ammunition.

The fighting of the paratroopers diverted the attention of the enemy from the troops of the 52nd Army, who were preparing to force. Thanks to this, on the night of November 14, the 254th Infantry Division was able to transport approx. 800 men and capture a small foothold below Svidovka.

By 19:00 on November 15, the brigade again captured the settlement of Svidovok and connected with the 254th Infantry Division. By the morning of November 16, the paratroopers again captured the strongholds of Sekirna and Elizavetovka, thereby expanding the bridgehead and the crossing area for the troops of the 52nd Army.

With the active assistance of the paratroopers, the enemy was driven out of nearby settlements with heavy losses.

At this turn, the OGVDB fought fierce battles for four days with suitable enemy reserves from the Smela direction, which helped the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front in successfully encircling and destroying the enemy in Cherkassy.

The subsequent combat operations of the units of the 3rd and 5th GVDB to expand the captured bridgehead took place until November 28 in close cooperation with units of the 294th and 254th rifle divisions.

On November 28, 1943, they surrendered their positions to the 7th Guards Airborne Division and were withdrawn from the battle.

The guards-paratroopers, despite the most difficult, difficult conditions, showed massive heroism and courage.

With the thought of the Victory, the guards-paratroopers on the night of September 24 took off in planes from the starting area in order to throw themselves behind the lines of the fascist troops. With the thought of the Motherland, the paratroopers went into a deadly battle with the enemy. Some of them burned up in the sky under the canopy of the parachute. Many death overtook the earth. Those who were threatened with fascist captivity died heroically. But the paratroopers fought on. Withstood. We won.

All paratroopers were awarded military orders and medals. Major A.A. Bluvshtein and Senior Lieutenant S.G. Petrosyan, armor-piercer I.Kondratyev were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for exceptional stamina, personal courage and combat successes shown in battles behind enemy lines.

Combat airborne operations in the 2nd World War.

Army General S.M. Shtemenko recalls that when reporting the first results of forcing the Dnieper River in September 1943, Stalin was especially annoyed by the failure to use the 1st, 3rd and 5th GVDB. A special order on this issue stated: "The release of a mass landing at night testifies to the illiteracy of the organizers of this case, because, as experience shows, the release of a mass night landing even on one's own territory is fraught with great difficulties."

The war has revealed weak sides Airborne Forces: dependence of their landing on weather conditions, greater vulnerability at the time of landing behind enemy lines and collection, poor technical equipment, difficulty in supporting landing forces during the battle due to the front line and additional supply of ammunition and other combat equipment.

This is confirmed by the results of military operations in other countries.

German mass airborne assault in 1941 during the capture of the island of Crete although it led to the capture of this important bridgehead in the Mediterranean, it was accompanied by such heavy losses (more than 60% of losses by the end of the first day) among the paratroopers thrown into the battle formations of the British to capture airfields that the German command abandoned massive airborne assaults and no longer applied them.

Three large airborne operations were carried out by the allied forces of the United States and Great Britain on the European continent.

In the Arnhem airlanding operation in 1944 to capture the bridges across the Rhine, the US 141st Airborne Division, which landed at a large distance (60 km) from the main forces, came under a tank attack and was unable to complete its combat mission. Having lost 7.5 thousand paratroopers, she broke through the encirclement and went to connect with the main forces.

Operations in which the landing was carried out at a distance of 10-15 km from the front and were reinforced by the offensive of the front troops were successful. However, paratrooper losses remained extremely high. In the Normandy operation of 1944 night landing led to a significant dispersion of paratroopers over a large area, by the end of the first day the losses amounted to more than 50%, and only a successful mass landing of an amphibious assault, which developed the success of the paratroopers, decided the outcome of the operation.

Brigade Banner Rescue Awards

On June 11, 1976, the Decree of the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian SSR was published: “For high patriotism, courage and courage shown during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45, to award Gannenko A.F. on behalf of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces. and Gannenko S.I.”. A photograph of Anatoly Ganenko at the battle banner of the 3rd GVDB, which he and his mother had saved, is today in the Museum of Military Glory (Fryazino).

It was the 14th day after the paratroopers landed. Anatoly's brother, Victor, together with a neighbor went for straw. From one stack they began to load the wagon with pitchforks. A barely audible groan reached them. Someone asked for a drink. What to do? Nearby, about fifty meters away, the Nazi foragers took straw. Victor pretended to be repairing the cart. The Germans left, then Viktor and Zinaida dug up the straw and found a wounded paratrooper officer in it. Captain N.I. Sapozhnikov lay here for 14 days, wounded in the shoulder and legs while still in the air. He asked for a drink.

Ganenko decided to help the paratrooper officer. Having healed a little, the brothers decided to transport the captain to the previously discovered group of wounded paratroopers. Only then did it become clear that the captain had the Brigade Banner and documents. German search parties were combing all the places, and the paratroopers were in a hurry to leave. But Sapozhnikov could not go. We decided to take it in turns. In order to protect the banner from being captured by the enemy, the paratroopers decided to leave it to Anatolia for preservation.

The Ganenko family kept their secret. In early 1944, the flag and documents were handed over to the Soviet command. Thus, the banner of the 3rd GVDB was saved, which is currently located in the Central Museum of the Armed Forces.

In September 1988, it left the museum building for the first time since the war. Accompanied by a military escort, the banner arrived in Fryazino, where a solemn meeting of paratrooper veterans was held. Each of them, kneeling down, kissed at this meeting their battle banner, scorched by the smoke of conflagrations and stained with the blood of heroes.

Fryazino remembers the heroes of the Dnieper

“We learned about the heroism of the paratroopers, about their partisan battles, by establishing contact with the Council of Veterans of the 3rd and 5th GVDB,” says Tamara Makarovna Antsiferova, a teacher of history and local history at school No. 1 in Fryazino, the initiator of the creation of the school Museum of Military Glory and the "Poisk" group - We started collecting materials about the heroic deeds of the paratroopers already in 1976. We found more than 200 veterans, began to correspond with many, and they sent memoirs and photographs to the museum.

In May 1978, our "Search" was at the anniversary meeting of paratroopers in the village. Svidovok Cherkasy region (Ukraine). It brought together former paratroopers from all over our country from the Arctic to Sakhalin. There they met with the standard-bearer of the brigade, Nikolai Sapozhnikov. He accepted the banner of the brigade in our city, jumped with it on that memorable night. During the landing, he was badly wounded. The banner was saved by 16-year-old Anatoly Ganenko.

We saw how relatives of the victims came to this meeting with the only hope of finding out what happened to their brother, father. We heard how, 34 years after the war, it was possible to establish the circumstances of the death of the battalion commander Zhernosekov, whose battalion was stationed at our school. We met the doctor of the brigade, V.I. Koroleva, who had gone through three concentration camps. The guys saw with their own eyes what the front-line brotherhood means.

Then the guys got acquainted with an extraordinary person, V.M.Dyachenko from Pavlodar, who became a friend of our school for many years. An excellent musician and poet, he collected a lot of information about the fallen comrades. One of his songs became the anthem of our Poisk squad.

In June 1978, 11 members of Poisk were once again in the Cherkassy region. We walked through the forests, through the villages where the paratroopers fought, were at their

graves, met partisans and underground fighters - fighting friends of the paratroopers, recorded on a tape recorder the memories of residents - witnesses of those distant days.

Having collected materials about the heroism of the paratroopers, we turned to the City Council with a proposal to perpetuate the memory of the paratroopers. The session of the City Council decided to install a memorial plaque and a memorial sign on the building of school N 1. One of the streets of Fryazino was named the paratroopers passage, today more than 2,000 people live on it.

On September 23, 1778, on the 35th anniversary of the Dnieper landing, veteran paratroopers from Armenia, Ukraine, the Moscow region and Moscow arrived at our school to meet with students. Some of them have not seen each other since then. The foreman, and now the candidate of medical sciences V.B. Frits met with his fighter Ilyichev. The Astakhov brothers met with joy with their platoon commander S.V.Barankin.

The students of the school listened with excitement to the story of the brave scout P.S.Danielyan about how, having received an invitation, he got ready to travel at night, how he arrived at night in the city of his distant youth and, having found the school, kissed its walls.

Former paratrooper M.E. Shayet then said: "How could I imagine that someday I would again be in that city, at that school, from where I went to the front in a formidable year."

The veterans handed over to the museum a sculptural figure of a paratrooper and a model of a parachute tower. An old friend of our school, Dyachenko, brought numerous gifts from the schools of the Cherkasy region, gave us a bag of high-yielding Ukrainian wheat, three capsules with earth from the mass graves of paratroopers. Thus a great friendship was born, which connected the paratroopers with our school and the city of Fryazino.

Based on the materials of these meetings, Rudolf Mikhailovich Popov made the film "Paratroopers". This wonderful film was watched by thousands of children from all schools in the city, several generations of schoolchildren.

By May 9, we send congratulations to dozens of veterans of the Dnieper landing. At first there were 300 addresses, but every year it becomes less and less."

The great selfless work of T.M. Antsiferova was repeatedly noted by the Chairman of the Council of Veterans of the 3rd GVDB Petr Nezhivenko. He spoke about friendship with the city of Fryazino, school No. 1 and the work carried out jointly with it on the pages of the magazines Veteran of War and Russian Warrior.

... High above the entrance to the former building of school No. 1, there is a figure of a paratrooper. The artist A.Davydova and the sculptor I.Frolov created a beautiful dynamic image of the "winged warrior" - the parachutist's foot has already touched the ground, the parachute inflated by the wind is falling, and the PPSh assault rifle is ready to go into battle. And the inscription: "Here, during the Great Patriotic War, the 3rd and 13th airborne brigades were formed."

A commemorative plaque on the passage of the Paratroopers also recalls the feat of the GVDB, which was formed in Fryazino. Here, 19 years ago, the paratroopers, who had gathered for a meeting, planted an alley of birches. They have long grown and have become as memorable as the name of the passage.

In April 1998, the Second Fryazino Local History Readings dedicated to the 55th anniversary of the formation of the 3rd GVDB and the Dnieper landing were held at the Museum of Military Glory of School No. 1. Guys - "cadets" of the military sports club "Mayak-SN" came to a meeting with the Chairman of the Council of Veterans P. Nezhivenko, and their leader Vyacheslav Pirogov told about a little-known chronicle of the capture of the Bukrinsky bridgehead, to whose aid the 3rd and 5th I am GVDB.

Military roads of fighters of the 3rd GVDB. 1944-1945

In January 1944, in the city of Teikovo (Moscow Military District), by order of NPO No. 003 of 19.1.44 and order of the Airborne Forces No. 0025 of 26.1.44, the 13th Guards was formed from 19.1.44 to 1.3.44. airborne division based on the "3rd GVDB, which left the rear of the enemy after landing on the right bank of the Dnieper on September 25, 1944", the 8th GVDB, formed in June 1943, and the 6th GVDB, formed from the remnants of 6, 13 and 15 GVDB. ... Division Commander - Guards Major General Kozin ".

By order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 0047 dated 12/18/44 and by order of the 37th Guards. building No. 0073 dated 12/21/44 on the basis of the 13 GVDB (3 and 6 GVDB in full force and one rifle battalion from 98 and 99 GVDB) was created in Bykhov (Mogilev region of the Byelorussian SSR) 103rd Guards Rifle division (317, 322 and 324 GRR with attached units).

317th Guards. The regiment was awarded the Battle Banner of the 3rd GVDB. With this banner, the guards of the 37th Guards. corps building 9 guards. armies on the 2nd Ukrainian Front fought in Hungary and Austria, Germany and Czechoslovakia.

"For the battles to defeat the enemy grouping southwest of Budapest and forcing the Raba River, the regiment was awarded the Order of Alexander Nevsky by Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces dated 26.4.45, and the division" for battles with German and Hungarian invaders during the capture of the city of Papa and Davecher "the Order of Kutuzov 2nd degree, and for the battles in Austria "when mastering the city of Sombel, Kaluvar, Keset" - the Order of the Red Banner. From May 6 to 12, pursuing scattered groups of Germans, the division passed Gaaden, Vienna, Litshan, Trezhbol (Czechoslovakia). Here she ended the war.

By the end of the war, the regiment had 207 officers, 766 sergeants, 1446 privates. Of these, they were awarded - orders: 7 - Red Banner, 1 - Alexander Nevsky, 1 - Suvorov 1st class, 64 - Patriotic War 1st and 179 - 2nd class, 478 - Red Star; medals: 204 - "For Military Merit", 1384 - "For Courage", 1122 - "For the Victory over Germany".

After nine months of post-war service in Hungary (Aldie and Szeged), the regiment was sent to their homeland, to the camp "Seltsy" in the Rybkovsky district of the Ryazan region (from 02/07/46).

Remember, paratrooper!

Council of Veterans 3 GVDB 1998

List of paratroopers of the 3rd GVDB and guests invited to Fryazino to celebrate Victory Day and the 55th anniversary of the formation of the 3rd GVDB in Fryazino. 1998

Additions May 2010-06-09

The 3rd Airborne Brigade was formed from the personnel of the 226th rifle division in Chernihiv.

The brigade was commanded by:
G. A. Kovalev
...

Literature:
Soviet airborne. Military history essay. - Moscow: Military Publishing, 1986, 2nd ed.

Airborne brigade, staff dated 04/23/1941

Name L / s total

CONTROL

DEP. INTELLIGENCE AND SCOOTER COMPANY

4 parachute battalions, each. 546

DEP. ARTILLERY DIVISION

DEP. ANTI-MACHINE GUN COMPANY

JUNIOR COMMAND SCHOOL

DEP. COMMUNICATION COMPANY

Personnel

Material part

45 mm anti-tank guns 12

50mm mortars 18

Backpack flamethrowers 288

Machine guns 16

Light machine guns 108

When landing, two battalions formed a parachute battle group and two battalions formed a glider battle group. At the same time, their separate platoons were also united in two, forming companies: communications, reconnaissance scooter, machine gun, mortar and artillery battery.

The latter was transferred to the airborne combat group, as well as an anti-tank battery and an anti-aircraft machine-gun company of the brigade.

The airborne combat group of the corps was formed on the basis of the corps artillery regiment and tank battalion. Being distributed among brigades, each such group included an artillery battalion (a full-time battalion of a corps artillery regiment plus 45-mm cannons of brigades and battalions), a tank company (a regular company of a corps TB), a mortar company and an anti-aircraft machine gun company (both - brigade subordination)

Forum materials about the Dnieper landing

Vladislav Goncharov

Dnieper landing operation

The last case of large-scale use of Soviet airborne troops in the Great Patriotic War was the Dnieper landing operation, carried out in the fall of 1943 during the crossing of the Dnieper and sometimes incorrectly called the "Kanevsky landing". Wrong - because initially the operation had nothing to do with the city of Kanev and was supposed to be carried out to support the troops on the Bukrinsky bridgehead.

In early September 1943, the German command decided to evacuate the Left-Bank Ukraine. The Germans, constrained by the need to export a large amount of equipment, supplies and material assets, were forced to withdraw their troops to the existing crossings in the area of ​​Kyiv, Kanev and Zaporozhye. At the same time, they had to have time to take up positions along the entire line of the Dnieper before the approach of Soviet troops.

The troops of the right wing of the Voronezh Front, together with the left-flank armies of the Central Front (13th and 60th), advanced on Romny, Priluki, Kyiv and the southern course of the Desna River, while the center and left flank of the front lingered at the turn of the river until mid-September Psel and in the Poltava region.

The plan of the offensive to the Dnieper was developed by the command of the Voronezh Front as early as September 9th. It provided for the exit of the front's mobile formations to the river on September 26–27, and the main forces of the armies - from October 1 to 5. By this time, the mobile troops were supposed to "if possible" seize the bridgeheads on the western bank of the river, from which it was planned to begin the liberation of the Right-Bank Ukraine in the future.

Deputy Commander of the Airborne Forces I. I. Zatevakhin (pre-war photo)

Already at this stage, it was decided to use airborne troops to force the Dnieper. For this, three airborne brigades - the 1st, 3rd and 5th - were transferred to the command of the Voronezh Front. Since the brigades were supposed to be used together, they were combined into an airborne corps. The corps commander was the deputy commander airborne troops Major General I. I. Zatevakhin, his headquarters was hastily formed from officers of the Airborne Forces. In fact, the brigade headquarters was an administrative and economic body, since it did not exercise real control over the troops - the brigade commanders received all orders directly from the front command.

Commander of the Airborne Forces in 1943–1944, Major General A. G. Kapitokhin

In total, there were about 10 thousand people in the corps, 24 anti-tank 45-mm guns, 180 mortars of 82 and 50 mm caliber, 328 anti-tank rifles and 540 heavy and light machine guns. For landing, it was supposed to allocate aircraft from the transport aviation and bombers from long-range aviation, as well as vehicles belonging directly to the Airborne Forces.

By September 17, the headquarters of the Voronezh Front had developed a fairly detailed plan of operation, which provided for interaction with bomber and attack aircraft, as well as ground artillery - for which it was supposed to include communications officers from these branches of the troops in the landing force. The air forces of the front were not only supposed to support the landing, but also to allocate a special squadron of spotter aircraft. For the transportation of people and cargo to the take-off airfields, the front placed 100 vehicles at the disposal of the commander of the airborne corps.

The commander of the front had to personally decide on the operation and set tasks directly to the commanders of the airborne brigades; responsibility for preparing for the landing was assigned to the commander of the Airborne Forces, Major General A. G. Kapitokhin, and directly for the landing, to the deputy commander of the ADD, Lieutenant General of Aviation N. S. Skripko. Air support for the landing was carried out by the 2nd Air Army of Colonel General S. A. Krasovsky, and such support was led by the Chief of Staff of the Red Army Air Force. The mere enumeration of those responsible for various aspects of the operation brings to mind the saying about seven nannies...

On September 19, the plan was approved by Marshal G.K. Zhukov, representative of the Headquarters, who demanded maximum secrecy in the preparation and conduct of the operation.

The operational situation in the Voronezh Front in the second half of September 1943 and the plan of the Dnieper landing operation

However, the moment for the use of airborne forces was still unclear; in addition, due to difficulties with railway communication in the newly liberated territories, until September 17, the brigades continued to remain in their places of permanent deployment. According to the plan of the operation, the brigades were supposed to arrive in the initial area for landing by October 21, but in reality this happened even later.

On September 16, a sharp weakening of the resistance of the German troops was noted - the "run to the Dnieper" began. By this time, the Germans had not yet managed to take up positions on the high right bank of the Dnieper. According to air reconnaissance reports, there were no significant enemy forces in the bend of the Dnieper between Rzhishchev and Kanev. However, the Soviet troops also did not have enough vehicles to have time to reach the river before the enemy. All hope remained on mobile troops.

Therefore, on the same day, September 16, the commander of the Voronezh Front ordered the command of the 3rd Guards Tank Army transferred to his disposal from the reserve of the Stavka to speed up the collection and concentration of units and, moving in the general direction to Priluki, Yagotin, as soon as possible reach the Dnieper in the Pereyaslav area -Khmelnitsky and start crossing the river. Operational Directive No. 0038 / op of September 18 provided for the withdrawal of troops of the 38th and 47th armies to the line of the Dnieper, and the command of the 40th combined arms and 3rd guards tank army was required to be ready to capture bridgeheads on the right bank of the river.

However, due to a delay in the delivery of rear supplies and materiel, the advance of the tank army from the concentration area west of Romna was only possible on the night of September 20th. Only on September 21 did the forward units of the army come into combat contact with the enemy at the turn of the Supa River.

The rate of advance of the army was 60–70 km per day, and the forward detachments moved even faster. As a result, on the evening of September 21, reconnaissance units of the 9th Mechanized and 6th Guards Tank Corps reached the left bank of the Dnieper south of Pereyaslav-Khmelnitsky. On the morning of September 22, the motorized rifle battalion of the 69th mechanized brigade of the 9th mechanized corps, having crossed the river on improvised means, occupied the village of Zarubentsy without a fight. A little later, by 15 o'clock on the same day, the 51st battalion of the guards crossed the river. tank brigade 6th Guards Tank Corps, capturing the village of Grigorovka.

Initially, the landing of the airborne assault was scheduled for September 21, that is, the paratroopers were supposed to seize positions on the right bank and facilitate the crossing of the advanced units of the front across the Dnieper. However, due to the congestion of the railways, it was not possible to concentrate the airborne brigades in the area of ​​​​the Bogodukhovsky air hub by the scheduled date, in fact, it was completed only by October 24.

The direct management of the operation was to be carried out by the commander of the Airborne Forces of the Red Army and his deputy for aviation, Major General M.P. Spirin, and the chief of staff of the Air Force of the Red Army was in charge of aviation support. 150 Il-4 and B-25 Mitchell bombers from the 101st Airborne Regiment under the command of V. Grizodubova, as well as 180 transport Li-2 (licensed execution of all that or DC-3).

In turn, the Airborne Forces aviation provided 10 Il-4 vehicles for dropping equipment and light guns, glider towing aircraft, as well as 35 A-7 and G-11 landing gliders.

On the morning of September 23, the commander of the Voronezh Front, General of the Army N.F. Vatutin, arrived at the command post of the 40th Army. After reviewing the situation in the army zone, he decided to use airborne troops in the area of ​​​​the Bukrinsky bridgehead. The goal of the operation was set in a rather original way - not to capture the bridgehead (it was already occupied), but to cover the troops deployed on the right bank of the Dnieper from suitable German reserves, giving units of the 40th and 3rd tank armies the opportunity to occupy as much territory as possible before the start of counterattacks enemy. Thus, the actions of the landing force were initially supposed to be passive, providing cover for the deployment of troops that had already crossed. The landing plan did not provide for the capture of new bridgeheads.

Formally, the airborne brigades were transferred to the operational subordination of the front, but in fact Vatutin had to contact them through the commander of the airborne troops of the Red Army A. G. Kapitokhin. It was possible to do this only by the middle of the day, so the original idea of ​​\u200b\u200bdropping troops right the next night had to be abandoned - especially since only 8 aircraft had arrived at the Bogodukhovsky air hub from the vehicles intended for participation in the operation. As a result, the landing was postponed to the night of 24/25 September. Alas, the day before, German troops began to enter the area of ​​​​the Bukrinsky bridgehead - both transferred from the reserve and crossed from the eastern coast. By the end of September 24, units of the 19th Panzer, 10th Motorized, 112th, 167th and 255th Infantry Divisions of the enemy were already here, the 7th Panzer and 73rd Infantry Divisions were being pulled up from the rear.

The landing units were assigned the following tasks:

3rd airborne brigade of Colonel P. A. Goncharov - to land in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe station Lazurtsy between the villages of Tulintsy, Beresnyaga and Chernyshi, fortify at the turn of Lipovy Rog - Makedony - Sinyavka - Kazarovka and hold it until the units of the 40th army approach, advancing from the Bukrinsky bridgehead , repulsing the attacks of enemy reserves advancing to the bridgehead from the west and south-west;

The 5th Airborne Brigade of Lieutenant Colonel P. M. Sidorchuk - land northwest of Kanev in the area of ​​​​Kovaly, Kostyanets, Grishentsy, capture the Gorkavshchina - Stepantsy - Sitniki line and prevent the enemy from approaching the bridgehead in the bend of the Dnieper from the south and southwest.

In total, there were 6598 people in the brigades scheduled for landing. The 1st Airborne Brigade of Colonel P.I. Krasovsky, which had not completed its concentration, remained in the reserve of the corps and was supposed to be thrown out on the third night.

Preparations for the landing took place in a state of extreme haste, exacerbated by multi-stage leadership and a lack of information about the situation. Before landing, officers from the headquarters of the Airborne Forces compiled special tables, according to which calculations were made for loading people and equipment, distributing them among vehicles, schedules for departures and returns.

For the sake of secrecy, the advanced units on the Bukrinsky bridgehead were to receive notification of the landing only after it had been carried out. Even the personnel of the airborne brigades learned about the timing of the upcoming operation one and a half hours before boarding the planes. As a result, the fighters and commanders were informed about their tasks in the most general terms: the drop area, the assembly area, and the approximate line that was to be defended. Naturally, no special training was carried out before landing.

In addition, there were problems with transport. Instead of the planned 65 transport vehicles for the landing of the 5th airborne brigade on the evening of September 24, only 48 aircraft were filed, and four tankers appeared only half an hour before departure. As a result, the departure of the first echelon had to be postponed for an hour and a half. The second echelon did not take off at all, as it turned out that fuel had not been delivered to the airfield. Therefore, the following groups of paratroopers were taken out on separate aircraft as they were refueled. As a result, only two incomplete battalions were landed from the 5th airborne brigade - a little more than 1000 people, after which the fuel at the airfield completely disappeared.

The landing of the 3rd airborne brigade, carried out on the same night, was somewhat better organized. True, she also received fewer planes for landing than planned, and at the very last moment it turned out that the depreciation of the engines of the cars did not allow them to take the regular amount of cargo. Many Li-2s could only lift 15–18 paratroopers or soft paratroop bags—instead of the estimated minimum of 20 units (16–18 men, 2–4 containers). As a result, urgent changes had to be made to the landing tables.

The takeoff of the first aircraft with units of the 3rd Airborne Brigade began at 18:30, with units of the 5th Airborne Brigade - at 20:30. Since the drop was planned to be carried out in three flights, it was originally planned that the planes of each flight would take off at the same time and return at the same time. However, due to the lack of tankers (despite the two-week preparation of the operation, it was discovered at the very last moment), the planes had to be released one by one, as a result, they returned at random; in addition, many pilots did not maintain a given route and flight regime.

In total, in the evening of 24 and on the night of September 25, transport vehicles made 296 sorties instead of 500 planned. At the same time, 13 vehicles with paratroopers returned to their airfields without finding a landing area, two aircraft landed paratroopers deep behind enemy lines, one dropped paratroopers directly into the Dnieper, and another one landed a group led by the deputy commander of the 5th airborne brigade, Lieutenant Colonel M. B. Ratner ... in his own rear on the left bank of the Dnieper. Later we will see that this ridiculous event turned out to be a great success.

It turned out that transport aviation pilots had no experience in dropping paratroopers - referring to the strong fire of anti-aircraft artillery, they carried out a drop from a height of about 2000 meters instead of 600-700 meters according to the standards. In addition, the landing was carried out at too high a speed - about 200 km / h.

As a result, by the morning of September 25, 4,575 paratroopers (230 of them over their own territory) and 666 soft containers with supplies were dropped from both brigades. 2017 people - 30% of the personnel - were not thrown out. In addition, 590 containers out of 1256 were not thrown out. Since the support group (provided by the original plan) was not thrown out, no one designated the landing area from the ground. Navigators of transport planes were guided by the terrain - primarily by the silver ribbon of the Dnieper, clearly visible in the dark - as well as by the flashes of shots on the ground and the lights of burning villages that marked the front line. As a result, the paratroopers were scattered over a very large area. Artillery (45-mm guns) was not dropped at all.

However, the most important difficulties began after the landing. Most of the problems were the result of the haste in which boarding was arranged. It turned out that the commander of the 3rd brigade, Colonel Goncharov, took the chief of staff, Major V.V. Fofanov, on his plane (although the rules prescribed them to fly in different cars) - but he forgot to grab a walkie-talkie!

Despite the large number of radio stations, some planes did not have them at all, while others had three or even six. Many radio operators were left without walkie-talkies, and walkie-talkies - without radio operators. The batteries of radio stations were dropped separately from them, and some of the radios simply turned out to be without power. Of the 31 radio stations, only 5 were able to work after landing, and all of them were of low power (of the RP-5 type). Four powerful radio stations of the operational group of the headquarters of the corps could not be found. But worst of all - because of the secrecy requirements, the radio operators did not have the radio codes that the signal officers had, that is, no one knows where. Therefore, when one of the walkie-talkies nevertheless contacted the radio station of the front headquarters, they simply refused to talk to her. As a result, walkie-talkies could only be used for communication between groups of paratroopers on the right bank of the Dnieper.

Although the landing had as its task the occupation of defense, it turned out that no one guessed to take large sapper shovels: the paratroopers carried only small shovels and a small number of axes. Anti-tank mines were not taken - in fact, the only real anti-tank weapon available to the paratroopers. Moreover, the paratroopers did not even have raincoats with them, although it was already Ukrainian, but still autumn. Each paratrooper had one and a half sets of ammunition and two daily rations of dry rations; another set of ammunition was dropped along with the paratroopers in a cargo container.

Since German troops were already in the landing area, the paratroopers were forced to immediately engage in battle, at best having managed to gather in small groups under the command of random and unfamiliar officers, and often even one by one. So, by the morning of September 25, the commander of the 5th Guards Airborne Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Sidorchuk, was able to gather around him only five people, and he met the paratroopers flying with him on the same plane only on the ninth day after landing. There were also funny things: for example, the fighter Drozdov landed in the village of Chernyshi right on the German field kitchen, dispersed the cooks and turned the kitchen over, destroying lunch for the whole German unit.

Commander of the 5th Airborne Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel P. M. Sidorchuk

True, the enemy, who appeared in this area literally the day before, also did not yet have time to understand the situation and establish command and control of his troops. In many places, the appearance of paratroopers caught the Germans by surprise and disorganized their rear. Closer to the front, where the combat units were located, the paratroopers had much worse. For example, the paratroopers of the 3rd airborne brigade in the area of ​​the village of Dudari were thrown directly onto the columns of the 10th motorized and 19th tank divisions advancing to the front. According to the description of the head of the operational department of the 19th tank division Lieutenant Colonel Binder, it looked like this:

“The first landing was dropped at 17:30. Even in the sky, the Russians came under fire from machine guns and an automatic 20-mm anti-aircraft gun. The Soviet formation was completely open - large machines appeared one by one, at most two, with an interval of half a minute, and so dropped their paratroopers. This made our countermeasures even more effective. Some planes, in all likelihood, noticing something was wrong, turned back to the north. Our powerful barrage and shining white flares everywhere must have sapped the Russians of their presence of mind. They started dropping people randomly, in different places. Broken into small and very small groups, they were doomed. They tried to hide in narrow ravines, but very soon they were found, killed or taken prisoner.

The 5th Airborne Brigade was more fortunate - it landed northwest of the 3rd and did not come under attack at the moment of landing. However, in the end, the units of both brigades were scattered in small groups over a vast territory, mainly to the south of the proposed landing zone. By the end of September 25, that is, a day after the start of the operation, there were about 35 such groups, their total number reached 2300 people - a little more than half of the paratroopers dropped behind enemy lines (4350 people).

This number did not include the dead paratroopers and fighters from the defeated groups, as well as those paratroopers who nailed to the partisans or went through the front line one by one. So, in the forest east of the village of Grushevo, after a bloody battle, the Germans destroyed a group from the 3rd Airborne Brigade in the amount of 150 people. In total, the Germans recorded a drop of 1,500 paratroopers to the west and north-west of Kanev, of which 209 people were captured on the first day - including allegedly the commander of the 5th airborne brigade; another 692 people were considered dead by the Germans.

To the credit of the captured commander, during interrogation he made every effort to frighten the Germans with the scale of the landing. Following the first landing, two others were expected, southeast of Kanev, tanks (!) And artillery were to land. Since, due to errors during the drop, some of the paratroopers actually landed in this area, this version seemed quite plausible to the Germans - at least back in the 60s they believed that the failure of two airborne brigades (they believed that three brigades landed ) led to the cancellation of a more ambitious operation.

As a result, the largest groups of paratroopers gathered in the Kanevsky forest area (600 people) and near the village of Chernyshi (200 people), four more groups with a total number of up to 300 people operated in the Yablonov area.

By the end of September, two main areas of concentration of paratroopers were revealed - north and south of Kanev. The group in the Kanevsky Forest, which consisted mainly of units of the 3rd Airborne Brigade, was led by the commander of the 5th Airborne Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Sidorchuk, who arrived here with a detachment of paratroopers on October 5th. To the north, in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe villages of Glincha and Buchak, a group of Major N.S. Lev operated, consisting mainly of fighters of the 3rd airborne brigade. It was formed on September 29 by the merger of three groups - the other two were commanded by lieutenants S. A. Zdelnik and G. N. Chukhrai.

Dnieper landing operation and the actions of paratroopers in October-November 1943

Some groups, using radio stations, managed to establish contact and unite, but the commanders of these detachments could not establish contact with the front headquarters - more precisely, the front radio stations refused to maintain such communication due to the lack of codes. Having no information from the landing force, on the night of September 27-28, the front headquarters sent three liaison groups with radio stations to the landing area, but none of the groups found any of the paratroopers. The U-2 aircraft sent on the afternoon of September 28 was shot down by the enemy over the front line. As a result, further landing and supply of supplies to the landed troops was stopped.

Only in early October, at the front headquarters, someone guessed to put Lieutenant Colonel Ratner, deputy commander of the 5th airborne brigade, on the radio (as we remember, he turned out to be “landed” on the left bank). As a result, on October 6, the commander of the 5th Airborne Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Sidorchuk, who was stubbornly trying to establish contact with the "Great Land", went to Ratner and was identified by him after several control questions. Later, Lieutenant Chukhrai, who went out through the Dnieper to establish communication, was engaged in identifying radio operators by ear.

Meanwhile, on September 27, the 27th Army from the front reserve was transferred to the Bukrinsky bridgehead. However, the enemy managed to block the expansion of the bridgehead - by September 30, he had only 12 km along the front and 6 km in depth. There was no longer any hope for a rapid development of the offensive from the bridgehead. Therefore, when Lieutenant Colonel Sidorchuk managed to contact the headquarters of the front, new instructions were given to the paratroopers - to switch to sabotage activities and engage in disorganization of the enemy's rear.

Sidorchuk's group at this point was called the "5th airborne brigade", although its main composition came from the 3rd brigade. It was reorganized into three battalions, as well as a sapper platoon, reconnaissance platoon, communications and anti-tank platoons. In the period from October 8 to 11, the operational group of the command of the Airborne Forces organized the delivery of food and ammunition to the paratroopers by air - both by dropping and landing U-2 aircraft. However, by October 11, the enemy was able to localize the place of operations of the main landing group and made an attempt to "clean up" the Kanev forest. In this regard, the command of the brigade made a completely reasonable decision - to move further from the front, where the density of enemy troops would be less.

The Taganchansky Forest, located between the Ross and Rossava rivers southwest of Kanev, 15–20 kilometers north of the city of Korsun-Shevchenkovsky and Korsun station, was chosen as the base site. The brigade moved here by October 13. The paratroopers organized several sabotage on railway, destroyed a number of enemy garrisons and defeated the headquarters of the 157th reserve battalion in Bude-Vorobievskaya. By the end of October, the 5th airborne brigade, strengthened by the addition of other units, already numbered about 1,000 people. So, on October 21, a group came here under the command of the chief of staff of the 3rd airborne brigade, Major Fofanov, who took the post of chief of staff of the combined brigade.

However, on October 23, the enemy, with the support of tanks and armored personnel carriers, launched an attack on the new location of the brigade. Therefore, the paratroopers were again forced to withdraw from the blow. Taking advantage of the enemy's carelessness and the absence of a continuous front of encirclement, on the night of October 24, the paratroopers infiltrated along a deep ravine past enemy patrols, broke out of the ring, and until October 26 made a 50-kilometer march to the east, crossing into the Cherkasy forest.

Here, to the west of the city of Cherkassy, ​​in the swampy interfluve of the Olshanka and the Irdyn, partisan detachments were already operating, who were well acquainted with the area. After the addition of several small groups of paratroopers, as well as the entry into the Cherkasy forest of a detachment of senior lieutenant Tkachev numbering 300 people, the total strength of Sidorchuk's brigade reached 1200 people. Due to this, from October 27 to October 30, the fourth battalion and several other units were formed. In total, by the beginning of November, the brigade had 12 heavy machine guns, 6 anti-tank rifles, as well as rifles and machine guns for the entire personnel.

In the same area there were several partisan detachments, totaling 800-900 fighters, although only half of the partisans had personal weapons. However, Sidorchuk's brigade maintained radio contact only with the headquarters of the 1st Ukrainian Front; Neither the partisans nor the paratroopers had any connection with the headquarters of the 52nd Army of the 2nd Ukrainian (former Steppe) Front, in the zone in which they now operated. According to the data received by the army headquarters from the headquarters of the 1st Ukrainian Front, on October 27, paratroopers and partisans were in two groups: one in the area of ​​​​mark 173.9 (4 km south of Moshna) and the other in the Vasilyevka tract.

In connection with the upcoming offensive of the left wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front in the Krivoy Rog direction, the front commander, Army General I.S. The army, in three divisions of which there were only 25 thousand people, was supposed to force the Dnieper, occupy Cherkassy and divert at least part of the German troops from the direction of the main attack.

At the same time, front-line assets (aviation and artillery) were not attached to the army. Its only "bonuses" were the presence on the western bank of the Dnieper, 30 km above Cherkassy, ​​of a small bridgehead near the village of Khreshchatyk - as well as a group of the 5th airborne brigade, which could be used both for strikes against enemy communications and for forcing Dnieper.

The order for the offensive was given on November 11, the offensive itself was to begin on the night of November 13 by simultaneously crossing the river in several places. Such scattered actions made it possible to hide the direction of the main attack - in the zone of the 254th Infantry Division between the villages of Elizavetovka and Svidovok, 15 km northwest of Cherkassy and directly close to the forest where the paratroopers were located.

The command of the airborne brigade was informed about the upcoming operation through the headquarters of the 1st Ukrainian Front on the night of November 12 - less than a day before the start of the operation. At the same time, Major Dergachev, Assistant Chief of the Operations Department of the 52nd Army Headquarters, was sent to its location on a U-2 communications aircraft to establish direct communication with the brigade that same night. The major brought a radio station, a table of signals and an order - the next night the paratroopers were to strike at the enemy from the rear to capture Elizavetovka and Svidovka.

According to the plan of the brigade commander, two battalions of paratroopers (2nd and 4th) were to attack Svidovok, where ferry crossing; The 1st battalion advanced on Sekirna, the 3rd battalion - on Lozovok. At the same time, the partisans were supposed to take the village of Budishche and intercept the only road that runs along the coast, bypassing the swamp, which stretches between the Olshanka and Irdyn rivers. Thus, the command of the German 3rd Panzer Corps, which kept its main forces (SS Panzergrenadier Division "Viking", 332nd and 57th Infantry Divisions) against the bridgehead near Khreshchatyk, was deprived of the opportunity to transfer them to the Cherkassy region, where one 72nd I am an infantry division.

By one in the morning on November 13, parts of the brigade took up their starting position for the attack. An hour earlier, two regiments of the 254th Infantry Division began crossing the Dnieper, for the purpose of secrecy, carried out without artillery preparation. The crossing of the 929th Infantry Regiment in the area northwest of Sekirna was discovered and repulsed by the enemy, however, due to the noise of the battle, the Germans did not notice the movement of the 933rd Infantry Regiment's watercraft north of the village of Svidovok. As a result, parts of the regiment reached the enemy coast without losses, being discovered by enemy guards only on the western coast. By 7 am on November 13, after the completion of the crossing, the regiment reached the northeastern outskirts of the village of Svidovok, destroying three enemy tanks.

Meanwhile, the paratroopers went on the offensive. Having attacked the Germans from the rear with a sudden blow, they broke into Lozovok, Elizavetovka, Budishche, and part of the forces started a battle on the southern outskirts of Svidovka. At the same time, two artillery batteries and up to 40 vehicles were captured in Lozovka.

By 5 o'clock in the morning, parts of the brigade took up defense from the village of Budishche along the southwestern outskirts of Lozovka and further along the Olshanka River to the Dnieper with a front to the west. By 11 o'clock the 1st battalion of the brigade occupied Sekirna. However, it was not possible to keep this area due to the small number of paratroopers and the lack of decisive success of the units of the 52nd Army. The next night, Lozovok, Budishche and Sekirna were abandoned, and parts of the brigade retreated to the swampy thickets between Lozovok and Sekirna near the banks of the Dnieper on both sides of the mouth of the Irdyn River.

On the afternoon of November 13, up to a company of fighters from the 933rd Infantry Regiment of the 254th Division made its way through the enemy’s battle formations northwest of the village of Svidovok to the positions of the airborne brigade. At the same time, officers from the headquarters of the 73rd Rifle Corps were sent here to clarify the combat mission and link the issues of interaction.

As a result, by the end of the day on November 13, a bridgehead of the 254th Infantry Division was formed north of the village of Svidovok, 4 km along the front and up to 3 km in depth. Two rifle regiments with a total number of 2473 people were sent here with 17 heavy and 46 light machine guns, 25 anti-tank rifles, 4 anti-tank guns and 28 mortars.

An order was transmitted to the airborne group by radio - the next day, together with the partisans, to take control of the Elizavetovka, Budishche line, ensuring the offensive of the strike group in the north-west, and also to cut off the enemy's escape routes to Geronimovka and Dakhnovka. However, all day on November 14, heavy fighting was going on in the bridgehead, the enemy was constantly counterattacking with the support of tanks and artillery. Only by the end of the day, the main forces of the 254th Infantry Division, attacking from the north and northeast, with the assistance of paratroopers advancing from the south, were able to capture most of the village of Svidovok. At the same time, the 929th rifle regiment of the division managed to get out east of Sekirna, and most importantly, the paratroopers finally managed to recapture the village of Budishche, interrupting the nearest connection between the eastern and western groups of the 3rd tank corps.

Actions of the 5th Airborne Brigade during the crossing of the Dnieper by the troops of the 52nd Army west of Cherkasy

By the morning of November 15, part of the forces of the airborne brigade were fighting in the village of Svidovok, part - in the forest northwest of it, together with the 929th regiment attacking Sekirna, the garrison of which, according to our reports, consisted of an infantry regiment, 20 tanks and up to two artillery battalions. A group of paratroopers, which had captured the village of Budishche the day before, was temporarily subordinated to the commander of the 73rd Rifle Corps; by the end of November 16, it was supposed to occupy and firmly hold the former line along the Olshanka River from Luterevka to Elizavetovka, ensuring the offensive of the main forces of the 73rd Rifle Corps from the west. At the same time, the army commander ordered the leadership of the actions of the paratroopers and partisans to be assigned to the commander of the airborne group.

On November 15, units of the 52nd Army, transferred to the bridgehead, repelled several enemy counterattacks and, by 19:00, together with the paratroopers, completely occupied Svidovok. On the morning of November 16, the 3rd and 4th battalions of the airborne brigade, together with units of the 254th rifle division, drove the enemy out of Sekirna, but later were again forced to leave it. As a result, by the end of that day, the bridgehead was expanded to 8 km along the front and 6 km in depth.

On the night of November 17, the 936th Rifle Regiment, using partisan guides, along with regimental and battalion artillery, went around the enemy’s flank through the forest, destroyed his outposts, and by 4 o’clock in the morning on November 17 reached the village of Geronimovka, located 10 km from the banks of the Dnieper . At the same time, a “mobile group” of the army came out to its northern outskirts - 10 tanks and self-propelled guns of the 259th separate tank and 1817th self-propelled artillery regiment with a landing of submachine gunners. At half past five in the morning of November 17, after a short fire raid, Geronimovka was captured by a quick attack; thus, the forces of the army gained access to the operational space.

On the afternoon of November 17, the enemy tried for the last time to counterattack the bridgehead from the north-western direction. Up to an infantry battalion with 10 tanks and 2 assault guns, they went on the offensive from the Sekirna area against the right flank of the 861st Rifle Regiment, which was operating west of Svidovka. At some point, enemy tanks managed to break through to the western outskirts of the village. At the same time, by attacking forces up to an infantry regiment from the town of Moshny on Budishche, the Germans managed to break through the battle formations of the airborne group and reach the Sekirna-Svidovok road.

However, this was the last attack of the enemy. Having lost (according to our data) four tanks and one assault gun from the fire of the 2nd battery of the 350th separate anti-tank battalion, the Germans turned back. In the evening, units of the 294th Infantry Division resumed their offensive against Sekirna and, bypassing it from the north and southwest, occupied this settlement on the night of November 18.

Thus, the bridgehead captured by the troops of the 52nd Army, by the end of November 18, was expanded to 16 km along the front and 9 km in depth. In the battles from November 13 to 18, army troops destroyed 41 tanks, 10 armored vehicles, 10 machine guns and 6 mortars of the enemy. The first stage of the Cherkasy operation was successfully completed. Our troops captured 33 machine guns, 7 guns, 5 tanks, 1 armored vehicle, 37 vehicles and 5 quartermaster warehouses. And this despite the fact that the troops of the 52nd Army at least did not outnumber the enemy in terms of personnel and had almost no tanks - while on December 1, 1943, the Viking SS division alone, according to the monthly "meldung", all still had 12,414 people, 21 tanks and self-propelled guns, 19 armored personnel carriers. The losses of the division from 1 to 30 November amounted to 117 killed and missing, 385 wounded and sick.

On November 28, 1943, the 5th Airborne Brigade was removed from the bridgehead, withdrawn to the rear and again transferred to the Stavka reserve. Lieutenant Colonel P. M. Sidorchuk was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The Soviet command did not conduct more airborne operations; from that moment on, all available airborne troops were used exclusively as ground troops.

Main literature

G. P. Sofronov. Airborne assaults in World War II. Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1962.

I. I. Lisov. Paratroopers (Airborne). Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1968.

G. Chukhrai. My war. Moscow: Algorithm, 2001.

Soviet airborne. Military history essay. Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1986.

The offensive of the 1st Ukrainian (Voronezh) Front in the Kiev direction in 1943. M. Military Publishing House, 1946.

Forcing the Dnieper by the 52nd Army in the Cherkasy region (November-December 1943) // Collection of military-historical materials of the Great Patriotic War. Issue 12. M.: Military Publishing House, 1953.

I. Samoylenko. From the experience of managing airborne assault forces during the war // Military History Journal, No. 12, 1979.

P. Karel. Eastern front. Book 2. Scorched Earth. 1943–1944 Moscow: Eksmo, 2003.

Vladislav Goncharov The Vyborg tragedy Finnish landing operations in the Vyborg Bay in the summer of 1941 Combat operations on the Karelian Isthmus in the summer of 1941 turned out to be, as it were, in the shadow of the battle that took place south of Leningrad. Actions of the 23rd Army north of Leningrad